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with Sen. JohnMc Cain

 

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https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2022/08/19/1384992/much-azov-about-nothing-how-the-ukrainian-neo-nazis-canard-fooled-the-world

 

 

with General Micheal Ryan

THÁNG 9-2024

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NHẬN ĐỊNH - QUAN ĐIỂM

 

Project 2025

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PROJECT

 

 

 

© 2023 by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE Washington, DC 20002

(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org

 

All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America.

 

ISBN: 978-0-89195-174-2


 


Section One

 

 

 

 

  

TAKING THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT

 

A

merica’s Bicentennial, which culminated on July 4, 1976, was a spirited and unifying celebration of our country, its Founding, and its ideals. As we approach our nation’s 250th anniversary, which will take place during the

next presidency, America is now divided between two opposing forces: woke revolu- tionaries and those who believe in the ideals of the American revolution. The former believe that America is—and always has been—“systemically racist” and that it is not worth celebrating and must be fundamentally transformed, largely through a cen- tralized administrative state. The latter believe in America’s history and heroes, its principles and promise, and in everyday Americans and the American way of life. They believe in the Constitution and republican government. Conservatives—the Ameri- canists in this battle—must fight for the soul of America, which is very much at stake. Just two years after the death of the last surviving Constitutional Convention delegate, James Madison, Abraham Lincoln warned that the greatest threat to America would come not from without, but from within. This is evident today: Whether it be mask and vaccine mandates, school and business closures, efforts to keep Americans from driving gas cars or using gas stoves, or efforts to defund the police, indoctrinate schoolchildren, alter beloved books, abridge free speech, undermine the colorblind ideal, or deny the biological reality that there are only two sexes, the Left’s steady stream of insanity appears to be never-ending. The next Administration must stand up for American ideals, American families, and

American culture—all things in which, thankfully, most Americans still believe. Highlighting this need, former director of the Office of Management and Budget

Russ Vought writes in Chapter 2, “The modern conservative President’s task is to


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people.” At the core of this goal is the work of the White House and the central personnel agencies. Article II of the Constitution vests all federal executive power in a Pres- ident, made accountable to the citizenry through regular elections. Our Founders wrote, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Accordingly, Vought writes, “it is the President’s agenda that should matter to the departments and agencies,” not their own.

Yet the federal bureaucracy has a mind of its own. Federal employees are often ideologically aligned—not with the majority of the American people—but with one another, posing a profound problem for republican government, a government “of, by, and for” the people. As Donald Devine, Dennis Kirk, and Paul Dans write in Chapter 3, “An autonomous bureaucracy has neither independent constitu- tional status nor separate moral legitimacy.” Byzantine personnel rules provide the bureaucrats with their chief means of self-protection. What’s more, knowledge of such rules is used to thwart the President’s appointees and agenda. As Devine, Kirk, and Dans write, “Managing the immense bureaucracy of the federal government is impossible without an understanding of the key central personnel agencies and their governing laws and regulations.”

Many of these laws and regulations governing a largely underworked, over- compensated, and unaccountable federal civilian workforce are so irrational that they would be comical in a less important context. This is true whether it comes to evaluating employees’ performance or hiring new employees. Only in the federal government could an applicant in the hiring process be sent to the front of the line because of a “history of drug addiction” or “alcoholism,” or due to “morbid obesity,” “irritable bowel syndrome,” or a “psychiatric disorder.” The next Admin- istration should insist that the federal government’s hiring, evaluation, retention, and compensation practices benefit taxpayers, rather than benefiting the lowest rung of the federal workforce.

In order to carry out the President’s desires, political appointees must be given the tools, knowledge, and support to overcome the federal government’s obstructionist Human Resources departments. More fundamentally, the new Administration must fill its ranks with political appointees. Devine, Kirk, and Dans observe that “the Trump Administration appointed fewer political appointees in its first few months in office” than any other recent presidency. This left career employees in charge in many places. This can occur even after departments have been fully staffed with political appointees. Vought writes that the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should establish a “reputation as the keeper of ‘commander’s intent,’” yet OMB is dominated by career employees who often try to overrule political appointees serving in the various executive depart- ments. Empowering political appointees across the Administration is crucial to a President’s success.


 

Above all, the President and those who serve under him or her must be commit- ted to the Constitution and the rule of law. This is particularly true of a conservative Administration, which knows that the President is there to uphold the Constitu- tion, not the other way around. If a conservative Administration does not respect the Constitution, no Administration will. In Chapter 1, former deputy chief of staff to the President Rick Dearborn writes that the White House Counsel “must take seriously the duty to protect the powers and privileges of the President from encroachments by Congress, the judiciary, and the administrative components of departments and agencies.” Equally important, the President must enforce the Constitution and laws as written, rather than proclaiming new “law” unilaterally. Presidents should not issue mask or vaccine mandates, arbitrarily transfer student loan debt, or issue monarchical mandates of any sort. Legislatures make the laws in a republic, not executives.

It is crucial that all three branches of the federal government respect what Mad- ison called the “double security” to our liberties: the separation of powers among the three branches, and the separation of powers between the federal government and the states. This double security has been greatly compromised over the years. Vought writes that “the modern executive branch…writes federal policy, enforces that policy, and often adjudicates whether that policy was properly drafted and enforced.” He describes this as “constitutionally dire” and “in urgent need of repair,” adding: “Nothing less than the survival of self-governance in America is at stake.” When it comes to ensuring that freedom can flourish, nothing is more import- ant than deconstructing the centralized administrative state. Political appointees who are answerable to the President and have decision-making authority in the executive branch are key to this essential task. The next Administration must not cede such authority to non-partisan “experts,” who pursue their own ends while engaging in groupthink, insulated from American voters. The following chapters detail how the next Administration can be responsive to the American people (not to entrenched “elites”); how it can take care that all the laws are “faithfully exe- cuted,” not merely those that the President desires to see executed; and how it can

achieve results and not be stymied by an unelected bureaucracy.


 


1

 

 

 

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Rick Dearborn

 

 

F

 
rom popular culture to academia, the American presidency has long been a prominent fixture of the national imagination—naturally so since it is the beating heart of our nation’s power and prestige. It has played, for instance,

a feature role in innumerable movies and television shows and has been prodded, analyzed, and critiqued by countless books, essays, and studies. But like nearly everything else in life, there is no substitute for firsthand experience, which this manual has compiled from the experience of presidential appointees and provides in accessible form for future use.

With respect to the presidency, it is best to begin with our Republic’s founda- tional document. The Constitution gives the “executive Power” to the President.1 It designates him as “Commander in Chief”2 and gives him the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”3 It further prescribes that the President might seek the assistance of “the principal Officer in each of the execu- tive Departments.”4 Beginning with George Washington, every President has been supported by some form of White House office consisting of direct staff officers as well as a Cabinet comprised of department and agency heads.

Since the inaugural Administration of the late 18th century, citizens have chosen to devote both their time and their talent to defending and strengthening our nation by serving at the pleasure of the President. Their shared patriotic endeavor has proven to be a noble one, not least because the jobs in what is now known as the White House Office (WHO) are among the most demanding in all of government.

The President must rely on the men and women appointed to the WHO. There simply are not enough hours in the day to manage the affairs of state single-handedly,


so delegation is not just advisable: It is essential. The decisions that assistants and senior advisers make will directly impact the Administration, its legacy, and—most important—the fate of the country. Their agenda must therefore be the President’s agenda. Choosing who will carry out that agenda on a daily basis is not only one of the first decisions a President makes in office, but also one of the most critical. The tone and tempo of an administration are often determined on January 20.

 

CHIEF OF STAFF

As with most of the positions that will be covered in this first chapter, the Chief of Staff is also an Assistant to the President. However, the chief is truly first among equals. Of all presidential staff members, the chief is the most critical to implementa- tion of the President’s vision for the country. The chief also has a dual role as manager of the staffs of both the WHO and the Executive Office of the President (EOP).5

The Chief of Staff’s first managerial task is to establish an organizational chart for the WHO. It should be simple and contain clear lines of authority and respon- sibility to avoid conflicts. It should also identify specific points of contact for each element of the government outside of the White House. These contacts should include the White House Liaisons who are selected by the Office of Presidential Personnel (PPO).

Receiving guidance from the President, the chief endeavors to implement the President’s agenda by setting priorities for the WHO. This process begins by taking stock of the President’s campaign promises, identifying current and prospective opportunities, and then delegating policy priorities among the departments and agencies of the Cabinet and throughout the three White House policy councils:

   The National Economic Council (NEC);

   The Domestic Policy Council (DPC); and

   The National Security Council (NSC).

The President is briefed on all of his policy priorities by his Cabinet and senior staff as directed by the chief. The chief—along with senior WHO staff—maps out the issues and themes that will be covered daily and weekly. The chief then works with the policy councils, the Cabinet, and the Office of Communications and Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) to sequence and execute the rollout of policies and announcements. White House Counsel and senior advisers and senior counselors are also intimately involved.

All senior staff report to the Chief of Staff, either directly or through his two or three deputies, unless the President determines that a particular Assistant to the President reports directly to him. Most chiefs have interacted directly with Cabinet officers and a select number of direct reports. In most cases, the direct reports to the chief are his two or three deputies, the Communications Director, PPO Director, White House Counsel, and senior advisers. Occasionally, the Office of Public Liaison (OPL), the Cabinet Secretary, and Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) also report directly to the chief. Usually, however, they report instead to a Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Chief of Staff’s main challenge is time management. His use of his deputies, meetings with senior staff, and direction provided to the WHO must all balance with the daily needs of the President. A successful chief steers the West Wing using his management of and influence with the various individuals and entities around him. It goes without saying that selecting the right person to be chief is vital.

 

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

In recent years, Presidents typically have appointed two Deputy Chiefs of Staff: a Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations and a Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. There also have been other types of deputy chiefs whose roles have included, for example, overseeing strategy, planning, and implementation. Chiefs of Staff have then occasionally appointed a principal Deputy Chief to be in charge of guiding decision-making, organizational structure, and information flow.

 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

Not all Chiefs of Staff have tapped a principal deputy. A major reason is that doing so adds another layer of command complexity. When principal deputies have been installed, their roles have varied based on the needs of particular chiefs. Most principal deputies have functioned as doorkeepers, sorting through action items, taking on those that can be handled at their own level, and passing up others that truly require the attention of the Chief of Staff or the President. Principal deputies also have assumed control of the scheduling functions, normally under the operations deputy, and have worked directly with the policy councils at the direction of the Chief of Staff. The OPL and Office of Political Affairs (OPA) also

have reported to a principal deputy.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations oversees the President’s schedule and all logistical aspects of his movement within and outside of the White House (for example, both air travel on Air Force One and Marine One and ground transpor- tation). This deputy also interfaces directly with the Secret Service as well as the military offices tasked with keeping the President and his family safe.

In the past, this deputy has also worked with the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Intelligence Community and on advancing all foreign trips. If their roles are separated from that of the policy deputy, this deputy should have a strong grasp of international affairs and robust foreign policy credentials.


This deputy further manages all facets of the working White House: technology, grounds management, support staff, personnel administration, and communica- tions. This individual therefore needs to be meticulous and ideally should possess a great deal of command-and-control experience.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. In some Administrations, the functions of the IGA, OPA, and OPL and other advisers within the WHO have fallen under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. For conservatives, this arrangement could help to connect the WHO’s outreach to political and external groups and be a strong conduit for state and local elected officials, state party organizations, and both grasstop and grassroots groups.

This deputy chief works directly with the Chief of Staff, Cabinet officers, and all three policy councils to support the development and implementation of the President’s agenda. This deputy chief should therefore have impressive policy cre- dentials in the realms of economic, domestic, and social affairs.

 

SENIOR ADVISERS

Presidents have surrounded themselves with senior advisers whose experi- ence and interests are not necessarily neatly defined. In recent Administrations, senior advisers have been appointed to offer broad guidance on political matters and communications issues; others have acted as “czars” for specific projects or policy areas.

The most powerful senior advisers frequently have had a long personal relation- ship with the President and often have spent a significant amount of time with him within and outside of the White House. They have been asked not only to provide guidance on a variety of policy issues, but also to offer instruction on communi- cating with the American people and the media.

In a number of Administrations, new offices—or “councils”—have been created to support senior advisers. For the most part, their functions have been duplicative or overlapping, as a result of which these offices have tended to be short-lived. Even so, senior advisers should be provided the staff and resources that their portfo- lios require. To ensure that senior advisers are effective, their portfolios must be clearly delineated and clearly communicated across the White House. This too is a responsibility of the Chief of Staff.

 

OFFICE OF WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL

The Office of White House Counsel provides legal guidance to the President and elements of the EOP on a host of issues, including presidential powers and privi- leges, ethics compliance, review of clemency applications, and judicial nominations. The selection of White House Counsel is one of the most important decisions an incoming President will make. The office is not designed to create or advance pol- icies on its own initiative—nor should it do so. Rather, it is dedicated to guiding the President and his reports on how (within the bounds of the law) to pursue and realize the President’s agenda.

While the White House Counsel does not serve as the President’s personal attor- ney in nonofficial matters, it is almost impossible to delineate exactly where an issue is strictly personal and has no bearing on the President’s official function. The White House Counsel needs to be deeply committed both to the President’s agenda and to affording the President proactive counsel and zealous representation. That individual directly advises the President as he performs the duties of the office, and this requires a relationship that is built on trust, confidentiality, and candor.

The Office of White House Counsel is also responsible for ensuring that each component of the White House adheres to all applicable legal and ethical guide- lines, which often requires ongoing training and monitoring to ensure compliance. This means ensuring that White House staff regularly consult with office attor- neys on required financial disclosures, received gifts, potential conflicts of interest, and other ethical concerns. The Office of White House Counsel is the first line of defense for the EOP. Its staff must take seriously the duty to protect the powers and privileges of the President from encroachments by Congress, the judiciary, and the administrative components of departments and agencies.

In addition to the White House Counsel, the office includes deputies, assistants, associates, and legal support staff. The assistant and associate attorneys are often specialists in particular areas of the law and offer guidance to the EOP on issues related to national security, criminal law, environmental law, and a host of admin- istrative and regulatory matters. Attorneys working in the Office of White House Counsel serve as legal advisers to the White House policy operation by reviewing executive orders, agency regulations, and other policy-related functions. Here again, subordinates should be deeply committed to the President’s agenda and see their role as helping to accomplish the agenda through problem solving and advocacy. They should not erect roadblocks out of an abundance of caution; rather, they should offer practical legal advice on how to promote the President’s agenda within the bounds of the law.

The White House Counsel’s office cannot serve as a finishing school to credential the next set of white-shoe law firm attorneys or federal judges in waiting who cabin their opinions for fear their elite credentials could be tarnished through a policy disagreement. Rather, it should function more as an activist yet ethical plaintiffs’ firm that advocates for its client—the Administration’s agenda—within the limits imposed by the Constitution and the duties of the legal profession.

The Office of White House Counsel also serves as the primary gateway for communication between the White House and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Traditionally, both the White House Counsel and the Attorney General have issued a memo requiring all contact between the two institutions to occur only between the Office of White House Counsel and the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney


General. The next Administration should reexamine this policy and determine whether it might be more efficient or more appropriate for communication to occur through additional channels. The White House Counsel also works closely with the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel to seek opinions on, for example, matters of policy development and the constitutionality of presidential power and privileges and with OLA and the DOJ Office of Legal Policy on presidential judicial nominees.

When a new President takes office, he will need to decide expeditiously how to handle any major ongoing litigation or other pending legal matters that might pres- ent a challenge to his agenda. To offer guidance, the White House Counsel must get up to speed as quickly as possible on all significant ongoing legal challenges across the executive branch that might affect the new Administration’s policy agenda and must be prepared at the outset of the Administration to present recommenda- tions to the President, including recommendations for reconsidering or reversing positions of the previous Administration in any significant litigation. This review will usually require consulting with the new political leadership at the Justice Department, including during the transition period.

No day is predictable at the White House. Therefore, to handle the pace and volatility of affairs, the Office of White House Counsel must offer measured legal guidance in a timely manner. This often means forgoing law review–style memos about esoteric legal concepts and instead quickly providing high-level yet incisive guidance. Due to evolving world events, domestic affairs, and political pressures, the office often faces legal questions for which there may not be a wealth of precedent. Attorneys in the Office of White House Counsel must therefore work collaboratively within the White House and the Department of Justice, relying on each other as a team, to ensure that proper legal guidance is delivered to the President.

The President should choose a White House Counsel who is well-versed in the Constitution, administrative and regulatory law, and the inner workings of Congress and the political process. Instead of choosing a specialist, the President should hire a counsel with extensive experience with a wide range of complex legal subjects. Moreover, while a candidate with elite credentials might seem ideal, the best one will be above all loyal to the President and the Constitution.

STAFF SECRETARY

The Office of the Staff Secretary is rarely visible to the outside world, but it performs work of tremendous importance. The office is similar to a military com- mander’s adjutant as it is responsible for fielding and managing a vast amount of information at the top of its organization. This includes information on its way into the Oval Office as well as information flowing out from the Oval Office. Because of its gatekeeping function, the position of Staff Secretary is one of extreme trust, and the individual who possesses it should be vetted to work as an “honest broker” in the President’s service.


The Office of the Staff Secretary has been described as the last substantive control point before papers reach the Oval Office. A great deal of information is headed toward the Oval Office at any moment. This includes presidential decision memos; bills passed by Congress (which may be accompanied by signing or veto statements); and briefing books, reading materials, samples of constituent mail, personal mail, and drafts of speeches. The Staff Secretary makes certain that these materials are complete, well-ordered, and up to date before they reach the Presi- dent. This necessarily means that the Staff Secretary plays a key role in determining who weighs in on policy matters and when.

As noted above, the Staff Secretary also handles information leaving the Oval Office. The President may have questions after reviewing incoming material, may wish to seek more information, or may demand revisions. The Staff Secretary is often responsible for directing these requests to the appropriate places and fol- lowing up on them to ensure that they are completed.

One of the Staff Secretary’s critical functions is managing and overseeing the clearance process for the President’s daily/nightly briefing book. This book is filled with all the reading material and leading documentation the President needs in the morning and the evening to help him make decisions. The Staff Secretary also oversees the use of the President’s signature, whether by hand or by autopen, and manages the Office of the Executive Clerk, Office of Records Management, and Office of Presidential Correspondence.

 

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

The Office of Communications, which operates under the Director of Com- munications, conveys the President’s agenda to the public through various media, including speeches and remarks, press briefings, off-the-record discussions with reporters, and social media. Depending on how a President chooses to structure his White House, the Office of Communications may include the Office of the Press Secretary (Press Office), but no matter how it is structured, the office must work closely with the Press Office as well as the President’s speechwriters and digital strategists.

Operational functions of the Office of Communications include scheduling and running press briefings, interviews, meetings, media appearances, speeches, and a range of other events. The Office of Communications must maintain robust rela- tionships with the White House Press Corps, the White House Correspondents’ Association, regional stakeholders, and key interest groups. No legal entitle- ment exists for the provision of permanent space for media on the White House campus, and the next Administration should reexamine the balance between media demands and space constraints on the White House premises.

Leadership within the Office of Communications should include a Com- munications Director (who is a direct report to the Chief of Staff ), a Deputy

Communications Director, a Deputy Director for Strategic Communications, and a Press Secretary. This leadership team must work together closely to drive the national narrative about the White House.

The best resource for the Office of Communications is the President. The Pres- ident conveys the White House’s overall message through one or two inaugural addresses, State of the Union addresses, speeches to Congress, and press confer- ences. The office must also ensure that the various White House offices disseminate a unified message to the public. The Communications Director and Press Secretary in particular should be careful to avoid contradicting the President or delivering conflicting information.

The speechwriting team is a critical component of the communications team. Speechwriting is a unique talent: The writers selected must understand policy, should have a firm grasp of history and other liberal-arts disciplines, and should be able to learn and adopt the President’s style of rhetoric and mode of delivery.

The Press Secretary is the President’s spokesperson, communicating to the American people through the media. The Press Secretary engages with the White House Press Corps formally through press briefings and informally through impromptu gaggles and meetings. Individuals who serve in this role must be quick on their feet, which means, when appropriate, deftly refuting and rebutting corre- spondents’ questions and comments.

The Communications Director must convey the President’s mission to the American people. Especially for conservatives, this means navigating the main- stream media to ensure that the President’s agenda is conveyed effectively and accurately. The Communications Director must be politically savvy and very aware of the ongoing activities of the other White House offices. The new Administration should examine the nature of the relationship between itself and the White House Correspondents Association and consider whether an alternative coordinating body might be more suitable.

 

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA)

Created by President Dwight Eisenhower, the OLA has continued to serve as the liaison between the White House and Congress. The White House must work with congressional leaders to ensure presidential nominees, for roles such as Cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, are confirmed by the Senate. The White House also relies on Congress to enact reforms promised by the President on the campaign trail, whether those promises relate to health care, education, or national defense. Because Congress holds the power of the purse, White House staffers must ensure that there is enough support on the Hill to secure the necessary funding through the appropriations process to fulfill the President’s agenda.

The OLA reports directly to the Chief of Staff and in some Administrations has done so under the guidance of a Deputy Chief of Staff (usually the Deputy Chief

for Policy). Regardless of the person to whom the OLA reports, however, the office exercises a certain autonomy on behalf of the President and the Chief of Staff in directly influencing congressional leaders of both major political parties. The OLA often must function as the mediator among the parties and find common ground to facilitate the successful enactment of the President’s agenda.

As is the case with many White House offices (but especially the Office of Com- munications), the OLA must ensure that congressional leaders receive one unified message. If other actors within the White House maintain their own relationships with congressional leaders and staffers, it may appear that the President’s agenda is fractured and lacks consensus. This dynamic has caused real problems for many Presidents in the past.

Internally, OLA staffers need to be involved in policy discussions, budget reviews, and other important meetings. They must also provide advice to policy staffers regarding whether certain ideas are politically feasible. Externally, OLA staffers have to communicate continuously with congressional offices of both parties in both the House and the Senate to ensure that the President has enough support to enact his legislative priorities or sustain votes.

The OLA requires staffers who are effective communicators and can provide a dose of reality to other White House staffers when necessary. Although a policy proposal from within the White House may be a great idea, OLA staffers must ensure that it is politically feasible. OLA staffers must therefore be skilled in both politics and policy. Furthermore, the President should seek out individuals who can advance his agenda and at the same time forge pathways with members of the opposing political party on other priorities.

Most important, the OLA must function as a well-oiled machine: precisely synced. The President cannot afford to have a tennis player on—much less as the leader of—his football team.

 

OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL PERSONNEL (PPO)

The political axiom that “personnel is policy” was popularized under President Ronald Reagan during the 1981 presidential transition. One of the most important offices in the White House is the PPO, which was created under President Richard Nixon to centralize political appointments. Departments and agencies had and still have direct legal authority on hiring and firing, but the power to fill Schedule C posi- tions—the core of political jobs—is vested with the President. Therefore, the White House, not the department or agency, has the final word on political appointments. PPO’s primary responsibility is to staff the executive branch with individuals who are equipped to implement the President’s agenda. Although its focus should be identifying and recruiting leaders to fill the approximately 1,000 appointments that require Senate confirmation, PPO must also fill approximately 3,000 political jobs that require dedicated conservatives to support the Administration’s political leadership.

Frequently, many medium-tier and top-tier jobs have been filled by policy experts tasked with accomplishing much of the work of the Administration. At the same time, appointees in the entry-level jobs have brought invaluable energy and commitment to the White House and have proved to be the “farm team” for the conservative movement.

The Office of Presidential Personnel is responsible for:

   Identifying potential political personnel both actively through recruitment and passively by fielding resumes and adjudicating requests from

political actors.

   Vetting potential political personnel by conducting political background checks and reviewing any clearance and fitness assessments by departments and agencies.

   Making recommendations to the President and to other appointment authorities on behalf of the President.

   Identifying programmatic political workforce needs early and developing plans (for example, Schedule F).

   Maintaining a strong relationship with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) both for operational purposes and to effectuate the President’s direct Title 5 authorities. The President is in charge of the federal workforce and exercises control principally by working through the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.

   Training and connecting political personnel.

   Playing “bad cop” in a way that other White House offices cannot (including serving as the office that takes direct responsibility for firings and hirings).

   Serving as a personnel link between conservative organizations and the executive branch.

In most Administrations, PPO will staff more than 100 positions during a transi- tion and thousands of noncareer positions during the President’s first term. Direct authority and a strong relationship with the President are necessary attributes for any PPO Director. Historically, PPO has had direct review and control of personnel files, including security clearance dossiers.


At the highest level, PPO is tasked with long-term, strategic workforce devel- opment. The “billets” of political appointments are of immense importance in credentialing and training future leaders. In addition, whatever one’s view of the constitutionality of various civil service rules (for example, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 19986) might be, it is necessary to ensure that departments and agencies have robust cadres of political staff just below senior levels in the event of unexpected vacancies.

 

OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (OPA)

The OPA is the primary office within the executive branch for managing the President’s political interests. Although its specific functions vary from Admin- istration to Administration, the OPA typically serves as the liaison between the President and associated political entities: national committees, federal and state campaigns, and interest groups. Within legal guidelines, the OPA engages in out- reach, conducts casework, and—if the President is up for reelection—assists with his campaign. The OPA may also monitor congressional campaigns, arrange pres- idential visits with other political campaigns, and recommend campaign staff to the Office of Presidential Personnel for service in the executive branch.

The OPA further serves as a line of communication between the White House and the President’s political party. This includes both relaying the President’s ambitions to political interests and listening to the needs of political interests. This relationship allows for the exchange of information between the White House and political actors across the country. The OPA should have one director of political affairs who reports either to the Chief of Staff or to a Deputy Chief of Staff. The OPA should also include various deputy directors, each of whom is responsible for a certain geographical region of the country.

Because nearly all White House activities are in some way inherently political, the OPA needs to be aware of all presidential actions and activities—including travel, policy decisions, speeches, nominations, and responses to matters of national security—and consider how they might affect the President’s image. The OPA must therefore have a designated staffer who communicates not only with other White House offices, but also with the Cabinet and executive branch agencies.

 

OFFICE OF CABINET AFFAIRS (OCA)

The OCA’s role has changed to some degree over the course of various Adminis- trations, but its overriding function remains the same: to ensure the coordination of policy and communication between the White House and the Cabinet. Most important, the OCA coordinates all Cabinet meetings with the President. It should also organize and administer regular meetings of the Deputy Secretaries because they also typically serve vital roles in the departments and agencies and, further, often become acting secretaries when Cabinet members resign.

There should be one Cabinet Secretary who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy chief, according to the chief’s preference and focus. The Cabinet Secretary maintains a direct relationship with all members of the Cabinet.

The OCA further consists of deputies and special assistants who work with each department’s principal, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other senior staff. The OCA also connects the departments to WHO offices.

The OCA coordinates with the Chief of Staff’s office and the Office of Communi- cations to promote the President’s agenda through the Cabinet departments and agencies. The Cabinet’s communications staffers are obviously another critical component of this operation.

In prior Administrations, the OCA has played a vital role by tracking the Pres- ident’s agenda for the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs, and senior advisers. It has worked with each department and agency to advance policy priorities. In the future, amplifying this function would truly benefit both the President and the conser- vative movement.

From time to time throughout an Administration, travel optics, ethics chal- lenges, and Hatch Act7 issues involving Cabinet members, deputies, and senior staffers can arise. The OCA is normally tasked with keeping the WHO informed of such developments and providing support if and when necessary.

The ideal Cabinet Secretary will have exceptional organizational skills and be a seasoned political operative or attorney. Because many Cabinet officials have been former presidential candidates, governors, ambassadors, and Members of Congress, the ideal candidate should also possess the ability to interact with and persuade accomplished individuals.

 

OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON (OPL)

The OPL is critically important in building coalitions and support for the Pres- ident’s agenda across every aligned social, faith-based, minority, and economic interest group. It is a critical tool for shaping public opinion and keeping myriad supporters, as well as “frenemies” and opponents alike who are within reach, better informed.

The OPL is a notably large office. It should have one Director who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy, according to the chief’s preference and focus. The Director must maintain relationships not only with other WHO heads, but also with the senior staff of every Cabinet department and agency. Since a President’s agenda is always in motion, it is important for the OPL to facilitate listening sessions to receive the views of the various leaders and mem- bers of key interest groups.

The OPL should also have a sufficient number of deputies and special assistants to cover the vast number of disparate interest groups that are engaged daily. The


OPL has, by far, held more meetings in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB) and within the West Wing itself than any other office within the WHO.

The OPL is the chief White House enforcer and gatekeeper among these var- ious interest groups. It has operated best whenever the Chief of Staff has given it permission to use both the proverbial “carrot” and the proverbial “stick.” To make this work, communication with the chief’s office is vital. Additionally, the OPL has had an outsized role in presidential scheduling and both official and political travel. The OPL Director should come from the President’s election campaign or Cap- itol Hill—but should not have deeply entrenched connections to a K Street entity or any other potential stakeholder. Some prior relationships can create real or perceived biases toward one group or another. The Director should be amiable, gregarious, highly organized, and willing to shoulder criticism and pushback from

interest groups and other elements of the Administration.

Unlike the Director, OPL deputies and special assistants need a deep under- standing of the capital, from K Street to Capitol Hill. They should have extensive experience in private industry, the labor sector, the conservative movement, and among the specific interest groups with which they will be asked to engage on behalf of the White House.

OPL staffers work with more external and internal parties than any other WHO staffers. In turn, they must be effective communicators and initiative-takers. They must also be able to influence, persuade, and—most important—listen to various stakeholders and ensure that they feel heard. All OPL staffers must understand from the outset that their jobs might be modified or even phased out entirely as the Administration’s priorities change.

 

OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (IGA)

The IGA connects the White House to state, county, local, and tribal govern- ments. In other words, it is the one-stop shop for disseminating an Administration’s agenda to all non–federal government entities.

The IGA should have a Director to whom one or two Deputy Directors report. The Director must ensure that the White House remains connected to all non– federal government entities. The interests and perspectives of these entities are represented in policy discussions, organized events with the West Wing, EOP senior staff, and IGA staff throughout the departments and agencies.

The IGA can be staffed in a variety of ways, but two arrangements are most common:

   Each deputy and that deputy’s staffers are responsible for a type of government.

   A group of staffers is responsible for a specific geographical region of the country.

The IGA, as suggested above, represents the interests and perspectives of non– federal government entities, but its primary job is to make sure that these entities understand an Administration’s agenda and ultimately support it.

The IGA must work with all other White House offices, especially the OPA and the OPL, and manage its staff throughout the departments and agencies. IGA staff- ers must therefore have communication skills, understand political nuance, and be willing to engage in complex policy discussions. They should also be not just generally responsive, but also proactive in seeking out the interests and perspec- tives of non–federal government entities.

 

WHITE HOUSE POLICY COUNCILS

As the federal government has ballooned in size over the past century, it has become increasingly difficult for the President alone to direct his agenda across the executive branch. Three White House policy councils have come into existence to help the President to control the bureaucracy and ensure continued alignment between agency leadership and White House priorities. Those councils—as pre- viewed above—are the NSC, NEC, and DPC. Each is headed by an Assistant to the President and performs three significant functions.

   Policy Coordination. The primary role of the policy councils is to coordinate the development of Administration policy. This frequently includes developing significant legislative priorities, coordinating policy decisions that impact multiple departments and agencies, and at times coordinating policy decisions within a single department or agency. This process must ensure that all relevant offices are included; that competing or conflicting opinions are thoroughly discussed and evaluated; and, when there is disagreement among White House senior staff or among Cabinet members, a well-structured question is presented to the President for an intermediate or final decision.

   Policy Advice. By virtue of working in the White House, the heads of the three policy councils will also function as independent policy advisers to the President. This aspect of the role will vary depending on the individual in this position and the President’s governing philosophy. Incumbents have ranged from “honest brokers,” who mostly coordinate and ensure that all opinions are fairly presented to the President, to “policy deciders,” who largely drive a given policy topic on behalf of the President.

   Policy Implementation. The policy councils also manage and mediate the implementation of previous policy decisions. Implementation of a new statute or an executive order frequently takes years and involves many distinct and more granular policy decisions along the way. It is essential to have a centralized process for evaluating and coordinating these decisions, especially if they involve more than one Cabinet department or agency with differing opinions on the best approach for securing the President’s goals.

The above functions have recently been managed by policy councils through a tiered interagency policy process. This process helps to identify differences of opinion and reach a decision without having to take every issue to the President. It can be used to address a single question or monitor a recurring issue on an ongoing basis. Typically, the process involves multiple Cabinet departments and agencies that have a pertinent role, policy interest, or disagreement. Each policy council’s process could involve the following committees:

   Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). A PCC is led by a Special Assistant to the President from the policy council and includes political Assistant Secretary–level experts from the relevant departments, agencies, or offices. The purpose is to determine where consensus exists, clearly identify where there are differing opinions, and develop options for resolving the remaining questions. If no outstanding questions or disagreements exist, the PCC may resolve the issue and move toward implementation at the agency level.

   Deputies Committee (DC). A DC is a meeting of presidentially appointed executives chaired by the policy council’s Deputy Assistant to the President and relevant Deputy Secretaries. It evaluates the options produced by the PCC and frequently directs the PCC to add, expand, or reevaluate an option or even to reach a compromise and resolve an issue at that level.

   Principals Committee (PC). When questions are not resolved by a DC, the Director of the Policy Council will chair a PC, which is attended by the relevant Cabinet Secretaries and senior White House political staff. This is the final opportunity for the President’s most senior advisers to discuss the question, make sure that each principal’s position is carefully understood, and see whether consensus or a compromise might be reached. If not,

the Chief of Staff’s office will schedule time for the PC to meet with the President for a final decision.

Despite having seemingly clear and separate portfolios, the three policy coun- cils frequently have areas of overlap, which can result in confusion, duplication, or conflict. For example, there are the areas of immigration and border security (either NSC or DPC); health care, energy, and environment (either NEC or DPC); and trade and international economic policy (either NSC or NEC). Identifying these potentially problematic areas and assigning policy responsibilities to only one council where possible will help to speed up the policy-coordination process. While other chapters will cover specific policy goals for each department or agency, incoming policy councils will need to move rapidly to lead policy processes around cross-cutting agency topics, including countering China, enforcing immi- gration laws, reversing regulatory policies in order to promote energy production, combating the Left’s aggressive attacks on life and religious liberty, and confronting

“wokeism” throughout the federal government.

National Security Council. The NSC is intended to be an interdepartmen- tal body within the White House that can set national security policy with a whole-of-government approach. Unlike the other policy councils, the NSC was established by statute.8 Statutory members and advisers who are currently part of the NSC include the President and Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of National Intelligence.9

The NSC staff, and particularly the National Security Adviser, should be vetted for foreign and security policy experience and insight. The National Secu- rity Adviser and NSC staff advise the President on matters of foreign policy and national security, serve as an information conduit in times of crisis, and as liaisons ensuring that written communications are properly shared among NSC members. Special attention should be given to the use of detailees to staff the NSC. In recent years, the NSC’s staff size has been rightsized from its peak of 400 in 2015 down to 100–150 professional members. The next Administration should try to

limit the number of detailees to ensure more direct presidential control.

National Economic Council. The NEC was established in 1993 by executive order and has four key functions:

   To “coordinate the economic policy-making process with respect to domestic and international economic issues.”

   To “coordinate economic policy advice to the President.”

   To “ensure that policy decisions and programs are consistent with the President’s stated goals” and “that those goals are being effectively pursued.”

   To “monitor implementation of the President’s economic policy agenda.”10

The NEC Director coordinates and implements the President’s economic policy objectives by working with Cabinet secretaries, their departments, and multiple

agencies. The Director is supported by a staff of policy experts in various fields, including infrastructure, manufacturing, research and development, agriculture, small business, financial regulation, housing, technology and innovation, and fiscal policy.

The NEC considers economic policy matters, and the DPC typically considers anything related to domestic matters with the exception of economic policy mat- ters. It also differs from the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). Whereas the NEC is in charge of policy development, the CEA acts as the White House’s internal research arm for economic analysis.

It is therefore critically important to find people with the right qualifica- tions to head both the NEC and the CEA. The CEA is almost always led by a well-known academic economist, and the NEC is regularly led by someone with expertise in directing the President’s economic policy process. Those who have served in the role have ranged from former CEOs of the nation’s largest invest- ment firms to financial-services industry managers to seasoned congressional staffers who have managed the economic policy issues for top financial and tax-writing committees.

Domestic Policy Council. The Domestic Policy Council (DPC) consists of advisers to the President on noneconomic domestic policy issues as well as inter- national issues with a significant domestic component (such as immigration). It is one of the primary policy councils serving the President along with the NSC and NEC. The Director serves as the principal DPC adviser to the President, along with members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Director chairs the committee respon- sible for coordinating domestic policy development at the Deputy Secretary level. In this respect, both the Director and the Deputy Director have critical institu- tional functions that affect the development of domestic policy throughout the Administration.

The DPC also has policy experts (for example, Special Assistants to the Presi- dent or SAPs) who are responsible for developing and coordinating, as well as for advising the President, on specific issues. It is essential that DPC policy expertise reflect the most prominent issues that are before the Administration: issues such as the environment, health care, housing, and immigration. In addition, DPC SAPs should demonstrate a working knowledge of the rulemaking process (although they need not necessarily be experts on regulation) because a working knowledge of the rulemaking process will facilitate the DPC’s effectiveness in coordinating Administration policy.

The DPC also needs to work closely with other offices within the Executive Office of the President to promote economic opportunity and private-sector inno- vation. This includes working with the Office of Management and Budget and its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as well as the Council of Economic Advisers, Council on Environmental Quality, and Office of Science and Technology Policy. To this end, the Director should chair a standing meeting with the princi- pals from each of the other EOP offices to enhance coordination from within the White House.

Several areas will be especially important as the DPC works to develop a well-defined domestic policy agenda. One is the promotion of innovation as a foundation for economic growth and opportunity. The President should establish an economic opportunity working group, chaired by the DPC Director, to coordi- nate the development of policies that promote economic opportunity. Another important area is the promotion of health care reform to bring down costs for the American people and the pressure that spending on health programs puts on the federal budget. Finally, DPC should coordinate with the NSC on a policy agenda to enhance border security.

 

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT (OVP)

In modern U.S. history, the Vice President has acted as a significant adviser to the President. Once elected, the VP helps to promote and, in many instances, put into place and execute the President’s agenda. The President may additionally determine the inclusion of OVP staff in White House meetings, including Policy Coordinating Committee, Deputies Committee, and Principals Committee dis- cussions as has been done in various recent Administrations.

Recent Presidents have decided to give Vice Presidents space in the West Wing. The VP’s proximity to the President—as well as to the Chief of Staff and additional senior advisers—makes his or her role a powerful one within the West Wing.

Presidents typically tap VPs to lead various Administration efforts. These efforts have included serving on the NSC Principals Committee, heading the National Space Council, addressing immigration and border issues, leading the response to health care crises, and supervising workforce programs. VPs traditionally also spearhead projects of personal interest that have been authorized by the President. The VP is also charged with breaking tie votes in the Senate and in recent years has served abroad as a brand ambassador for the White House and more broadly the United States, announcing Administration priorities and coordinating with heads of state and other top foreign government officials. The Vice President, as President of the Senate, could be a President’s emissary to the Senate.

 

OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY/FIRST GENTLEMAN

The First Lady or First Gentleman plays an interesting role in the formation, implementation, and execution of policy in concert with the President. Active and interested first spouses often champion a select number of signature issues, whether they be thorny social issues or deeper policy issues. One advantage of the first spouse’s taking on hot-button social issues is that any political backlash will be less severe than it would be for the President.


The first spouse normally appoints a chief of staff who has enough assistants to support the spouse’s activities in the East Wing of the White House. This group works exclusively with the first spouse and senior members of the White House along with EOP personnel to implement and execute the first spouse’s priorities, which reflect the first spouse’s passions and interests and are often identified as important in discussions with the President. Executed well, they can be strategi- cally useful in accelerating the Administration’s agenda. Past East Wing initiatives have focused on such issues as combating bullying, fighting drug abuse, promoting literacy, and encouraging physical education for young adults and children.

The first spouse is afforded significant resources. His or her staff also works with the President’s policy team, members of the Cabinet, and other EOP staff.

 

 

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Edwin Meese III, Donald Devine, Ambassador Andrew Bremberg, and Jonathan Bronitsky deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.


ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

2.                U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2.

3.                U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3.

4.                 U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2.

5.                See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra.

6.                H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/

PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

7.                 S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).

8.                S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

9.                See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra.

10.          President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo.

gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).


2

 

 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Russ Vought

 

 

I

 
n its opening words, Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes it abundantly clear that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 That enormous power is not vested in departments or agencies, in staff or administrative bodies, in nongovernmental organizations or other equities and interests close to the government. The President must set and enforce a plan for the executive branch. Sadly, however, a President today assumes office to find a sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences

of a radical, supposedly “woke” faction of the country.

The modern conservative President’s task is to limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people. This challenge is created and exacerbated by factors like Congress’s decades-long tendency to delegate its lawmaking power to agency bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “inde- pendence” that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the presumed inability to hold career civil servants accountable for their performance, and the increasing reality that many agencies are not only too big and powerful, but also increasingly weaponized against the public and a President who is elected by the people and empowered by the Constitution to govern.

In Federalist No. 47, James Madison warned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”2 Regrettably, that wise and cautionary note describes to a significant degree the modern executive branch, which—whether controlled


by the bureaucracy or by the President—writes federal policy, enforces that policy, and often adjudicates whether that policy was properly drafted and enforced. The overall situation is constitutionally dire, unsustainably expensive, and in urgent need of repair. Nothing less than the survival of self-governance in America is at stake.

The great challenge confronting a conservative President is the existential need for aggressive use of the vast powers of the executive branch to return power— including power currently held by the executive branch—to the American people. Success in meeting that challenge will require a rare combination of boldness and self-denial: boldness to bend or break the bureaucracy to the presidential will and self-denial to use the bureaucratic machine to send power away from Washington and back to America’s families, faith communities, local governments, and states.

Fortunately, a President who is willing to lead will find in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) the levers necessary to reverse this trend and impose a sound direction for the nation on the federal bureaucracy. The effectiveness of those EOP levers depends on the fundamental premise that it is the President’s agenda that should matter to the departments and agencies that operate under his constitutional authority and that, as a general matter, it is the President’s chosen advisers who have the best sense of the President’s aims and intentions, both with respect to the policies he intends to enact and with respect to the interests that must be secured to govern successfully on behalf of the American people. This chapter focuses on key features of and recommendations for several of the EOP’s important components.

 

U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB)

OMB assists the President in the execution of his policy agenda across the gov- ernment by employing many statutory and executive procedural levers to bring the bureaucracy in line with all budgetary, regulatory, and management decisions. Properly understood, it is a President’s air-traffic control system with the abil- ity and charge to ensure that all policy initiatives are flying in sync and with the authority to let planes take off and, at times, ground planes that are flying off course. OMB’s key roles include:

   Developing and enforcing the President’s budget and executing the appropriations laws that fund the government;

   Managing agency and personnel performance, procurement policy, financial management, and information technology;

   Developing the President’s regulatory agenda, reviewing new regulatory actions, reviewing federal information collections, and setting and enforcing federal information policy; and


   Coordinating and clearing agency communications with Congress, including testimonies and views on draft legislation.

OMB cannot perform its role on behalf of the President effectively if it is not inti- mately involved in all aspects of the White House policy process and lacks knowledge of what the agencies are doing. Internally to the EOP, ensuring that the policy-for- mulation procedures developed by the White House to serve the President include OMB is one of any OMB Director’s major responsibilities. A common meme of those who intend to evade OMB review is to argue that where “resources” are not being discussed, OMB’s participation is optional. This ignores both OMB’s role in all down- stream execution and the reality that it has the only statutory tools in the White House that are powerful enough to override implementing agencies’ bureaucracies. The Director must view his job as the best, most comprehensive approxima- tion of the President’s mind as it pertains to the policy agenda while always being ready with actual options to effect that agenda within existing legal authorities and resources. This role cannot be performed adequately if the Director acts instead as the ambassador of the institutional interests of OMB and the wider bureaucracy to the White House. Once its reputation as the keeper of “commander’s intent” is established, then and only then does OMB have the ability to shape the most

efficient way to pursue an objective.

Externally, the Director must ensure that OMB has sufficient visibility into the deep caverns of agency decision-making. One indispensable statutory tool to that end is to ensure that policy officials—the Program Associate Directors (PADs) managing the vast Resource Management Offices (RMOs)—personally sign what are known as the apportionments. In 1870, Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Act3 to prevent the common agency practice of spending down all appropriated funding, creating artificial funding shortfalls that Congress would have to fill. The law mandated that all funding be allotted or “apportioned” in installments. This process, whereby agencies come to OMB for allotments of appropriated funding, is essential to the effective financial stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OMB can then direct on behalf of a President the amount, duration, and purpose of any appor- tioned funding to ensure against waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure consistency with the President’s agenda and applicable laws.

The vast majority of these apportionments were signed by career officials—the Deputy Associate Directors (DADs)—until the Trump Administration placed this responsibility in the hands of the PADs and thereby opened wide vistas of oversight that had escaped the attention of policy officials. The Biden Administration sub- sequently reversed this decision. No Director should be chosen who is unwilling to restore apportionment decision-making to the PADs’ personal review, who is not aggressive in wielding the tool on behalf of the President’s agenda, or who is unable to defend the power against attacks from Congress.


It should be noted that each of OMB’s primary functions, along with other executive and statutory roles, is carried out with the help of many essential OMB support offices. The two most important offices for moving OMB at the will of a Director are the Budget Review Division (BRD) and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The Director should have a direct and effective relationship with the head of the BRD (considered the top career official within OMB) and transmit most instructions through that office because the rest of the agency is institution- ally inclined toward its direction and responds accordingly. The BRD inevitably will translate the directions from policy officials to the career staff, and at every stage, it is obviously vital that the Director ensure that this translation is an accurate one.

In addition, many key considerations involved in enacting a President’s agenda hinge on existing legal authorities. The Director must ensure the appointment of a General Counsel who is respected yet creative and fearless in his or her abil- ity to challenge legal precedents that serve to protect the status quo. This is vital within OMB not only with respect to the adequate development of policy options for the President’s review, but also with respect to agencies that attempt to protect their own institutional interests and foreclose certain avenues based on the mere assertion (and not proof) that the law disallows it or that, conversely, attempt to disregard the clear statutory commands of Congress.

In general, the Director should empower a strong Deputy Director with author- ity over the Deputy for Management, the PADs, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to work diligently to break down barriers within OMB and not allow turf disputes or a lack of visibility to undermine the agency’s prin- cipal budget, management, and regulatory functions. OMB should work toward a “One OMB” position on behalf of the President and represent that view during the various policymaking processes.

Budget. The United States today faces an untenable fiscal situation and owes

$31 trillion on a debt that is steadily increasing. The OMB Director should present a fiscal goal to the President early in the budget development process to address the federal government’s fiscal irresponsibility. This goal would help to align the months-long process of developing the actual proposals for inclusion in the budget. Though some mistakenly regard it as a mere paper-pushing exercise, the Pres- ident’s budget is in fact a powerful mechanism for setting and enforcing public policy at federal agencies. The budget team includes six Resource Management Offices that, together with the BRD and other components, help the Director of OMB to develop and execute detailed agency spending plans that bear on every major aspect of policy formation and execution at federal agencies. Through initial priority-setting and ongoing supervision of agency spending, OMB’s budget team plays a key role in executing policy across the executive branch, including at many

agencies wrongly regarded as “independent.”


The RMOs, each of which is led by a political appointee known as the PAD and a career DAD, are separated into six functional units:

   National Security.

   Natural Resources, Energy, and Science.

   Health.

   Education, Income Maintenance, and Labor.

   Transportation, Justice, and Homeland Security.

   Treasury, Commerce, and Housing.

Because the RMOs are institutionally ingrained in nearly all policymaking and implementation across the executive branch, they play a critical role in helping the Director to implement the President’s public policy agenda. However, because each RMO is responsible for formulating and supervising such a wide range of policy details, many granular but critical policy decisions are effectively left to the career professionals who serve across Administrations.

To enhance the OMB Director’s ability to help the President drive policy at the agencies, the existing six RMOs should be divided into smaller subject-matter areas, allowing for more PADs, and each of these PADs should have a Deputy PAD. This expanded pool of RMOs with additional political leadership would enable more comprehensive direction and oversight of policy development and implementation. Regardless of whether Congress adopts the President’s full set of budget rec- ommendations, the President should reintroduce the concept of administrative pay-as-you-go, or administrative PAYGO. This simple procedural requirement imposes budget neutrality on the discretionary choices of federal agencies, of which there are many in nearly all areas of policymaking. This simple step forces the executive branch to control what it can control. The principle may occasionally yield to other overarching requirements, such as a presidential regulatory budget, but in nearly all cases, administrative PAYGO plays a unique and indispensable

role in enforcing fiscal responsibility at federal departments and agencies.

The President should use every possible tool to propose and impose fiscal disci- pline on the federal government. Anything short of that would constitute abject failure. Management. The Management Office of OMB (the “M-Side” as it is often called) is responsible for carrying out several important agency oversight functions, many of which are statutory. The Management team includes the following offices

led by presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed individuals:


   The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP).

   The Office of Performance and Personnel Management (OPPM).

   The Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM).

   The Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer (OFCIO).

   The Made in America Office (MIAO), which was added by the Biden Administration and is not a Senate-confirmed slot.

Each of these offices has responsibilities and authorities that a President can use to help drive policy across the government. It is vital that the Director and his political staff, not the careerists, drive these offices in pursuit of the President’s actual priorities and not let them set their own agenda based on the wishes of the sprawling “good government” management community in and outside of govern- ment. Many Directors do not properly prioritize the management portfolio, leaving it to the Deputy for Management, but such neglect creates purposeless bureaucracy that impedes a President’s agenda—an “M Train to Nowhere.”

OFPP. This office plays a critical role in leading the development of new policies and regulations concerning federal contracting and procurement. Through the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, which is generally chaired by the OFPP Administrator, OFPP helps the Director to set a wide range of policies for all of those who contract with the executive branch. In the past, those governmentwide contracting rules have played a key role in helping to implement the President’s policy agenda. This office should be engaged early and often in OMB’s effort to drive policy, including by obtaining transparency about entities that are awarded federal contracts and grants and by using government contracts to push back against woke policies in corporate America.

OPPM. Through this office, the Director helps federal agencies to establish their performance goals and performance review processes. OPPM also works with the

U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish and manage personnel policies and practices across the federal government. The Director should instruct OPPM to establish annual performance goals and review processes for agencies that reflect the President’s agenda. OPPM should also be part of the President’s strategy to set and enforce sensible policies and practices for the federal workforce. OFFM. This office helps the Director to root out waste, fraud, and abuse in fed- eral programs—for example, through the Do Not Pay program. It should be part of

efforts to save precious taxpayer resources.

OFCIO. This office guides the federal government’s use and adoption of Inter- net-based technologies to improve government operations and save taxpayer


money. As a function of its leadership role, it is critical in interagency discussions on a wide range of technology issues. The office thus is an important part of the President’s efforts to modernize, strengthen, and set technology-adoption policy for the executive branch.

MIAO. Building on the example and work of the Trump Administration, Presi- dent Biden established this office to centralize, carry out, and further develop the federal government’s Buy-American and other Made-in-America commitments. Its work ought to be continued and further strengthened.

Regulatory and Information Policy. OMB’s OIRA plays an enormous and vital role in reining in the regulatory state and ensuring that regulations achieve important benefits while imposing minimal burdens on Americans. The President should maintain Executive Order (EO) 12866,4 the foundation of OIRA’s review of regulatory actions. The Administration should likewise maintain the recent extension of those standards to regulatory actions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.5 Regulatory analysis and OIRA review should also be required of the historically “independent” agencies as the Office of Legal Counsel has found is legally permissible.6

If the current Administration proceeds with its declared intent to modify aspects of EO 12866 or review OMB Circular A-4,7 the related document that provides the foundation for cost-benefit analysis, the next President should imme- diately begin to undo those changes and develop a rigorous, data-driven approach that will result in the least burdensome rules possible. The next President should also revive the directive in Executive Order 138918 that significant guidance doc- uments also must pass through OIRA review.

Because OIRA review often leads to fewer regulatory burdens, more regulatory benefits, and better coordination of regulatory policy, funding for OIRA tends to pay large dividends. Yet over the years, funding for OIRA has diminished. This trend should be reversed. The budget should also include sufficient full-time equiv- alent (FTE) employees to form regulatory advance teams that would consult with agencies on cost-benefit analysis and good regulatory practices at the beginning of the rulemaking process for the most important regulations. These teams would help agencies take cost-benefit analysis into account from the beginning of their rulemaking efforts, which in turn would result in higher-quality regulations and a swifter eventual OIRA review. To preserve the integrity of OIRA review, the staff who consult at the beginning of a rulemaking should not handle its eventual review.

The next President should also reinstate the many executive orders signed by President Trump that were designed to make the regulatory process more just, efficient, and transparent. Executive Orders 13771,9 13777,10 13891,11 13892,12

13893,13 13924 Section 6,14 13979,15 and 1398016 should be revived (with modifica- tions as needed). Executive Order 1313217 on federalism should be strengthened so that state regulatory and fiscal operations are not commandeered by the federal government through so-called cooperative federalism programs. Additionally, the President should revise and sign an updated version of President Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 1263018 on federal takings.

The next President should strengthen implementation of the Information Qual- ity Act,19 robustly use the authority of the Paperwork Reduction Act,20 carefully enforce the Privacy Act,21 and ensure the sound execution of OIRA’s statistical and other information policy functions. Regulatory cooperation agreements can also promote the further adoption of good regulatory practices, which improve market conditions for America and her allies. OIRA should also work with other components of OMB to revise and apply OMB’s uniform Guidance for Grants and Agreements22 and ensure that federal contract and grant guidelines satisfy EO 12866 and other centralized standards as appropriate.

But executive reforms and actions, while vital, are not enough: Congress also must act. The next President should work with Congress to pass significant reg- ulatory policy and process reforms, which could go a long way toward reining in the administrative state. Excellent examples of such legislation include the Reg- ulatory Accountability Act,23 SMART Act,24 GOOD Act,25 Early Participation in Regulations Act,26 Unfunded Mandates Accountability and Transparency Act,27 and REINS Act.28

Finally, the next President should work with Congress to maximize the utility of the Congressional Review Act (CRA),29 which allows Congress to undo midnight regulatory actions (including those disguised as “guidance”) on an accelerated timeline. To leverage the CRA’s power to the maximum extent, Congress and the President should enact the Midnight Rules Relief Act,30 which would help to ensure that multiple regulatory actions could be packaged and voted on at the same time. Immediate and robust use of the CRA would allow the President to focus his rulemaking resources on major new regulatory reforms rather than devoting months or years to undoing the final rulemakings of the Biden Administration.

Legislative Clearance and Coordination. OMB plays a critical role in ensur- ing that the executive branch is aligned on legislative proposals and language, agency testimonies, and other communications with Congress. The Director should use these authorities to enforce policy and message consistency aggressively and promote the effective engagement of the executive branch in legislative processes.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

The National Security Council (NSC) was established by statute to support the President in developing and implementing national security policy by coordinating across relevant departments and agencies, integrating authorities and resources toward common ends, and objectively assessing progress toward established goals. Led by the National Security Advisor (NSA), the NSC staff will be success- ful in implementing the President’s national security goals only if it is made up of personnel with technical expertise and experience as well as an alignment to the President’s declared national security policy priorities. The NSC must then chart a course that articulates and achieves the President’s national security goals and objectives. The President should empower a strong NSC that not only has the power to convene the policy process, but also is entrusted with the full power of the presidency to drive the bureaucracy.

In organizing (by means of Presidential Directive31) an NSC staff that is more responsive and aligned with the President’s goals and empowered to implement them, the NSA should immediately evaluate and eliminate directorates that are not aligned with the President’s agenda and replace them with new directorates as appropriate that can drive implementation of the President’s signature national security priorities. In addition to realigning the staff organization to the President’s priorities, the NSA should assign responsibility for implementation of specific policy initiatives to senior NSC officials from across the NSC staff structure. These officials should develop, direct, and execute tangible action plans in coordination with multiple agencies to achieve measurable, time-defined milestones.

Aligning NSC staff to the President’s national security goals will provide clearer direction, a mandate for action, and a baseline of accountability that can be used to evaluate staff performance and the NSC’s overall progress. Accountable senior officials, themselves either political appointees or a minimum number of career detailees, who are selected and vetted politically and report directly to political staff should be the main day-to-day managers for interagency coordination and implementation of their assigned national security policy objectives. They should provide policy analysis for consideration by the broader NSC and relevant agencies and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The accountable senior officials should be established at the direction of the NSA and draw on per- sonnel and expertise from beyond the NSC, including OMB, the National Economic Council, and relevant federal agencies.

The NSC staff and principals should work in tandem with the National Eco- nomic Council and OMB at all levels, presenting a united effort to achieve the President’s goals and drawing on the latter’s statutory authorities to guide the bureaucracy. To accomplish national objectives effectively, foreign policy should fully incorporate the economic instruments of national power. National security policy must also include the prioritized allocation of resources. When policies are divorced from the resources required to implement them, they are stillborn—aca- demic exercises that undermine our national security and leave departments and agencies to their own devices.

The accountable senior officials should be empowered to identify, recruit, clear, and hire staff who are aligned with and willing to shepherd the President’s national security priorities. NSC staff leads, under the direction of the NSA, should have the discretion to reduce the number of positions that need high-level clearances, and the NSC should be adequately resourced and authorized to adjudicate and hold security clearances internally with investigators who work directly for the NSC and whose sole task is to clear NSC officials. If certain staff are determined not to need high-level clearances, the question becomes whether they should be part of the NSC at all.

The NSC should take a leading role in directing the drafting and thorough review of all formal strategies: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strat- egy, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Missile Defense Strategy, etc. In particular, the National Defense Strategy, which by tradition has evaded significant review, should be prioritized for White House review by the NSC and OMB. Both should also conduct reviews of operational war plans and global force planning and allo- cations with the Secretary of Defense to align them with presidential priorities and review all key policy and guidance intended for implementation by the heads of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community before they are authorized for distribution. The NSC should rigorously review all general and flag officer promotions to prioritize the core roles and responsibilities of the military over social engineering and non-defense matters, including climate change, critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other polarizing policies that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’s finest men and women from enlisting to serve in defense of our liberty.

The NSC staff will need to consolidate the functions of both the NSC and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), incorporate the recently established Office of the National Cyber Director, and evaluate the required regional and functional directorates. Given the aforementioned prerequisites, the NSC should be prop- erly resourced with sufficient policy professionals, and the NSA should prioritize staffing the vast majority of NSC directorates with aligned political appointees and trusted career officials. For instance, the NSA should return all nonessen- tial detailees to their home agencies on their first day in office so that the new Administration can proceed efficiently without the personnel land mines left by the previous stewards and as soon as possible should replace all essential detailees with staff aligned to the new President’s priorities. The HSC has overseen pandemic response, and its incorporation is important.

In the end, change requires intervention, and the NSC staff should be appro- priately recruited, manned, and empowered to achieve the President’s national security and foreign policy objectives and maintain robust policy analysis and discussion while minimizing resistance from those who have an agenda or who jealously guard their resources and autonomy at the expense of national security and sound policy development. This resistance and inertia can be inadvertently enabled by a small and unempowered NSC.

Additionally, the White House Chief of Staff and NSA must ensure that the NSC is functioning in tandem with the rest of the White House staff to benefit from

the best strategic thinking of the President’s top advisers. History shows that an unsupervised NSC staff can stray from its statutory role and adversely affect a Pres- ident and his policies. Moreover, while the NSC should be fully incorporated into the White House, it should also be allowed to do its job without the impediment of dually hatted staff that report to other offices. For instance, the NSC needs its own counsel to inform what legal options can be provided to the President. The White House Counsel should be part of that policy process as the President’s top legal adviser. These recommendations provide a clear road map for rapidly sizing and solidifying the NSC staff to support and achieve the President’s objectives beginning on Inauguration Day.

 

NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL (NEC)

The National Economic Council is one of the policy councils serving the Pres- ident along with the NSC and the Domestic Policy Council (DPC). The Director serves as principal adviser to the President on domestic and international eco- nomic policy and communicates the President’s economic message to the media. The Deputy Director is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the council, which includes chairing the committee that coordinates economic policy devel- opment at the Deputy Secretary level. In effect, the Director and Deputy Director are the officials who are primarily responsible for the development of economic policymaking for the Administration. Once a policy is adopted, it is the appropri- ate agency’s responsibility to implement it. The NEC’s policy process is also used to determine whether the President should support or oppose legislation passed by Congress.

In addition to its leadership, the NEC has policy experts (for example, Special Assistants to the President or SAPs) who are responsible for developing and coor- dinating, as well as advising the President, on specific issues. It is essential that the policy expertise of the NEC reflect the current environment’s most pressing issues. Today, this would include (among other topics) taxes, energy and envi- ronment, technology, infrastructure, health care, financial services, workforce, agriculture, antitrust and competition policy, and retirement programs. NEC’s SAPs should have a working knowledge of how the Administration can implement policy through the rulemaking process, although it is not necessary that they be experts on regulation themselves, particularly given OMB’s role. This will facilitate the NEC’s effectiveness in coordinating Administration policy.

The NEC needs to work closely with other offices within the Executive Office of the President to promote innovation by the private sector and create an envi- ronment that will stimulate economic activity while reducing federal spending and debt. This includes working with the DPC, NSC, OMB, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of Cabinet Affairs, White House Counsel, Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Legislative Affairs,


and Office of Science and Technology Policy. To this end, the NEC Director should chair a standing meeting with the principals from each of the other EOP offices to enhance coordination from within the White House.

In the past, there has been tension among the DPC, NEC, and NSC over juris- diction. It is important to set clear jurisdictions at the start of an Administration to prevent needless and counterproductive turf fights. In addition, the Principal Deputy for international economic policy is jointly appointed at NEC and NSC and could end up serving two different interests. To avoid such problems, international economic policy should be entirely coordinated from NEC.

It will be especially important for the NEC to work seamlessly with the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), which provides the President and the White House offices with the latest economic data and forecasts, as well as estimates of the eco- nomic impact of proposed policies, and prepares the annual Economic Report of the President. The CEA is not a policy council and therefore does not run policy processes, which is the responsibility of the NEC, DPC, and NSC. However, the CEA does play a key role in ensuring that any policy considered by the councils is rigorously evaluated for its economic impacts.

The NEC works closely with the White House Office of Communications and Office of Speechwriting to ensure that the White House’s messaging and media engagement communicate the President’s economic policy effectively.

The NEC also plays a key role in advancing the President’s economic agenda by advising the Office of Presidential Personnel on appointments to key economic posts, including positions in financial regulatory agencies. The NEC helps to ensure that each economic post is held by a person who shares the President’s policy pri- orities and works well with the rest of the Administration’s economic team. The financial regulators are run partly by civil servants (some of whom were politi- cal appointees in prior liberal Administrations) who often resist a conservative Administration’s policies. It is therefore critical that an Administration not only appoints capable individuals to lead these agencies, but also has personnel who can be hired into senior staff positions within the agencies.

A few areas will be especially important if the NEC is to develop a well-defined economic policy agenda. One is the promotion of innovation as a foundation for economic growth and opportunity. Another is the creation of an environment that fosters economic growth through tax reform and the elimination of regulatory and procedural barriers.

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR)

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative provides the President with the internal White House resources necessary to formulate and execute a unified, whole-of-government approach to trade policy. The President should ensure that the USTR is empowered to serve in that leadership role, much as other


EOP components organize and drive a coordinated policy agenda on behalf of the President.

The People’s Republic of China’s predatory trade practices have disrupted the open-market trading system that has provided mutual benefit to all participating countries—including China—for decades. The failure of the World Trade Organi- zation (WTO) to discipline China for abrogation of its trading commitments has seriously undermined its credibility and made it a largely ineffective institution. The United States, through an empowered USTR, must act to rebalance and refocus international trading relationships in favor of democratic nations that embrace free, fair, and open trade principles built on market-driven economies.

Chapter 26 of this book outlines recommended trade policy priorities for the incoming President. However, regardless of the approach, successful implemen- tation of that trade agenda will require the President to articulate a clear policy direction and instructions for the executive branch to operate in a coordinated fashion under the leadership of an empowered USTR.

To address these and other challenges, protect the American worker, and secure free and open markets for our communities and businesses, the next President must leverage the institutional resources and strength of the USTR and neither allow institutional interests to drive a fragmented trade policy that is developed from the ground up nor cater to parochial interests across government and Wash- ington’s broader industry of influence.

The USTR’s mission is vitally important in reorienting the global trading system in a direction that is open, fair, and prosperous. In order to achieve the President’s policy goals, a strong USTR must be empowered to set trade policy from the White House with the authority and resources to represent the interests of the Presi- dent’s trade agenda with adequate budget, staff, analysis, and expertise to engage meaningfully in internal and interagency policy deliberations. The USTR should organize and harness existing interagency trade committees to serve the Presi- dent’s trade agenda and drive a consensus among federal stakeholders, dispose of legacy advisory committees with members who serve special interests, direct action to implement policy priorities, measure progress toward implementing the President’s agenda, and hold agencies and officials accountable for delivering the President’s agenda. The USTR’s leadership should not only coordinate and enforce the President’s agenda across the federal community, but also set and enforce the President’s trade agenda internally.

Trade policy and priorities should be set by the President and implemented by the U.S. Trade Representative in cooperation with the other economic and national security officials, not by the range of governmental and nongovernmental interests that attempt to force their policy preferences on the USTR. A strong USTR empow- ered with the necessary resources, authorities, and interagency cooperation will protect U.S. interests in the global marketplace more effectively.


COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (CEA)

Congress established the Council of Economic Advisers in 1946 to advise the President on economic policy based on data, research, and evidence. The CEA is one of the oldest congressionally created offices within the White House complex and plays a broad role in bringing economic expertise to Administration policy across a large range of policy areas. The CEA has one presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed chair, two presidentially appointed members who assist and often have expertise that complements the chair, and approximately 40 staff employees.

Statutorily, the CEA is charged with being the President’s principal source of economic advice. However, this role has diminished over time as its policy appraisal and especially formulation and recommendation functions have been taken over or diluted by other economic policy bodies within the White House. By law, the CEA is required to publish an annual Economic Report of the President within 10 days after submission of the budget. This report is not just a messaging document; it is an opportunity to provide greater rigor in support of policy areas that the White House is prioritizing and to build up the external credibility of those ideas.

A future conservative Administration should utilize the CEA as the senior inter- nal White House economists much as the White House Counsel’s office functions as the senior internal White House lawyers. This does not mean that there are no economists in other offices. There are, just as there often are lawyers in the policy councils and other White House offices, but the CEA’s role, like the White House Counsel’s, is to employ its unique expertise (particularly on the technical side) to ensure that sound analysis is contributing to and shaping the policy discussion.

In practice, this means that CEA staff do not “coordinate” the policy process in the way that the DPC or NEC would, but they should be integral to the EOP’s policy development processes. CEA staff should support sound policy development and execution by actively contributing to running policy dialogues, proactively raising issues that need to be addressed, consulting on questions that arise, and guiding EOP and agency officials on the analytical foundations of policy. Structurally, the White House Chief of Staff should ensure that the CEA has a seat at the policymak- ing table on all relevant policy.

Senior economists traditionally have not gone through the Office of Presidential Personnel process and more often than not are hired on an academic-year cycle. As a result, senior economists hired in the summer of a presidential election year tend to remain on staff until the next summer even if a President from the opposite party takes power and installs a new slate of CEA political appointees for chair, members, etc. Although these hiring practices create some continuity, the presence of senior economists who were never fully vetted for their alignment with White House policy objectives or who were holdovers from a recently departed Administra- tion can breed skepticism and distrust of the CEA by other units within the White House, creating the risk that the CEA’s role in the policymaking process will be diminished. A future Administration should consider hiring that reflects the White House calendar (mid-January) and involves the Office of Presidential Personnel.

 

NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL (NSPC)

The National Space Council is responsible for providing advice and recommen- dations to the President on the formulation and implementation of space policy and strategy. It is charged with conducting a whole-of-government approach to the nation’s space interests: civil, military, intelligence, commercial, or diplomatic. Historically, it has been chaired by the Vice President at the President’s direction, and its members consist of members of the Cabinet and other senior executive branch officials as specified by the President in Executive Order 13803.32 The NSpC’s purpose is to ensure that the President’s priorities relative to space are carried out and, as necessary, to resolve policy conflicts among departments and agencies that are related to space.

Space projects and programs are risky, complex, expensive, and time consum- ing—although commercial space innovations are lowering costs and accelerating schedules. Nevertheless, while fiscal discipline should not be ignored, long-term policy stability is crucial to investors, innovators, industry, and agencies. Policy stability is easier when policies and programs are aligned with long-term national interests as opposed to those of particular advocacy groups or political factions. The Trump Administration’s major space policies—including the U.S. Space Force, the Artemis program to land the next Americans on the moon, and support for a strong commercial space sector—have endured under the Biden Administration. Major challenges remain in implementation and regulatory reform to keep up with rapidly evolving space markets and competitors. These include the long-term sustainability of space activities in light of increasing orbital debris; creation of space situational awareness services for civil and commercial uses; management of mega-constellations; licensing of new commercial remote sensing capabilities; keeping up with licensing demands due to high launch rates; transitioning Inter- national Space Station operations to multiple, privately owned space platforms; and (most important) accelerating the acquisition and fielding of national security

space capabilities in response to an increasingly aggressive China.

The Vice President should have a clear understanding with the National Secu- rity Advisor and the White House Counsel that they and their respective staffs will work within the White House to determine the scope and leadership of policy reviews that can overlap multiple areas of responsibility. A similar understanding is necessary with the heads of other policy councils such as the NEC, DPC, and National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).

As a result of the President’s direction and the Vice President’s leadership, the NSpC under the Trump Administration was able to coordinate a wide range of

space policy reviews, legislative proposals, and regulatory reforms smoothly. The NSpC generally led on space issues within the EOP, but other White House offices also took on space topics.

   As a member of the NSpC, and in coordination with other members, the Office of Science and Technology Policy developed a national space weather strategy, research and development (R&D) plans to mitigate the effects of orbital debris, and protocols for planetary protection to avoid biological contamination of celestial bodies.

   The Council of Economic Advisers did research on the economic benefits of space property rights.

   OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Reform updated and streamlined commercial launch licensing and commercial remote sensing satellite rules.

During the Trump Administration, if a topic was purely military, such as stand- ing up the U.S. Space Command, the NSC took the lead. If a topic cut across military, civil, and commercial sectors, as was the case with cybersecurity in space, the NSpC and NSC would cochair the policy review groups.

Trusted, collegial relationships across the White House complex are critical to successful space policy development, implementation, and oversight. Nowhere is this more important than in the relationship between the NSpC staff and OMB staff who oversee civil and national security–related space spending. Teamwork between the NSpC and OMB staff can communicate clear presidential priorities to departments and agencies, facilitating smooth development of the President’s budget request. The NSpC and OMB have many opportunities to collaborate in promoting presidential priorities while finding offsets in lower-priority programs and funding lines.

 

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP)

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was created by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976.33 Before its creation, Presidents received their advice and counsel on such matters through advisers and boards that had no statutory authority. The Director of OSTP is one of the few Senate-confirmed positions within the Executive Office of the President. Consistent with other laws, the President may delegate to the Director of OSTP directive authority over other elements of the executive branch. Other EOP policy officials and organizations such as the NSC and NEC are formally only advisory with relevant agency directives issued by the President.

The OSTP’s functions, as contained in the law, are to advise the President of scientific and technological considerations, evaluate the effectiveness of the federal effort, and generally lead and coordinate the federal government’s R&D programs. If science is being manipulated at the agencies to support separate political and institutional agendas, the President should increase the prominence of the OSTP’s Director either formally or informally. This would elevate the role of science in policy discussions and subsequent outcomes and theoretically help to balance out agencies like the Departments of Energy, State, and Commerce and the Envi- ronmental Protection Agency and Council on Environmental Quality. The OSTP can also help to bring technical expertise to regulatory matters in support of OMB. The OSTP should continue to play a lead role in coordinating federal R&D pro- grams. Recent legislation, especially the CHIPS and Science Act,34 has expanded federal policy and funding across the enterprise, and there is a need for more sig- nificant leadership in this area both to ensure effectiveness and to avoid duplication of effort. As befitting its location in the White House, the OSTP must be concerned with advancing national interests and not merely the parochial concerns of departments, agencies, or parts of the scientific community.

During the Trump and Biden Administrations, there has been a bipartisan focus on prioritizing R&D funding around the so-called Industries of the Future (IOTF). Under President Trump, IOTF priorities were artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information science (QIS), advanced communications/5G, advanced manufacturing, and biotechnology. Under President Biden, this list has been expanded to include advanced materials, robotics, battery technology, cybersecurity, green products and clean technology, plant genetics and agricultural technologies, nanotechnology, and semiconductor and microelectronics technologies. These priorities should be eval- uated and narrowed to ensure consistency with the next Administration’s priorities. Given a long list of priorities, coordinating efforts across agencies and mea- suring success are extremely challenging. The OSTP and OMB are required to work together on an annual basis to prioritize the funding requests and whatever Congress adds on top of them, but there continues to be concern about mission creep and funds expended on nonscientific R&D.

The President should also issue an executive order to reshape the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and related climate change research pro- grams. The USGCRP produces strategic plans and research (for example, the National Climate Assessment) that reduce the scope of legally proper options in presidential decision-making and in agency rulemakings and adjudications. Also, since much environmental policymaking must run the gauntlet of judicial review, USGCRP actions can frustrate successful litigation defense in ways that the career bureaucracy should not be permitted to control. The process for producing assess- ments should include diverse viewpoints. The OSTP and OMB should jointly assess the independence of the contractors used to conduct much of this outsourced

government research that serves as the basis for policymaking. The next President should critically analyze and, if required, refuse to accept any USGCRP assessment prepared under the Biden Administration.

The President should also restore related EOP research components to their purely informational and advisory roles. Consistent with the Global Change Research Act of 1990,35 USGCRP-related EOP components should be confined to a more limited advisory role. These components should include but not necessarily be limited to the OSTP; the NSTC’s Committee on Environment; the USGCRP’s Interagency Groups (for example, the Carbon Cycle Interagency Working Group); and the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology. As a general matter, the new Administration should separate the scientific risk assessment function from the risk management function, which is the exclusive domain of elected policymakers and the public.

Finally, the next Administration will face a significant challenge in unwinding policies and procedures that are used to advance radical gender, racial, and equity initiatives under the banner of science. Similarly, the Biden Administration’s climate fanaticism will need a whole-of-government unwinding. As with other federal departments and agencies, the Biden Administration’s leveraging of the federal government’s resources to further the woke agenda should be reversed and scrubbed from all policy manuals, guidance documents, and agendas, and scientific excellence and innovation should be restored as the OSTP’s top priority.

 

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (CEQ)

The Council on Environmental Quality is the EOP component with the prin- cipal task of administering the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)36 by issuing regulations and interpretive documents and by overseeing the processes of individual permitting agencies’ own NEPA regulations, including categorical exclusions. The CEQ also coordinates environmental policy across the federal government, and its influence has waxed and waned across Administrations.

The President should instruct the CEQ to rewrite its regulations implementing NEPA along the lines of the historic 2020 effort and restoring its key provisions such as banning the use of cumulative impact analysis. This effort should incor- porate new learning and more aggressive reform options that were not included in the 2020 reform package with the overall goal of streamlining the process to build on the Supreme Court ruling that “CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference.”37 It should frame the new regulations to limit the scope for judicial review of agency NEPA analysis and judicial remedies, as well as to vindicate the strong public interest in effective and timely agency action.

The Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council (FPISC), of which the CEQ is a part, has been empowered by Congress through significant new funding and amendments to FAST-41.38 The President should build on this foundation to further empower the FPISC by making its Executive Director an EOP appointee with delegated presidential directive authority over executive branch permitting agencies. For instance, the implementation of Executive Order 13807’s One Federal Decision39 revealed many ways that the systems established by EO 13807 can be improved. The new President should seek to issue a new executive order to create a unified process for major infrastructure projects that includes giving project proponents more control of any regulatory clocks.

The President should issue an executive order establishing a Senior Advisor to coordinate the policy development and implementation of relevant energy and environment policy by officials across the EOP (for example, the policy staff of the NSC, NEC, DPC, CEQ, and OSTP) and abolishing the existing Office of Domestic Cli- mate Policy. The Senior Advisor would report directly to the Chief of Staff. The role would be similar to the role that Brian Deese and John Podesta had in the Obama White House. This energy/environment coordinator would help to lead the fight for sound energy and environment policies both domestically and internationally. The President should eliminate the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), which is cochaired by the OSTP, OMB, and CEA, and by executive order should end the use of SCC analysis.

Finally, the President should work with Congress to establish a sweeping mod- ernization of the entire permitting system across all departments and agencies that is aimed at reducing litigation risk and giving agencies the authority to establish programmatic, general, and provisional permits.

 

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (ONDCP)

Congress created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198840 to serve as a coordinative auxiliary for the Pres- ident on all matters related to drug policy. The next President’s top drug policy priority must be to address the current fentanyl crisis and reduce the number of overdoses and fatalities. This crisis resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 Americans in 2021.

The next Administration must reaffirm a commitment to preventing drug use before it starts, providing treatment that leads to long-term recovery, and reducing the availability of illicit drugs in the United States. The drug trafficking environ- ment is exponentially more dynamic and dangerous today than it was just five years ago as powerful synthetic opioids (fentanyl and its analogues) are mixed into other drugs of abuse. Drug trafficking organizations are extremely nimble and able to adapt quickly to federal government actions and changes in user behavior. Disrupting the flow of drugs across our borders and into our communities is of paramount importance, both to save lives and to bolster our public health efforts. For these reasons, the Director of ONDCP should make it a point to consult with federal border enforcement officials.


The National Drug Control Program agencies represented a total of $41 billion in fiscal year 2022. Whereas the position for overseeing budget activities is tradi- tionally held by a career official, it is imperative that a political appointee lead the ONDCP budget office to ensure coordination between the OMB Program Associate Director and the ONDCP budgetary appointee.

ONDCP grant-making activities have been controversial over the years, par- ticularly within conservative Administrations concerned that the White House lacks the expertise to oversee such programs directly. The ONDCP administers two grant programs: the Drug-Free Communities Support Program and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program. While it makes sense to transfer these programs eventually to the Department of Justice and Department of Health and Human Services, respectively, it is vital that the ONDCP Director ensure in the immediate term that these grant programs are funding the President’s drug control priorities and not woke nonprofits with leftist policy agendas. Thus, the President must insure that the ONDCP is managed by political appointees who are commit- ted to the Administration’s agenda and not acquiesce to management by political or career military personnel who oversaw the prior Administration’s ONDCP.

 

GENDER POLICY COUNCIL (GPC)

The President should immediately revoke Executive Order 1402041 and every policy, including subregulatory guidance documents, produced on behalf of or related to the establishment or promotion of the Gender Policy Council and its subsidiary issues. Abolishing the Gender Policy Council would eliminate central promotion of abortion (“health services”); comprehensive sexuality education (“education”); and the new woke gender ideology, which has as a principal tenet “gender affirming care” and “sex-change” surgeries on minors. In addition to elim- inating the council, developing new structures and positions will have the dual effect of demonstrating that promoting life and strengthening the family is a pri- ority while also facilitating more seamless coordination and consistency across the U.S. government.

Specifically, the President should appoint a position/point of contact with the rank of Special Assistant to the President or higher to coordinate and lead the Pres- ident’s domestic priorities on issues related to life and family in cooperation with the Domestic Policy Council. This position would be responsible for facilitating meetings, discussions, and agreements among personnel; coordinating Adminis- tration policy; and ensuring agency support for implementation of policies related to the promotion of life and family in the United States.

 

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT (OVP)

The Vice President is elected to the second highest office in the nation and plays a constitutionally vital role as President-in-waiting. The Vice President is also

 

the President of the Senate and is charged with breaking tie votes in that body. In recent years, the Vice President has been granted office space in the West Wing and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building.

The OVP is another one of the levers that the President should use to execute his agenda. This is particularly true because there is significant and unique leverage that the Vice President’s leadership of the OVP can evoke to shape policy discus- sions and outcomes. Every other appointed White House official serves at the pleasure of the President, whereas the Vice President is elected, and the process for filling vacancies in that Article II constitutional office, which includes confir- mation of a replacement Vice President by a majority of both Houses of Congress, is governed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.42

The Vice President has his or her own economic advisers, domestic policy and national security staff, and daily intelligence briefings. The Vice President should fill his or her office with strong and sound policy minds to effectively assist the President in fulfilling his agenda.

The Vice President is also a statutory member of the National Security Council.43 In theory, in light of the fact that the Vice President is a member of the Smithso- nian Institution’s Board of Regents,44 there is nothing to prevent Congress from assigning the Vice President additional statutory duties.

All of the component councils and offices discussed in this chapter include real policy development and implementation authority, and a robust OVP should be fully integrated into all policy-formation procedures. Only a Vice President who is deeply steeped in the interworking of the interagency and policy councils can offer useful advice and prove helpful in accomplishing the President’s agenda. It is also obvious, in view of the fact that many former Vice Presidents have gone on to be elected President in their own right,45 that the Vice Presidency can act as a training ground for presidential office.

In the past, the Vice President has been tasked with leading certain initiatives or issues. For example, Mike Pence was tasked with coordinating the federal response to COVID-19, and both Pence and Kamala Harris have chaired the National Space Council. Vice Presidents Richard Cheney and Dan Quayle were also active on the deregulatory front and in imposing regulatory moratoria. However, OVP offi- cials should be fully integrated into each and every process from the start of a new Administration and not have to wait to be invited to join various meetings or working groups on an ad hoc basis. For example, the budget and regulatory review processes are linchpins in the execution of policy, and the OVP should have a seat at the table through every phase of policy development.

Past Vice Presidents have also spent significant time abroad serving as a type of brand ambassador for the White House and, more broadly, for the United States, announcing Administration priorities and coordinating with heads of state and other top officials of foreign governments. The Vice President, as President of the


Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda.

To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

ENDNOTES

1.               U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023).

2.                James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023).

3.               31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and

§ 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023).

4.                 President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/

FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

5.                Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

6.                See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C.   (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

7.                Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

8.                President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235–

55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.

pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

9.               President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo.

gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

10.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/

pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

11.           See note 8, supra.

12.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf

(accessed January 31, 2023).

13.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749.

pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

14.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo.

gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

15.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https://

www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

16.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021),

pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

17.           President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13132, “Federalism,” August 4, 1999, in Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 153 (August 10, 1999), pp. 43255–43259, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/99-

20729.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

18.           President Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12630, “Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,” March 15, 1988, in Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 53 (March 18,

1988),  pp.  8859–8862,  https://www.regulationwriters.com/downloads/Executive_Orders/EO_12630.pdf

(accessed January 31, 2023).

19.           Section 115 in H.R. 4577, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Public Law No. 106-544, 106th Congress,

December 21, 2000, https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ554/PLAW-106publ554.pdf (accessed

January 31, 2023).

20.           H.R. 6410, Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Public Law No. 96-511, 96th Congress, December 11, 1980, https://

www.congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg2812.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

21.           S. 3418, An Act to Amend Title 5, United States Code, by Adding a Section 552a, to Safeguard Individual Privacy from the Misuse of Federal Records, to Provide that Individuals Be Granted Access to Records Concerning Them Which Are Maintained by Federal Agencies, to Establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for Other Purposes (Privacy Act of 1974), Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed

January 31, 2023).

22.           Office of Management and Budget, “Guidance for Grants and Agreements,” Final Guidance, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 157 (August 13, 2020), pp. 49506–49582, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-13/ pdf/2020-17468.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023), and “Guidance for Grants and Agreements,” Correcting Amendments, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 33 (February 22, 2021), pp. 10439–10440, https://www.govinfo.

gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-02-22/pdf/2021-02969.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

23.           H.R. 5, Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, 115th Congress, introduced January 3, 2017, https://www. congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5 (accessed January 31, 20/23), and S. 951, Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, 115th Congress, introduced April 26, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th- congress/senate-bill/951 (accessed January 31, 2023).

24.           S. 2314, Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology Act (SMART Act), 116th Congress, introduced July 30, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2314/text (accessed January 31, 2023).

25.           H.R. 1605, Guidance Out of Darkness Act (GOOD Act), 117th Congress, introduced March 8, 2021, https://www. congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1605 (accessed January 31, 2023).

26.           S. 2804, Early Participation in Regulations Act of 2021, 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2804 (accessed January 31, 2023).

27.           S. 170, Unfunded Mandates Accountability and Transparency Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 2, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/170 (accessed January 31, 2023).

28.           H.R. 277, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023 (REINS Act), 118th Congress, introduced January 11, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/277/all-info?r=217

(accessed January 31, 2023).

29.           Subtitle E, “Congressional Review,” in H.R. 3136, Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-121, 104th Congress, March 29, 1996, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ121/pdf/

PLAW-104publ121.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

30.           H.R. 115, Midnight Rules Relief Act of 2023, 118th Congress, introduced January 9, 2023, https://www.congress.

gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/115/text?s=1&r=18 (accessed January 31, 2023).

31.           See Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “Presidential Directives and Executive Orders,” https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/direct.htm (accessed February 1, 2023), and Library of Congress, Researchers, Newspaper and Current Periodical Reading Room, “Presidential Directives and Where to Find Them,” March 30, 2022, https://www.loc.gov/rr/news/directives.html (accessed February 1, 2023).

32.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13803, “Reviving the National Space Council,” June 30, 2017, in

Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 129 (July 7, 2017), pp. 31429–31432, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-

2017-07-07/pdf/2017-14378.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

33.           H.R. 10230, National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976, Public Law No. 94-282, 94th Congress, May 11, 1976, https://www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-90/STATUTE-90-Pg459.

pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

34.           H.R. 4346, CHIPS [Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors] and Science Act, Public Law No. 117-167, 117th Congress, August 9, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf

(accessed February 1, 2023).

35.           S. 169, Global Change Research Act of 1990, Public Law No. 101-606, 101st Congress, November 16, 1990,

https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg3096.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

36.           S. 1075, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law No. 91-190, 91st Congress, January 1, 1970,

https://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/91/190.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

37.           Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep442/

usrep442347/usrep442347.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).

38.           Title XLI (41) in H.R. 22, Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act), Public Law No. 114-94, 114th Congress, December 4, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-129/STATUTE-129-Pg1312.pdf

(accessed February 1, 2023).

39.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13807, “Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects,” August 15, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 163 (August 24, 2017), pp. 40463–40469, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-08-24/

pdf/2017-18134.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

40.            H.R. 5210, Anti-Drug Abuse of 1988, Public Law No. 100-690, 100th Congress, November 18, 1988, https://www.

congress.gov/100/statute/STATUTE-102/STATUTE-102-Pg4181.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

41.            President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14020, “Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council,” March 8, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 46 (March 11, 2021), pp. 13797–13801, https://www.

govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-03-11/pdf/2021-05183.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

42.            U.S. Constitution, Amendment XXV, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxxv (accessed March 9, 2023).

43.            50 U.S.C. § 3021(c)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3021 (accessed March 9, 2023).

44.            20 U.S.C. § 20(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/42#:~:text=The%20business%20of%20the%20 Institution%20shall%20be%20conducted,no%20two%20of%20them%20of%20the%20same%20State (accessed March 9, 2023).

45.            Vice Presidents Gerald Ford and Lyndon Johnson assumed (Ford) or initially assumed (Johnson) the office of the presidency by a process of succession.

 

 

Heritage Foundation - Politico - Bureau Labor Statistic - Market Watch - Statistic Highest Rate - American Presidency Project

Thống Kê Việc Làm Và Thất Nghiệp Từ 1980-2023 - https://gop.com/about-our-party/ - Neo Marx - New Left

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fredric_Jameson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterculture_of_the_1960s - Joe Mac Carthy- Ame Enterprise Institute

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/museums/hrnm/Education/EducationWebsiteRebuild/RussianPropagandaAboutGermany/

https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/difference-between-communism-capitalism-and-socialism/

https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/082415/pros-and-cons-capitalist-vs-socialist-economies.asp

https://www.oneplace.com/ministries/changing-worldviews/read/articles/difference-between-socialism-and-communism-9441.html

https://www.crossingbordersnk.org/communism-and-dictatorship-in-north-korea?utm_source=google&utm_medium=ppc&utm_id=google-ad-grant&gad_source]

https://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=13056&gad_source=

https://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/engl_258/lecture%20notes/capitalism%20etc%20defined.htm

https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/difference-between-capitalism-socialism-and-communism

Capitalism-and-Communism-same-goal/

Online.Hillsdale.Edu/Marxism-Socialism-Communism?

MINH THỊ

LỊCH SỬ ĐÃ CHỨNG MINH, KHÔNG MỘT ĐÁM NGOẠI NHÂN NÀO YÊU THƯƠNG ĐẤT NƯỚC, DÂN TỘC CỦA CHÚNG TA NẾU CHÍNH CHÚNG TA KHÔNG BIẾT YÊU THƯƠNG LẤY ĐẤT NƯỚC VÀ DÂN TỘC CỦA MÌNH. 

DÂN TỘC VIỆT NAM PHẢI TỰ QUYẾT ĐỊNH LẤY VẬN MỆNH CỦA MÌNH CHỨ KHÔNG THỂ VAN NÀI, CẦU XIN ĐƯỢC TRỞ THÀNH QUÂN CỜ PHỤC VỤ CHO LỢI ÍCH CỦA NGOẠI BANG VÀ NHỮNG THẾ LỰC QUỐC TẾ. 

 

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