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Project
2025
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PROJECT
©
2023
by
The
Heritage
Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington,
DC
20002
(202)
546-4400
|
heritage.org
All
rights
reserved.
Printed
in
the
United
States
of
America.
ISBN: 978-0-89195-174-2
TAKING THE REINS OF
GOVERNMENT
merica’s Bicentennial, which
culminated on July 4, 1976, was a spirited
and
unifying
celebration
of
our
country,
its
Founding,
and
its
ideals.
As
we
approach
our
nation’s
250th
anniversary,
which
will
take
place
during
the
next
presidency,
America
is
now
divided
between
two
opposing
forces:
woke
revolu-
tionaries
and
those
who
believe
in
the
ideals
of
the
American
revolution.
The
former
believe
that
America
is—and
always
has
been—“systemically
racist”
and
that
it
is
not
worth
celebrating
and
must
be
fundamentally
transformed,
largely
through
a
cen-
tralized
administrative
state.
The
latter
believe
in
America’s
history
and
heroes,
its
principles
and
promise,
and
in
everyday
Americans
and
the
American
way
of
life.
They
believe
in
the
Constitution
and
republican
government.
Conservatives—the
Ameri-
canists
in
this
battle—must
fight
for
the
soul
of
America,
which
is
very
much
at
stake. Just
two years
after the
death of
the last
surviving
Constitutional
Convention delegate, James Madison, Abraham Lincoln warned that
the greatest threat to America
would come
not from
without, but
from within.
This is
evident
today: Whether it
be mask
and vaccine
mandates,
school and
business
closures, efforts
to
keep
Americans
from
driving
gas
cars
or
using
gas
stoves,
or
efforts
to
defund the
police,
indoctrinate
schoolchildren,
alter
beloved
books,
abridge
free
speech, undermine
the
colorblind
ideal,
or
deny
the
biological
reality
that
there
are
only two
sexes, the
Left’s steady
stream of
insanity
appears to
be
never-ending. The
next
Administration
must
stand
up
for
American
ideals,
American
families,
and
American
culture—all
things
in
which,
thankfully,
most
Americans
still
believe.
Highlighting
this
need,
former
director
of
the
Office
of
Management
and
Budget
Russ
Vought
writes
in
Chapter
2,
“The
modern
conservative
President’s
task
is
to
Mandate for
Leadership:
The Conservative
Promise
limit,
control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the
American people.” At
the core
of this
goal is
the work
of the
White House
and the
central
personnel agencies.
Article
II
of
the
Constitution
vests
all
federal
executive
power
in
a
Pres-
ident, made accountable to
the citizenry through regular elections. Our Founders
wrote, “The
executive
Power shall
be vested
in a
President of
the United
States of
America.”
Accordingly,
Vought
writes,
“it
is
the
President’s
agenda
that
should matter
to the
departments
and agencies,”
not their
own.
Yet
the
federal
bureaucracy
has
a
mind
of
its
own.
Federal
employees
are
often
ideologically aligned—not with the majority of the American
people—but with one another,
posing a
profound
problem for
republican
government, a
government “of,
by,
and
for”
the
people.
As
Donald
Devine,
Dennis
Kirk,
and
Paul
Dans
write in
Chapter 3, “An autonomous bureaucracy has neither independent
constitu- tional status nor
separate moral legitimacy.” Byzantine personnel rules provide
the bureaucrats
with
their
chief
means
of
self-protection.
What’s
more,
knowledge
of
such
rules
is
used
to
thwart
the
President’s
appointees
and
agenda.
As
Devine,
Kirk,
and
Dans
write,
“Managing
the
immense
bureaucracy
of
the
federal
government
is impossible without an
understanding of the key central personnel agencies and
their governing
laws and
regulations.”
Many
of these
laws and
regulations
governing a
largely
underworked, over-
compensated,
and
unaccountable
federal
civilian
workforce
are
so
irrational
that
they
would
be
comical
in
a
less
important
context.
This
is
true
whether
it
comes
to evaluating
employees’
performance
or
hiring
new
employees.
Only
in
the
federal
government could an applicant in the hiring process be sent to
the
front of the
line
because
of
a
“history
of
drug
addiction”
or
“alcoholism,”
or
due
to
“morbid
obesity,”
“irritable
bowel
syndrome,”
or
a
“psychiatric
disorder.”
The
next
Admin-
istration should insist that
the federal government’s hiring, evaluation, retention,
and compensation practices
benefit taxpayers, rather than benefiting the lowest rung
of the federal workforce.
In order to carry out the
President’s desires, political appointees must be given
the tools,
knowledge,
and support
to overcome
the federal
government’s obstructionist Human Resources departments.
More fundamentally, the new
Administration
must
fill
its
ranks
with
political
appointees.
Devine,
Kirk,
and
Dans
observe
that
“the
Trump
Administration
appointed
fewer
political
appointees
in its
first few
months in
office” than
any other
recent
presidency. This
left career
employees
in
charge
in
many
places.
This
can
occur
even
after
departments
have been
fully
staffed
with
political
appointees.
Vought
writes
that
the
White
House Office
of Management
and Budget
(OMB) should
establish a
“reputation as
the keeper
of
‘commander’s
intent,’”
yet
OMB
is
dominated
by
career
employees
who
often
try
to
overrule
political
appointees
serving
in
the
various
executive
depart- ments.
Empowering
political appointees
across the
Administration
is crucial
to a President’s success.
Above
all,
the
President
and
those
who
serve
under
him
or
her
must
be
commit-
ted
to
the
Constitution
and
the
rule
of
law.
This
is
particularly
true
of
a
conservative
Administration,
which
knows
that
the
President
is
there
to
uphold
the
Constitu- tion,
not
the
other
way
around.
If
a
conservative
Administration
does
not
respect the
Constitution, no Administration will. In Chapter 1, former
deputy chief of staff
to
the
President
Rick
Dearborn
writes
that
the
White
House
Counsel
“must
take seriously the duty to
protect the powers and privileges of the President from
encroachments by Congress, the judiciary, and the administrative
components of departments
and agencies.”
Equally
important, the
President must
enforce the
Constitution
and
laws
as
written,
rather
than
proclaiming
new
“law”
unilaterally.
Presidents
should
not
issue
mask
or
vaccine
mandates,
arbitrarily
transfer
student
loan
debt,
or
issue
monarchical
mandates
of
any
sort.
Legislatures
make
the
laws in a
republic, not executives.
It
is
crucial
that
all
three
branches
of
the
federal
government
respect
what
Mad-
ison
called
the
“double
security”
to
our
liberties:
the
separation
of
powers
among
the
three
branches,
and
the
separation
of
powers
between
the
federal
government and
the
states.
This
double
security
has
been
greatly
compromised
over
the
years.
Vought
writes
that
“the
modern
executive
branch…writes
federal
policy,
enforces that
policy, and
often
adjudicates whether
that policy
was properly
drafted and
enforced.”
He
describes
this
as
“constitutionally
dire”
and
“in
urgent
need
of
repair,”
adding:
“Nothing
less
than
the
survival
of
self-governance
in
America
is
at
stake.” When
it comes
to ensuring
that freedom
can flourish,
nothing is
more import-
ant
than
deconstructing
the
centralized
administrative
state.
Political
appointees who
are
answerable to
the President
and have
decision-making
authority in
the executive
branch
are
key
to
this
essential
task.
The
next
Administration
must
not cede
such
authority
to
non-partisan
“experts,”
who
pursue
their
own
ends
while
engaging in groupthink,
insulated from American voters. The following chapters detail
how
the
next
Administration
can
be
responsive
to
the
American
people
(not to
entrenched
“elites”); how
it can
take care
that all
the laws
are
“faithfully exe-
cuted,”
not
merely
those
that
the
President
desires
to
see
executed;
and
how
it
can
achieve
results
and
not
be
stymied
by
an
unelected
bureaucracy.
F
rom
popular
culture
to
academia,
the
American
presidency
has
long
been
a
prominent
fixture
of
the
national
imagination—naturally
so
since
it
is
the
beating
heart
of
our
nation’s
power
and
prestige.
It
has
played,
for
instance,
a
feature
role
in
innumerable
movies
and
television
shows
and
has
been
prodded, analyzed,
and critiqued
by countless
books,
essays, and
studies. But
like nearly
everything else
in life,
there is
no substitute
for firsthand
experience,
which this
manual has compiled from the
experience of presidential appointees and provides in
accessible form for future use.
With
respect
to
the
presidency,
it
is
best
to
begin
with
our
Republic’s
founda- tional
document.
The
Constitution
gives
the
“executive
Power”
to
the
President.1 It
designates
him as
“Commander in
Chief”2
and gives
him the
responsibility
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”3
It further prescribes that the
President
might
seek
the
assistance
of
“the
principal
Officer
in
each
of
the
execu-
tive
Departments.”4 Beginning
with
George
Washington,
every
President
has
been
supported by
some
form of
White
House
office
consisting
of
direct
staff
officers
as
well
as a
Cabinet
comprised of
department and
agency heads.
Since
the
inaugural
Administration
of
the
late
18th
century,
citizens
have
chosen to
devote
both
their
time
and
their
talent
to
defending
and
strengthening
our
nation by
serving at
the pleasure
of the
President.
Their shared
patriotic
endeavor has
proven
to
be
a
noble
one,
not
least
because
the
jobs
in
what
is
now
known
as
the
White
House
Office
(WHO)
are
among
the
most
demanding
in
all
of
government.
The
President
must
rely
on
the
men
and
women
appointed
to
the
WHO.
There
simply
are
not
enough
hours
in
the
day
to
manage
the
affairs
of
state
single-handedly,
so
delegation
is
not
just
advisable:
It
is
essential.
The
decisions
that
assistants
and
senior
advisers
make
will
directly
impact
the
Administration,
its
legacy,
and—most
important—the fate of the country. Their agenda must therefore
be the President’s
agenda.
Choosing
who
will
carry
out
that
agenda
on
a
daily
basis
is
not
only
one
of
the
first decisions a President makes in office, but also one of the
most critical. The
tone
and
tempo
of
an
administration
are
often
determined
on
January
20.
CHIEF OF
STAFF
As
with
most
of
the
positions
that
will
be
covered
in
this
first
chapter,
the
Chief
of
Staff is also an Assistant to the President. However, the chief
is truly first among
equals.
Of
all
presidential
staff
members,
the
chief
is
the
most
critical
to
implementa-
tion of the
President’s vision for the country. The chief also has a dual
role as manager
of
the
staffs
of
both
the
WHO
and
the
Executive
Office
of
the
President
(EOP).5
The
Chief
of
Staff’s
first
managerial
task
is
to
establish
an
organizational
chart
for
the
WHO.
It
should
be
simple
and
contain
clear
lines
of
authority
and
respon- sibility to avoid conflicts. It should also identify
specific points of contact for each
element
of the
government
outside of
the White
House. These
contacts
should include the
White House
Liaisons who
are selected
by the
Office of
Presidential Personnel
(PPO).
Receiving
guidance
from
the
President,
the
chief
endeavors
to
implement
the
President’s
agenda
by
setting
priorities
for
the
WHO.
This
process
begins
by
taking
stock
of
the
President’s
campaign
promises,
identifying
current
and
prospective opportunities,
and
then
delegating
policy
priorities
among
the
departments
and
agencies
of the
Cabinet and
throughout the
three White
House policy
councils:
•
The
National
Economic
Council
(NEC);
•
The
Domestic
Policy
Council
(DPC);
and
•
The
National
Security
Council
(NSC).
The
President
is
briefed
on
all
of
his
policy
priorities
by
his
Cabinet
and
senior staff
as
directed
by
the
chief.
The
chief—along
with
senior
WHO
staff—maps
out
the
issues and themes that will be covered daily and weekly. The
chief then works
with
the
policy
councils,
the
Cabinet,
and
the
Office
of
Communications
and
Office of
Legislative
Affairs (OLA)
to sequence
and execute
the rollout
of policies
and announcements.
White House Counsel and senior advisers and senior counselors
are also intimately involved.
All
senior staff
report to
the Chief
of Staff,
either
directly or
through his
two or three
deputies,
unless the
President
determines that
a particular
Assistant to
the President
reports
directly to
him. Most
chiefs have
interacted
directly
with
The
Chief
of
Staff’s
main
challenge
is
time
management.
His
use
of
his
deputies,
meetings
with
senior
staff,
and
direction
provided
to
the
WHO
must
all
balance
with
the
daily
needs
of
the
President.
A
successful
chief
steers
the
West
Wing
using
his management of and influence with the various individuals and
entities around him.
It goes
without saying
that selecting
the right
person to
be chief
is vital.
DEPUTY
CHIEFS OF
STAFF
In recent
years, Presidents typically have appointed two Deputy Chiefs of
Staff: a
Deputy Chief
of Staff
for Management
and Operations
and a
Deputy Chief
of
Staff
for
Policy.
There
also
have
been
other
types
of
deputy
chiefs
whose
roles
have
included, for example,
overseeing strategy, planning, and implementation. Chiefs of
Staff have then occasionally appointed a principal Deputy Chief
to be in charge of
guiding
decision-making,
organizational
structure,
and
information
flow.
PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY CHIEFS
OF
STAFF
Not
all Chiefs
of Staff
have tapped
a principal
deputy. A
major reason
is that doing
so adds
another layer
of command
complexity. When
principal deputies
have
been
installed,
their
roles
have
varied
based
on
the
needs
of
particular
chiefs. Most
principal
deputies
have
functioned
as
doorkeepers,
sorting
through
action items,
taking
on
those
that
can
be
handled
at
their
own
level,
and
passing
up
others that
truly require the attention of the Chief of Staff or the
President. Principal deputies
also
have
assumed
control
of
the
scheduling
functions,
normally
under the
operations
deputy,
and
have
worked
directly
with
the
policy
councils
at
the
direction of
the
Chief
of
Staff.
The
OPL and
Office
of
Political
Affairs
(OPA) also
have
reported
to
a
principal
deputy.
Deputy
Chief of
Staff for
Management and
Operations.
The Deputy Chief
of Staff
for Management
and Operations
oversees the
President’s schedule
and
all
logistical
aspects
of
his
movement
within
and
outside
of
the
White
House
(for example,
both
air
travel
on
Air
Force
One
and
Marine
One
and
ground
transpor- tation).
This deputy
also interfaces
directly with
the Secret
Service as
well as
the military offices
tasked with
keeping the
President and
his family
safe.
In
the
past,
this
deputy
has
also
worked
with
the
NSC,
the
Secretary
of
Defense,
the
Secretary
of
State,
and
the
Intelligence
Community
and
on
advancing
all
foreign
trips. If
their roles are separated from that of the policy deputy, this
deputy should
have
a
strong
grasp
of
international
affairs
and
robust
foreign
policy
credentials.
This
deputy
further
manages
all
facets
of
the
working
White
House:
technology,
grounds
management, support staff, personnel administration, and
communica- tions.
This
individual
therefore
needs
to
be
meticulous
and
ideally
should
possess a great deal of
command-and-control experience.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy.
In some
Administrations, the functions of
the
IGA,
OPA,
and
OPL
and
other
advisers
within
the
WHO
have
fallen
under
the
Deputy
Chief
of
Staff
for
Policy.
For
conservatives,
this
arrangement
could
help to
connect the
WHO’s
outreach to
political and
external
groups and
be a
strong conduit
for state
and local
elected
officials, state
party
organizations, and
both grasstop and grassroots groups.
This
deputy chief
works
directly with
the Chief
of Staff,
Cabinet
officers, and all
three policy
councils to
support the
development
and implementation
of the
President’s agenda. This
deputy chief should therefore have impressive policy cre-
dentials in
the realms
of economic,
domestic, and
social
affairs.
SENIOR
ADVISERS
Presidents
have
surrounded
themselves with
senior
advisers whose
experi- ence
and interests
are not
necessarily
neatly defined.
In recent
Administrations,
senior
advisers
have
been
appointed
to
offer
broad
guidance
on
political
matters and
communications
issues;
others have
acted as
“czars” for
specific
projects or policy
areas.
The
most
powerful
senior
advisers
frequently
have
had
a
long
personal
relation- ship
with
the
President
and
often
have
spent
a
significant
amount
of
time
with
him
within
and
outside
of
the
White
House.
They
have
been
asked
not
only
to
provide guidance
on a
variety of
policy
issues, but
also to
offer
instruction on
communi- cating
with the
American
people and
the media.
In
a
number
of
Administrations,
new
offices—or
“councils”—have
been
created to support senior advisers. For the most part, their
functions have been duplicative
or
overlapping,
as
a
result
of
which
these
offices
have
tended
to
be
short-lived.
Even
so,
senior
advisers should
be provided
the staff
and resources
that their
portfo- lios
require.
To
ensure
that
senior
advisers
are
effective,
their
portfolios
must
be clearly
delineated
and
clearly
communicated
across
the
White
House.
This
too
is a
responsibility of the Chief of Staff.
OFFICE OF
WHITE HOUSE
COUNSEL
The
Office
of
White
House
Counsel
provides
legal
guidance
to
the
President
and
elements
of
the
EOP
on
a
host
of
issues,
including
presidential
powers
and
privi-
leges,
ethics
compliance,
review
of
clemency
applications,
and
judicial
nominations. The
selection of
White House
Counsel is
one of
the most
important
decisions an
incoming
President
will
make.
The
office
is
not
designed
to
create
or
advance
pol- icies
on its
own
initiative—nor
should it
do so.
Rather, it
is dedicated
to guiding
While
the
White
House
Counsel
does
not
serve
as
the
President’s
personal
attor-
ney
in nonofficial
matters, it
is almost
impossible to
delineate exactly
where an
issue is strictly
personal and has no bearing on the President’s official
function. The White
House
Counsel
needs
to
be
deeply
committed
both
to
the
President’s
agenda
and
to
affording
the
President
proactive
counsel
and
zealous
representation.
That individual
directly advises
the President
as he
performs the
duties of
the office,
and
this
requires
a
relationship
that
is
built
on
trust,
confidentiality,
and
candor.
The
Office of
White House
Counsel is
also responsible
for ensuring
that each
component
of
the
White
House
adheres
to
all
applicable
legal
and
ethical
guide-
lines, which often requires
ongoing training and monitoring to ensure compliance. This
means ensuring
that White
House staff
regularly consult
with office
attor- neys on
required financial disclosures, received gifts, potential
conflicts of interest, and
other ethical
concerns. The
Office of
White House
Counsel is
the first
line of
defense for
the EOP.
Its staff
must take
seriously the
duty to
protect the
powers and privileges
of the
President from
encroachments by
Congress, the
judiciary, and
the administrative
components of
departments and
agencies.
In addition
to the White House Counsel, the office includes deputies,
assistants,
associates,
and
legal
support
staff.
The
assistant
and
associate
attorneys
are
often
specialists
in particular
areas of
the law
and offer
guidance to
the EOP
on issues
related to national
security, criminal law, environmental law, and a host of admin-
istrative and
regulatory matters. Attorneys working in the Office of White
House Counsel
serve
as
legal
advisers
to
the
White
House
policy
operation
by
reviewing executive
orders, agency
regulations, and
other policy-related
functions. Here
again, subordinates
should be
deeply committed
to the
President’s agenda
and see
their
role
as
helping
to
accomplish
the
agenda
through
problem
solving
and
advocacy.
They
should
not
erect
roadblocks
out
of
an
abundance
of
caution;
rather,
they
should
offer
practical
legal
advice
on
how
to
promote
the
President’s
agenda within
the bounds of the law.
The
White
House
Counsel’s
office
cannot
serve
as
a
finishing
school
to
credential the
next
set
of
white-shoe
law
firm
attorneys
or
federal
judges
in
waiting
who
cabin
their
opinions
for
fear
their
elite
credentials
could
be
tarnished
through
a
policy disagreement.
Rather,
it
should
function
more
as
an
activist
yet
ethical
plaintiffs’
firm
that
advocates
for
its
client—the
Administration’s
agenda—within
the
limits
imposed
by the
Constitution and
the duties
of the
legal profession.
The Office of White House Counsel
also serves as the primary gateway for
communication
between
the
White
House
and
the
Department
of
Justice
(DOJ).
Traditionally,
both
the
White
House
Counsel
and
the
Attorney
General
have
issued
a
memo
requiring
all
contact
between
the
two
institutions
to
occur
only
between
the
Office
of
White
House
Counsel
and
the
Attorney
General
or
Deputy
Attorney
General.
The next
Administration
should reexamine
this policy
and determine
whether
it
might
be
more
efficient
or
more
appropriate
for
communication
to
occur
through
additional
channels.
The
White
House
Counsel
also
works
closely
with
the
DOJ
Office
of
Legal
Counsel
to
seek
opinions
on,
for
example,
matters
of
policy
development
and
the
constitutionality
of
presidential
power
and
privileges
and with
OLA
and
the
DOJ
Office
of
Legal
Policy
on
presidential
judicial
nominees.
When
a
new
President
takes
office,
he
will
need
to
decide
expeditiously
how
to
handle
any
major
ongoing
litigation
or
other
pending
legal
matters
that
might
pres-
ent
a
challenge
to
his
agenda.
To
offer
guidance,
the
White
House
Counsel
must
get
up to
speed as quickly as possible on all significant ongoing legal
challenges across the executive branch that might affect the new
Administration’s policy agenda and
must
be prepared
at the
outset of
the
Administration to
present
recommenda- tions to the
President, including recommendations for reconsidering or
reversing positions of the previous Administration in any
significant litigation. This review will usually require
consulting with the new political leadership at the Justice
Department, including
during the
transition
period.
No
day is
predictable
at the
White House.
Therefore, to
handle the
pace and
volatility of affairs, the
Office of White House Counsel must offer measured legal guidance
in
a
timely
manner.
This
often
means
forgoing
law
review–style
memos about
esoteric
legal
concepts
and
instead
quickly
providing
high-level
yet
incisive
guidance.
Due
to
evolving
world
events,
domestic
affairs,
and
political
pressures,
the
office often faces legal
questions for which there may not be a wealth of precedent.
Attorneys
in
the
Office
of
White
House
Counsel
must
therefore
work
collaboratively
within
the
White
House
and
the
Department
of
Justice,
relying
on
each
other
as
a
team,
to
ensure
that
proper
legal
guidance
is
delivered
to
the
President.
The
President
should choose
a White
House Counsel
who is
well-versed in
the Constitution,
administrative
and
regulatory law,
and the
inner workings
of Congress and the
political process. Instead of choosing a specialist, the
President should
hire
a
counsel
with
extensive
experience
with
a
wide
range
of
complex
legal
subjects.
Moreover,
while
a
candidate
with
elite
credentials
might
seem
ideal,
the best
one will
be above
all loyal
to the
President and
the
Constitution.
STAFF
SECRETARY
The Office of the Staff Secretary
is rarely visible to the outside world, but it
performs
work
of
tremendous
importance.
The
office
is
similar
to
a
military
com- mander’s
adjutant
as
it
is
responsible
for
fielding
and
managing
a
vast
amount
of
information at the top of
its organization. This includes information on its way into
the
Oval
Office
as
well
as
information
flowing
out
from
the
Oval
Office.
Because of
its
gatekeeping
function,
the
position
of
Staff
Secretary
is
one
of
extreme
trust,
and
the
individual
who
possesses
it
should
be
vetted
to
work
as
an
“honest
broker” in the
President’s service.
The Office of the Staff Secretary
has been described as the last substantive control
point before
papers reach
the Oval
Office. A
great deal
of
information is
headed toward the Oval
Office at any moment. This includes presidential decision
memos; bills passed by
Congress (which may be accompanied by signing or veto
statements); and
briefing
books, reading
materials,
samples of
constituent
mail, personal
mail,
and
drafts
of
speeches.
The
Staff
Secretary
makes
certain
that
these
materials
are
complete,
well-ordered,
and
up
to
date
before
they
reach
the
Presi-
dent.
This
necessarily
means
that
the
Staff
Secretary
plays
a
key
role
in
determining
who weighs
in on
policy
matters and
when.
As
noted
above,
the
Staff
Secretary
also
handles
information
leaving
the
Oval
Office.
The
President
may
have
questions
after
reviewing
incoming
material,
may
wish
to seek
more
information, or
may demand
revisions.
The Staff
Secretary is
often responsible
for directing
these requests
to the
appropriate
places and
fol- lowing up
on them
to ensure
that they
are completed.
One
of
the
Staff
Secretary’s
critical
functions
is
managing
and
overseeing
the
clearance
process
for
the
President’s
daily/nightly
briefing
book.
This
book
is
filled
with
all
the
reading
material
and
leading
documentation
the
President
needs
in
the
morning
and
the
evening
to
help
him
make
decisions.
The
Staff
Secretary
also
oversees the use of the President’s signature, whether by hand
or by autopen, and manages
the Office
of the
Executive
Clerk, Office
of Records
Management,
and Office of Presidential Correspondence.
OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
The
Office of
Communications,
which
operates under
the Director
of Com-
munications, conveys the
President’s agenda to the public through various media,
including
speeches
and
remarks,
press
briefings,
off-the-record
discussions
with reporters,
and
social
media.
Depending
on
how
a
President
chooses
to
structure
his
White
House,
the
Office
of
Communications
may
include
the
Office
of
the
Press
Secretary
(Press
Office),
but
no
matter
how
it
is
structured,
the
office
must
work closely
with the
Press Office
as well
as the
President’s
speechwriters and
digital strategists.
Operational
functions of the Office of Communications include scheduling and
running press briefings, interviews, meetings, media
appearances, speeches, and a
range
of
other
events.
The
Office
of
Communications
must
maintain
robust
rela-
tionships
with the
White House
Press Corps,
the White
House
Correspondents’ Association, regional stakeholders, and key
interest groups. No legal entitle- ment
exists for
the provision
of permanent
space for
media on
the White
House campus,
and
the
next
Administration
should
reexamine
the
balance
between
media demands
and space
constraints on
the White
House
premises.
Leadership within the Office of
Communications should include a Com- munications Director (who
is a direct report to the Chief of Staff
), a Deputy
Communications
Director,
a
Deputy
Director
for
Strategic
Communications,
and
a
Press
Secretary. This
leadership
team must
work together
closely to
drive the
national narrative about the White House.
The
best
resource
for
the
Office
of
Communications
is
the
President.
The
Pres-
ident
conveys
the
White
House’s
overall
message
through
one
or
two
inaugural addresses,
State
of
the
Union
addresses,
speeches
to
Congress,
and
press
confer-
ences.
The
office
must
also
ensure
that
the
various
White
House
offices
disseminate a unified message to the public. The Communications
Director and Press Secretary
in
particular
should
be
careful
to
avoid
contradicting
the
President
or
delivering conflicting
information.
The
speechwriting
team
is
a
critical
component
of
the
communications
team.
Speechwriting
is a
unique
talent: The
writers
selected must
understand
policy, should
have
a
firm
grasp
of
history
and
other
liberal-arts
disciplines,
and
should be
able
to
learn
and
adopt
the
President’s
style
of
rhetoric
and
mode
of
delivery.
The Press Secretary is the
President’s spokesperson, communicating to the
American people through the
media. The Press Secretary engages with the White House
Press Corps formally through press briefings and informally
through impromptu
gaggles
and
meetings.
Individuals
who
serve
in
this
role
must
be
quick
on
their
feet,
which
means,
when
appropriate,
deftly
refuting
and
rebutting
corre-
spondents’ questions and comments.
The Communications Director must
convey the President’s mission to the American
people.
Especially for
conservatives,
this means
navigating
the main- stream
media to
ensure that
the
President’s agenda
is conveyed
effectively
and accurately.
The
Communications
Director
must
be
politically
savvy
and
very
aware
of the ongoing activities of
the other White House offices. The new Administration
should
examine
the
nature
of
the
relationship
between
itself
and
the
White
House
Correspondents
Association and
consider
whether an
alternative
coordinating body might be more suitable.
OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS
(OLA)
Created
by
President
Dwight
Eisenhower,
the
OLA
has
continued
to
serve
as
the
liaison
between
the
White
House
and
Congress.
The
White
House
must
work
with
congressional
leaders
to
ensure
presidential
nominees,
for
roles
such
as
Cabinet
secretaries
and ambassadors, are confirmed by the Senate. The White House
also relies
on Congress
to enact
reforms
promised by
the President
on the
campaign trail,
whether
those
promises
relate
to
health
care,
education,
or
national
defense.
Because Congress holds the
power of the purse, White House staffers must ensure
that
there
is
enough
support
on
the
Hill
to
secure
the
necessary
funding
through the
appropriations
process to
fulfill the
President’s
agenda.
The OLA
reports directly to the Chief of Staff and in some
Administrations has
done
so
under
the
guidance
of
a
Deputy
Chief
of
Staff
(usually
the
Deputy
Chief
for
Policy).
Regardless
of
the
person
to
whom
the
OLA
reports,
however,
the
office exercises
a certain
autonomy on
behalf of
the President
and the
Chief of
Staff in
directly influencing
congressional leaders of both major political parties. The OLA
often
must
function
as
the
mediator
among
the
parties
and
find
common
ground to
facilitate the
successful
enactment of
the
President’s agenda.
As is the
case with many White House offices (but especially the Office of
Com-
munications),
the
OLA
must
ensure
that
congressional
leaders
receive
one
unified message.
If
other
actors
within
the
White
House
maintain
their
own
relationships with
congressional
leaders
and
staffers,
it
may
appear
that
the
President’s
agenda
is fractured
and lacks consensus. This dynamic has caused real problems for
many Presidents in the past.
Internally,
OLA staffers need to be involved in policy discussions, budget
reviews, and
other
important meetings.
They must
also provide
advice to
policy
staffers regarding
whether
certain
ideas
are
politically
feasible.
Externally,
OLA
staffers have
to
communicate
continuously with
congressional
offices of
both parties
in both the
House and
the Senate
to ensure
that the
President has
enough
support to enact his legislative priorities or sustain votes.
The
OLA
requires
staffers
who
are
effective
communicators
and
can
provide
a
dose
of
reality
to
other
White
House
staffers
when
necessary.
Although
a
policy proposal
from within
the White
House may
be a
great idea,
OLA staffers
must ensure
that
it
is
politically
feasible.
OLA
staffers
must
therefore
be
skilled
in
both
politics
and
policy.
Furthermore,
the
President
should
seek
out
individuals
who
can
advance
his
agenda
and
at
the
same
time
forge
pathways
with
members
of
the opposing
political party on other priorities.
Most important, the OLA must
function as a well-oiled machine: precisely
synced.
The
President
cannot
afford
to
have
a
tennis
player
on—much
less
as
the leader
of—his football team.
OFFICE OF
PRESIDENTIAL
PERSONNEL
(PPO)
The
political
axiom
that
“personnel
is
policy”
was
popularized
under
President Ronald
Reagan
during
the
1981
presidential
transition.
One
of
the
most
important offices
in
the
White
House
is
the
PPO,
which
was
created
under
President
Richard Nixon
to
centralize
political
appointments.
Departments
and
agencies
had
and
still
have
direct
legal
authority
on
hiring
and
firing,
but
the
power
to
fill
Schedule
C
posi-
tions—the
core
of
political
jobs—is
vested
with
the
President.
Therefore,
the
White
House,
not
the
department
or
agency,
has
the
final
word
on
political
appointments. PPO’s
primary
responsibility is
to staff
the executive
branch with
individuals who
are
equipped
to
implement
the
President’s
agenda.
Although
its
focus
should
be
identifying
and
recruiting
leaders
to
fill
the
approximately
1,000
appointments
that
require
Senate
confirmation,
PPO
must
also
fill
approximately
3,000
political
jobs
that
require
dedicated
conservatives
to
support
the
Administration’s
political
leadership.
Frequently, many medium-tier and
top-tier jobs have been filled by policy experts
tasked with
accomplishing
much of
the work
of the
Administration.
At the
same
time,
appointees
in
the
entry-level
jobs
have
brought
invaluable
energy
and
commitment
to
the
White
House
and
have
proved
to
be
the
“farm
team”
for the
conservative movement.
The
Office
of
Presidential
Personnel
is
responsible
for:
•
Identifying
potential
political
personnel
both
actively
through
recruitment and
passively
by
fielding
resumes
and
adjudicating
requests
from
political
actors.
•
Vetting potential
political
personnel by
conducting
political background
checks
and
reviewing
any
clearance
and
fitness
assessments
by
departments
and agencies.
•
Making
recommendations
to
the
President
and
to
other
appointment
authorities on behalf of the President.
•
Identifying
programmatic
political
workforce
needs
early
and
developing
plans (for example, Schedule F).
•
Maintaining
a
strong
relationship
with
the
Office
of
Personnel
Management (OPM)
both
for
operational
purposes
and
to
effectuate
the
President’s
direct
Title 5
authorities.
The President
is in
charge of
the federal
workforce and
exercises control
principally by
working
through the
Director of
the Office of
Personnel Management.
•
Training
and
connecting
political
personnel.
•
Playing “bad
cop” in
a way
that other
White House
offices
cannot (including
serving as
the office
that takes
direct
responsibility for
firings and
hirings).
•
Serving
as
a
personnel
link
between
conservative
organizations
and
the
executive branch.
In
most
Administrations,
PPO
will
staff
more
than
100
positions
during
a
transi-
tion
and
thousands
of
noncareer
positions
during
the
President’s
first
term.
Direct authority
and
a
strong
relationship
with
the
President
are
necessary
attributes
for
any
PPO
Director.
Historically,
PPO
has
had
direct
review
and
control
of
personnel files, including
security clearance dossiers.
At
the
highest
level,
PPO
is
tasked
with
long-term,
strategic
workforce
devel-
opment. The “billets” of political
appointments are of immense importance in
credentialing and training
future leaders. In addition, whatever one’s view of the
constitutionality of various civil service rules (for example,
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 19986)
might be, it is necessary to ensure that departments and
agencies
have
robust
cadres
of
political
staff
just
below
senior
levels
in
the
event of
unexpected vacancies.
OFFICE OF
POLITICAL
AFFAIRS
(OPA)
The
OPA is
the primary
office within
the executive
branch for
managing the
President’s political
interests. Although its specific functions vary from Admin-
istration to
Administration,
the OPA
typically
serves as
the liaison
between the
President
and
associated
political
entities:
national
committees,
federal
and
state
campaigns,
and
interest
groups.
Within
legal
guidelines,
the
OPA
engages
in
out- reach, conducts
casework, and—if the President is up for reelection—assists with
his campaign. The OPA
may also monitor congressional campaigns, arrange pres-
idential
visits
with
other
political
campaigns,
and
recommend
campaign
staff
to the
Office of
Presidential
Personnel for
service in
the executive
branch.
The
OPA
further
serves
as
a
line
of
communication
between
the
White
House
and
the
President’s political
party. This
includes both
relaying the
President’s ambitions
to political interests and listening to the needs of political
interests. This relationship allows for the exchange of
information between the White House and
political actors across the
country. The OPA should have one director of political
affairs who
reports
either to
the Chief
of Staff
or to
a Deputy
Chief of
Staff. The
OPA
should
also
include
various
deputy
directors,
each
of
whom
is
responsible
for a
certain
geographical region
of the
country.
Because
nearly
all
White
House
activities
are
in
some
way
inherently
political, the
OPA needs
to be
aware of
all
presidential actions
and
activities—including travel, policy decisions, speeches,
nominations, and responses to matters of
national
security—and
consider
how
they
might
affect
the
President’s
image.
The
OPA
must
therefore
have
a
designated
staffer
who
communicates
not
only
with
other
White
House
offices,
but
also
with
the
Cabinet
and
executive
branch
agencies.
OFFICE OF CABINET
AFFAIRS (OCA)
The
OCA’s
role
has
changed
to
some
degree
over
the
course
of
various
Adminis-
trations,
but
its
overriding
function
remains
the
same:
to
ensure
the
coordination of
policy and
communication
between the
White House
and the
Cabinet. Most
important, the OCA
coordinates all Cabinet meetings with the President. It should
also
organize
and
administer
regular
meetings
of
the
Deputy
Secretaries
because they
also
typically
serve
vital
roles
in
the
departments
and
agencies
and,
further, often
become acting
secretaries
when Cabinet
members
resign.
There should
be one Cabinet Secretary who reports to the Chief of Staff’s
office,
either
directly
or
through
a
deputy
chief,
according
to
the
chief’s
preference
and
focus.
The
Cabinet
Secretary
maintains
a
direct
relationship
with
all
members
of
the
Cabinet.
The
OCA
further
consists
of
deputies
and
special
assistants
who
work
with
each
department’s principal,
Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries,
and other
senior staff.
The OCA
also connects
the
departments to
WHO offices.
The
OCA
coordinates
with
the
Chief
of
Staff’s
office
and
the
Office
of
Communi-
cations
to
promote
the
President’s
agenda
through
the
Cabinet
departments
and
agencies.
The Cabinet’s
communications
staffers are
obviously
another critical
component of this operation.
In
prior
Administrations,
the
OCA
has
played
a
vital
role
by
tracking
the
Pres-
ident’s
agenda for
the Chief
of Staff,
Deputy Chiefs,
and senior
advisers. It
has worked with each
department and agency to advance policy priorities. In the
future, amplifying
this function
would truly
benefit both
the President
and the
conser- vative
movement.
From time to
time throughout an Administration, travel optics, ethics chal-
lenges, and
Hatch Act7
issues involving
Cabinet
members, deputies,
and senior
staffers
can
arise.
The
OCA
is
normally
tasked
with
keeping
the
WHO
informed of
such
developments
and
providing
support
if
and
when
necessary.
The ideal
Cabinet Secretary will have exceptional organizational skills
and be a
seasoned
political operative
or attorney.
Because many
Cabinet
officials have
been
former
presidential
candidates,
governors,
ambassadors,
and
Members
of
Congress, the ideal
candidate should also possess the ability to interact with and
persuade
accomplished
individuals.
OFFICE OF
PUBLIC
LIAISON
(OPL)
The
OPL
is
critically
important
in
building
coalitions
and
support
for
the
Pres-
ident’s
agenda across
every aligned
social,
faith-based,
minority, and
economic interest
group.
It
is
a
critical
tool
for
shaping
public
opinion
and
keeping
myriad
supporters, as well as “frenemies” and opponents alike who are
within reach, better
informed.
The OPL is a
notably large office. It should have one Director who reports to
the
Chief
of
Staff’s
office,
either
directly
or
through
a
deputy,
according
to
the
chief’s preference and
focus. The Director must maintain relationships not only with
other
WHO
heads,
but
also
with
the
senior
staff
of
every
Cabinet
department
and agency.
Since
a
President’s
agenda
is
always
in
motion,
it
is
important
for
the
OPL to
facilitate
listening
sessions
to
receive
the
views
of
the
various
leaders
and
mem- bers of
key interest groups.
The
OPL
should
also
have
a
sufficient
number
of
deputies
and
special
assistants
to
cover
the
vast
number
of
disparate
interest
groups
that
are
engaged
daily.
The
OPL
has,
by
far,
held
more
meetings
in
the
Eisenhower
Executive
Office
Building (EEOB)
and within
the West
Wing itself
than any
other office
within the
WHO.
The
OPL is
the chief
White House
enforcer and
gatekeeper
among these
var- ious
interest
groups.
It
has
operated
best
whenever
the
Chief
of
Staff
has
given
it
permission
to
use
both
the
proverbial
“carrot”
and
the
proverbial
“stick.”
To
make this
work,
communication
with
the
chief’s
office
is
vital.
Additionally,
the
OPL
has
had
an
outsized
role
in
presidential
scheduling
and
both
official
and
political
travel. The
OPL Director
should come
from the
President’s
election campaign
or Cap-
itol
Hill—but
should
not
have
deeply
entrenched
connections
to
a
K
Street
entity or any
other potential stakeholder. Some prior relationships can create
real or perceived
biases toward
one group
or another.
The Director
should be
amiable, gregarious,
highly
organized,
and
willing
to
shoulder
criticism
and
pushback
from
interest
groups
and
other
elements
of
the
Administration.
Unlike
the Director,
OPL deputies
and special
assistants
need a
deep under-
standing
of
the
capital,
from
K
Street
to
Capitol
Hill.
They
should
have
extensive experience
in
private
industry,
the
labor
sector,
the
conservative
movement,
and among
the specific
interest
groups with
which they
will be
asked to
engage on
behalf of the White House.
OPL
staffers
work
with
more
external
and
internal
parties
than
any
other
WHO
staffers.
In
turn,
they
must
be
effective
communicators
and
initiative-takers.
They must
also
be
able
to
influence,
persuade,
and—most
important—listen
to
various
stakeholders
and
ensure
that
they
feel
heard.
All
OPL
staffers
must
understand
from the
outset that
their jobs
might be
modified or
even phased
out entirely
as the Administration’s priorities change.
OFFICE OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS
(IGA)
The
IGA connects
the White
House to
state, county,
local, and
tribal govern-
ments.
In
other
words,
it
is
the
one-stop
shop
for
disseminating
an
Administration’s
agenda to all non–federal government entities.
The
IGA
should
have
a
Director
to
whom
one
or
two
Deputy
Directors
report. The
Director must
ensure that
the White
House remains
connected to
all non–
federal government
entities. The
interests and
perspectives
of these
entities are
represented in policy discussions, organized events with the
West Wing, EOP senior
staff, and
IGA staff
throughout the
departments
and agencies.
The IGA can be staffed in a variety
of ways, but two arrangements are most
common:
•
Each
deputy
and
that
deputy’s
staffers
are
responsible
for
a
type
of
government.
•
A
group
of
staffers
is
responsible
for
a
specific
geographical
region
of
the country.
The
IGA,
as
suggested
above,
represents
the
interests
and
perspectives
of
non–
federal
government
entities,
but
its
primary
job
is
to
make
sure
that
these
entities understand
an
Administration’s
agenda and
ultimately
support it.
The IGA must
work with all other White House offices, especially the OPA and
the
OPL,
and
manage
its
staff
throughout
the
departments
and
agencies.
IGA
staff-
ers
must
therefore
have
communication
skills,
understand
political
nuance,
and
be
willing to
engage in
complex
policy discussions.
They should
also be
not just
generally
responsive,
but
also
proactive
in
seeking
out
the
interests
and
perspec- tives
of non–federal government entities.
WHITE HOUSE
POLICY
COUNCILS
As
the federal
government
has ballooned
in size
over the
past century,
it has become
increasingly
difficult for
the President
alone to
direct his
agenda across
the executive branch. Three
White House policy councils have come into existence
to
help
the
President
to
control
the
bureaucracy
and
ensure
continued
alignment between
agency
leadership
and
White
House
priorities.
Those
councils—as
pre-
viewed above—are the NSC,
NEC, and DPC. Each is headed by an Assistant to the
President and performs three significant functions.
•
Policy Coordination.
The primary role of the policy councils is to coordinate
the
development of
Administration
policy. This
frequently includes
developing significant legislative priorities, coordinating
policy decisions
that impact
multiple
departments and
agencies, and
at times
coordinating
policy
decisions
within
a
single
department
or
agency.
This process
must
ensure
that
all
relevant
offices
are
included;
that
competing
or
conflicting
opinions
are
thoroughly
discussed
and
evaluated;
and,
when
there
is
disagreement
among
White
House
senior
staff
or
among
Cabinet
members, a
well-structured
question is
presented to
the President
for an
intermediate or final decision.
•
Policy Advice.
By virtue
of working
in the
White House,
the heads
of the three
policy
councils will
also function
as independent
policy
advisers to
the
President.
This
aspect
of
the
role
will
vary
depending
on
the
individual
in
this
position
and
the
President’s
governing
philosophy.
Incumbents
have ranged
from “honest
brokers,” who
mostly
coordinate and
ensure that
all opinions
are fairly
presented to
the President,
to “policy
deciders,” who
largely drive
a given
policy topic
on behalf
of the
President.
•
Policy
Implementation.
The policy
councils also
manage and
mediate the
implementation of
previous
policy decisions.
Implementation
of a
new statute or an executive order frequently takes years
and involves many
The
above
functions
have
recently
been
managed
by
policy
councils
through a
tiered
interagency
policy
process.
This
process
helps
to
identify
differences
of
opinion
and
reach
a
decision
without
having
to
take
every
issue
to
the
President.
It
can
be
used
to
address
a
single
question
or
monitor
a
recurring
issue
on
an
ongoing
basis.
Typically,
the
process
involves
multiple
Cabinet
departments
and
agencies
that
have
a
pertinent
role,
policy
interest,
or
disagreement.
Each
policy
council’s
process
could involve
the following
committees:
•
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC).
A PCC is led by a Special
Assistant
to
the
President
from
the
policy
council
and
includes
political Assistant Secretary–level experts from the relevant departments,
agencies,
or
offices.
The
purpose
is
to
determine
where
consensus
exists, clearly
identify
where
there
are
differing
opinions,
and
develop
options for
resolving the
remaining questions.
If no
outstanding questions
or
disagreements exist,
the PCC
may resolve
the issue
and move
toward implementation at the agency level.
•
Deputies Committee (DC).
A
DC
is a
meeting of
presidentially
appointed executives
chaired
by
the
policy
council’s
Deputy
Assistant
to
the
President and
relevant Deputy
Secretaries. It
evaluates the
options produced
by the
PCC
and
frequently
directs
the
PCC
to
add,
expand,
or
reevaluate
an
option or
even to
reach a
compromise and
resolve an
issue at
that level.
•
Principals Committee (PC).
When questions are not resolved by a DC,
the
Director
of
the
Policy
Council
will
chair
a
PC,
which
is
attended
by
the relevant
Cabinet
Secretaries
and
senior
White
House
political
staff.
This
is the
final
opportunity
for
the
President’s
most
senior
advisers
to
discuss
the question,
make
sure
that
each
principal’s
position
is
carefully
understood, and
see whether
consensus or
a compromise
might be
reached. If
not,
the
Chief
of
Staff’s
office
will
schedule
time
for
the
PC
to
meet
with
the
President for a final
decision.
Despite
having seemingly clear and separate portfolios, the three policy
coun-
cils
frequently
have
areas
of
overlap,
which
can
result
in
confusion,
duplication,
or
conflict. For
example, there
are the
areas of
immigration and
border security
“wokeism”
throughout
the
federal
government.
National Security Council.
The NSC is intended to be an
interdepartmen- tal
body within the White House that can set national security
policy with a whole-of-government
approach. Unlike
the other
policy councils,
the NSC
was
established
by
statute.8 Statutory
members
and
advisers
who
are
currently
part
of
the
NSC include the President and Vice President; the Secretaries of
State, Defense,
and
Energy;
the
Chairman
of
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff;
and
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence.9
The NSC staff, and particularly the
National Security Adviser, should be
vetted
for
foreign
and
security
policy
experience
and
insight.
The
National
Secu- rity
Adviser
and
NSC
staff
advise
the
President
on
matters
of
foreign
policy
and national
security,
serve
as
an
information
conduit
in
times
of
crisis,
and
as
liaisons
ensuring
that
written
communications
are
properly
shared
among
NSC
members. Special attention should be given to the use of detailees to
staff the NSC. In recent
years,
the
NSC’s
staff
size
has
been
rightsized
from
its
peak
of
400
in
2015 down
to 100–150
professional members.
The next
Administration should
try to
limit
the
number
of
detailees
to
ensure
more
direct
presidential
control.
National Economic Council.
The NEC was established in 1993 by executive order and has four
key functions:
•
To
“coordinate
the
economic
policy-making
process
with
respect
to
domestic and international economic issues.”
•
To
“coordinate
economic
policy
advice
to
the
President.”
•
To
“ensure that
policy decisions
and programs
are consistent
with the
President’s
stated
goals”
and
“that
those
goals
are
being
effectively
pursued.”
•
To
“monitor
implementation
of
the
President’s
economic
policy
agenda.”10
The
NEC
Director
coordinates
and
implements
the
President’s
economic
policy
objectives
by
working
with
Cabinet
secretaries,
their
departments,
and
multiple
agencies.
The Director
is supported
by a
staff of
policy
experts in
various
fields, including
infrastructure, manufacturing, research and development,
agriculture, small business, financial regulation,
housing, technology and innovation, and fiscal
policy.
The
NEC
considers
economic
policy
matters,
and
the
DPC
typically
considers anything
related
to
domestic
matters
with
the
exception
of
economic
policy
mat-
ters.
It also
differs from
the Council
of Economic
Advisers
(CEA). Whereas
the NEC
is
in
charge
of
policy
development,
the
CEA
acts
as
the
White
House’s
internal
research arm for economic analysis.
It is therefore critically
important to find people with the right qualifica- tions to head
both the NEC and the CEA. The CEA is almost always led by a
well-known
academic
economist,
and
the
NEC
is
regularly
led
by
someone
with expertise
in directing
the
President’s economic
policy
process. Those
who have
served in
the role
have ranged
from former
CEOs of
the nation’s
largest
invest- ment firms to financial-services industry managers to
seasoned congressional staffers who have managed the economic
policy issues for top financial and tax-writing
committees.
Domestic Policy Council.
The Domestic
Policy Council (DPC) consists of
advisers
to
the
President
on
noneconomic
domestic
policy
issues
as
well
as
inter-
national issues with a
significant domestic component (such as immigration). It is
one
of
the
primary
policy
councils
serving
the
President
along
with
the
NSC
and
NEC. The Director serves as
the principal DPC adviser to the President, along with
members of
the Cabinet,
and the
Deputy
Director chairs
the committee
respon- sible
for
coordinating
domestic
policy
development
at
the
Deputy
Secretary
level. In this
respect, both the Director and the Deputy Director have critical
institu- tional
functions that
affect the
development
of domestic
policy
throughout the
Administration.
The
DPC
also
has
policy
experts
(for
example,
Special
Assistants
to
the
Presi-
dent
or
SAPs)
who
are
responsible
for
developing
and
coordinating,
as
well
as
for
advising
the
President,
on
specific
issues.
It
is
essential
that
DPC
policy
expertise reflect
the
most
prominent
issues
that
are
before
the
Administration:
issues
such
as
the environment, health care, housing, and immigration. In
addition, DPC SAPs should
demonstrate a
working
knowledge of
the
rulemaking process
(although they
need
not
necessarily
be
experts
on
regulation)
because
a
working
knowledge of
the
rulemaking process
will
facilitate the
DPC’s
effectiveness in
coordinating Administration
policy.
The
DPC also
needs to
work closely
with other
offices
within the
Executive Office
of
the
President
to
promote
economic
opportunity
and
private-sector
inno- vation. This
includes working with the Office of Management and Budget and
its Office
of
Information
and
Regulatory
Affairs
as
well
as
the
Council
of
Economic
Advisers,
Council
on
Environmental
Quality,
and
Office
of
Science
and
Technology
Several areas will be especially
important as the DPC works to develop a well-defined domestic
policy agenda. One is the promotion of innovation as a
foundation
for
economic
growth
and
opportunity.
The
President
should
establish an
economic
opportunity
working
group,
chaired
by
the
DPC
Director,
to
coordi- nate
the development
of policies
that promote
economic opportunity.
Another important
area
is
the
promotion
of
health
care
reform
to
bring
down
costs
for
the American
people
and
the
pressure
that
spending
on
health
programs
puts
on
the federal
budget.
Finally,
DPC
should
coordinate
with
the
NSC
on
a
policy
agenda to
enhance border security.
OFFICE
OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT
(OVP)
In
modern
U.S.
history,
the
Vice
President
has
acted
as
a
significant
adviser
to
the
President.
Once
elected,
the
VP
helps
to
promote
and,
in
many
instances,
put
into
place and
execute the
President’s agenda.
The President
may additionally
determine
the
inclusion
of
OVP
staff
in
White
House
meetings,
including
Policy Coordinating
Committee, Deputies
Committee, and
Principals Committee
dis-
cussions as
has been
done in
various recent
Administrations.
Recent
Presidents have decided to give Vice Presidents space in the
West Wing. The VP’s proximity to the President—as well as to the
Chief of Staff and additional
senior
advisers—makes
his
or
her
role
a
powerful
one
within
the
West
Wing.
Presidents
typically
tap
VPs
to
lead
various
Administration
efforts.
These
efforts
have
included serving
on the
NSC Principals
Committee, heading
the National
Space
Council,
addressing
immigration
and
border
issues,
leading
the
response
to health care crises, and
supervising workforce programs. VPs traditionally also spearhead
projects
of
personal
interest
that
have
been
authorized
by
the
President. The
VP is
also charged
with breaking
tie votes
in the
Senate and
in recent
years has
served
abroad
as
a
brand
ambassador
for
the
White
House
and
more
broadly the
United States,
announcing Administration
priorities and
coordinating with
heads
of
state
and
other
top
foreign
government
officials.
The
Vice
President,
as
OFFICE
OF THE
FIRST LADY/FIRST
GENTLEMAN
The
First Lady
or First
Gentleman plays
an interesting
role in
the formation,
implementation, and execution of policy in concert with the
President. Active and
interested
first
spouses
often
champion
a
select
number
of
signature
issues,
whether they be thorny
social issues or deeper policy issues. One advantage of the
first
spouse’s
taking
on
hot-button
social
issues
is
that
any
political
backlash
will be
less severe
than it
would be
for the
President.
The
first spouse
normally
appoints a
chief of
staff who
has enough
assistants to
support
the
spouse’s
activities
in
the
East
Wing
of
the
White
House.
This
group
works
exclusively
with
the
first
spouse
and
senior
members
of
the
White
House along
with
EOP
personnel
to
implement
and
execute
the
first
spouse’s
priorities,
which reflect
the first
spouse’s
passions and
interests and
are often
identified as
important
in
discussions
with
the
President.
Executed
well,
they
can
be
strategi-
cally useful in accelerating
the Administration’s agenda. Past East Wing initiatives
have
focused
on
such
issues
as
combating
bullying,
fighting
drug
abuse,
promoting
literacy,
and
encouraging
physical
education
for
young
adults
and
children.
The first
spouse is afforded significant resources. His or her staff also
works with the
President’s
policy team,
members of
the Cabinet,
and other
EOP staff.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of
individuals involved in the
2025
Presidential
Transition
Project.
All
contributors
to
this
chapter
are
listed
at
the
front
of
this
volume,
but
Edwin
Meese
III,
Donald
Devine,
Ambassador
Andrew
Bremberg,
and
Jonathan
Bronitsky
deserve
special
mention.
The
author
alone
assumes
responsibility
for
the
content
of
this
chapter,
and
no
views
expressed
herein
should
be attributed
to any other individual.
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S.
Constitution,
art.
II,
§
1,
https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/
(accessed
February
14,
2023).
2.
U.S.
Constitution,
art.
II,
§
2.
3.
U.S.
Constitution,
art.
II,
§
3.
4.
U.S.
Constitution,
art.
II,
§
2.
5.
See
Chapter
2,
“Executive
Office
of
the
President,”
infra.
6.
H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated
and
Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105-
277, 105th Congress, October
21,
1998, Division C, Title I, §
151,
https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/
PLAW-105publ277.pdf
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
7.
S. 1871, An Act
to
Prevent Pernicious Political
Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2,
1939,
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf
(accessed March 7,
2023).
8.
S.
758,
National
Security
Act
of
1947,
Public
Law
No.
80-253,
80th
Congress,
July
26,
1947,
https://govtrackus.
s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
“The
National
Security Council was
established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61
Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402),
amended by the National
Security
Act Amendments of 1949 (63
Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949,
as part of the
Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive
Office of the President.” The White
House,
“National
Security
Council,”
https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
9.
See
Chapter
2,
“Executive
Office
of
the
President,”
infra.
10.
President
William
J.
Clinton,
Executive
Order
12835,
“Establishment
of
the
National
Economic
Council,”
January
25, 1993, in
Federal
Register,
Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190,
https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf
(accessed
March
7,
2023).
I
n
its
opening
words,
Article
II
of
the
U.S.
Constitution
makes
it
abundantly
clear
that “[t]he
executive
power shall
be vested
in a
President of
the United
States of America.”1
That enormous power is not vested in departments or
agencies,
in
staff
or
administrative
bodies,
in
nongovernmental
organizations
or other
equities and
interests
close to
the
government. The
President
must set
and enforce
a
plan
for
the
executive
branch.
Sadly,
however,
a
President
today
assumes
office
to
find
a
sprawling
federal
bureaucracy
that
all
too
often
is
carrying
out
its
own
policy
plans
and
preferences—or,
worse
yet,
the
policy
plans
and
preferences
of a
radical,
supposedly “woke” faction of
the
country.
The
modern
conservative
President’s task
is to
limit,
control, and
direct the
executive branch on behalf of the American people. This
challenge is created and
exacerbated
by
factors
like
Congress’s
decades-long
tendency
to
delegate
its
lawmaking power to agency
bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “inde- pendence”
that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the
presumed inability
to
hold
career
civil
servants
accountable
for
their
performance,
and
the increasing
reality
that
many
agencies
are
not
only
too
big
and
powerful,
but
also
increasingly weaponized
against the public and a President who is elected by the
people and
empowered by
the
Constitution to
govern.
In
Federalist
No.
47,
James
Madison
warned
that
“[t]he
accumulation
of
all
powers,
legislative,
executive,
and judiciary,
in the
same hands,
whether of
one, a
few, or
many,
and
whether
hereditary,
self-appointed,
or
elective,
may
justly
be
pronounced
the
very
definition
of
tyranny.”2 Regrettably,
that
wise
and
cautionary
note
describes
to
a
significant
degree
the
modern
executive
branch,
which—whether
controlled
by the
bureaucracy or by the President—writes federal policy, enforces
that policy, and often adjudicates whether that policy was
properly drafted and enforced. The
overall
situation is constitutionally dire, unsustainably expensive, and
in urgent need
of
repair.
Nothing
less
than
the
survival
of
self-governance
in
America
is
at
stake.
The
great
challenge
confronting
a
conservative
President
is
the
existential
need
for
aggressive use
of the
vast powers
of the
executive
branch to
return power—
including
power
currently
held
by
the
executive
branch—to
the
American
people.
Success
in
meeting
that
challenge
will
require
a
rare
combination
of
boldness
and self-denial:
boldness
to
bend
or
break
the
bureaucracy
to
the
presidential
will
and
self-denial
to
use
the
bureaucratic
machine
to
send
power
away
from
Washington and
back
to
America’s
families,
faith
communities,
local
governments,
and
states.
Fortunately,
a
President
who
is
willing
to
lead
will
find
in
the
Executive
Office of
the President
(EOP) the
levers
necessary to
reverse this
trend and
impose a sound
direction for
the nation
on the
federal
bureaucracy. The
effectiveness
of those EOP
levers depends
on the
fundamental
premise that
it is
the
President’s agenda
that
should
matter
to
the
departments
and
agencies
that
operate
under
his
constitutional
authority
and
that,
as
a
general
matter,
it
is
the
President’s
chosen
advisers who have the best
sense of the President’s aims and intentions, both with
respect to
the policies
he intends
to enact
and with
respect to
the interests
that must be
secured to
govern
successfully on
behalf of
the American
people. This
chapter
focuses
on
key
features
of
and
recommendations
for
several
of
the
EOP’s
important components.
U.S. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
(OMB)
OMB
assists
the
President
in
the
execution
of
his
policy
agenda
across
the
gov-
ernment
by
employing
many
statutory
and
executive
procedural
levers
to
bring
the
bureaucracy in line with all budgetary, regulatory, and
management decisions.
Properly understood,
it is
a President’s
air-traffic
control system
with the
abil- ity and
charge to
ensure that
all policy
initiatives
are flying
in sync
and with
the authority to let
planes take off and, at times, ground planes that are flying off
course. OMB’s key roles include:
•
Developing and enforcing
the President’s
budget and
executing the
appropriations laws
that fund
the
government;
•
Managing
agency
and
personnel
performance,
procurement
policy,
financial
management, and
information
technology;
•
Developing
the President’s
regulatory
agenda, reviewing
new regulatory
actions, reviewing federal
information collections, and setting and enforcing
federal information policy; and
•
Coordinating and clearing
agency
communications with
Congress, including
testimonies
and views
on draft
legislation.
OMB
cannot
perform
its
role
on
behalf
of
the
President
effectively
if
it
is
not
inti-
mately
involved
in
all
aspects
of
the
White
House
policy
process
and
lacks
knowledge
of
what
the
agencies
are
doing.
Internally
to
the
EOP,
ensuring
that
the
policy-for- mulation
procedures
developed
by
the
White
House
to
serve
the
President
include
OMB
is
one
of
any
OMB
Director’s
major
responsibilities.
A
common
meme
of
those
who
intend
to
evade
OMB
review
is
to
argue
that
where
“resources”
are
not
being
discussed,
OMB’s
participation
is
optional.
This
ignores
both
OMB’s
role
in
all
down-
stream
execution and
the reality
that it
has the
only statutory
tools in
the White
House
that
are
powerful
enough
to
override
implementing
agencies’
bureaucracies.
The Director must view his job as the best, most comprehensive
approxima- tion
of
the
President’s
mind
as
it
pertains
to
the
policy
agenda
while
always
being
ready
with
actual
options
to
effect
that
agenda
within
existing
legal
authorities
and
resources.
This
role
cannot
be
performed
adequately
if
the
Director
acts
instead
as the
ambassador
of
the
institutional
interests
of
OMB
and
the
wider
bureaucracy to
the White
House. Once
its
reputation as
the keeper
of
“commander’s intent”
is established,
then and
only then
does OMB
have the
ability to
shape the
most
efficient
way
to
pursue
an
objective.
Externally, the
Director must ensure that OMB has sufficient visibility into
the
deep
caverns
of
agency
decision-making.
One
indispensable
statutory
tool
to
that end is to ensure that
policy officials—the Program Associate Directors (PADs)
managing
the
vast
Resource
Management
Offices
(RMOs)—personally
sign
what
are
known
as
the
apportionments.
In
1870,
Congress
passed
the
Anti-Deficiency
Act3
to prevent
the common
agency
practice of
spending down
all
appropriated funding,
creating
artificial
funding
shortfalls
that
Congress
would
have
to
fill.
The
law
mandated
that
all
funding
be
allotted
or
“apportioned”
in
installments.
This
process, whereby agencies
come to OMB for allotments of appropriated funding, is
essential
to
the
effective
financial
stewardship
of
taxpayer
dollars.
OMB
can
then direct
on behalf
of a
President the
amount,
duration, and
purpose of
any appor-
tioned
funding
to
ensure
against
waste,
fraud,
and
abuse
and
ensure
consistency
with the
President’s
agenda and
applicable
laws.
The
vast
majority
of
these
apportionments
were
signed
by
career
officials—the Deputy
Associate
Directors
(DADs)—until
the
Trump
Administration
placed
this
responsibility
in
the
hands
of
the
PADs
and
thereby
opened
wide
vistas
of
oversight
that
had
escaped
the
attention
of
policy
officials.
The
Biden
Administration
sub-
sequently
reversed
this
decision.
No
Director
should
be
chosen
who
is
unwilling to
restore
apportionment
decision-making
to
the
PADs’
personal
review,
who
is
not
aggressive
in
wielding
the
tool
on
behalf
of
the
President’s
agenda,
or
who
is
unable
to defend
the power
against
attacks from
Congress.
It should be noted that each of
OMB’s primary functions, along with other
executive
and
statutory
roles,
is
carried
out
with
the
help
of
many
essential
OMB support
offices. The
two most
important
offices for
moving OMB
at the
will of
a Director
are
the
Budget
Review
Division
(BRD)
and
the
Office
of
General
Counsel (OGC).
The
Director
should
have
a
direct
and
effective
relationship
with
the
head of the
BRD (considered the top career official within OMB) and transmit
most instructions through that office because the rest of the
agency is institution- ally
inclined
toward
its
direction
and
responds
accordingly.
The
BRD
inevitably
will translate
the directions
from policy
officials to
the career
staff, and
at every
stage, it is obviously vital that the Director ensure that this
translation is an accurate
one.
In addition,
many key considerations involved in enacting a President’s
agenda hinge on existing
legal authorities. The Director must ensure the appointment
of
a
General
Counsel
who
is
respected
yet
creative
and
fearless
in
his
or
her
abil- ity
to challenge
legal
precedents that
serve to
protect the
status quo.
This is
vital within
OMB
not
only
with
respect
to
the
adequate
development
of
policy
options for
the
President’s
review,
but
also
with
respect
to
agencies
that
attempt
to
protect
their
own
institutional
interests
and
foreclose
certain
avenues
based
on
the
mere assertion
(and not
proof) that
the law
disallows it
or that,
conversely,
attempt to disregard
the clear
statutory
commands of
Congress.
In general,
the Director should empower a strong Deputy Director with
author-
ity
over
the
Deputy
for
Management,
the
PADs,
and
the
Office
of
Information
and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to work diligently to break down
barriers within OMB
and
not
allow
turf
disputes
or
a
lack
of
visibility
to
undermine
the
agency’s
prin-
cipal
budget,
management,
and
regulatory
functions.
OMB
should
work
toward
a
“One
OMB”
position
on
behalf
of
the
President
and
represent
that
view
during
the
various policymaking
processes.
Budget.
The
United
States
today
faces
an
untenable
fiscal
situation
and
owes
$31
trillion
on
a
debt
that
is
steadily
increasing.
The
OMB
Director
should
present a
fiscal
goal
to
the
President
early
in
the
budget
development
process
to
address the
federal
government’s
fiscal
irresponsibility.
This
goal
would
help
to
align
the
months-long
process
of
developing
the
actual
proposals
for
inclusion
in
the
budget. Though
some
mistakenly regard
it as
a mere
paper-pushing
exercise, the
Pres- ident’s
budget is
in fact
a powerful
mechanism for
setting and
enforcing
public policy at
federal
agencies. The
budget team
includes six
Resource
Management Offices
that, together
with the
BRD and
other
components, help
the Director
of OMB to
develop and
execute
detailed agency
spending plans
that bear
on
every
major
aspect
of
policy
formation
and
execution
at
federal
agencies.
Through
initial
priority-setting
and
ongoing
supervision
of
agency
spending,
OMB’s
budget
team plays
a
key
role
in
executing
policy
across
the
executive
branch,
including
at
many
agencies
wrongly
regarded
as
“independent.”
The
RMOs,
each
of
which
is
led
by
a
political
appointee
known
as
the
PAD
and
a
career DAD,
are separated
into six
functional
units:
•
National
Security.
•
Natural
Resources,
Energy,
and
Science.
•
Health.
•
Education,
Income
Maintenance,
and
Labor.
•
Transportation,
Justice,
and
Homeland
Security.
•
Treasury,
Commerce,
and
Housing.
Because
the
RMOs
are
institutionally
ingrained
in
nearly
all
policymaking
and
implementation across the executive branch, they play a critical
role in helping the
Director
to
implement
the
President’s
public
policy
agenda.
However,
because
each
RMO
is responsible for formulating and supervising such a wide range
of policy details,
many
granular
but
critical
policy
decisions
are
effectively
left
to
the
career professionals
who serve
across
Administrations.
To
enhance
the
OMB
Director’s
ability
to
help
the
President
drive
policy
at
the
agencies,
the
existing
six
RMOs
should
be
divided
into
smaller
subject-matter
areas, allowing
for
more
PADs,
and
each
of
these
PADs
should
have
a
Deputy
PAD.
This
expanded
pool
of
RMOs
with
additional
political
leadership
would
enable
more
comprehensive
direction
and
oversight
of
policy
development
and
implementation. Regardless
of whether
Congress
adopts the
President’s
full set
of budget
rec- ommendations,
the President
should
reintroduce the
concept of
administrative pay-as-you-go,
or
administrative
PAYGO. This
simple
procedural
requirement imposes budget neutrality on the discretionary
choices of federal agencies, of
which
there
are
many
in
nearly
all
areas
of
policymaking.
This
simple
step
forces
the
executive
branch
to
control
what
it
can
control.
The
principle
may
occasionally yield
to
other
overarching
requirements,
such
as
a
presidential
regulatory
budget,
but
in
nearly
all
cases,
administrative
PAYGO
plays
a
unique
and
indispensable
role
in
enforcing
fiscal
responsibility
at
federal
departments
and
agencies.
The
President
should
use
every
possible
tool
to
propose
and
impose
fiscal
disci-
pline
on
the
federal
government.
Anything
short
of
that
would
constitute
abject
failure.
Management.
The Management
Office of OMB (the “M-Side” as it is often
called)
is
responsible
for
carrying
out
several
important
agency
oversight
functions,
many
of
which
are
statutory.
The
Management
team
includes
the
following
offices
led
by
presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed individuals:
•
The
Office
of
Federal
Procurement
Policy
(OFPP).
•
The Office of Performance and
Personnel Management (OPPM).
•
The
Office
of
Federal
Financial
Management
(OFFM).
•
The Office of the Federal
Chief Information Officer (OFCIO).
•
The
Made
in
America
Office
(MIAO),
which
was
added
by
the
Biden
Administration and
is not
a
Senate-confirmed
slot.
Each
of these
offices has
responsibilities
and
authorities that
a President
can use
to
help
drive
policy
across
the
government.
It
is
vital
that
the
Director
and
his political
staff, not
the
careerists, drive
these offices
in pursuit
of the
President’s actual
priorities
and
not
let
them
set
their
own
agenda
based
on
the
wishes
of
the
sprawling “good government”
management community in and outside of govern- ment.
Many
Directors
do
not
properly
prioritize
the
management
portfolio,
leaving it
to
the
Deputy
for
Management,
but
such
neglect
creates
purposeless
bureaucracy
that
impedes
a
President’s
agenda—an
“M
Train
to
Nowhere.”
OFPP.
This
office
plays
a
critical
role
in
leading
the
development
of
new
policies and
regulations
concerning federal
contracting
and procurement.
Through the
Federal Acquisition
Regulatory Council, which is generally chaired by the OFPP
Administrator,
OFPP helps
the Director
to set
a wide
range of
policies for
all of
those
who
contract
with
the
executive
branch.
In
the
past,
those
governmentwide
contracting
rules
have
played
a
key
role
in
helping
to
implement
the
President’s
policy agenda. This office
should be engaged early and often in OMB’s effort to drive
policy,
including
by
obtaining
transparency
about
entities
that
are
awarded
federal
contracts
and
grants
and
by
using
government
contracts
to
push
back
against
woke policies
in corporate America.
OPPM.
Through
this
office,
the
Director
helps
federal
agencies
to
establish
their
performance
goals
and
performance
review
processes.
OPPM
also
works
with
the
U.S.
Office
of
Personnel
Management
(OPM)
to
establish
and
manage
personnel policies
and
practices
across
the
federal
government.
The
Director
should
instruct OPPM
to
establish
annual
performance
goals
and
review
processes
for
agencies that
reflect the
President’s
agenda. OPPM
should also
be part
of the
President’s strategy
to
set
and
enforce
sensible
policies
and
practices
for
the
federal
workforce.
OFFM.
This office
helps the
Director to
root out
waste, fraud,
and abuse
in fed-
eral
programs—for
example,
through
the
Do
Not
Pay
program.
It
should
be
part
of
efforts
to
save
precious
taxpayer
resources.
OFCIO.
This office guides the federal government’s use and adoption of
Inter- net-based
technologies to improve government operations and save taxpayer
money.
As
a
function
of
its
leadership
role,
it
is
critical
in
interagency
discussions on
a wide
range of
technology
issues. The
office thus
is an
important
part of
the President’s
efforts to modernize, strengthen, and set technology-adoption
policy for the executive branch.
MIAO.
Building
on
the
example
and
work
of
the
Trump
Administration,
Presi-
dent
Biden
established
this
office
to
centralize,
carry
out,
and
further
develop
the
federal
government’s
Buy-American
and
other
Made-in-America
commitments. Its
work ought
to be
continued and
further
strengthened.
Regulatory and Information Policy.
OMB’s
OIRA plays an enormous and
vital
role
in
reining
in
the
regulatory
state
and
ensuring
that
regulations
achieve
important benefits while
imposing minimal burdens on Americans. The President
should
maintain
Executive
Order
(EO)
12866,4 the
foundation
of
OIRA’s
review
of
regulatory
actions. The
Administration
should
likewise maintain
the recent
extension
of
those
standards
to
regulatory
actions
of
the
U.S.
Department
of
the Treasury.5
Regulatory analysis
and OIRA
review should
also be
required of
the historically
“independent”
agencies as
the Office
of Legal
Counsel has
found is
legally permissible.6
If the current
Administration proceeds with its declared intent to modify
aspects of EO 12866 or review OMB Circular A-4,7
the related document that
provides the foundation for cost-benefit analysis, the next
President should imme- diately begin to undo those changes and
develop a rigorous, data-driven approach
that
will
result
in
the
least
burdensome
rules
possible.
The
next
President
should also
revive
the
directive
in
Executive
Order
138918 that
significant
guidance
doc-
uments
also must
pass through
OIRA review.
Because
OIRA
review
often
leads
to
fewer
regulatory
burdens,
more
regulatory
benefits,
and
better
coordination
of
regulatory
policy,
funding
for
OIRA
tends
to
pay
large
dividends. Yet
over the
years,
funding for
OIRA has
diminished.
This trend
should
be
reversed.
The
budget
should
also
include
sufficient
full-time
equiv-
alent
(FTE)
employees
to
form
regulatory
advance
teams
that
would
consult
with agencies
on
cost-benefit
analysis
and
good
regulatory
practices
at
the
beginning of
the
rulemaking
process
for
the
most
important
regulations.
These
teams
would help
agencies take
cost-benefit
analysis into
account from
the beginning
of their
rulemaking
efforts,
which
in
turn
would
result
in
higher-quality
regulations
and
a swifter
eventual
OIRA
review.
To
preserve
the
integrity
of
OIRA
review,
the
staff
who
consult
at
the
beginning
of
a
rulemaking
should
not
handle
its
eventual
review.
The next
President should also reinstate the many executive orders signed
by President Trump that were designed to make the regulatory
process more just,
efficient,
and
transparent.
Executive
Orders
13771,9 13777,10 13891,11 13892,12
13893,13
13924 Section
6,14
13979,15
and 1398016
should be
revived (with
modifica- tions
as
needed).
Executive
Order
1313217 on
federalism
should
be
strengthened
so
that
state
regulatory
and
fiscal
operations
are
not
commandeered
by
the
federal
The next President should strengthen
implementation of the Information Qual-
ity
Act,19
robustly
use the
authority of
the Paperwork
Reduction Act,20
carefully enforce
the Privacy
Act,21
and
ensure the
sound execution
of OIRA’s
statistical and
other
information
policy
functions.
Regulatory
cooperation
agreements
can also
promote the
further adoption
of good
regulatory practices,
which improve
market
conditions
for
America
and
her
allies.
OIRA
should
also
work
with
other
components of OMB to revise
and apply OMB’s uniform Guidance for Grants and Agreements22
and ensure that federal contract and grant guidelines satisfy EO
12866 and
other centralized
standards as
appropriate.
But
executive
reforms
and
actions,
while
vital,
are
not
enough:
Congress
also
must
act.
The
next
President
should
work
with
Congress
to
pass
significant
reg-
ulatory policy and process reforms, which could go a long way
toward reining in
the
administrative
state. Excellent
examples of
such legislation
include the
Reg- ulatory Accountability
Act,23
SMART
Act,24
GOOD
Act,25
Early
Participation in Regulations
Act,26
Unfunded
Mandates Accountability
and Transparency
Act,27
and REINS Act.28
Finally,
the
next
President
should
work
with
Congress
to
maximize
the
utility
of
the
Congressional
Review
Act
(CRA),29 which
allows
Congress
to
undo
midnight
regulatory
actions (including
those disguised
as “guidance”)
on an
accelerated timeline.
To leverage
the CRA’s
power to
the maximum
extent, Congress
and
the
President
should
enact
the
Midnight
Rules
Relief
Act,30 which
would
help
to
ensure
that multiple regulatory actions could be packaged and voted on
at the same
time.
Immediate and
robust use
of the
CRA would
allow the
President to
focus his rulemaking
resources on major new regulatory reforms rather than devoting
months or
years to
undoing the
final rulemakings
of the
Biden Administration.
Legislative Clearance and Coordination.
OMB plays a
critical role in ensur- ing
that the
executive branch
is aligned
on legislative
proposals and
language, agency
testimonies,
and
other
communications
with
Congress.
The
Director
should
use
these
authorities
to
enforce
policy
and
message
consistency
aggressively
and
promote
the
effective
engagement
of
the
executive
branch
in
legislative
processes.
NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC)
The
National
Security
Council
(NSC)
was
established
by
statute
to
support
the
President
in
developing
and
implementing
national
security
policy
by
coordinating
across
relevant
departments
and
agencies,
integrating
authorities
and
resources toward common ends, and objectively assessing progress toward
established goals. Led by
the National Security Advisor (NSA), the NSC staff will be
success- ful in
implementing the
President’s national
security goals
only if
it is
made up
In
organizing
(by
means
of
Presidential
Directive31)
an
NSC
staff
that
is
more
responsive
and
aligned
with
the
President’s
goals
and
empowered
to
implement
them,
the
NSA
should
immediately
evaluate
and
eliminate
directorates
that
are
not
aligned
with
the
President’s
agenda
and
replace
them
with
new
directorates
as
appropriate
that
can
drive
implementation
of
the
President’s
signature
national
security
priorities.
In
addition
to
realigning
the
staff
organization
to
the
President’s
priorities,
the NSA
should assign
responsibility
for implementation
of specific
policy
initiatives to senior NSC officials from across the NSC staff
structure. These officials
should
develop,
direct,
and
execute
tangible
action
plans
in
coordination with
multiple agencies
to achieve
measurable, time-defined
milestones.
Aligning NSC
staff to the President’s national security goals will provide
clearer
direction,
a
mandate
for
action,
and
a
baseline
of
accountability
that
can
be
used
to
evaluate
staff
performance
and
the
NSC’s
overall
progress.
Accountable
senior
officials,
themselves either
political appointees
or a
minimum number
of career detailees,
who are
selected and
vetted politically
and report
directly to
political staff
should
be
the
main
day-to-day
managers
for
interagency
coordination
and
implementation of their
assigned national security policy objectives. They should
provide
policy
analysis
for
consideration
by
the
broader
NSC
and
relevant
agencies
and
ensure
timely
responses
to
decisions
made
by
the
President.
The
accountable senior
officials
should
be
established
at
the
direction
of
the
NSA
and
draw
on
per-
sonnel
and
expertise
from
beyond
the
NSC,
including
OMB,
the
National
Economic Council, and relevant federal agencies.
The
NSC staff
and principals
should work
in tandem
with the
National Eco-
nomic Council and OMB at all levels, presenting a united effort
to achieve the President’s
goals and
drawing on
the latter’s
statutory authorities
to guide
the
bureaucracy. To accomplish
national objectives effectively, foreign policy should
fully
incorporate
the
economic
instruments
of
national
power.
National
security
policy must also include the
prioritized allocation of resources. When policies are divorced
from
the
resources
required
to
implement
them,
they
are
stillborn—aca- demic
exercises that undermine our national security and leave
departments and agencies to their own devices.
The
accountable senior officials should be empowered to identify,
recruit, clear,
and
hire
staff
who
are
aligned
with
and
willing
to
shepherd
the
President’s
national
security
priorities.
NSC
staff
leads,
under
the
direction
of
the
NSA,
should
have
the
discretion
to
reduce
the
number
of
positions
that
need
high-level
clearances,
and
the
NSC
should
be
adequately
resourced
and
authorized
to
adjudicate
and
hold
security
clearances
internally
with
investigators
who
work
directly
for
the
NSC
and
whose
sole
task
is
to
clear
NSC
officials.
If
certain
staff
are
determined not
to
need
high-level
clearances,
the
question
becomes
whether
they
should
be
part of the NSC at all.
The NSC should
take a leading role in directing the drafting and thorough
review
of
all
formal
strategies:
the
National
Security
Strategy,
the
National
Defense
Strat-
egy,
the
Nuclear
Posture
Review,
the
Missile
Defense
Strategy,
etc.
In
particular, the
National
Defense
Strategy,
which
by
tradition
has
evaded
significant
review,
should
be
prioritized
for
White
House
review
by
the
NSC
and
OMB.
Both
should also
conduct
reviews
of
operational
war
plans
and
global
force
planning
and
allo-
cations with the Secretary of Defense to align them with
presidential priorities and
review
all
key
policy
and
guidance
intended
for
implementation
by
the
heads
of
the
Department
of
Defense,
the
Department
of
State,
and
the
Intelligence
Community before
they
are
authorized
for
distribution.
The
NSC
should
rigorously
review
all
general
and
flag
officer
promotions
to
prioritize
the
core
roles
and
responsibilities of
the
military
over
social
engineering
and
non-defense
matters,
including
climate
change,
critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other
polarizing policies
that
weaken
our
armed
forces
and
discourage
our
nation’s
finest
men
and
women
from
enlisting to
serve in
defense of
our liberty.
The
NSC staff
will need
to consolidate
the functions
of both
the NSC
and the
Homeland
Security
Council
(HSC),
incorporate
the
recently
established
Office
of the
National Cyber
Director, and
evaluate the
required regional
and functional directorates.
Given the
aforementioned prerequisites,
the NSC
should be
prop-
erly resourced with
sufficient policy professionals, and the NSA should prioritize
staffing the
vast majority
of NSC
directorates with
aligned political
appointees and trusted career officials. For instance, the NSA
should return all nonessen- tial detailees to their home agencies on their first
day in office so that the new
Administration
can
proceed
efficiently
without
the
personnel
land
mines
left
by
the previous stewards and as
soon as possible should replace all essential detailees
with
staff
aligned
to
the
new
President’s
priorities.
The
HSC
has
overseen
pandemic response, and its incorporation is important.
In
the end,
change requires
intervention, and
the NSC
staff should
be appro-
priately recruited,
manned, and
empowered to
achieve the
President’s national security
and foreign
policy objectives
and maintain
robust policy
analysis and
discussion
while
minimizing
resistance
from
those
who
have
an
agenda
or
who jealously
guard
their
resources
and
autonomy
at
the
expense
of
national
security and
sound
policy
development.
This
resistance
and
inertia
can
be
inadvertently enabled
by a
small and
unempowered NSC.
Additionally,
the
White
House
Chief
of
Staff
and
NSA
must
ensure
that
the
NSC
is
functioning in
tandem with
the rest
of the
White House
staff to
benefit from
the
best
strategic
thinking
of
the
President’s
top
advisers.
History
shows
that
an
unsupervised
NSC
staff
can
stray
from
its
statutory
role
and
adversely
affect
a
Pres-
ident
and
his
policies.
Moreover,
while
the
NSC
should
be
fully
incorporated
into
the
White
House,
it
should
also
be
allowed
to
do
its
job
without
the
impediment of
dually hatted
staff that
report to
other
offices. For
instance, the
NSC needs
its own
counsel to
inform what
legal options
can be
provided to
the
President. The
White
House
Counsel
should
be
part
of
that
policy
process
as
the
President’s
top
legal
adviser.
These
recommendations
provide
a
clear
road
map
for
rapidly
sizing and
solidifying
the NSC
staff to
support and
achieve the
President’s
objectives beginning on Inauguration Day.
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
COUNCIL
(NEC)
The
National
Economic
Council
is
one
of
the
policy
councils
serving
the
Pres-
ident
along with
the NSC
and the
Domestic
Policy Council
(DPC). The
Director serves
as principal
adviser to
the President
on domestic
and
international eco-
nomic
policy
and
communicates
the
President’s
economic
message
to
the
media. The
Deputy
Director is
responsible
for the
day-to-day
operation of
the council,
which includes
chairing the
committee
that coordinates
economic
policy devel-
opment
at
the
Deputy
Secretary
level.
In
effect,
the
Director
and
Deputy
Director are
the officials
who are
primarily
responsible for
the
development of
economic policymaking
for
the
Administration.
Once
a
policy
is
adopted,
it
is
the
appropri- ate
agency’s responsibility to implement it. The NEC’s policy
process is also used
to
determine
whether
the
President
should
support
or
oppose
legislation
passed by
Congress.
In
addition
to
its
leadership,
the
NEC
has
policy
experts
(for
example,
Special
Assistants
to
the
President
or
SAPs)
who
are
responsible
for
developing
and
coor-
dinating,
as well
as advising
the President,
on specific
issues. It
is essential
that the
policy expertise
of the
NEC reflect
the current
environment’s
most pressing
issues. Today,
this would
include (among
other topics)
taxes, energy
and envi-
ronment, technology,
infrastructure,
health care,
financial
services, workforce,
agriculture,
antitrust and
competition
policy, and
retirement
programs. NEC’s
SAPs
should
have
a
working
knowledge
of
how
the
Administration
can
implement policy
through the
rulemaking
process, although
it is
not necessary
that they
be experts on
regulation themselves, particularly given OMB’s role. This will
facilitate the
NEC’s effectiveness
in
coordinating
Administration
policy.
The
NEC
needs
to
work
closely
with
other
offices
within
the
Executive
Office of
the President
to promote
innovation by
the private
sector and
create an
envi- ronment
that will
stimulate
economic activity
while
reducing federal
spending and
debt.
This
includes
working
with
the
DPC,
NSC,
OMB,
Council
of
Economic
Advisers, Office
of
Intergovernmental
Affairs, Office
of Cabinet
Affairs,
White House
Counsel,
Council
on
Environmental
Quality,
Office
of
Legislative
Affairs,
and
Office
of
Science
and
Technology
Policy.
To
this
end,
the
NEC
Director
should
chair
a
standing
meeting
with
the
principals
from
each
of
the
other
EOP
offices
to
enhance coordination from
within the White House.
In
the
past,
there
has
been
tension
among
the
DPC,
NEC,
and
NSC
over
juris-
diction.
It is
important to
set clear
jurisdictions
at the
start of
an
Administration to
prevent
needless
and
counterproductive
turf
fights.
In
addition,
the
Principal
Deputy
for
international
economic
policy
is
jointly
appointed
at
NEC
and
NSC
and could
end
up
serving
two
different
interests.
To
avoid
such
problems,
international
economic policy
should be
entirely
coordinated from
NEC.
It will be
especially important for the NEC to work seamlessly with the
Council
of
Economic
Advisers
(CEA),
which
provides
the
President
and
the
White
House
offices
with
the
latest
economic
data
and
forecasts,
as
well
as
estimates
of
the
eco-
nomic
impact of
proposed
policies, and
prepares the
annual
Economic
Report of the
President.
The CEA
is not
a policy
council and
therefore does
not run
policy processes,
which is
the
responsibility of
the NEC,
DPC, and
NSC. However,
the CEA
does
play
a
key
role
in
ensuring
that
any
policy
considered
by
the
councils
is rigorously
evaluated for
its economic
impacts.
The
NEC
works
closely
with
the
White
House
Office
of
Communications
and
Office
of
Speechwriting
to
ensure
that
the
White
House’s
messaging
and
media
engagement
communicate
the President’s
economic
policy effectively.
The
NEC also
plays a
key role
in advancing
the
President’s economic
agenda by
advising
the
Office
of
Presidential
Personnel
on
appointments
to
key
economic
posts,
including
positions
in
financial
regulatory
agencies.
The
NEC
helps
to
ensure
that
each
economic
post
is
held
by
a
person
who
shares
the
President’s
policy
pri- orities
and works
well with
the rest
of the
Administration’s
economic
team. The financial
regulators
are run
partly by
civil
servants (some
of whom
were politi-
cal appointees
in prior
liberal
Administrations) who
often resist
a
conservative Administration’s
policies. It
is therefore
critical that
an
Administration not
only appoints
capable individuals
to lead
these
agencies, but
also has
personnel who
can be
hired into
senior staff
positions
within the
agencies.
A
few
areas
will
be
especially
important
if
the
NEC
is
to
develop
a
well-defined
economic
policy
agenda.
One
is
the
promotion
of
innovation
as
a
foundation
for
economic growth and opportunity. Another is the creation of an
environment that fosters
economic
growth
through
tax
reform
and
the
elimination
of
regulatory
and
procedural
barriers.
OFFICE OF
THE U.S.
TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
(USTR)
The
Office of
the U.S.
Trade
Representative
provides the
President
with the internal
White House resources necessary to formulate and execute a
unified, whole-of-government approach to trade policy. The
President should ensure that the USTR is empowered to serve in
that leadership role, much as other
EOP
components
organize and
drive a
coordinated
policy agenda
on behalf
of the
President.
The People’s
Republic of China’s predatory trade practices have disrupted the
open-market trading system that has provided mutual benefit to
all participating countries—including
China—for
decades.
The
failure
of
the
World
Trade
Organi-
zation
(WTO)
to
discipline
China
for
abrogation
of
its
trading
commitments
has
seriously
undermined
its
credibility
and
made
it
a
largely
ineffective
institution.
The
United
States,
through
an
empowered
USTR,
must
act
to
rebalance
and
refocus international
trading
relationships in
favor of
democratic
nations that
embrace free,
fair, and
open trade
principles
built on
market-driven
economies.
Chapter
26 of
this book
outlines
recommended trade
policy
priorities for
the incoming
President.
However,
regardless
of
the
approach,
successful
implemen-
tation of
that trade
agenda will
require the
President to
articulate a
clear policy
direction and
instructions
for the
executive
branch to
operate in
a coordinated
fashion under
the leadership
of an
empowered
USTR.
To
address
these
and
other
challenges,
protect
the
American
worker,
and
secure free
and open
markets for
our
communities and
businesses,
the next
President must
leverage the
institutional
resources and
strength of
the USTR
and neither
allow
institutional
interests
to
drive
a
fragmented
trade
policy
that
is
developed
from
the
ground
up
nor
cater
to
parochial
interests
across
government
and
Wash- ington’s
broader
industry of
influence.
The
USTR’s
mission
is
vitally
important
in
reorienting
the
global
trading
system
in
a
direction
that
is
open,
fair,
and
prosperous.
In
order
to
achieve
the
President’s
policy
goals, a strong USTR must be empowered to set trade policy from
the White House with the
authority and resources to represent the interests of the Presi-
dent’s
trade
agenda
with
adequate
budget,
staff,
analysis,
and
expertise
to
engage
meaningfully
in
internal
and
interagency
policy
deliberations.
The
USTR
should
organize and
harness
existing interagency
trade
committees to
serve the
Presi- dent’s
trade
agenda
and
drive
a
consensus
among
federal
stakeholders,
dispose of
legacy
advisory
committees
with
members
who
serve
special
interests,
direct
action
to
implement
policy
priorities,
measure
progress
toward
implementing
the President’s
agenda,
and
hold
agencies
and
officials
accountable
for
delivering
the
President’s agenda. The
USTR’s leadership should not only coordinate and enforce
the President’s agenda
across the federal community, but also set and enforce the
President’s trade agenda internally.
Trade
policy
and
priorities
should
be
set
by
the
President
and
implemented
by
the
U.S. Trade Representative in cooperation with the other economic
and national security officials, not by the range of
governmental and nongovernmental interests that attempt to force
their policy preferences on the USTR. A strong USTR empow-
ered
with
the
necessary
resources,
authorities,
and
interagency
cooperation
will
protect
U.S.
interests in
the global
marketplace
more effectively.
COUNCIL
OF
ECONOMIC
ADVISERS
(CEA)
Congress
established
the
Council
of
Economic
Advisers
in
1946
to
advise
the
President
on
economic
policy
based
on
data,
research,
and
evidence.
The
CEA
is
one
of
the
oldest
congressionally
created
offices
within
the
White
House
complex and
plays a
broad role
in bringing
economic
expertise to
Administration
policy across
a large
range of
policy areas.
The CEA
has one
presidentially
appointed and
Senate-confirmed
chair, two
presidentially
appointed
members who
assist and often have expertise that complements the
chair, and approximately 40 staff
employees.
Statutorily,
the
CEA
is
charged
with
being
the
President’s
principal
source
of
economic advice. However, this role has diminished over time as
its policy appraisal
and
especially
formulation
and
recommendation
functions
have
been
taken
over
or
diluted by other economic policy bodies within the White House.
By law, the CEA is
required to
publish an
annual
Economic
Report of
the President
within 10
days after
submission
of
the
budget.
This
report
is
not
just
a
messaging
document;
it
is
an
opportunity
to
provide
greater
rigor
in
support
of
policy
areas
that
the
White House
is
prioritizing and
to build
up the
external
credibility of
those ideas.
A
future
conservative
Administration
should
utilize
the
CEA
as
the
senior
inter-
nal
White
House
economists
much
as
the
White
House
Counsel’s
office
functions
as
the
senior
internal
White
House
lawyers.
This
does
not
mean
that
there
are
no
economists
in
other
offices.
There
are,
just
as
there
often
are
lawyers
in
the
policy councils
and
other
White
House
offices,
but
the
CEA’s
role,
like
the
White
House
Counsel’s,
is
to
employ
its
unique
expertise
(particularly
on
the
technical
side)
to
ensure
that sound
analysis is
contributing
to and
shaping the
policy
discussion.
In
practice,
this
means
that
CEA
staff
do
not
“coordinate”
the
policy
process
in
the
way
that
the
DPC
or
NEC
would,
but
they
should
be
integral
to
the
EOP’s
policy
development
processes.
CEA
staff
should
support
sound
policy
development
and
execution by actively contributing to running policy dialogues,
proactively raising
issues
that
need
to
be
addressed,
consulting
on
questions
that
arise,
and
guiding
EOP and
agency officials on the analytical foundations of policy.
Structurally, the
White
House
Chief
of
Staff
should
ensure
that
the
CEA
has
a
seat
at
the
policymak- ing table on all
relevant policy.
Senior
economists traditionally have not gone through the Office of
Presidential Personnel process and more often than not are hired
on an academic-year cycle. As a result, senior economists hired
in the summer of a presidential election year tend
to
remain
on
staff
until
the
next
summer
even
if
a
President
from
the
opposite
party
takes
power
and
installs
a
new
slate
of
CEA
political
appointees
for
chair,
members,
etc.
Although
these
hiring
practices
create
some
continuity,
the
presence
of
senior economists
who were
never fully
vetted for
their
alignment with
White House
policy objectives
or who
were holdovers
from a
recently
departed Administra-
tion
can
breed
skepticism
and
distrust
of
the
CEA
by
other
units
within
the
White
NATIONAL
SPACE COUNCIL
(NSPC)
The National Space Council is
responsible for providing advice and recommen-
dations
to the
President on
the formulation
and implementation
of space
policy and
strategy.
It
is
charged
with
conducting
a
whole-of-government
approach
to
the
nation’s
space
interests:
civil,
military,
intelligence,
commercial,
or
diplomatic.
Historically, it has been chaired by the Vice President at the
President’s direction, and
its members
consist of
members of
the Cabinet
and other
senior executive branch officials as specified by the President in
Executive Order 13803.32
The NSpC’s
purpose is
to ensure
that the
President’s priorities
relative to
space are
carried
out
and,
as
necessary,
to
resolve
policy
conflicts
among
departments
and agencies
that are related to space.
Space
projects
and
programs
are
risky,
complex,
expensive,
and
time
consum-
ing—although
commercial
space
innovations
are
lowering
costs
and
accelerating schedules.
Nevertheless,
while
fiscal
discipline
should
not
be
ignored,
long-term
policy
stability is
crucial to
investors, innovators,
industry, and
agencies. Policy
stability
is
easier
when
policies
and
programs
are
aligned
with
long-term
national interests
as opposed
to those
of particular
advocacy groups
or political
factions. The
Trump
Administration’s
major
space
policies—including
the
U.S.
Space
Force,
the
Artemis
program
to
land
the
next
Americans
on
the
moon,
and
support
for
a strong
commercial
space
sector—have
endured
under
the
Biden
Administration.
Major challenges
remain in
implementation
and regulatory
reform to
keep up
with
rapidly
evolving
space
markets
and
competitors.
These
include
the
long-term sustainability
of space
activities in
light of
increasing orbital
debris; creation
of
space
situational
awareness
services
for
civil
and
commercial
uses;
management of
mega-constellations;
licensing
of
new
commercial
remote
sensing
capabilities; keeping
up
with
licensing
demands
due
to
high
launch
rates;
transitioning
Inter- national
Space
Station
operations
to
multiple,
privately
owned
space
platforms; and
(most
important)
accelerating
the
acquisition
and
fielding
of
national
security
space
capabilities
in
response
to
an
increasingly
aggressive
China.
The
Vice
President
should
have
a
clear
understanding
with
the
National
Secu-
rity
Advisor and
the White
House Counsel
that they
and their
respective staffs
will work within the
White House to determine the scope and leadership of policy
reviews
that
can
overlap
multiple
areas
of
responsibility.
A
similar
understanding is
necessary with
the heads
of other
policy councils
such as
the NEC,
DPC, and National
Science and
Technology Council
(NSTC).
As
a
result
of
the
President’s
direction
and
the
Vice
President’s
leadership,
the
NSpC
under the
Trump Administration
was able
to coordinate
a wide
range of
space policy
reviews, legislative proposals, and regulatory reforms smoothly.
The NSpC
generally
led
on
space
issues
within
the
EOP,
but
other
White
House
offices also took on space
topics.
•
As a
member of
the NSpC,
and in
coordination
with other
members, the
Office
of
Science
and
Technology
Policy
developed
a
national
space
weather
strategy, research
and
development (R&D)
plans to
mitigate the
effects of
orbital debris,
and protocols
for planetary
protection to
avoid
biological contamination of celestial bodies.
•
The
Council
of
Economic
Advisers
did
research
on
the
economic
benefits
of
space property rights.
•
OMB’s
Office
of
Information
and
Regulatory
Reform
updated
and streamlined
commercial
launch
licensing
and
commercial
remote
sensing
satellite rules.
During the
Trump Administration, if a topic was purely
military, such as stand-
ing up the
U.S. Space Command, the NSC took the lead. If a topic cut across
military,
civil,
and
commercial
sectors,
as
was
the
case
with
cybersecurity
in
space,
the
NSpC and
NSC would
cochair the
policy review
groups.
Trusted,
collegial relationships across the White House complex are
critical to
successful
space
policy
development,
implementation,
and
oversight.
Nowhere
is
this
more
important
than
in
the
relationship
between
the
NSpC
staff
and
OMB
staff who oversee civil and national security–related space
spending. Teamwork
between
the
NSpC
and
OMB
staff
can
communicate
clear
presidential
priorities
to
departments and agencies, facilitating smooth development of the
President’s
budget
request.
The
NSpC
and
OMB
have
many
opportunities
to
collaborate
in
promoting presidential priorities while finding offsets in
lower-priority programs and
funding lines.
OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
(OSTP)
The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was created by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976.33 Before its creation, Presidents received their advice and counsel on such matters through advisers and boards that had no statutory authority. The Director of OSTP is one of the few Senate-confirmed positions within the Executive Office of the President. Consistent with other laws, the President may delegate to the Director of OSTP directive authority over other elements of the executive branch. Other EOP policy officials and organizations such as the NSC and NEC are formally only advisory with relevant agency directives issued by the President.
The
OSTP’s functions,
as contained
in the
law, are
to advise
the President
of
scientific
and
technological
considerations,
evaluate
the
effectiveness
of
the
federal effort,
and
generally
lead
and
coordinate
the
federal
government’s
R&D
programs. If
science is
being manipulated
at the
agencies to
support separate
political and
institutional
agendas,
the
President
should
increase
the
prominence
of
the
OSTP’s Director
either formally
or informally.
This would
elevate the
role of
science in
policy discussions
and subsequent
outcomes and
theoretically help
to balance
out
agencies
like
the
Departments
of
Energy,
State,
and
Commerce
and
the
Envi- ronmental
Protection
Agency
and
Council
on
Environmental
Quality.
The
OSTP
can
also
help
to
bring
technical
expertise
to
regulatory
matters
in
support
of
OMB. The
OSTP should
continue to
play a
lead role
in coordinating
federal R&D
pro-
grams.
Recent
legislation,
especially
the
CHIPS
and
Science
Act,34 has
expanded federal
policy
and
funding
across
the
enterprise,
and
there
is
a
need
for
more
sig-
nificant
leadership
in
this
area
both
to
ensure
effectiveness
and
to
avoid
duplication
of
effort.
As
befitting
its
location
in
the
White
House,
the
OSTP
must
be
concerned
with
advancing
national
interests
and
not
merely
the
parochial
concerns
of
departments,
agencies,
or
parts
of
the
scientific
community.
During
the
Trump
and
Biden
Administrations,
there
has
been
a
bipartisan
focus
on
prioritizing
R&D
funding
around
the
so-called
Industries
of
the
Future
(IOTF). Under
President
Trump,
IOTF
priorities
were
artificial
intelligence
(AI),
quantum
information
science
(QIS),
advanced
communications/5G,
advanced
manufacturing,
and
biotechnology.
Under
President
Biden,
this
list
has
been
expanded
to
include
advanced
materials,
robotics,
battery
technology,
cybersecurity,
green
products
and
clean
technology,
plant
genetics
and
agricultural
technologies,
nanotechnology,
and
semiconductor
and
microelectronics
technologies.
These
priorities
should
be
eval-
uated
and
narrowed
to
ensure
consistency
with
the
next
Administration’s
priorities.
Given a long
list of priorities, coordinating efforts across agencies and
mea- suring success are extremely challenging. The OSTP and OMB
are required to work
together
on
an
annual
basis
to
prioritize
the
funding
requests
and
whatever Congress
adds
on
top
of
them,
but
there
continues
to
be
concern
about
mission
The
President
should
also
issue
an
executive
order
to
reshape
the
U.S.
Global
Change
Research Program
(USGCRP) and
related climate
change research
pro- grams. The USGCRP produces strategic plans and
research (for example, the National
Climate
Assessment)
that
reduce
the
scope
of
legally
proper
options
in
presidential
decision-making
and
in
agency
rulemakings
and
adjudications.
Also, since
much
environmental
policymaking
must
run
the
gauntlet
of
judicial
review, USGCRP
actions
can
frustrate
successful
litigation
defense
in
ways
that
the
career bureaucracy
should
not
be
permitted
to
control.
The
process
for
producing
assess-
ments
should
include
diverse
viewpoints.
The
OSTP
and
OMB
should
jointly
assess the
independence of the contractors used to conduct much of this
outsourced
government
research that serves as the basis for policymaking. The next
President
should
critically
analyze
and,
if
required,
refuse
to
accept
any
USGCRP
assessment prepared
under the Biden Administration.
The
President
should also
restore
related EOP
research
components to
their purely informational and advisory roles. Consistent
with the Global Change
Research
Act
of
1990,35 USGCRP-related
EOP
components
should
be
confined
to
a
more
limited
advisory
role.
These
components
should
include
but
not
necessarily
be
limited to
the OSTP;
the NSTC’s
Committee on
Environment;
the USGCRP’s
Interagency Groups (for
example, the Carbon Cycle Interagency Working Group);
and the Federal Coordinating
Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology. As
a general
matter, the
new
Administration
should separate
the
scientific risk
assessment function
from the
risk
management function,
which is
the exclusive
domain of
elected
policymakers and
the public.
Finally,
the
next
Administration
will
face
a
significant
challenge
in
unwinding
policies and
procedures that are used to advance radical gender, racial, and
equity initiatives under the
banner of science. Similarly, the Biden Administration’s
climate
fanaticism
will
need
a
whole-of-government
unwinding.
As
with
other federal
departments
and
agencies,
the
Biden
Administration’s
leveraging
of
the
federal
government’s
resources
to
further
the
woke
agenda
should
be
reversed
and
scrubbed from all policy
manuals, guidance documents, and agendas, and scientific
excellence and
innovation
should be
restored as
the OSTP’s
top priority.
COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
(CEQ)
The
Council on
Environmental
Quality is
the EOP
component with
the prin-
cipal task
of
administering the
National
Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)36
by issuing
regulations
and
interpretive
documents
and
by
overseeing
the
processes of
individual
permitting
agencies’
own
NEPA
regulations,
including
categorical
exclusions. The CEQ also coordinates environmental policy across
the federal government,
and
its
influence
has
waxed
and
waned
across
Administrations.
The
President
should
instruct
the
CEQ
to
rewrite
its
regulations
implementing
NEPA
along the
lines of
the historic
2020 effort
and restoring
its key
provisions such
as banning
the use
of cumulative
impact
analysis. This
effort should
incor- porate
new
learning
and
more
aggressive
reform
options
that
were
not
included in
the 2020
reform package
with the
overall goal
of
streamlining the
process to
build
on
the
Supreme
Court
ruling
that
“CEQ’s
interpretation
of
NEPA
is
entitled
to
substantial
deference.”37 It
should
frame
the
new
regulations
to
limit
the
scope
for
judicial
review of
agency NEPA
analysis and
judicial
remedies, as
well as
to vindicate
the strong
public
interest in
effective and
timely agency
action.
The
Federal
Permitting
Improvement
Steering
Council
(FPISC),
of
which
the
CEQ
is a part, has been empowered by Congress through significant
new funding
and
amendments
to FAST-41.38 The
President
should build
on
this
foundation
to
The
President
should
issue
an
executive
order
establishing
a
Senior
Advisor
to
coordinate
the policy
development and
implementation
of relevant
energy and
environment
policy
by
officials
across
the
EOP
(for
example,
the
policy
staff
of
the
NSC,
NEC,
DPC,
CEQ,
and
OSTP)
and
abolishing
the
existing
Office
of
Domestic
Cli-
mate
Policy.
The
Senior
Advisor
would
report
directly
to
the
Chief
of
Staff.
The
role
would
be
similar
to
the
role
that
Brian
Deese
and
John
Podesta
had
in
the
Obama White
House.
This
energy/environment
coordinator
would
help
to
lead
the
fight
for
sound
energy
and
environment
policies
both
domestically
and
internationally.
The President
should eliminate
the Interagency
Working Group
on the
Social Cost of
Carbon (SCC),
which is
cochaired by
the OSTP,
OMB, and
CEA, and
by
Finally, the
President should work with Congress to establish a sweeping mod-
ernization of the entire permitting system across all
departments and agencies that
is
aimed
at
reducing
litigation
risk
and
giving
agencies
the
authority
to
establish
programmatic,
general, and
provisional permits.
OFFICE
OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL
POLICY
(ONDCP)
Congress created the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) through
the
Anti-Drug
Abuse
Act
of
198840 to
serve
as
a
coordinative
auxiliary
for
the
Pres-
ident
on all
matters related
to drug
policy. The
next President’s
top drug
policy priority
must be
to address
the current
fentanyl crisis
and reduce
the number
of
overdoses and
fatalities. This
crisis resulted
in the
deaths of
more than
100,000
Americans in 2021.
The
next
Administration
must
reaffirm
a
commitment
to
preventing
drug
use
before it starts, providing treatment that leads to long-term
recovery, and reducing
the
availability
of
illicit
drugs
in
the
United
States.
The
drug
trafficking
environ-
ment
is exponentially
more dynamic
and dangerous
today than
it was
just five
years ago
as powerful
synthetic opioids
(fentanyl and
its analogues)
are mixed
into other drugs of abuse.
Drug trafficking organizations are extremely nimble and
able
to
adapt
quickly
to
federal
government
actions
and
changes
in
user
behavior. Disrupting
the flow
of drugs
across our
borders and
into our
communities is
of paramount
importance, both to save lives and to bolster our public health
efforts. For
these
reasons,
the
Director
of
ONDCP
should
make
it
a
point
to
consult
with federal
border enforcement officials.
The
National
Drug
Control
Program
agencies
represented
a
total
of
$41
billion
in
fiscal
year
2022.
Whereas
the
position
for
overseeing
budget
activities
is
tradi-
tionally
held
by
a
career
official,
it
is
imperative
that
a
political
appointee
lead
the
ONDCP
budget
office
to
ensure
coordination
between
the
OMB
Program
Associate Director
and the
ONDCP
budgetary appointee.
ONDCP
grant-making
activities have
been
controversial over
the years,
par- ticularly
within
conservative
Administrations
concerned that
the White
House lacks
the expertise
to oversee
such programs
directly. The
ONDCP
administers two
grant
programs:
the
Drug-Free
Communities
Support
Program
and
the
High
Intensity
Drug
Trafficking
Areas
Program.
While
it
makes
sense
to
transfer
these programs
eventually
to
the
Department
of
Justice
and
Department
of
Health
and Human
Services,
respectively, it
is vital
that the
ONDCP
Director ensure
in the
immediate
term
that
these
grant
programs
are
funding
the
President’s
drug
control
priorities
and
not
woke
nonprofits
with
leftist
policy
agendas.
Thus,
the
President must
insure
that
the
ONDCP
is
managed
by
political
appointees
who
are
commit- ted
to
the
Administration’s
agenda
and
not
acquiesce
to
management
by
political
or
career
military
personnel
who
oversaw
the
prior
Administration’s
ONDCP.
GENDER POLICY
COUNCIL
(GPC)
The
President
should
immediately
revoke
Executive
Order
1402041 and
every
policy,
including
subregulatory
guidance documents,
produced on
behalf of
or related to the establishment or promotion of the
Gender Policy Council and its
subsidiary
issues.
Abolishing
the
Gender
Policy
Council
would
eliminate
central
promotion of abortion (“health services”); comprehensive
sexuality education
(“education”);
and
the
new
woke
gender
ideology,
which
has
as
a
principal
tenet
“gender affirming care” and
“sex-change” surgeries on minors. In addition to elim-
inating the
council,
developing new
structures
and positions
will have
the dual
effect
of
demonstrating
that
promoting
life
and
strengthening
the
family
is
a
pri- ority
while also
facilitating
more seamless
coordination
and consistency
across the U.S. government.
Specifically,
the
President
should
appoint
a
position/point
of
contact
with
the
rank
of Special Assistant to the President or higher to coordinate
and lead the Pres-
ident’s
domestic priorities on issues related to life and family in
cooperation with the
Domestic
Policy Council.
This position
would be
responsible
for facilitating
meetings, discussions, and
agreements among personnel; coordinating Adminis-
tration policy; and ensuring
agency support for implementation of policies related to
the promotion
of life
and family
in the
United
States.
OFFICE OF
THE VICE
PRESIDENT
(OVP)
The
Vice
President
is
elected
to
the
second
highest
office
in
the
nation
and
plays
a
constitutionally
vital role
as
President-in-waiting.
The Vice
President is
also
the
President
of
the
Senate
and
is
charged
with
breaking
tie
votes
in
that
body.
In
recent
years, the
Vice
President has
been granted
office space
in the
West Wing and
the
Eisenhower Executive
Office
Building.
The
OVP
is
another
one
of
the
levers
that
the
President
should
use
to
execute
his
agenda.
This
is
particularly
true
because
there
is
significant
and
unique
leverage that
the
Vice
President’s
leadership
of
the
OVP
can
evoke
to
shape
policy
discus-
sions and outcomes. Every other
appointed White House official serves at the pleasure
of the
President,
whereas the
Vice
President is
elected, and
the process
for
filling
vacancies
in
that
Article
II
constitutional
office,
which
includes
confir-
mation
of
a
replacement
Vice
President
by
a
majority
of
both
Houses
of
Congress, is
governed by
the
Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.42
The
Vice
President
has
his
or
her
own
economic
advisers,
domestic
policy
and
national
security
staff,
and
daily
intelligence
briefings.
The
Vice
President
should fill
his or
her office
with strong
and sound
policy minds
to
effectively assist
the President in fulfilling his agenda.
The
Vice
President
is
also
a
statutory
member
of
the
National
Security
Council.43 In
theory, in
light of
the fact
that the
Vice
President is
a member
of the
Smithso- nian
Institution’s Board
of Regents,44
there is
nothing to
prevent
Congress from
assigning the
Vice
President additional
statutory
duties.
All of the component councils and
offices discussed in this chapter include real
policy
development and implementation authority, and a robust OVP
should be fully integrated into all policy-formation procedures.
Only a Vice President who
is
deeply
steeped
in
the
interworking
of
the
interagency
and
policy
councils
can
offer
useful
advice
and
prove
helpful
in
accomplishing
the
President’s
agenda.
It
is
also obvious, in view of the fact that many former Vice
Presidents have gone on
to
be elected
President in
their own
right,45
that the
Vice
Presidency can
act as
a training ground for presidential office.
In the past,
the Vice President has been tasked with leading certain
initiatives or issues.
For
example,
Mike
Pence
was
tasked
with
coordinating
the
federal
response
to
COVID-19,
and
both
Pence
and
Kamala
Harris
have
chaired
the
National
Space
Council.
Vice
Presidents
Richard
Cheney
and
Dan
Quayle
were
also
active
on
the
deregulatory
front and
in imposing
regulatory
moratoria. However,
OVP offi-
cials should be fully integrated into each and every process
from the start of a new
Administration
and
not
have
to
wait
to
be
invited
to
join
various
meetings
or
working
groups
on
an
ad
hoc
basis.
For
example,
the
budget
and
regulatory
review
processes
are
linchpins
in
the
execution
of
policy,
and
the
OVP
should
have
a
seat at
the table
through every
phase of
policy
development.
Past Vice
Presidents have also spent significant time abroad serving as a
type of
brand
ambassador for the White House and, more broadly, for the United
States,
announcing
Administration
priorities
and
coordinating
with
heads
of
state
and
other
top
officials
of
foreign
governments.
The
Vice
President,
as
President
of
the
Senate,
often
serves
as
a
presidential
emissary
to
the
Senate
and
thus
can
be
espe-
cially
helpful
in
securing
passage
of
the
President’s
legislative
agenda.
To
the extent
that he
or she
desires, a
Vice President
can have
a direct
role in
shaping
Administration
policy.
A
Vice
President
who
regularly
attends
meetings
and
disperses
staff
across
the
interagency
and
policy
councils
is
a
Vice
President
whose voice will be heard.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
Special thanks
to those
who
contributed to
this chapter:
Stephen Billy,
Scott Pace,
Casey Mulligan, Edie
Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe,
Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige
Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul
Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway,
Valerie Huber, James Rockas,
Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund,
Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin,
Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey
B. Clark,
Jonathan
Wolfson, and
Bob Burkett.
2025 Presidential
Transition
Project
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S. Constitution, Article
II, Section 1,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1
(accessed
January 30, 2023).
2.
James
Madison,
The
Federalist
Papers
No.
47,
January
30,
1788,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/01-10-02-0266
(accessed
January
30,
2023).
3.
31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A)
and
1341(a)(1)(B),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341
(accessed
January
30,
2023);
§
1342,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342
(accessed
January
30,
2023);
and
§
1517(a),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a)
(accessed
January
30,
2023).
4.
President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory
Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993,
in
Federal Register,
Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf
(accessed
March
9,
2023).
5.
Brent
J.
McIntosh,
General
Counsel,
Department
of
the
Treasury,
and
Neomi
Rao,
Administrator,
Office
of
Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the
Treasury and the
Office of Management and
Budget
Review of Tax Regulations
Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018,
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf
(accessed January
31, 2023).
6.
See
Steven
A.
Engel,
Assistant
Attorney
General,
Office
of
Legal
Counsel,
“Extending
Regulatory
Review
Under
Executive
Order
12866
to
Independent
Regulatory
Agencies,”
43
Op.
O.L.C.
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://
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(accessed January
31, 2023).
7.
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Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003,
https://
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(accessed
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8.
President
Donald
J.
Trump,
Executive
Order
13891,
“Promoting
the
Rule
of
Law
Through
Improved
Agency
Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in
Federal
Register,
Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235–
55238,
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.
pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
9.
President
Donald
J.
Trump,
Executive
Order
13771,
“Reducing
Regulation
and
Controlling
Regulatory
Costs,”
January
30, 2017,
in
Federal Register,
Vol. 82,
No. 22
(February 3,
20170, pp.
9339–9341,
https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
10.
President Donald J. Trump,
Executive
Order 13777, “Enforcing the
Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24,
2017,
in
Federal Register,
Vol. 82,
No. 39
(March 1,
2017), pp.
12285–12287,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
11.
See
note
8,
supra.
12.
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the
Rule of Law Through Transparency and
Fairness
in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in
Federal Register,
Vol. 84, No. 199 (October
15,
2019),
pp.
55239–55243,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
13.
President
Donald
J.
Trump,
Executive
Order
13893,
“Increasing
Government
Accountability
for
Administrative
Actions by Reinvigorating
Administrative
PAYGO,”
October 10, 2019, in
Federal
Register,
Vol. 84, No. 200
(October
16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749.
pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
14.
President Donald J. Trump,
Executive
Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,”
May 19,
2020,
in
Federal Register,
Vol. 85,
No. 100
(May 22,
2020), pp.
31353–31356,
esp. 31355,
https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
15.
President
Donald
J.
Trump,
Executive
Order
13979,
“Ensuring
Democratic
Accountability
in
Agency
Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in
Federal
Register,
Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815,
https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
16.
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Americans from Overcriminalization
Through
Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in
Federal Register,
Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021),
pp. 6817–6820,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf
(accessed
January 31, 2023).
Mandate for
Leadership:
The Conservative
Promise
17.
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J. Clinton,
Executive
Order 13132,
“Federalism,”
August 4,
1999, in
Federal Register,
Vol. 64,
No. 153
(August 10, 1999), pp. 43255–43259,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/99-
20729.pdf
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31,
2023).
18.
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Ronald
Reagan,
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12630,
“Governmental
Actions
and
Interference
with
Constitutionally
Protected
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Rights,”
March
15,
1988,
in
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1988),
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115
in
H.R.
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Consolidated
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106-544,
106th
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21,
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2023).
20.
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6410,
Paperwork
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Act
of
1980,
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96th
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11,
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31,
2023).
21.
S.
3418,
An
Act
to
Amend
Title
5,
United
States
Code,
by
Adding
a
Section
552a,
to
Safeguard
Individual
Privacy
from
the
Misuse
of
Federal
Records,
to
Provide
that
Individuals
Be
Granted
Access
to
Records
Concerning
Them
Which
Are
Maintained
by
Federal
Agencies,
to
Establish
a
Privacy
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2023).
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31,
2023),
and
“Guidance
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Grants
and
Agreements,”
Correcting
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2023).
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Accountability Act of 2017,
115th
Congress, introduced April
26, 2017,
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congress/senate-bill/951
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January
31,
2023).
24.
S. 2314, Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology Act (SMART
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2019,
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31,
2023).
25.
H.R. 1605, Guidance Out of Darkness Act (GOOD Act), 117th
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31,
2023).
26.
S. 2804, Early Participation
in
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31,
2023).
27.
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January
31,
2023).
28.
H.R. 277, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act
of 2023 (REINS Act), 118th Congress,
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January
11,
2023,
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(accessed
January
31,
2023).
29.
Subtitle E, “Congressional Review,”
in
H.R. 3136, Contract with
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March 29, 1996,
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January
31,
2023).
30.
H.R.
115,
Midnight
Rules
Relief
Act
of
2023,
118th
Congress,
introduced
January
9,
2023,
https://www.congress.
gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/115/text?s=1&r=18
(accessed
January
31,
2023).
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https://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/engl_258/lecture%20notes/capitalism%20etc%20defined.htm
https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/difference-between-capitalism-socialism-and-communism
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