at Capitol. June 19.1996
with Sen. JohnMc Cain
with General John K Singlaub
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https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2022/08/19/1384992/much-azov-about-nothing-how-the-ukrainian-neo-nazis-canard-fooled-the-world
with General Micheal Ryan
OVERVIEW
From
the
very
first
Mandate for
Leadership,
the
“personnel is
policy” theme
has
been
the
fundamental
principle guiding
the
government’s
personnel management. As
the U.S.
Constitution
makes clear,
the
President’s
appointment, direction,
and
removal
author-
ities
are
the
central elements
of
his
executive power.1 In
implementing
that power,
the
people and
the President
deserve the
most talented
and
responsible workforce possible.
Who
the
President
assigns to
design and
implement his
political policy
agenda will
determine whether he
can carry
out the
responsibility given to
him by
the American
people.
The
President
must
recognize
that
whoever
holds
a
government position
sets
its
policy.
To fulfill
an
electoral
mandate,
he
must
therefore
give
per-
sonnel
management
his
highest
priority, including
Cabinet-level
precedence.
The
federal government’s
immense bureaucracy
spreads into
hundreds of
agen-
cies
and
thousands
of
units
and
is
centered and
overseen at
the
top
by
key
central personnel
agencies
and
their
governing laws
and
regulations.
The
major
separate personnel
agencies in
the national government
today are:
•
The
Office of Personnel Management (OPM);
•
The
Merit
Systems Protection
Board
(MSPB);
•
The
Federal
Labor Relations
Authority
(FLRA); and
•
The
Office
of Special
Counsel
(OSC).
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Title
5 of
the U.S.
Code charges
the OPM
with executing,
administering, and enforcing
the
rules,
regulations,
and
laws
governing
the
civil
service.2 It
grants
the OPM
direct responsibility
for
activities
like retirement,
pay, health,
training, federal
unionization,
suitability, and
classification
functions
not
specifically
granted to
other
agencies
by
statute.
The
agency’s
Director is
charged with
aiding the
President, as
the
President
may request,
in
preparing
such
civil service
rules
as
the
President
pre-
scribes
and
otherwise
advising
the
President
on
actions
that
may
be
taken
to
promote
an efficient civil service
and a systematic application of the merit system principles,
including
recommending
policies
relating
to
the
selection,
promotion,
transfer,
per-
formance,
pay, conditions
of
service,
tenure,
and
separation
of
employees.
The
MSPB is
the
lead
adjudicator for
hearing and
resolving cases
and
contro-
versies
for
2.2
million federal
employees.3 It
is
required to
conduct fair
and
neutral
case
adjudications,
regulatory reviews, and
actions and
studies to
improve the
workforce.
Its
court-like
adjudications
investigate
and
hear
appeals
from
agency actions
such as furloughs, suspensions, demotions, and terminations and
are appealable to
the U.S.
Court of
Appeals.
The
FLRA hears
appeals of
agency personnel
cases involving
federal labor
griev-
ance
procedures
to
provide
judicial review
with binding
decisions appealable
to
appeals
courts.4 It
interprets
the
rights
and
duties
of
agencies
and
employee
labor organizations—on
management
rights, OPM
interpretations,
recognition
of
labor
organizations,
and
unfair
labor practices—under
the
general
principle of
bargain- ing
in good
faith and
compelling need.
The
OSC
serves
as
the
investigator,
mediator,
publisher, and
prosecutor before
the
MSPB with
respect to
agency and
employees
regarding prohibited person-
nel practices, Hatch Act5
politicization, Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act6
issues,
and
whistleblower complaints.7
The
Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has
general respon-
sibility
for reviewing charges of
employee
discrimination
against all
civil rights
breaches.
However,
it also
administers
a government
employee
section
that
investi- gates and adjudicates
federal employee complaints concerning equal employment
violations
as with
the
private
sector.8
This
makes
the
agency
an
additional
de
facto
factor in government
personnel management.
While
not
a
personnel agency
per
se,
the
General
Services Administration
(GSA)
is
charged
with general
supervision of
contracting.9 Today,
there
are
many more
contractors in
government than there are civil service employees. The GSA must
therefore
be a
part of
any personnel
management discussion.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OPM: Managing
the Federal Bureaucracy.
At the very pinnacle of the modern
progressive
program to
make
government competent stands
the ideal of
professionalized,
career civil
service. Since
the turn
of the
20th century,
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
progressives have sought a system
that could effectively select, train, reward,
and
guard
from
partisan
influence
the
neutral
scientific
experts
they
believe
are required
to
staff
the
national
government
and
run
the
administrative
state.
Their
U.S.
system was
initiated by
the
Pendleton
Act
of
188310 and
institutionalized
by
the
1930s New
Deal to
set
principles
and
practices
that were
meant to
ensure that
expert
merit rather
than partisan
favors or
personal
favoritism ruled within
the federal bureaucracy. Yet,
as public
frustration with the
civil service
has grown,
generating calls
to “drain
the swamp,”
it has
become clear
that their
project has
had serious unintended consequences.
The
civil service
was
devised
to
replace
the
amateurism
and
presumed
corrup-
tion
of
the
old
spoils
system, wherein
government jobs
rewarded loyal
partisans who
might or
might not
have
professional backgrounds. Although
the system
appeared to be sufficient
for the
nation’s first
century,
progressive intellectuals and
activists
demanded
a
more
professionalized,
scientific,
and
politically
neutral
Administration.
Progressives
designed
a
merit
system
to
promote
expertise
and shield
bureaucrats
from
partisan
political
pressure,
but
it
soon
began
to
insulate
civil servants from
accountability. The modern merit system increasingly made it
almost
impossible
to fire
all
but
the
most
incompetent
civil
servants.
Complying with
arcane
rules
regarding
recruiting,
rating,
hiring,
and
firing
simply
replaced the
goal of
cultivating
competence and expertise.
In the 1970s, Georgia Democratic
Governor Jimmy Carter, then a political
unknown,
ran
for
President
supporting
New
Deal
programs
and
their
Great
Soci-
ety
expansion
but opposing
the
way
they
were
being
administered.
The
policies
were not
actually
reducing
poverty,
increasing
prosperity,
or
improving
the
envi-
ronment,
he argued,
and
to
make
them
work
required
fundamental
bureaucratic
reform. He
correctly charged that
almost all
government
employees were rated
as
“successful,” all
received
the
same
pay
regardless
of
performance,
and
even
the
worst
were
impossible
to fire—and
he
won
the
presidency.
President
Carter fulfilled his campaign promise by hiring Syracuse
University Dean
Alan Campbell,
who
served
first as
Chairman of
the
U.S.
Civil Service
Com-
mission and then as Director of the OPM and helped him devise and pass
the Civil
Service
Reform Act
of
1978
(CSRA)11 to
reset
the
basic
structure of
today’s bureau-
cracy.
A new
performance
appraisal system was
devised with
a five rather
than three
distribution
of
rating
categories
and
individual
goals
more
related
to
agency
missions
and
more
related
to
employee
promotion
for
all.
Pay
and
benefits
were
based
directly
on improved
performance
appraisals
(including
sizable
bonuses)
for mid-level
managers and
senior
executives. But time
ran out
on President
Carter before the act
could be
fully
executed, so it
was left
to President
Ronald Reagan
and his
new OPM
and agency
leadership to implement.
Overall,
the new
law seemed
to work
for a
few years
under Reagan,
but the
Carter–
Reagan
reforms were
dissipated within
a
decade.
Today, employee
evaluation is
back
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
to
pre-reform levels
with almost
all
rated
successful or
above, frustrating
any
rela-
tion
between
pay
and
performance. An
“outstanding”
rating
should be
required for
Senior
Executive
Service
(SES) chiefs
to
win
big
bonuses,
but
a
few
years
ago, when it was
disclosed that the Veterans Administration executives who
encouraged false reporting of waiting lists for hospital
admission were rated outstanding, the Senior
Executive
Association
justified
it,
telling
Congress that
only
outstanding
performers would
be
promoted
to
the
SES
in
the
first
place
and
that
precise
ratings
were
unnec-
essary.12 The
Government
Accountability
Office
(GAO), however,
has
reported
that pay raises, within-grade pay increases, and locality
pay for regular employees and
executives
have
become
automatic rather
than based
on
performance—as
a
result
of
most
employees being
rated at
similar appraisal
levels.13
OPM:
Merit Hiring
in a
Merit System.
It should not
be impossible
even for
a
large
national
government
to
hire
good
people
through
merit
selection.
The government
did so
for years,
but it
has proven
difficult in recent
times to
select personnel
based on
their
knowledge,
skills,
and
abilities
(KSA)
as
the
law
dictates.
Yet for
the
past
34
years,
the
U.S.
civil
service
has
been
unable
to
distinguish
con- sistently
between strong
and unqualified applicants for
employment.
As the Carter
presidency was winding
down, the
U.S. Department
of Justice
and
top lawyers
at
the
OPM
contrived
with
plaintiffs
to
end
civil
service
IQ
exam-
inations
because of
concern
about
their
possible
impact
on
minorities.
The
OPM had
used
the
Professional and
Administrative
Career
Examination
(PACE)
gen-
eral intelligence exam to
select college graduates for top agency employment, but Carter
Administration officials—probably without the President’s
informed con- currence—abolished
the
PACE
through
a
legal
consent
court
decree
capitulating to
demands
by
civil
rights
petitioners who
contended
that
it
was
discriminatory. The
judicial
decree
was
to
last
only
five
years
but
still
controls
federal hiring
and is
applied to
all KSA tests
even today.
General
ability
tests
like
the
PACE
have
been used
successfully
to assess
the
use-
fulness and
cost-effectiveness of broad intellectual qualities across many
separate occupations.
Courts have
ruled that
even without
evidence of
overt,
intentional discrimination,
such results might suggest discrimination. This doctrine of
dispa- rate
impact
could
be
ended
legislatively or
at
least
narrowed
through
the
regulatory
process by a future
Administration. In any event, the federal government has been
denied
the
use
of
a
rigorous
entry examination
for
three
decades,
relying
instead on
self-evaluations that have forced managers to resort to
subterfuge such as
preselecting
friends
or
associates
that
they
believe
are
competent
to
obtain
qual- ified
employees.
In
2015, President
Barack Obama’s
OPM
began
to
introduce
an
improved
merit examination called USAHire, which it had been
testing quietly since 2012 in a few agencies
for
a
dozen
job
descriptions.
The
tests
had
multiple-choice
questions with
only
one
correct answer.
Some questions
even required
essay replies:
questions
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
that would
change regularly to depress cheating. President Donald Trump’s
OPM planned
to implement such changes
but was
delayed
because of
legal concerns
over possible disparate impact.
Courts
have agreed
to review
the consent
decree if
the Uniform Guidelines
on
Employee
Selection
Procedures
setting
the
technical
requirements
for
sound exams
are reformed.
A government
that is
unable to
select
employees based on
KSA-like
test
qualifications
cannot
work,
and
the
OPM
must
move
forward on
this very basic
personnel management obligation.
The Centrality
of Performance Appraisal.
In the meantime, the OPM must
manage
the
workforce
it
has.
Before
they
can
reward
or
discipline
federal
employees,
managers
must
first
identify
who
their
top
performers
are
and
who
is
performing
less than
adequately.
In
fact,
as
Ludwig
von
Mises
proved
in
his
classic
Bureaucracy,14 unlike
the
profit-and-loss
evaluation tool
used in
the
private
sector, government
performance
measurement
depends totally
on
a
functioning appraisal
system. If
they
cannot
be
identified
in
the
first place
within a
functioning appraisal
system, it
is impossible
to
reward good
performance or
correct poor
performance. The
problem is that
the
collegial
atmosphere of
a
bureaucracy
in
a
multifaceted appraisal
system
that
is
open
to
appeals
makes this
a
very
challenging ideal
to
implement
successfully. The
GAO reported
more recently
that overly
high and
widely spread
perfor- mance
ratings
were
again
plaguing
the government,
with
more
than
99
percent
of employees
rated fully
successful or above
by their
managers, a mere
0.3 percent
rated as
minimally
successful,
and
0.1
percent
actually
rated
unacceptable.15 Why? It is human
nature that
no one
appreciates
being told
that he
or she
is less
than outstanding in
every
way.
Informing
subordinates
in
a
closely
knit
bureaucracy
that they
are not
performing well is
difficult. Rating compatriots
is even
consid- ered
rude
and
unprofessional.
Moreover,
managers
can
be
and
often
are
accused
of
racial or
sexual discrimination
for
a
poor rating,
and
this
discourages honesty.
In
2018, President
Trump issued
Executive Order
1383916 requiring
agen-
cies to reduce
the time
for employees
to improve
performance before corrective
action could be taken;
to initiate
disciplinary actions against
poorly
performing employees
more expeditiously; to reiterate
that agencies
are obligated
to make
employees improve;
to reduce
the time
for employees
to respond
to allegations
of poor performance; to
mandate that
agencies
remind supervisors
of expiring
employee probationary periods; to prohibit agencies from entering into
settlement agreements
that
modify
an
employee’s
personnel
record;
and
to
reevaluate
proce- dures for
agencies to discipline supervisors who retaliate against
whistleblowers. Unfortunately, the order was overturned by the
Biden Administration,17 so
it will need to be
reintroduced in 2025.
The fact remains
that
meaningfully
evaluating employees’
performance is
a critical part
of
a
manager’s
job.
In
the
Reagan
appraisal
process,
managers
were evaluated
on how
they themselves
rated their
subordinates. This is
critical
to
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
responsibility
and
improved
management. It
is
essential
that political
executives
build policy goals directly into employee appraisals both for mission
success and
for
employees to
know what
is
expected.
Indistinguishable
from
their coworkers on
paper, hard-working
federal employees
often go
unrewarded for
their efforts
and
are often
the system’s
greatest
critics. Federal
workers who
are performing
inadequately get
neither
the
benefit
of
an
honest
appraisal
nor
clear
guidance
on
how
to
improve.
Political
executives
should
take
an
active
role
in
supervising
per-
formance
appraisals
of
career
staff,
not
unduly
delegate
this
responsibility
to
senior
career managers,
and
be
willing
to
reward
and
support
good
performers.
Merit
Pay.
Performance
appraisal means little to daily operations if it is not tied
directly
to
real
consequences
for success
as
well
as
failure.
According
to a
survey
of
major U.S. private
companies—which, unlike the federal government, also have a
profit-and-loss
evaluation—90 percent
use
a
system
of
merit
pay
for
performance
based on
some
type
of
appraisal
system.
Despite
early
efforts
to
institute
merit
pay
throughout
the federal
government,
however,
compensation
is
still
based
primarily on
seniority rather than merit.
Merit
pay
for
executives and
managers was
part of
the
Carter
reforms and
was implemented
early in
the Reagan
presidency. Beginning in
the summer
of 1982,
the
Reagan OPM
entered
18
months
of
negotiations
with
House
and
Senate
staff on
extending
merit
pay
to
the
entire
workforce.
Long and
detailed
talks
between the
OPM and
both Democrats and Republicans
in Congress
ensued, and
a final agreement was reached
in 1983 that supposedly ensured the passage of legislation
creating
a new
Performance
Management
and
Recognition
System
(PMRS)
for
all, (not
just
management) GS-13
through GS-15
employees.
Meanwhile, the OPM issued
regulations to expand the role of performance related to pay
throughout the entire workforce, but congressional allies of the
employee
unions,
led
by
Representative Steny
Hoyer
(D)
of
government
employee– rich
Maryland,
stoutly resisted
this extension of
pay-for-performance
and, with
strong union
support,
used
the
congressional
appropriations
process
to
block
OPM
administrative pay reforms.
Bonuses for SES career employees survived, but per-
formance
appraisals
became
so
high
and
widely
distributed
that
there
was
little
relationship between performance and remuneration.
Ever
since the
original merit
pay
system
for
federal
managers (GM-13
through GM-15
grade
levels, just
below the
SES) was
allowed to
expire in
September 1993,
little to
nothing has been done either to reinstate the federal merit pay
program for managers or to distribute performance rating
evaluations for the SES, much less to extend
the
program
to
the
remainder of
the
workforce.
A
reform-friendly
President
and
Congress
might just
provide the
opportunity to
create a
more comprehensive
performance plan; in the meantime, however, political executives
should use exist-
ing
pay
and
especially
fiscal awards
strategically
to
reward good
performance to
the
degree allowed
by law.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Making the
Appeals Process Work. The
nonmilitary government dismissal
rate is
well
below
1
percent,
and
no
private-sector
industry
employee
enjoys
the job
security that
a federal employee
enjoys. Both
safety and
justice demand
that managers
learn
to
act
strategically
to
hire
good
and
fire
poor
performers
legally.
The initial paperwork
required to separate poor or abusive performers (when they
are
infrequently identified)
is
not
overwhelming,
and
managers
might
be
motivated
to act
if
it
were
not
for
the
appeals
and
enforcement
processes.
Formal
appeal
in
the
private sector is mostly a
rather simple two-step process, but government unions and
associations have been able to convince politicians to support a
multiple and extensive appeals and enforcement process.
As noted, there
are multiple
administrative appeals bodies.
The FLRA,
OSC, and
EEOC
have
relatively
narrow
jurisdictions.
Claims
that
an
employee’s
removal or
disciplinary actions violate the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement between
an
agency
and
a
union
are
handled
by
the
FLRA,
employees
who
claim
their
removal
was the
result
of
discrimination
can
appeal
to
the
EEOC,
and
employ-
ees who believe their firing
was retribution for being a whistleblower can go to the
OSC. While
the MSPB
specializes in abuses
of direct
merit system
issues, it
can and
does hear
and
review
almost
any
of
the
matters
heard
by
the
other
agencies.
Cases
involving
race, gender,
religion, age,
pregnancy, disability,
or
national
origin
can
be
appealed
to
the
EEOC or
the
MSPB—and
in
some
cases to
both—and to the
OSC. This
gives employees
multiple opportunities
to
prove
their cases,
and while the
EEOC, MSPB,
FLRA, and
OSC
may
all
apply
essentially the
same burden
of
proof,
the
odds
of
success
may
be
substantially
different
in
each
forum. In
fact,
forum
shopping
among them
for
a
friendlier venue
is
a
common practice,
but
fre-
quent
filers face
no
consequences
for
frivolous
complaints. As
a
result,
meritorious
cases
are
frequently
delayed, denying
relief and
justice to
truly aggrieved
individuals. The MSPB
can and does handle all such matters, but it faces a backlog of
an estimated 3,000
cases of
people who
were
potentially wrongfully terminated
or disciplined as far back as 2013. From 2017–2022 the
MSPB lacked the quorum
required
to
decide
appeals.
On
the
other
hand,
as
of
January
2023,
the
EEOC
had
a
backlog of
42,000
cases.
While
federal employees
win
appeals
relatively
infrequently—MSPB
adminis-
trative
judges
have
upheld
agency
decisions
as
much
as
80
percent of
the
time—the
real
problem is
the time
and paperwork
involved in
the elaborate
process that
managers
must
undergo
during
appeals.
This
keeps
even
the
best
managers
from bringing
cases in
all but
the most
egregious cases
of poor
performance or
mis- conduct. As
a
result,
the
MSPB,
EEOC,
FLRA,
and
OSC
likely
see
very
few
cases compared
to
the
number
of
occurrences, and
nonperformers
continue
to
be
paid and
often are
placed in
nonwork
positions.
Having a choice
of appeals is especially unique to the government. If lower-pri-
ority
issues
were addressed
in-house, serious
adverse actions
would be
less subject
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
to delay. With the proper limitation
of labor union actions, the FLRA should
have
limited
reason for
appeals.
The
EEOC’s
federal
employee
section
should
be
transferred to
the
MSPB,
and
many
of
the
OCS’s
investigatory
functions
should
be returned to the
OPM. The MSPB could then become the main reviewer of adverse
actions,
greatly simplifying
the burdensome appeal process.
Making
Civil Service
Benefits
Economically and
Administratively Ratio- nal. In recent
years, the combined wages and benefits of the executive branch
civilian workforce totaled $300 billion according to official
data. But even that amount
does
not
properly
account for
billions
in
unfunded
liability
for
retirement and
other
government
reporting
distortions.
Official
data
also
report
employment as
approximately 2 million, but this ignores approximately 20
million contractors
who,
while
not
eligible
for
government
pay
and
benefits,
do
receive
them
indirectly
through contracting
(even
if
they
are
less
generous).
Official
data
also
claim
that national
government
employees
are
paid
less
than
private-sector
employees
are paid
for similar
work, but
several more
neutral sources
demonstrate
that pub-
lic-sector
workers
make
more
on
average
than
their
private-sector
counterparts.
All of this extravagance
deserves close
scrutiny.
Market-Based
Pay and Benefits.
According to current law, federal workers
are
to
be
paid
wages
comparable
to
equivalent
private-sector
workers
rather
than compared
to all
private-sector employees. While
the official
studies claim
that federal
employees are underpaid
relative to
the private sector
by 20
percent or
more,
a
2016
Heritage
Foundation
study
found
that
federal
employees
received
wages that
were
22
percent
higher
than
wages
for
similar
private-sector
workers; if the value
of employee benefits was included, the total compensation
premium for federal employees over their private-sector
equivalents increased to between 30
percent
and 40
percent.18 The
American
Enterprise Institute
found a
14
percent
pay
premium and
a 61
percent total
compensation
premium.19
Base
salary is
only one
component of
a
federal
employee’s total
compensation. In
addition
to
high
starting wages,
federal employees
normally receive
an
annual
cost-of-living
adjustment
(available to all
employees) and generous
scheduled raises known as
step
increases. Moreover, a large
proportion of federal
employ- ees are stationed in the Washington, D.C., area
and other large cities and are entitled
to steep
locality pay
enhancement to
account for
the high
cost of
living in these areas.
A federal
employee with five years’ experience receives 20 vacation days,
13 paid
sick
days, and
all
10
federal holidays
compared to
an
employee
at
a
large private
company
who
receives
13
days
of
vacation
and eight
paid
sick
days.
Federal
health
benefits
are
more
comparable
to those
provided
by
Fortune
500 employers
with
the
government
paying 72
percent
of
the
weighted
average
premiums,
but
this
is
much higher than for most
private plans. Almost half of private firms do not offer
any employer contributions at all.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
The obvious
solution to these discrepancies is to move closer to a market
model for federal pay and benefits. One need is for a neutral
agency to oversee pay hiring
decisions,
especially for
high-demand occupations.
The
OPM
is
independent
of
agency
operations, so it can assess requirements more neutrally. For
many years,
with
its
Special Pay
Rates program,
the
OPM
evaluated claims
that federal
rates in an
area were
too
low
to
attract
competent employees
and
allowed
agencies to
offer
higher
pay
when
needed rather
than increased
rates for
all. Ideally,
the
OPM
should
establish an
initial pay
schedule for
every occupation
and
region,
monitor turnover
rates and
applicant-to-position
ratios, and
adjust pay
and recruitment
on that basis. Most of this requires legislation, but the OPM should be
an advocate for
a true
equality of
benefits
between the
public and
private
sectors.
Reforming Federal Retirement Benefits.
Career civil servants enjoy retire-
ment
benefits
that are
nearly
unheard
of
in
the
private
sector.
Federal
employees
retire earlier
(normally at age
55 after
30 years),
enjoy richer
pension
annuities, and
receive
automatic
cost-of-living
adjustments
based
on
the
areas
in
which
they retire.
Defined-benefit federal pensions are fully indexed for
inflation—a practice that
is extremely
rare in the private
sector. A
federal
employee with
a preretire- ment income
of $25,000
under the
older of
the two
federal
retirement plans
will receive
at
least
$200,000
more
over
a
20-year
period
than
will
private-sector
work- ers
with the
same
preretirement salary
under historic
inflation levels.
During
the
early
Reagan years,
the
OPM
reformed many
specific provisions
of
the
federal pension
program to
save billions
administratively.
Under
OPM
pres-
sure, Reagan and Congress
ultimately ended the old Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS)
entirely for
new employees, which (counting
disbursements for the unfunded liability) accounted for 51.3 percent of the
federal government's total payroll. The retirement system that
replaced it—the Federal Employees
Retirement System
(FERS)—reduced the cost of federal employee retirement dis-
bursements
to 28.5
percent
of
payroll
(including
contributions
to
Social
Security
and the
employer
match
to
the
Thrift
Savings
Plan).
More
of
the
pension
cost
was
shifted
to the
employee,
but
the
new
system
was
much
more
equitable
for
the
40 percent
who received
few or
no benefits
under the
old system.
By
1999, more
than half
of
the
federal workforce
was
covered
by
the
new
system,
and
the
government’s per
capita share
of
the
cost (as
the
employer)
was
less
than half
the cost
of the
old system:
20.2 percent
of FERS
payroll vs.
44.3 percent
of CSRS
payroll, representing one of
the largest
examples of
government
savings anywhere.
Although
the government
pension
system
has
become
more
like private
pension systems, it still
remains much more generous, and other means might be
considered in the
future to
move it
even closer
to private
plans.
GSA: Landlord and Contractor Management.
The General Services
Administration
is
best
known
as
the
federal
government’s
landlord—designing,
constructing, managing, and preserving government buildings and
leasing and
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
managing
outside commercial
real estate
contracting with
376.9 million
square feet
of
space.
Obviously, as
its
prime
function, real
estate expertise
is
key
to
the
GSA’s
success. However, the GSA is also the government’s purchasing agent,
connecting federal purchasers with
commercial products and
services in
the private sector
and their personnel
management functions. With contractors performing so many
functions
today,
the
GSA
therefore
becomes
a
de
facto
part
of
governmentwide
personnel management.
The GSA
also manages
the
Presidential
Transition Act (PTA) process,
which also
directly
involves the
OPM. A
recent
proposal would
have
incorporated
the
OPM
and
GSA
(and
OMB).
Fortunately,
this
did
not
take
place
in
that
form,
but
it
would
make
sense
for
GSA
and
OPM
leadership
and staff to
hold regular
meetings to
work through
matters of
common
interest such
as moderating PTA personnel
restrictions and the
relationships between contract and
civil service employees.
Reductions-in-Force.
Reducing the number of federal employees seems an obvious
way to
reduce the
overall expense
of the
civil service,
and many
prior Administrations have attempted to do just this.
Presidents Bill Clinton and
Barack
Obama
began
their
terms,
as
did
Ronald
Reagan
and
Donald
Trump,
by mandating
a
freeze
on
the
hiring
of
new
federal
employees,
but
these
efforts
did not
lead
to
permanent
and substantive
reductions
in
the
number
of
nondefense
federal employees.
First,
it
is
a
challenge
even to
know which
workers to
cut. As
mentioned, there
are 2 million federal employees, but
since budgets have exploded, so has the total number of
personnel with nearly 10 times more federal contractors than
federal employees.
Contractors are less
expensive because they
are not
entitled to
high
government
pensions
or
benefits
and
are
easier
to
fire
and
discipline.
In addition,
millions
of state
government
employees
work
under
federal
grants,
in
effect
administering federal
programs;
these
cannot
be
cut
directly.
Cutting
federal employment
can
be
helpful
and can
provide
a
simple
story
to
average
citizens,
but
cutting
functions,
levels,
funds,
and
grants
is
much
more
important
than
setting simple
employment size.
Simply
reducing
numbers can
actually
increase costs.
OMB
instructions fol-
lowing President Trump’s
employment freeze told
agencies to
consider buyout
programs, encouraging early
retirements in order to shift costs from current bud-
gets
in
agencies
to the
retirement
system
and
minimize
the
number
of
personnel
fired. The
Environmental Protection Agency
immediately implemented such
a program, and OMB
urged the passage of legislation to increase payout maximums
from
$25,000
to
$40,000
to
further
increase
spending
under
the
“cuts.”
President
Clinton’s OMB had introduced
a similar buyout that cost the Treasury $2.8 billion,
mostly
for
those
who were
going
to
retire
anyway. Moreover,
when
a
new
employee
is hired
to
fill
a
job
recently
vacated
in
a
buyout,
the
government
for
a
time
is
paying two
people to fill one job.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
What is needed
at the
beginning is
a freeze on
all top
career-position hiring to
prevent
“burrowing-in”
by
outgoing
political
appointees.
Moreover,
four
fac-
tors
determine
the order
in
which
employees
are
protected
during
layoffs:
tenure,
veterans’ preference, seniority, and performance in that order
of importance. Despite
several
attempts
in
the
House
of
Representatives
during
the
Trump
years to
enact
legislation that
would
modestly
increase
the
weight
given
to
performance
over time-of-service,
the
fierce
opposition
by
federal
managers
associations
and
unions representing
long-serving but not necessarily well-performing constituents
explains why the bills failed to advance. A determined President
should insist that performance
be first
and be
wary of
costly types
of
reductions-in-force.
Impenetrable
Bureaucracy.
The
GAO
has
identified almost
a
hundred
actions that the
executive branch
or
Congress
could take
to
improve
efficiency and
effec- tiveness across
37 areas that span a broad range of government missions and
functions.
It identified
33
actions
to
address
mission
fragmentation,
overlap,
and duplication
in
the
12
areas
of
defense,
economic
development,
health,
homeland
security, and information
technology. It also identified 59 other opportunities for
executive agencies
or Congress
to reduce
the cost
of government
operations or enhance revenue collection across 25 areas of government.20
A
logical place
to
begin
would be
to
identify
and
eliminate
functions and
pro- grams that
are
duplicated
across Cabinet
departments or
spread across
multiple agencies.
Congress hoped
to help
this effort
by passing
the Government
Perfor- mance and Results Act of 1993,21 which required all federal
agencies to define their
missions,
establish
goals
and
objectives,
and
measure
and
report
their
per- formance
to Congress.
Three decades
of endless
time-consuming
reports later, the government continues
to grow
but with
more paper
and little
change either
in performance
or in
the number
of levels
between
government and
the people.
The Brookings Institution’s Paul
Light emphasizes the importance of the
increasing
number of
levels
between
the
top
heads
of
departments
and
the
people at
the
bottom
who
receive
the products
of
government
decision-making.
He
esti-
mates
that
there
are
perhaps
50
or
more
levels
of
impenetrable bureaucracy
and
no way
other
than
imperfect
performance
appraisals
to
communicate
between
them.22 The
Trump
Administration
proposed some
possible
consolidations, but these
were
not
received
favorably
in
Congress,
whose
approval
is
necessary
for
most
such
proposals.
The best
solution
is
to
cut
functions
and
budgets
and
devolve
respon-
sibilities. That
is a
challenge
primarily for
Presidents, Congress, and
the entire
government, but
the
OPM
still
needs
to
lead
the
way
governmentwide
in
managing
personnel
properly
even in
any
future
smaller government.
Creating a Responsible Career Management Service.
The people elect a
President
who
is
charged
by
Article
2,
Section
3
of
the
Constitution23 with
seeing
that the laws
are “faithfully executed” with his political appointees
democratically
linked
to
that
legitimizing
responsibility.
An
autonomous bureaucracy
has
neither
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
independent
constitutional status nor separate moral legitimacy. Therefore,
career
civil
servants
by
themselves
should not
lead major
policy changes
and
reforms.
The creation of
the Senior
Executive
Service was
the top
career change
intro- duced by the 1978 Carter–Campbell Civil Service
Reform Act. Its aim was to
professionalize
the
career
service
and
make
it
more
responsible
to
the
democrat-
ically elected commander in
chief and his political appointees while respecting the rights
due
to
career
employees,
very
much
including
those
in
the
top
positions.
The
new
SES
would
allow
management
to be
more
flexible
in
filling
and
reassigning
executive positions
and locations
beyond narrow
specialties
for more
efficient mission
accomplishment and
would
provide
pay
and
large
bonuses
to
motivate career
performance.
The desire to infiltrate political
appointees improperly into the high career
civil
service
has been
widespread
in
every
Administration,
whether
Democrat
or Republican.
Democratic
Administrations,
however,
are
typically
more
successful
because they
require
the
cooperation
of
careerists,
who
generally
lean
heavily
to
the Left. Such burrowing-in
requires career job descriptions for new positions that
closely
mirror
the
functions
of
a
political
appointee;
a
special
hiring
authority
that
allows the bypassing of
veterans’ preference as well as other preference categories;
and the ability
to frustrate
career
candidates from
taking the
desired
position.
President
Reagan’s OPM
began by
limiting such
SES
burrowing-in, arguing that the
proper course
was to
create and
fill political
positions. This simultane-
ously
promotes
the CSRA
principle
of
political
leadership
of
the
bureaucracy
and respects
the
professional autonomy
of the career service.
But this
requires that
career SES
employees
should respect
political
rights too.
Actions such
as career staff
reserving
excessive
numbers
of
key
policy
positions
as
“career
reserved”
to deny
them to
noncareer SES employees
frustrate CSRA intent.
Another
evasion is the general
domination by career staff on SES personnel evaluation boards,
the opposite
of noncareer
executives dominating these
critical
meeting discussions
as
expected
in the
SES.
Career
training
also
often
underplays
the
political
role
in leadership
and inculcates
career-first policy and
value
viewpoints.
Frustrated
with these
activities by
top
career
executives, the
Trump Adminis-
tration
issued
Executive Order 1395724 to make career
professionals in positions
that
are
not
normally
subject to
change
as
a
result
of
a
presidential
transition
but
who
discharge
significant
duties
and
exercise
significant
discretion
in
formulating
and implementing executive
branch policy and programs an exception to the com-
petitive
hiring
rules
and
examinations for
career
positions
under
a
new
Schedule
F.
It
ordered
the
Director
of
OPM
and
agency
heads to
set
procedures
to
prepare
lists of
such confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or
policy-advocating
positions
and
prepare
procedures to
create exceptions
from civil
service rules
when careerists
hold such
positions, from which
they can
relocate back
to the
regular civil service
after
such
service.
The
order
was
subsequently
reversed
by
President
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Biden25 at the demand
of the
civil service
associations and unions.
It should
be reinstated, but SES responsibility should come first.
Managing
Personnel in a Union Environment.
Historically, unions were
thought to
be
incompatible
with
government
management.
There
is
a
natural
limit
to the bargaining power of
private-sector unions, but the financial bottom line of
public-sector unions is
not similarly
constrained. If private-sector
unions push
too
hard
a
bargain,
they
can
so
harm
a
company
or
so
reduce
efficiency
that
their
employer
is forced
to
go
out
of
business
and
eliminate
union
jobs
altogether.
There
is
no
such
limit
in
government, which
cannot
go
out
of
business,
so
demands
can
be
excessive
without negatively
affecting
employee
and
union
bottom
lines.
Even
Democratic President
Franklin Roosevelt
considered union
representa- tion
in
the
federal
government to
be
incompatible
with democracy.
Striking and
even
threats
of
bargaining
and
delay
were considered
acts against
the
people
and thus improper.
It
was
not
until
President John
Kennedy that
union representation
in
the
federal government
was
recognized—and
then merely
by
executive
order.
Labor bargaining was not set in statute until the Carter Administration
was forced
by
Congress to
do
so
in
order
to
pass
the
CSRA,
although all
bargaining was
placed under OPM
review.
The CSRA was
able to
maintain strong
management
rights for
the OPM
and agencies and
forbade collective bargaining on pay and benefits as well as
manage- ment
prerogatives. Over
time,
OPM,
FLRA,
and
agencies’
personnel
offices
and courts,
especially
in Democratic
Administrations,
narrowed
management
rights
so that labor bargaining
expanded as management rights contracted. But the man-
agement
rights
are
still
in
statute,
have
been
enforced
by
some
Administrations,
and should
be
enforced
again
by
any
future
OPM
and
agency
managements,
which should
not be
intimidated by union
power.
Rather than
being
daunted,
President Trump issued
three executive
orders:
•
Executive Order 13836,
encouraging agencies to
renegotiate all union
collective
bargaining
agreements
to
ensure
consistency
with
the
law
and respect for
management rights;26
•
Executive Order 13837,
encouraging agencies to
prevent union
representatives
from
using
official
time
preparing
or
pursuing
grievances
or from
engaging in
other union
activity on
government
time;27
and
•
Executive
Order
13839,
encouraging
agencies
both
to
limit
labor
grievances
on removals
from service
or on
challenging performance appraisals
and to
prioritize performance
over
seniority
when
deciding
who
should
be
retained
following
reductions-in-force.28
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
All
were revoked
by
the
Biden Administration29 and
should
be
reinstated
by
the
next
Administration,
to
include
the
immediate
appointment of
the
FLRA
General Counsel and
reactivation of the Impasses Panel.
Congress should also consider whether public-sector unions are
appropriate in the first
place. The
bipartisan
consensus up until
the middle
of the
20th cen-
tury
held that
these
unions
were
not
compatible
with
constitutional
government.30 After
more
than
half a
century of
experience with
public-sector
union
frustrations
of
good
government management,
it
is
hard to
avoid reaching
the
same
conclusion.
Fully
Staffing the
Ranks of
Political
Appointees. The President
must rely legally
on
his
top
department
and
agency
officials
to
run
the
government
and
on
top White
House
staff
employees
to coordinate
operations
through
regular
Cabinet
and
other
meetings
and communications.
Without
this
political
leadership,
the
career
civil
service
becomes
empowered
to lead
the
executive
branch
without
democratic
legitimacy.
While
many
obstacles
stand
in
his
way,
a
President
is
constitutionally and
statutorily
required
to fill
the
top
political
positions
in
the
executive
branch
both
to
assist
him
and
to
provide
overall legitimacy.
Most Presidents
have had some difficulty obtaining congressional approval of
their
appointees, but
this has
worsened recently.
After the
2016 election,
President
Trump
faced
special
hostility from
the
opposition
party and
the
media
in
getting
his
appointees
confirmed or even
considered by the
Senate. His
early Office
of Presidential
Personnel
(PPO)
did
not
generally
remove
political
appointees
from the
previous
Administration but
instead
relied
mostly
on
prior
political
appoin-
tees and
career
civil
servants
to
run
the
government.
Such
a
reliance
on
holdovers and
bureaucrats led to a lack of agency control and the absolute
refusal of the Acting Attorney
General
from
the
Obama
Administration
to
obey
a
direct
order from the
President.
Under the early PPO, the Trump
Administration appointed fewer political
appointees
in
its
first
few
months
in
office
than
had
been
appointed
in any
recent
presidency,
partly
because
of
historically
high
partisan
congressional
obstructions
but also
because several
officials
announced that
they preferred
fewer political
appointees in the agencies as a
way to cut federal spending. Whatever the reasoning, this
had the effect of
permanently hampering the
rollout of
the new President’s
agenda.
Thus,
in
those
critical
early years,
much
of
the
government
relied
on
senior
careerists and holdover Obama
appointees to carry out the sensitive responsibili- ties
that would
otherwise belong to
the new
President’s appointees.
Fortunately,
the later PPO, OPM, and Senate leadership began to cooperate to
build
a
strong
team to
implement the
President’s personnel
appointment agenda.
Any
new
Administration would be
wise to
learn that
it will
need a
full cadre
of sound
political
appointees
from
the
beginning
if
it
expects
to
direct
this
enormous
federal bureaucracy.
A close
relationship between the
PPO at
the White
House and the
OPM,
coordinating with agency
assistant secretaries of
administration
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
and PPO’s
chosen White House Liaisons and their staff at each agency, is
essential
to
the
management of
this large,
multilevel, resistant,
and
bureaucratic
challenge. If
“personnel
is
policy”
is
to
be
our
general guide,
it
would
make sense
to
give
the
President
direct
supervision
of
the
bureaucracy with
the
OPM
Director available
in his Cabinet.
A
REFORMED
BUREAUCRACY
Today,
the federal
government’s bureaucracy cannot
even meet
its own
civil service
ideals.
The
merit
criteria
of
ability,
knowledge,
and
skills
are
no
longer
the
basis
for
recruitment, selection,
or
advancement,
while
pay
and
benefits
for
com- parable
work
are
substantially above
those
in
the
private
sector.
Retention
is
not based
primarily
on
performance, and
for
the
most
part,
inadequate
performance is
not appraised, corrected, or punished.
The authors have made many
suggestions here that, if implemented, could
bring
that
bureaucracy
more
under
control
and
enable
it
to
work
more
efficiently and
responsibly,
which
is
especially
required
for
the
half
of
civilian
government that
administers its
undeniable
responsibilities for defense
and foreign
affairs. While a better administered central bureaucracy
is crucial for both those and
domestic
responsibilities, the
problem
of
properly
running
the
government
goes beyond
simple
bureaucratic
administration. The
specific
deficiencies of the
fed- eral
bureaucracy—size, levels of organization, inefficiency, expense,
and lack of
responsiveness to political leadership—are rooted in the
progressive ideology that
unelected
experts
can
and
should
be
trusted
to
promote
the
general
welfare
in
just about
every area of social life.
The
Constitution,
however,
reserved a
few
enumerated
powers to
the
federal
government
while leaving
the
great
majority of
domestic activities
to
state,
local, and private
governance. As
James Madison
explained: “The
powers reserved
to the
several States
will extend
to all the objects,
which, in
the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the
lives,
liberties and
properties of
the people;
and the internal order,
improvement and
prosperity of
the state.”31
Modern
progressive
politics has simply given
the national
government more to
do than
the complex
separa- tion-of-powers Constitution allows.
That
progressive system
has
broken
down in
our
time,
and
the
only real
solution
is
for
the
national government
to
do
less: to
decentralize and
privatize as
much as
possible
and
then
ensure that
the
remaining
bureaucracy is
managed effectively
along
the lines
of the
enduring
principles set out
in detail
here.
AUTHORS’ NOTE:
The
authors are
grateful for
the
collaborative work of
the
individuals listed
as
contributors to
this
chapter
for
the
2025
Presidential
Transition
Project.
The
authors
alone
assume
responsibility
for
the
content
of this
chapter, and no
views
expressed herein
should be
attributed to
any other
individual.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S.
Constitution, Article II, Section 2,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed February 1, 2023).
2.
5 U.S. Code §§ 1101
et seq. and 1103(a)(5),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-II/chapter-11 (accessed February
1,
2023).
3.
5
U.S.
Code
§
1201,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1201
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
4.
5
U.S.
Code
§
7101,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7101
(accessed
February
1,
2023),
and
§
7117,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7117
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
5.
S. 1871, An
Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No.
76-252, August 2, 1939,
https://
govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).
6.
H.R.
995,
Uniformed
Services
Employment
and
Reemployment
Rights
Act
of
1994,
Public
Law
No.
103-353,
101st
Congress,
October 13,
1994,
https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-108/STATUTE-108-Pg3149.
pdf
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
7.
5
U.S.
Code
§
1206,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1206
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
8.
42
U.S.
Code
§
2000e,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000e
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
9.
40
U.S.
Code
§
581,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/40/581
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
10.
U.S.
National
Archives,
“Milestone
Documents:
Pendleton
Act
(1883),”
last
reviewed
February
8,
2022,
https://
www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/pendleton-act
(accessed February 2, 2023).
11.
S.
2640,
Civil
Service
Reform
Act
of
1978,
Public Law
No.
95-454,
95th
Congress,
October 13,
1978,
https://
www.congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1111.pdf
(accessed
February
2,
2023).
12.
Donovan Sack and Bill Theobald, “Veterans Affairs Pays $140
Million in Bonuses Amid Scandals,”
USA
Today, November 11, 2015,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/11/veterans-affairs-pays-142-
million-bonuses-amid-scandals/75537586/
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
13.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce:
Distribution of Performance Ratings Across
the Federal Government,
2013,” GAO-16-520R,
May 9, 2016,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-520r.pdf
(accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government Accountability
Office,
Results-Oriented
Management: OPM Needs
to Do More
to Ensure
Meaningful Distinctions Are
Made in
SES Ratings
and
Performance Awards,
GAO-15-
189,
January
2015,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-189.pdf
(accessed
March
15,
2023);
U.S.
Government
Accountability Office,
“Measuring Federal Employee Performance,” WatchBlog, posted
October 18, 2016,
https://www.gao.gov/blog/2016/10/18/measuring-federal-employee-performance
(accessed March 15, 2023);
Lisa
Rein, “The
Federal
Workforce, Where Everyone’s
Performance Gets Rave
Reviews,”
The
Washington Post,
June
13,
2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/13/heres-the-news-from-the-
federal-government-where-everyone-is-above-average-way-above/
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
14.
Ludwig von
Mises,
Bureaucracy
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944),
https://ia902300.us.archive.
org/17/items/mises-pdfs/1944-01-01_LudwigVonMises_Bureaucracy.pdf
(accessed
February
2,
2023).
15.
Figure
1,
“Permanent,
Non-Senior
Executive
Service
Employee
Performance
Rating
Outcomes
(All
Rating Systems, Calendar Year
2013),” in
U.S. Government
Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of
Performance
Ratings
Across
the
Federal
Government,
2013,”
p.
6.
16.
President
Donald
J.
Trump,
Executive
Order
13839,
“Promoting
Accountability
and
Streamlining
Removal Procedures
Consistent with Merit
System
Principles,” May
25, 2018,
in
Federal Register,
Vol. 83,
No. 106
(June 1, 2018), pp. 25343–25347,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11939.pdf
(accessed
February
2,
2023).
17.
President
Joseph
R.
Biden
Jr.,
Executive
Order
14003,
“Protecting
the
Federal
Workforce,”
January
22,
2021,
in
Federal
Register,
Vol.
86,
No.
16
(January
27,
2021),
pp.
7231–7233,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2021-01-27/pdf/2021-01924.pdf
(accessed
February
2,
2023).
18.
Rachel
Greszler
and
James
Sherk,
“Why
It
Is
Time
to
Reform
Compensation
for
Federal
Employees,”
The Heritage Foundation, July 27,
2016,
https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/why-it-time-reform-
compensation-federal-employees.
19.
Andrew
G.
Biggs
and
Jason
Richwine,
“Comparing
Federal
and
Private
Sector
Compensation,”
American Enterprise
Institute
Working
Paper
No.
2011-02,
revised
June
2011,
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/AEI-Working-Paper-on-Federal-Pay-May-2011.pdf?x91208
(accessed
February
2, 2023).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
20.
See
Gene
L.
Dodaro,
Comptroller
General
of
the
United
States,
“Government
Efficiency
and
Effectiveness:
Opportunities to Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions in
Financial Benefits,”
testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Spending Oversight, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S.
Senate, GAO-21-544T, May 12,
2021,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
21-544t.pdf
(accessed February 2,
2023).
21.
S. 20,
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law No.
103-62, 103rd Congress, August
3, 1993,
https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-107/STATUTE-107-Pg285.pdf (accessed
February
2,
2023).
22.
Paul Light,
“The Real
Crisis in
Government,”
The Capital
Times
(Madison,
Wisconsin), January 22,
2010,
https://
captimes.com/news/opinion/column/paul-c-light-the-real-crisis-in-government/article_9e139318-3d00-
5898-908d-4c7aee1e105d.html
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
23.
U.S.
Constitution, Article II, Section 3,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section3 (accessed February 2, 2023).
24.
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating
Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21, 2020, in
Federal
Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26,
2020), pp. 67631–67635,
https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf
(accessed
February
2,
2023).
25.
See
note
17,
supra.
26.
President Donald J. Trump,
Executive Order 13836, “Developing Efficient, Effective, and
Cost-Reducing Approaches
to Federal
Sector
Collective
Bargaining,” May 25,
2018, in
Federal Register,
Vol. 83,
No. 106
(June 1, 2018), pp. 25329–25334,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11913.pdf
(accessed
February
2,
2023).
27.
President Donald J. Trump,
Executive
Order 13837, “Ensuring Transparency,
Accountability, and Efficiency
in
Taxpayer-Funded
Union Time
Use,” May
25, 2018,
in
Federal Register,
Vol. 83,
No. 106
(June 1,
2018),
pp.
25335–25340,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11916.pdf
(accessed February 2, 2023).
28.
See
note
16,
supra.
29.
See
note
17,
supra.
30.
Philip
K.
Howard,
Not Accountable:
Rethinking the Constitutionality
of Public
Employee Unions
(Garden
City,
NY: Rodin Books, 2023).
31.
James
Madison,
The
Federalist Papers
No.
45,
January
26,
1788,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/01-10-02-0254
(accessed
February
1,
2023).
W
hile the lives of
Americans are affected in noteworthy ways, for better or
worse,
by
each
part
of
the
executive branch,
the
inherent
importance of national
defense and foreign
affairs makes the
Departments of Defense
and State first
among equals. Originating in the George Washington Administra-
tion,
the War
Department (as
it was
then known)
was headed
by Henry
Knox, America’s chief
artillery
officer
in
the
Revolutionary
War;
Thomas
Jefferson,
the
primary author of the
Declaration of Independence, was the first Secretary of State.
Despite
such
long
and
storied
histories,
neither
department
is
currently
living
up
to its standards, and the
success of the next presidency will be determined in part
by whether they
can be
significantly improved in
short order.
“Ever
since
our
Founding,”
former
acting secretary
of
defense
Christopher
Miller writes in Chapter 4,
“Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid war is
to
be
prepared
for it
in
peace.”
Yet
the
Department
of
Defense
“is
a
deeply
troubled
institution.” It has
emphasized leftist politics over military readiness, “Recruiting
was
the
worst
in
2022
that
it
has
been
in
two
generations,”
and
“the
Biden
Admin-
istration’s
profoundly
unserious
equity
agenda
and
vaccine
mandates
have
taken
a serious toll.”
Additionally, Miller writes that “the atrophy of our defense
industrial base,
the
impact
of
sequestration,
and
effective
disarmament
by
many
U.S.
allies
have exacted
a
high
toll
on
America’s
military.”
Moreover,
our
military
has
adopted
a risk-averse culture—think
of masked soldiers, sailors, and airmen—rather than
instilling and
rewarding
courage in
thought and
action.
The good news
is that
most enlisted
personnel, and most
officers,
especially below
the
rank
of
general
or
admiral,
continue
to
be
patriotic
defenders
of
liberty.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
But this is
now Barack
Obama’s general
officer corps.
That is
why Russ
Vought argues in
Chapter
2
that
the
National
Security
Council
“should
rigorously
review all
general and
flag officer
promotions to
prioritize the core
roles and
responsi- bilities
of the
military over
social
engineering and non-defense
related
matters, including climate
change, critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other
polarizing
policies that
weaken
our
armed
forces and
discourage
our nation’s
finest men
and women
from
enlisting.”
Ensuring
that many
of
America’s
best
and bright- est continue
to choose military service is essential.
“By
far
the
most significant
danger” to
America from
abroad, Miller
writes, “is
China.”
That
communist
regime
“is
undertaking
a
historic
military
buildup,” which “could
result in
a nuclear
force that
matches or
exceeds
America’s own
nuclear arsenal.”
Resisting Chinese expansionist aims “requires a denial defense”
whereby we
make “the
subordination of Taiwan
or other
U.S. allies
in Asia
prohibitively difficult.”
However,
Miller adds
that
“[c]ritically,
the
United
States
must
be
able to
do this
at a
level of
cost and
risk that
Americans are
willing to
bear.”
The best gauge
of such willingness is congressional approval. Accordingly, we
must
rediscover
and
adhere
to
the
Founders’ wise
division of
war
powers,
whereby Congress,
the most
representative and deliberative
branch,
decides whether
to go to war; and the
executive, the most energetic and decisive branch, decides how
to
carry
it
out
once
begun.
As
the
past
75
years
have
repeatedly
demonstrated
in
different ways—from Korea, to
Vietnam, to Iraq, to Afghanistan—we depart from our
constitutional design at our peril.
Miller
writes that
we
“must
treat missile
defense as
a
top
priority,” ensure
that more
of our
weapons are
made in
America, reform
the budgeting
process, and
sustain
“an efficient
and
effective
counterterrorism
enterprise.”
Across
all
of
our
efforts,
we must
keep
in
mind
that
part
of
peace
through
strength
is
knowing
when
to
fight.
As
George
Washington
warned nearly
two
centuries
ago,
we
must
con- tinue
to be
on guard
against being
drawn into
conflicts that
do not
justify great
loss
of
American
treasure
or
significant
shedding
of
American
blood.
At
the
same time,
we
must
be
prepared
to defend
our
interests
and
meet
challenges
where
and when they
arise.
An effective diplomatic
corps is
central to
defending our
interests and
influ- encing world
events.
Whereas
most
military
personnel
have
had
leftist
priorities
imposed from above, the problem at State comes largely from
within. Former State Department director of policy planning
Kiron Skinner writes in Chapter
6, “[L]arge
swaths
of
the
State
Department’s
workforce
are
left-wing
and
predis- posed
to
disagree
with a
conservative
President’s
policy
agenda
and
vision.”
She adds
that
the
department
possesses
a
“belief
that
it
is
an
independent
institution
that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own
foreign policy, and does
not need
direction from
an elected
President”—a
view that
does not
align with the Constitution.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
The
solution to
this problem
is
strong
political leadership.
Skinner writes,
“The next Administration
must take
swift and
decisive steps
to
reforge
the
department
into a
lean and
functional diplomatic
machine that
serves the
President and,
thereby,
the American people.” Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in
fulfilling
its
constitutional
obligation
to
confirm
presidential appointees,
she
recommends putting
appointees into
acting roles
until such
time as
the
Senate
confirms them.
Skinner writes that State should
also stop skirting the Constitution’s trea- ty-making
requirements and stop
enforcing “agreements” as
treaties. It should encourage
more trade
with allies,
particularly with Great
Britain, and
less with
adversaries.
And
it
should
implement
a
“sovereign
Mexico”
policy,
as
our
neighbor
“has functionally
lost
its
sovereignty
to
muscular
criminal
cartels
that
effectively
run the
country.”
In
Africa,
Skinner
writes,
the
U.S.
“should
focus
on
core
security,
economic,
and
human
rights”
rather
than
impose
radical
abortion
and
pro-LGBT
initiatives.
Divisive
symbols
such
as
the
rainbow
flag
or
the
Black
Lives
Matter
flag have
no place
next to
the Stars
and Stripes
at our
embassies.
When
it comes
to China,
Skinner writes
that “a
policy of
‘compete where
we must,
but cooperate
where
we
can’…has
demonstrably failed.”
The
People’s
Repub-
lic of China’s (PRC) “aggressive behavior,” she writes, “can only be
curbed through external pressure.” Efforts to protect or
excuse China must stop. She observes, “[M]any
were quick
to dismiss
even the
possibility that COVID
escaped from
a Chinese
research
laboratory.”
Meanwhile,
Skinner
writes,
“[g]lobal
leaders
includ- ing President
Joe Biden…have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese
behavior.” She adds, “In some cases, these voices, like global
corporate giants BlackRock and Disney”—or
the National
Basketball
Association
(NBA)—“directly benefit from doing
business with Beijing.”
Former
vice president
of
the
U.S. Agency
for
Global
Media Mora
Namdar writes in
Chapter 8
that we
need to
have people
working for
USAGM who
actually believe
in
America,
rather than
allowing the
agencies to
function as
anti-American,
tax- payer-funded
entities
that
parrot
our
adversaries’
propaganda
and
talking
points.
Former acting deputy
secretary of homeland security Ken Cuccinelli says in Chap-
ter 5
that the
Department of
Homeland
Security (DHS),
a creation
of the George
W.
Bush era,
should be
closed, as
it
has
added needless
additional bureaucracy
and
expense
without
corresponding
benefit.
He
recommends
that it
be
replaced
with
a new “stand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level”
and that the remaining parts
of DHS
be distributed
among other
departments.
Former
chief of
staff for
the
director
of
National
Intelligence Dustin
Carmack writes
in Chapter
7 that
the U.S.
Intelligence Community is
too inclined
to look
in
the rearview
mirror,
engage
in
“groupthink,”
and
employ
an
“overly
cautious”
approach aimed
at personal
approval rather
than at
offering the
most accurate,
unvarnished
intelligence for
the
benefit
of
the
country.
And
in
Chapter
9,
former
acting deputy
administrator
of
the
U.S.
Agency
for
International
Development
Max
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
Primorac
asserts that
the United
States Agency
for
International
Development (USAID) must be reformed, writing, “The Biden Administration has deformed
the agency
by
treating
it as
a
global
platform
to
pursue
overseas
a
divisive
political
and cultural
agenda that
promotes
abortion, climate
extremism, gender radicalism, and
interventions against perceived
systematic racism.”
If the recommendations
in the
following chapters are
adopted, what
Skinner says
about the
State
Department could
be true
for other
parts of
the federal gov-
ernment’s
national
security
and
foreign
policy
apparatus:
The
next
conservative
President has the opportunity to restructure the making and
execution of U.S. defense
and foreign
policy and
reset the
nation’s role
in the world.
The recom-
mendations outlined
in
this
section
provide
guidance
on
how
the
next
President
should use
the federal
government’s vast resources
to do
just that.
T
he
Constitution requires the federal government to “provide for the
common defence.”1 It assigns to Congress the
authority to “raise and support
Armies” and
to “provide
and maintain
a Navy”2 and speci-
fies that the President is
“commander in Chief” of America’s armed forces.3
Ever since our Founding,
Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid
war is
to be
prepared for
it in
peace—but when
deterrence
fails, we
must fight and win.
The
Department of
Defense (DOD)
is
the
largest part
of
our
federal government.
It
has
almost 3
million people
serving in
uniform or
a
civilian
capacity throughout the
world and
consumes approximately
$850 billion
annually—more
than
50
per-
cent
of our
government’s
discretionary spending.
The DOD is
also a
deeply troubled
institution. Historically, the
military has
been
one
of
America’s
most
trusted
institutions,
but
years
of
sustained
misuse,
a
two-tiered
culture of
accountability
that
shields
senior
officers
and
officials
while
exposing
junior officers
and
soldiers
in
the
field,
wasteful
spending,
wildly
shifting
security policies,
exceedingly poor discipline
in program
execution, and (most recently)
the Biden
Administration’s profoundly unserious
equity agenda
and vaccine mandates have
taken a
serious toll.
Our
disastrous withdrawal
from Afghanistan,
our
impossibly
muddled China strategy,
the
growing
involvement of
senior military
officers in
the
political
arena,
and deep confusion about the purpose of our military are clear signals of
a disturb-
ing
decay and
markers of
a
dangerous
decline in
our
nation’s
capabilities and
will. Additionally,
more
than 100,000
Americans die
annually in
large measure
because
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
of
illicit narcotics
flows—more than
four times
as
many
people in
one
year
as
we
lost in our 20-year war
against al-Qaeda.
We also are
witnessing a transformation
in the
character of war.
The democ-
ratization of technology and the collapse of time and space
require dramatic, thoughtful
changes in
how
we
defend,
deter,
and
fight.
As
with
any
huge
bureau-
cracy—and
the
DOD
is
one
of
the
world’s
largest—breaking
the
status
quo
requires
leadership
and
endurance.
Technology
is
critical
to
maintaining
our
warfighting
primacy,
but
we
must
be
leery
of
the
siren
song
that
technology
alone
can
protect us.
More
important
is how
new
technologies
are
developed,
tested,
procured,
and used,
and
that
relies
on
the
true
competitive advantages
of
our
people:
ingenuity,
common sense,
and
thoughtfulness
grounded
in
a
free
society.
Because
war
will continue
to be
the most
stressful and consequential
human
endeavor, the
most powerful
weapon
systems
will
remain
the
six
inches
between
the
ears
of
our
citi- zens
and the
strength of
their hearts
and content
of their
souls.
Military
service is
the
most
difficult task
we
ask
of
our
citizens, and
our
nation
is
enormously
blessed that so many young, patriotic Americans eagerly
volunteer to
carry
such
a
heavy
burden. We
owe
them
everything, and
we
must
do
better.
To
do
better,
however, means
recognizing and
implementing four
overriding priorities:
•
Priority No.
1:
Reestablish
a culture
of command
accountability, nonpoliticization,
and warfighting
focus.
•
Priority No.
2:
Transform
our armed
forces for
maximum
effectiveness in an
era of great-power competition.
•
Priority No.
3:
Provide
necessary
support to
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) border
protection
operations. Border protection
is a
national security
issue
that
requires
sustained
attention
and
effort
by
all elements of
the executive branch.
•
Priority
No. 4:
Demand financial transparency
and
accountability.
This
chapter offers
recommendations
for
improving our
armed forces
and
the
civilian
organizations
that support
and oversee
them.
DOD
POLICY
By far the most
significant danger to Americans’ security, freedoms, and pros-
perity
is
China.
China
is
by
any
measure
the
most
powerful state
in
the
world other than the
United States itself. It apparently aspires to dominate Asia and
then, from that
position,
become globally
preeminent. If
Beijing could
achieve this
goal, it
could
dramatically
undermine
America’s
core
interests,
including
by
restricting
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
U.S. access to
the world’s most important market. Preventing this from
happening must
be the
top priority
for American
foreign and
defense
policy.
Beijing presents a challenge to
American interests across the domains of
national
power,
but
the
military
threat that
it
poses
is
especially
acute
and
signif- icant.
China is
undertaking a
historic
military buildup
that includes
increasing capability
for
power
projection
not
only
in
its
own
region,
but
also
far
beyond
as well
as a
dramatic
expansion of
its nuclear
forces that
could result
in a nuclear force that
matches or
exceeds
America’s own
nuclear
arsenal.
The
most severe
immediate threat
that Beijing’s
military poses,
however, is
to Taiwan
and other
U.S. allies
along the
first island
chain in
the Western
Pacific. If
China could
subordinate Taiwan or
allies like
the
Philippines, South Korea,
and Japan,
it
could
break
apart
any
balancing
coalition
that
is
designed
to
prevent
Bei-
jing’s hegemony over Asia.
Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China
does
not
succeed.
This
requires
a
denial
defense:
the
ability
to
make
the
subordi- nation
of
Taiwan
or
other
U.S.
allies
in
Asia
prohibitively difficult.
Critically,
the United
States
must
be
able
to
do
this
at
a
level
of
cost
and
risk
that
Americans
are willing
to bear
given the
relative
importance of
Taiwan to
China and
to the
U.S.
The
United States
and
its
allies also
face real
threats from
Russia, as
evidenced by Vladimir
Putin’s brutal
war
in
Ukraine, as
well as
from Iran,
North Korea,
and transnational terrorism at a time when decades of
ill-advised military operations in the
Greater Middle
East, the
atrophy of
our
defense
industrial base,
the
impact
of
sequestration,
and effective
disarmament by many
U.S. allies
have exacted
a high toll
on America’s military.
This is a
grim landscape.
The United
States needs
to deal
with these
threats forthrightly
and with strength, but it also needs to be realistic. It cannot
wish away these problems. Rather, it must confront them with a
clear-eyed recognition of the need
for choice,
discipline, and adequate
resources for
defense.
In this light,
U.S. defense
strategy must
identify China
unequivocally
as the top
priority for U.S.
defense planning
while
modernizing and
expanding
the
U.S. nuclear arsenal and sustaining
an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise. U.S. allies
must also
step up,
with some
joining the
United States
in taking on
China in
Asia while
others take
more of
a lead
in dealing
with threats
from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea.
The reality is that achieving these goals will require more
spending on defense, both by the United States and by its
allies, as well as active support for reindustrialization and
more support for allies’ productive capacity so that we can
scale our free- world efforts together.
Needed
Reforms
•
Prioritize a
denial defense
against China.
U.S. defense
planning
should
focus
on China
and, in
particular, the
effective
denial defense
of Taiwan.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
This
focus and
priority for
U.S. defense
activities will
deny China
the
first
island
chain.
1.
Require
that
all
U.S.
defense
efforts,
from
force
planning
to
employment
and
posture,
focus
on
ensuring
the
ability
of
American
forces
to
prevail
in
the pacing
scenario and
deny China
a
fait
accompli
against Taiwan.
2.
Prioritize
the
U.S.
conventional
force
planning
construct
to
defeat a
Chinese
invasion
of
Taiwan
before
allocating
resources
to
other
missions, such
as
simultaneously fighting another
conflict.
•
Increase allied
conventional
defense
burden-sharing.
U.S. allies
must take
far greater
responsibility
for their
conventional
defense. U.S.
allies must
play their
part
not
only
in
dealing
with
China,
but
also
in
dealing
with threats
from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
1.
Make
burden-sharing
a central
part of
U.S. defense
strategy with
the United
States
not
just
helping
allies to
step
up,
but
strongly
encouraging
them to do so.
2.
Support
greater
spending
and
collaboration
by
Taiwan
and
allies
in
the
Asia–Pacific
like
Japan
and
Australia
to
create
a
collective
defense
model.
3.
Transform NATO so
that U.S.
allies are
capable of
fielding the
great majority
of the conventional
forces required
to deter
Russia while
relying on the
United States
primarily for
our nuclear
deterrent, and
select
other
capabilities while
reducing
the
U.S.
force
posture
in
Europe.
4.
Sustain support for
Israel even as America empowers Gulf partners to take
responsibility for their own coastal, air, and missile defenses
both
individually
and working
collectively.
5.
Enable
South
Korea
to
take
the
lead
in
its
conventional
defense
against
North Korea.
•
Implement nuclear
modernization
and expansion.
The
United States
manifestly
needs to
modernize,
adapt, and
expand its
nuclear
arsenal. Russia
maintains
and is
actively
brandishing
a
very
large
nuclear
arsenal, but
China is
also
undertaking a historic
nuclear
breakout.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
1.
Expand
and modernize
the U.S.
nuclear force
so that
it has
the size,
sophistication,
and
tailoring
to
deter
Russia
and
China
simultaneously.
2.
Develop
a
nuclear
arsenal
with
the
size,
sophistication,
and
tailoring—
including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that
there
is no
circumstance
in which
America is
exposed to
serious nuclear
coercion.
•
Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing.
Transnational
terrorism
remains
a
threat
to
Americans
even
as
we
pivot
toward
Asia.
1.
Sustain
the military
forces needed
to deter,
prevent, and
combat terrorism,
but
at
a
sustainable
cost
in
concert
with
other
elements
of national
power and partner efforts.
2.
Prioritize
enhancing
the
capability
of
allies
and
partners
to
take
the
lead
in combating terrorism in their regions.
DOD
ACQUISITION AND
SUSTAINMENT
(A&S)
The
DOD’s ability
to
acquire
and
field
new
and
existing technologies
is
essential
to
the
ability of
America’s military
personnel to
fight and
win
our
nation’s wars.
To
succeed in
this endeavor, we must
optimize the
systems and
personnel that
the department
uses, but
the inflexible bureaucratic structure
and
risk-adverse culture that
have
developed
over
the
decades
make
it
difficult
to
provide
the
tools that
warfighters need at
the speed
of relevance.
The number one
problem is
the DOD budgeting
process
(instituted in
1961) that requires acquisition
spending to
be locked years
in advance.
Because tech-
nologies change
so rapidly
and
requirements can
change
overnight, this creates
situations
in which
military
personnel
not
only
go
to
war
with
outdated
technol-
ogy, but
also
may
be
fighting
with
equipment
that
is
less
capable
than
that
of
their
competitors. America
owes its
military many
things, and
the most
important is
the resources
they need
to survive
on the battlefield and
carry out
the tasks
we ask of them.
Needed
Reforms
•
Reform
the
planning,
programming,
budgeting,
and
execution
(PPBE) process.
1.
Enhance
funding
and
authority
for
DOD
mission-focused
innovation
organizations and
away from
program-specific
stovepipes that, planned
for
and
designed
two
or
three
years
earlier,
may
no
longer
be
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
relevant.
This allows
the
acquisition
community to
focus on
portfolio management
and move
money around
more easily
instead of
being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement
cycles.
2.
The President should examine the
recommendations of the congressionally
mandated
Commission on Planning,
Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution
Reform4
and develop
a strategy
for implementing
those
that
the
Administration
considers
to
be
in
the
best interests
of the
American
people. The
commission’s final report
is due on
September 1, 2023.
3.
Develop
legislation or
other means
of providing
funding outside
the traditional
PPBE process
for the
prototyping and experimentation
of emerging
technologies
that
are
deemed
essential
to
modernization
and future
conflict.
Consider
creating
a
“fast
track”
for
projects
that
satisfy the
most pressing national security needs.
4.
Require the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research
and Engineering, and
all
service
secretaries
to
conduct
“Night
Court”
and
use
existing
authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs
so
that money
can be
used for
what works
and will
work. Require
the Under Secretaries
and service
secretaries to brief
the Secretary
annually on the results.
5.
Require
the Office
of the
Secretary of Defense
to research
and report
on
the acquisition
processes
used
by
America’s
adversaries
to
improve our
understanding
of
how
they
are
often
able
to
innovate
and field
new
technologies on a faster timeline.
•
Strengthen America’s
defense
industrial
base.
1.
Replenish
and maintain
U.S.
stockpiles of
ammunition and
other equipment that
have
been
depleted
as
a
result
of
U.S.
support
to
Ukraine. This
will
strengthen the defense
industry
supply chain
and ensure
that adequate inventory exists
if it
is needed
for a
future
conflict.
2.
Collaborate with industry
to develop
a prioritized
list of
reforms that
the
DOD
and
Congress
can
enact
and
implement
to
incentivize
industry to
help America’s military
innovate and
field needed
capabilities.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
3.
Strengthen
the
ability
of
acquisition
authorities
to
engage
in
multiyear
procurements
and
block buys.
This
will
improve
private-sector
rates
of
return, thereby
incentivizing
defense contractors to partner
with the
government. It
will
also
reduce
government
overhead
by
reducing
the number of
procurement competitions.
4.
Prioritize the U.S.
and allies
under the
“domestic end
product” and
“domestic
components”
requirements
of
the
Build
America,
Buy America
Act.5 Currently,
defense
companies
are
required
to manufacture
defense
items
for
the
U.S.
government
that
are
100
percent
domestically
produced and
at least 50
percent
composed of
domestically produced
components.
However,
there
are
loopholes
that
allow
companies
to manufacture
these
items
overseas.
This
can
create supply
chain and
other issues,
especially in
wartime.
Manufacturing components
and end
products
domestically and with
allies spurs
factory development,
increases
American
jobs,
and
builds
resilience
in America’s
defense industrial base.
5.
Review
the sectors
currently
prioritized for
onshoring or
“friendshoring” of
manufacturing (kinetic capabilities,
castings and
forgings, critical materials,
microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle batteries);
evaluate them
according to
the strategic landscape; and expand
or reprioritize the list as appropriate.
6.
Help
small
businesses
to
become
medium-size
and
large
vendors,
which
encourages a
more resilient
industrial base
and fosters
competition.
Encourage
and plan
for durable
supply chains
for small
businesses so they also
have
commercial/private-sector
customers and
are not solely
dependent
on
defense
orders,
which
can
be
highly
specialized,
expensive, and irregular.
7.
Increase
external
engagement
among
small
businesses
to
inform
them of
DOD’s
needs
and
how
they
could
work
with
DOD
to
meet
national
security priorities.
•
Optimize
the
DOD
acquisition
community.
1.
Create
incentives
to emphasize
speed
and
agility
in
decision-making
for prototyping
and
program-of-record
starts and
terminations. Most bureaucrats would
rather follow
a checklist and fail
than go
outside the procedures and
win because
failure means
negative
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
career
repercussions.
Senior acquisition
leaders should
design a
system
that
allows
decision-makers
to
stay
within
the
law
but
bypass unnecessary
departmental regulations
that
are
not
in
the
best
interest of
the government and
hamper the
acquisition of capabilities
that warfighters require.
2.
The
Under
Secretary of Defense
for
Acquisition and
Sustainment, Under
Secretary for
Research and
Engineering,
and all
service secretaries
should
assess
their
acquisition
workforces;
determine
what additional
personnel, resources, and
training they
need; and
develop implementation plans.
The
goal
is
to
develop,
prototype,
acquire,
and field
required
capabilities at
the speed
of relevance
to meet
America’s pacing threats and
maintain a
warfighting
advantage.
3.
Decentralize Defense Acquisition
University (DAU) offerings
and expand the DAU
mission to
include
accreditation of non-DOD
institutions. The
critical
shortage of
trained and
certified
acquisition personnel
must be
addressed with
urgency in
order to
support DOD
mission objectives and
goals. With
the rapid
evolution of
training and
educational
technologies,
including remote
and virtual
practices,
there is no
reason for
DAU to
maintain a
monopoly on
the knowledge
and certification
that are
required to
perform as
acquisition
professionals. Further,
the cost
to private
contractors and non-DOD
civilians who aspire
to
such
a
role
limits
the
supply
of
trained
and
certified
candidates. DAU
has
become
an
unnecessary barrier
to
entry
in
a
career
field
that
is vital to the
DOD mission.
DOD
RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT,
TEST,
AND
EVALUATION
(RDT&E)
The FY 2017
National
Defense Authorization
Act established
the position
of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering and assigned broad responsibility for “all defense
research and engineering, technology develop- ment,
technology
transition, prototyping,
experimentation, and
developmental testing
activities and
programs,
including the allocation
of resources
for defense
research and
engineering,
and
unifying
defense
research
and
engineering
efforts across
the
Department,” to the
new Under
Secretary, who also
was tasked
with “serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary
on all research, engineering, and technology development
activities and programs
in the
Department.”6
This led to the single
largest DOD structural change since the Goldwater–Nichols act of
19867
and was organized effectively
during President Donald Trump’s
Administration.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Needed
Reforms
•
Champion, engage,
and focus
the American
innovation ecosystem.
To
maintain leadership in the
era of
great-power competition and succeed
against our
adversaries, a
key DOD
effort must
be the
creation of
mechanisms and processes
to embrace
America’s most significant
competitive advantage: innovation.
1.
Engage
and
leverage
all
of
America’s
scientific,
engineering,
and
high-
tech production communities to
research, develop, prototype,
and rapidly
deploy
advanced
technology
capabilities
on
a
continuing
basis
to preserve
our
warfighting
advantage.
2.
Increase
integration
and
collaboration
among
the
DOD,
government
labs,
and
private
companies
to
solve
the
department’s
most
difficult problems.
3.
Reduce
the number
of critical
technology areas from
14 to
a more
manageable number
to
concentrate
effort
and
resources
on
those
that bear
directly on great-power competition.
4.
Rebuild
RDT&E
infrastructure
that
resides
in
Cold
War–era
facilities
and is
not
well-suited to the
current era
of rapid development
and testing of advanced
technology and concepts
to the
maturity level
necessary for
acquisition and operational
fielding.
5.
Move
toward
a
much
more
comprehensive
independent
risk-reduction
approach to
increase
understanding of the
technical risks
by drawing on the expertise
in DOD
laboratories and agencies
to help
acquisition programs
succeed.
•
Improve
the rapid
deployment of technology
to the
battlefield.
America’s military
advantage
has derived
from
the professionalism of
our
servicemembers and
our ability
to manifest
our
technological
advantage in battlefield capability.
The current
era of
great-power competition will
continue
for the
foreseeable
future,
and
technology
will
be
the
currency
of competition.
Our ability
to prevail
will rest
on our
ability to
develop new
technologies and move
them onto
the battlefield
more rapidly
than our
adversaries can.
1.
Accelerate the
prototyping
cycle to
meet
immediate battlefield
needs.
2.
Require tighter integration with user
communities to provide value.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
3.
Establish a pipeline
of near-term,
mid-term, and
long-term
technology that is aimed
at great-power
competition (China) and
can be
matured, prototyped,
and evaluated
to support
major
acquisitions (the
ability to
produce
at
scale)
to
break
the
cycle
of
schedule
delays
and
cost
overruns from
underdeveloped
and poorly
understood technologies.
•
Develop
a framework
to protect
the RDT&E
enterprise from foreign
exploitation.
Strategic
competition and
adaptive
adversaries require new thinking
about how
to protect
technology. China has
been relentless
in stealing
U.S.
technology,
using
the
full
range
of
measures
from
influence
operations to
outright theft.
This has
been a
major factor
in its
ability to
close the
gap and
in some
cases to
exceed U.S.
capabilities.
1.
Implement
a comprehensive
approach
to
preserving
U.S.
technological
leadership
that
is
based
on
outpacing
our adversaries;
clear
about
what
we need
to
protect;
tailored
to
various
specific
sectors
(for
example,
academia, the
defense
industrial
base, and
laboratories);
and
underpinned
with
a
full range
of
consequences for
attempted or
actual theft.
DOD
FOREIGN MILITARY
SALES
The
United States
must regain
its
role
as
the
“Arsenal of
Democracy.” In
fiscal year (FY)
2021, U.S.
government foreign
military sales
(FMS) nosedived
to
a
low
of
$34.8
billion from
a
record
high of
$55.7 billion
in
FY
2018.8 This decrease
hinders
interoperability with partners and allies, decreases defense industrial
base capac-
ity,
and
increases
the
taxpayer
burden on
the
U.S.
military’s own
procurements.
Under previous Administrations, the United States built
its reputation as a reliable
partner with
a strong
defense
industrial base
that could
supply
military articles
and
goods
in
a
timely
manner.
Today’s FMS
process
is
encumbered
by
byzantine
bureaucracy,
long
contracting
times,
high
costs,
and
mundane
technology.
The United States
can change
this downward
trajectory by improving
inter- nal processes
that incentivize partners and allies to procure U.S. defense
systems, thereby
expanding our
“defense
ecosystem.” We must
reverse the
recent dip
in FMS
to ensure
both
that
our
partners
remain
interoperable
with
the
United
States and
that
our
defense
industrial
base
regains
much-needed
capacity
in
preparation for
future challenges.
Needed
Reforms
•
Emphasize
exportability with U.S.
procurements.
The
record-low FMS sales in 2021
were driven
partly by
the high
costs of
converting weapon
systems
on the
back
end
of
production
rather
than
emphasizing
exportability in initial capability planning.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
1.
Ensure
that
senior
U.S.
military
leadership
emphasizes
exportability
in the
initial
development
of
defense
systems
that
are
both
available
and
interoperable with our partners and allies.
2.
Create
a
funding
mechanism
to
incentivize
exportability
in
initial
planning, which
can be
recouped after
future FMS
transactions.
•
End informal
congressional
notification.
Informal
congressional notification
or
“tiered
review”
is
a
hinderance
to
ensuring
timely
sales
to our
global
partners.
The
tiered
review
process
is
not
codified
in
law;
it
is
merely
a
practice
by which
the
Department
of
State
provides
a
preview
of prospective
arms transfers
before
Congress is
formally
notified.9
1.
End
the
tiered
review
process
to
eliminate
at
least
20
days
from
the
FMS process.
2.
Use
the
tiered
review
process
only
when
unanimous
congressional
support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the
“weaponization” by select
Members
of
Congress
that
has
prevented
billions
of
dollars
of
arms
sales from
moving into
formal
congressional notification.
•
Minimize barriers to collaboration.
The high cost of developing
advanced
defense platforms
requires
the
United
States
to
collaborate
with key
allies
to
minimize
waste, complement
strengths,
and
supplement
our defense
industrial base to
create a
system that
is greater
than that
of the United
States alone.
1.
Enhance
defense
industrial base
planning with
partners to
allow them
to focus
on
niche
areas
where
there
are
cost
advantages
for
the United
States.
2.
Decrease
International
Traffic
in
Arms
Regulations
(ITAR)
to
facilitate trade
with
such
allies
as
the
United
Kingdom,
Canada,
and
Australia.
3.
Create
opportunities
to
improve
the
health
of
the
defense
supply
chain
with added
opportunities
for partners
and allies
to contribute.
•
Reform the FMS contracting process.
The contracting timeline for the
FMS process is shockingly
slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes
approximately
18
months
because
of
slow
bureaucratic
processes
and chronic
understaffing.10
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
1.
Immediately
fund
more
contracting
capacity
in
all
services
to
decrease the
contracting
timeline
and
improve
the
delivery
of
defense
articles
to
our global partners.
2.
Rationalize
and
speed
arms
sales
decision-making
to
preclude
our enemies
from
exploiting
bureaucratic
slothfulness
and
allow
us
to
manage
the
development
of
indigenous
defense
industrial
bases.
DOD
PERSONNEL
The
men
and
women of
America’s armed
forces are
the
most
critical component of
our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have
been overextended,
undervalued,
and
insufficiently
resourced. Their
families help
them to
carry the
burden
of service,
but the
assistance they receive
is
disproportionately
less than
the sacrifices they make.
Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are
disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them
from learning about military
service and
preparing for
the honor
of wearing
Ameri- ca’s
uniform.
The United
States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by
exceptional
people
who
have
defended
our
nation
and
changed
the
course
of
history,
but
the
Biden
Administration,
through word
and
deed,
has
treated
the
armed
forces as
just another place
to
work.
We
must
restore our
military to
a
place
of
honor
and
respect
and
recruit and
retain the
individuals
who will
meet the
rigorous
standards of
excellence
that are
required
for
membership
in
the
world’s
greatest
fighting
force.
Needed
Reforms
•
Rescue recruiting and retention.
Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it
has
been
in
two
generations and
is
expected
to
be
even
worse
in
2023.
Some
of the problems are
self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not
service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force.
1.
Appoint
a
Special
Assistant
to
the
President
who
will
maintain
liaison
with Congress, DOD, and
all other
interested parties on
the issue
of recruiting and retention.
2.
Improve
recruiting
by
suspending
the
use
of
the
recently
introduced
MHS Genesis
system that
uses private
medical records
of potential
recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS),
creating unnecessary delays and
unwarranted rejections.11
3.
Improve
military
recruiters’
access
to
secondary
schools
and
require
completion of
the Armed
Services
Vocational Aptitude
Battery
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
(ASVAB)—the
military entrance
examination—by
all
students in
schools that receive
federal funding.12
4.
Encourage
Members
of
Congress
to
provide
time
to
military
recruiters
during each
townhall
session in
their
congressional districts.
5.
Increase the
number
of Junior
ROTC
programs in
secondary
schools.
•
Restore standards of lethality
and
excellence.
Entrance
criteria for
military
service
and
specific
occupational
career
fields
should
be
based
on the
needs of
those
positions. Exceptions for individuals
who are
already predisposed to require
medical
treatment (for
example, HIV
positive
or
suffering
from gender
dysphoria) should
be
removed,
and
those
with gender
dysphoria
should be
expelled from
military
service. Physical
fitness
requirements
should
be
based
on
the
occupational
field
without
consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, or orientation.
•
Eliminate
politicization,
reestablish trust and
accountability, and
restore faith to the force.
In 2021, the Reagan National Defense
Survey found that
only 45
percent of
Americans have
“a great
deal of
trust and
confidence in
the
military”—down from
70 percent
in 2018.13
1.
Strengthen
protections
for
chaplains
to
carry
out
their
ministry
according to the tenets of their faith.
2.
Codify language to instruct senior
military officers (three and four
stars) to
make certain
that they
understand their primary
duty
to be ensuring the readiness of the
armed forces, not pursuing a social engineering agenda. This
direction should be reinforced
during the Senate confirmation process. Orders and
direction motivated by
purely partisan motives should be identified as
threats
to
readiness.
3.
Reinstate servicemembers to
active duty
who were
discharged for not
receiving
the
COVID
vaccine,
restore
their
appropriate
rank,
and provide
back pay.
4.
Eliminate Marxist indoctrination and
divisive critical race theory
programs
and
abolish
newly
established
diversity,
equity,
and
inclusion
offices and staff.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
5.
Restrict
the
use
of
social
media
solely
for
purposes
of
recruitment
and
discipline
any
armed
services
personnel
who
use
an
official
command
channel
to engage
with civilian
critics on
social media.
6.
Audit
the
course
offerings
at
military
academies
to
remove
Marxist
indoctrination,
eliminate tenure for
academic
professionals, and
apply the
same rules
to instructors that are
applied to
other DOD
contracting personnel.
7.
Reverse
policies that
allow
transgender
individuals to serve
in the
military. Gender
dysphoria
is
incompatible
with
the
demands
of
military
service, and
the use
of public
monies for
transgender
surgeries or to facilitate
abortion for
servicemembers
should be
ended.
•
Value the military family.
Military service requires extreme
sacrifices by families.
1.
Support
legislation
to
increase
wages
and
family
allowances
for
active-
duty
enlisted
personnel.
No
uniformed personnel
should
ever
have
to rely
on
social
benefits
like
as
food
stamps
or
public
housing
assistance.
2.
Improve
base
housing
and
consider
the
military
family
holistically
when
considering change-of-station moves.
3.
Improve
spouse
employment
opportunities
and
protections,
including
licensing reform,14
and expand childcare.
4.
Audit
all curricula
and health
policies in
DOD schools for
military families, remove all
inappropriate materials, and reverse inappropriate
policies.
5.
Support
legislation
giving
education
savings
account
options
to
military families.15
•
Reduce the number of generals.
Rank creep is pervasive. The number
of 0-6
to 0-9
officers is
at an all-time
high across
the armed
services (above World War
II levels),
and the
actual
battlefield
experience of
this officer
corps is at
an all-time
low. The
next President
should limit
the continued advancement of
many of
the existing
cadre, many
of whom
have
been advanced
by
prior
Administrations
for
reasons
other
than
their
warfighting prowess.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
DOD
INTELLIGENCE
Our national defense establishment
must evolve to meet the rapid, pro-
found,
and
dynamic
change in
the
global
landscape,
but
absent
significant
effort to
evaluate and
retool in
critical
areas—including our intelligence
and security
portfolios—America’s
competitive
advantage
against
rivals
and
adversaries
is
at
serious risk. However, for
any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel-
ligence Community (IC)/Defense
Intelligence Enterprise (DIE)
leadership must be addressed.16
The DIE
accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel
and a
significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements,
eight are within DOD,17 two are
independent,18 and
seven
belong
to
various
other departments
and
agencies.19 Overall,
“[t]he
DoD
provides
86
percent
of
the
personnel who
conduct intelligence
activities, both military and
civilian.”20
The Defense Intelligence Enterprise
must deliver accurate, unbiased, and
timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and
independence. If they
continue
on
their
current
path,
however,
both
the
DIE
and
the
Intelligence
Com-
munity writ large will
continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence
assessments that mislead policymakers.
Needed
Reforms
•
Improve the intelligence process.
Defense intelligence assets have been
committed
to the
prosecution
of
operational
campaigns
since
September
11, 2001,
at
the
expense
of our
strategic
objectives,
and
this
has
led
to
increased risk.21
Further,
the DIE
has evolved
into a
“customer-based” model with
the
DIE/IC trying
to
be
supportive of
policy direction
at
the
expense
of
analytical
integrity. The
result has
been a
significant politicization
of intelligence.
1.
Establish unbiased intelligence reporting
from DIE/IC senior leaders.
As
the
leader
of
the
DIE,
the
Under
Secretary
of Defense
for
Intelligence and
Security
should
provide
a top-line,
dissenting,
or
clarifying
view
of DIE and IC
assessments as needed.
2.
Align
collection
and
analysis
with
vital
national
interests
(countering
China and Russia).
3.
Establish an effective
global
federated intelligence framework with
allies
and
partners
and
our
Combatant
Commands.
Avoid
the
temptation
to
neglect
areas that
appear less
pertinent but
that support
a
convergence of
threats and
the critical
requirements
to sustain
those
threats.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
4.
Establish
and
sustain
feedback
loops
to
provide
insight
and
direction
for continuous improvement and
accountability.22
We must
revisit our
assessments
and
understand
where
we
got
it
right
and
where
we got it
wrong.
5.
Better
exploit
publicly available information (PAI)
data and
foster innovation
to
improve
collection
and
analysis.
We
must
end
the
practice
of multiple
DIE
organizations
paying
to
acquire
the
same
PAI
data
and invest
more in
machine
learning (ML)
and artificial
intelligence (AI) to exploit
open-source and classified intelligence data.
6.
Remove
policy
obstacles that
impede
available technical solutions
and
tailored
approaches
in
order
to
preclude
corruption
at
the
point of
collection.
7.
Develop
statistical
discrimination
techniques based on
relative value
to
deal
with
the
volume
and
velocity
of
available
data
and
information, which
are
rapidly
exceeding
our
ability
to
exploit
and
analyze
available data
and information efficiently.
•
Expand the
integration of
intelligence
activities.
The
prevalence of
asymmetric warfare requires
Defense
Intelligence to
leverage the
unique authorities and
capabilities
of
U.S.
departments
and
agencies,
as
well
as
our partners
and allies,
to competitive
advantage.
1.
Create
an improved
cyber defense
and capability.
We must
reevaluate the
dual-hat
structure
between
the
National
Security
Agency
(NSA)
and
U.S.
Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM).
2.
Resurrect
economic
analysis
capability
to
improve
our
ability
to
counter
Chinese
whole-of-government strategies that
combine
security with
predatory economic objectives.
3.
Resurrect
critical
thinking
to
provide
true
strategic
intelligence
that
will enable
the
U.S.
to
counter
global
adversaries and
emerging
technologies (such
as
adversary
advances
in
hypersonics,
Unmanned
Aerial
Systems (UAS),
cyber
domain,
advanced
fighter aircraft,
and
advanced
undersea
capabilities) more effectively.
4.
Rebuild
human
intelligence
(HUMINT)
and
counterintelligence
(CI)
and improve
their
integration
with
defensive
and
offensive
cyber
operations.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
5.
Establish
true
alignment
between
DOD
and
DHS
both
to
improve
the
defense of
critical U.S.
infrastructure
and national
border
integrity and
to develop
vital
information
that
enables
defense
against
foreign
targeted disruptions.23
•
Restore accountability and public trust.
In recent years, public
trust in
Defense
Intelligence
has
been
eroded
by,
for
example,
flawed
assumptions
leading up
to
our
Afghanistan
withdrawal,
flawed
Russia–Ukraine
assessments,
divergences in
relations
with
key
Gulf
allies,
and
voids
being filled
by Russia
and China
around the
world. For
trust to
be restored
and sustained, officials must
be held
accountable.
1.
Restore
DIE
critical
thinking.
Establish
mechanisms
to
restore
analytic
integrity and
return to
true
intelligence-driven
operations. The next
Administration should
eliminate the
conflict of
interest in
the current
customer-based model
(in which
the customer
is always
right) by
enforcing time-tested
procedures
that
guarantee
independent
analysis, even
if it means
challenging policymakers’
assumptions. The
Under Secretary
of Defense for
Intelligence and Security’s
leadership role should
be
expanded
to
include
providing
analytic
top-line
views
and improve
DIE
transparency by
highlighting
diverging
views.
2.
Elevate
the
DIE’s
voice
in
national
policy
discussions,
commensurate
with the
DIE’s 75
percent share
of the IC budget.
Present
defense intelligence to senior policymakers, either
independently to
avoid
all-source bias
or
in
consensus products
like the
National Intelligence
Estimates.
•
Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not
advance military
readiness.
In
2019,
following the
catastrophic 2015 data
breach
at
the
U.S.
Office
of
Personnel
Management
(OPM), the
Defense
Counterintelligence
and
Security
Agency (DCSA)
accepted transfer
of
the
responsibility
to conduct
security
clearance and
suitability
investigations for 95 percent
of the
U.S.
government’s civilian
workforce.
This decision,
which
grew
out
of
an
intention
to deconstruct
OPM,
was
wrongheaded
on
many
levels
and
made
the
federal
bureaucracy
dependent
on
a
new
overlay of
DOD
bureaucracy, in
a
sense
instilling
DOD
control
of
civilian
managers. This
function
should be
returned to
OPM except
for military
security clearance investigations.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
U.S.
ARMY
The
U.S. Army’s
mission is
“[t]o deploy,
fight and
win
our
nation’s wars
by
pro-
viding ready,
prompt
and
sustained
land dominance
by
Army
forces
across the
full
spectrum
of
conflict
as
part
of
the
joint
force.”24 Today,
however,
the
Army
cannot
execute
its
land
dominance mission.25 The
U.S.
Army
is
at
an
inflection
point that
is marked by
more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted
buying
power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and
training capacity, a near crisis
in
the
recruiting
and
retention
of
critical
personnel, and
a
bevy
of
aging
weapons systems
that no
longer provide
a qualitative edge over
peer and
near-peer com- petitors but
will not
be replaced
in the
near term.
All
of
these
challenges are
set
against
the
backdrop
of
a
complex and
dynamic
global
geopolitical
environment that
is
exemplified
and
exacerbated
by
the
triumph
of
our
adversaries
in
Afghanistan
after a
20-year struggle
there as
well as
recent
Russian
outrages
in
the
Ukraine and
China’s bellicosity
both on
its
borders
and
in
surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing
operational pulls, our
Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer
resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive
politically driven top-down focus on progressive social
policies
that emphasize
matters like
so-called diversity,
equity, and
inclusion
and
climate
change, often
to
the
detriment of
the
Army’s
core warfighting
mission.
Needed
Reforms
•
Rebuild the
Army.
The
total Army
budget has
decreased by
roughly 11
percent
since
2018,
perilously
affecting
the
service’s
readiness
and
ability
to train
and
to
procure
new
personnel
and equipment.
Declining
budgets
and decreased
buying
power
have
forced
the
Army
to
lower
training
standards and
opportunities to train,
propose
reductions in
end strength,
slash military construction programs
to historically
low levels,
and scale
back essential modernization programs.
1.
Increase the
Army
budget to
remain
the world’s
preeminent
land power.
2.
Accelerate the development
and
procurement of
the six
current Army
modernization
priorities
(long-range
precision
fires,
the
Next- Generation
Combat
Vehicle,
Future Vertical
Lift,
the
Army
network, air
and
missile
defense,
and soldier
lethality)
to
replace
worn
out
and outdated
combat systems
and ensure
ground combat
dominance.
3.
Increase funding
to
improve Army
training
and operational
readiness.
4.
Increase
the
Army
force
structure
by
50,000
to
handle
two
major
regional contingencies simultaneously.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
5.
Reform
recruiting
efforts.
The
Army
missed
its
2022
recruitment
goal
by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers.
•
Focus on
deployability
and sustained
operations.
The
U.S. Army’s
very
lethal
ground
force
capability
is
irrelevant
if
it
cannot
quickly
deploy to
locations for employment
in decisive
operations to secure
our global
security interests.
Additionally,
Army
logisticians
provide
the
ground transportation
(of
both
personnel
and equipment);
fuel,
food,
and
water;
munitions (bombs
and bullets);
medical
supplies and
services; and
veterinary services
(food safety)
that are
critical to
sustainment of
the other
services.
1.
Immediately
increase
the
production
and
stockpiling
of
critical
munitions and repair parts.
2.
Prioritize
expeditionary
logistics
in
all
force
design
and
operational
planning to
guarantee entry
into a
contested
theater of
war.
3.
Increase
the
level
of
Joint
Force
training,
synchronization,
and
coordination focused on logistics.
4.
Prepare
to
deploy
forces
from
degraded
U.S.-based
transportation
infrastructure that
is compromised by opposing
forces.
•
Transform Army culture and training.
The Army can no longer serve
as
the
nation’s
social testing
ground.
A
rebuilt
Army
that
is
focused
again
on
its
core warfighting
mission and
empowered it
with the
tools, resources,
and
authorities it
needs to
accomplish that
mission must
be the
next Administration’s
highest
defense priority.
1.
Stop
using the
Army as
a test
bed for
social
evolution. Misusing
the Army
in
this
way
detracts
from
its
core
purpose
while
doing
little
to reshape
the American
social
structure. The
Army no
longer reflects
national
demographics
to
the
degree
that
it
did
before
1974
when
the draft was
eliminated.
2.
Demand
accountability
in
senior
leaders
to
reverse
the
decline
in
public
support for military service.
3.
Reestablish the experiential
base for
the planning,
execution, and leadership
of
Army
formations
in
large-scale
operations.
Currently,
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
there
are
no
general or
field-grade officers
who
served
as
planners
or commanders
against a
near-peer
adversary in combat.
4.
Examine the logic of
emerging Army concepts about employing massed
long-range
fires
and
effects
without
considering
how
to
gain
advantage
by
closing with
and dominating an adversary
on land.
5.
Recognize that high-intensity
land combat
operations cannot be
sustained
through short-term
individual
or
unit
rotations
in
the
style
of
the
sustained
low-intensity
campaigns
conducted
over
the
past
20
years.
6.
Transform
how
the
National
Guard
is
employed
during
extended
operations
short of
declared
war
to
preclude
back-to-back
federal
and state
deployments
of
National
Guard
soldiers
in
order
to
stabilize
and
preserve military volunteerism in our communities.
7.
Revamp
Army
school
curricula
to
concentrate
on
preparation
for
large-
scale land
operations that
focus on
defeating a
peer threat.
8.
Address the
underlying causal issues driving increasing Army suicide
rates, which
have surpassed
pre–World War
II rates
and are
now eclipsing the rate among civilians.
U.S.
NAVY
As
noted at
the
beginning
of
this
chapter, the
U.S. Constitution
gives Congress
the power to
“provide and maintain a Navy.” Inherent in this phrase is a
recognition that
there is
a vital
national
interest in
the maritime
environment and that
this national interest
requires sustained planning and investment. This is as true
today as it
was almost
250 years
ago and
will remain
true into
the future.
The U.S. Navy
(USN) exists
for two
primary
reasons: to
project
prompt, sus-
tained,
and
effective
combat
power
globally,
both
at
sea
and
ashore,
and
to
deter
aggression
by potential
adversaries
by
maintaining
a
forward
operating
presence
in conjunction with allies
and partners. Today, the People’s Republic of China Peo- ple’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN’s ability to
accomplish its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In
the
production,
employment, and
control of
maritime forces,
the
USN
must
consider the scope and rate of technological change and, where
appropriate, adapt
its
processes and
workforce development.
In
balancing
the
necessary
long-term industrial
model
of
naval
platforms against
emerging short-term
opportunities,
the
USN
must take
account of
advances that
may
present
vulnerabilities
and
risks as
well as
what is
assured and
secure.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Needed
Reforms
•
Invest in and expand force structure.
The USN’s organizing
principle remains
platform-centered:
vessels
manned
by
sailors.
The
manned
surface and
subsurface
forces
act
in
concert
with
land-based, air-based,
and
space- based
forces to
project power
outside
sovereign territory,
principally by
operating
in
international
waters.
Investments
must
be
closely
coordinated
with these other elements of military power.
1.
Build
a
fleet of
more
than 355
ships.26
2.
Develop and
field
unmanned systems
to
augment the
manned
forces.
3.
Require
that
range
and
lethality
be
the
key
factors
in
all
procurement
and sustainment decisions for
ships,
aircraft, and
munitions.
•
Reestablish the
General Board.
In contrast
with the
Navy
General
Board that served
ship
development so
well during
the interwar
period, the current joint process27 for defining the requirements
for major
defense acquisitions is not
well-suited to long-term planning of the sort that is needed for
USN fleet architecture and shipbuilding. The interwar General
Board should serve as a model, empowered with
final decision authority over all
requirements documents concerning ships and the major defense
systems fielded on ships. The individual board members would
ensure a broad base of knowledge as well as
independent
thinking.28
•
Establish a Rapid Capabilities Office.
The USN must transition
technology
into
warfighting capability
more
rapidly.
It
must
foster
a
culture of
innovation
that
includes
connecting
theoretical
and
intangible
ideas
with real
production
environments that
produce
tangible
and
practical
outcomes and
adapting proven
processes to
advance
material solutions.
1.
Harness
innovation
and
willingness
to
tolerate
risk
so
that
“good
enough” systems
can be fielded rapidly.
2.
Use the Space
Development Agency
as a model.
3.
Establish
an
oversight
Board
of
Directors
made
up
of
the
service
chief,
service
secretary,
and
Under Secretary
of
Defense
for
Acquisition
and Sustainment.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
Accelerate the purchase of key munitions.
It takes years to build
and
maintain
navies
but
only
hours
to
expend
their
ordnance
in combat.
The USN
must be
prepared to
expend large
quantities of
air-launched
and sea-launched stealthy, precision,
cruise
missiles against
targets both
at
sea
and
ashore.
Additionally,
modern
air
defense
requires the
use
of
high- performance
surface-to-air missiles.
1.
Produce key
munitions
at the
maximum
rate with
significant
capacity.
2.
Working
with
the
Congress,
employ
the
widest
possible
range
of techniques
to
enhance
the
munitions
supply
chains
and
workforce.
•
Enhance warfighter development.
The USN requires a variety of
documented
qualifications
for
personnel
to
advance
in
their
careers
and assume
leadership positions. It
also requires
individual professional qualifications
that are
focused on
warfighting.
1.
Mandate
qualifications
that demonstrate an understanding
of core
competence in
collective,
integrated
warfighting,
especially
based
on current
plans and technologies.
2.
Elevate
the Headquarters
Staff
focused
on
Warfighter
Development
(N7) within
the
Office
of
the
Chief
of
Naval
Operations
(OPNAV)
and empower
it to
develop such
requirements.
3.
Require
that war
games
be
utilized
as
experiential
learning
environments
for the
participants
as
a
prerequisite
for
achieving
career
milestones (department
heads,
commanding
officers,
and
major
commanders).
4.
Highlight
in
training
and
leader
development
that
USN
forces
can
and
must maintain
the ability
to operate
from and/or
defend
sovereign territory to include our allies and partners.
5.
Train
to
balance
effects
from
kinetic
to
nonkinetic
and
from
lethal
to
nonlethal through
effective
command and
control.
U.S.
AIR
FORCE
The U.S. Air
Force today
lacks a
force
structure with the
lethality, survivabil- ity, and capacity to fight a major conflict with a
great power like China, deter
nuclear
threats,
and
meet
its
other
operational
requirements
under
the
National
Defense Strategy.29 For 30 years,
the Air
Force has
received less
annual funding
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
(if
pass-through funding,
defined as
money in
the
Air
Force budget
that does
not go to
the
Air
Force, is
removed from
the
equation)
than the
Army and
Navy have
received.
This
underfunding has forced
the Air
Force to
cut its forces
and forgo
modernizing aging weapons
systems that were never designed to operate in current
threat
environments
and
are
structurally
and
mechanically
exhausted.
The
result is
an Air
Force that
is the
oldest,
smallest, and
least ready
in its
history.
The
decline in
Air
Force
capacity and
capability is
occurring at
the
same
time the security
environment demands
the
very
options that
the
Air
Force uniquely
provides.
Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force
capabilities than
the service
has the
capacity to
provide. The
Air Force
today simply
cannot accomplish all of
the missions
it is
required to
perform.
The
Air
Force
has
consistently
stated on
the
official
record that
it
is
not
sized
to
meet
the
mission
demands placed
on
it
by
the
various U.S.
Combatant Commands.
A
2018
study, “The
Air
Force
We
Need,”30 showed
a
24
percent deficit
in
Air
Force capacity
to meet
the needs
of the
National
Defense Strategy.
Those
conclusions remain valid and
are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire-
ments.
The
demand
is
also
higher
because
of
world
events.
To
understand
these
trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year
budget plan retires
1,463 aircraft
while buying
just 467.
This makes
for a
reduction of 996
air- craft
by
2027.
The
net
result
is
a
force
that
is
smaller,
older,
and
less
ready
at
a
time when
demand is burgeoning.
Needed
Reforms
•
Increase
spending and
budget accuracy
in line with a
threat-based strategy.
Returning the
U.S. military
to a force that
can achieve
deterrence or win in
a fight
if necessary
requires
returning to
a threat-based
defense strategy.
Real
budget
growth
combined
with
a
more
equitable
distribution of
resources
across the
armed services
is the
only realistic
way to
create a
modernized Air Force with
the capacity
to meet
the needs
of the
National Defense
Strategy.
Additionally,
as
noted
above,
pass-through
funding
causes numbers
cited in
current DOD
budget
documents to
be higher than
the dollar amounts actually
received by
the Air Force.
1.
Adopt
a
two-war
force
defense
strategy
with
scenarios
for
each
service
that will
allow the
Air Force
to attain
the resources
it requires
by developing a force-sizing
construct that
reflects what
is required
to accomplish strategic objectives.
2.
Eliminate pass-through
funding,
which has
grown
to more
than
$40
billion per
year and
has
caused
the
Air
Force to
be
chronically underfunded for
decades.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
3.
Increase
the
Air
Force
budget
by
5
percent
annually
(after
adjusting
for inflation)
to
reverse
the
decline
in
size,
age,
and
readiness
and
facilitate
the transition to a
more modern,
lethal, and
survivable
force.
•
Reduce near-term and mid-term risk.
Increasing the Air
Force’s acquisition
of
next-generation
capabilities
that
either
are
or
soon
will
be
in production
will increase
the ability
of the
United States
to deter
or defeat
near-term to mid-term threats.
1.
Increase F-35A
procurement to 60–80
per
year.
2.
Build
the
capacity
for
a
B-21
production rate
of
15–18
aircraft
per year
along
with
applicable
elements
of
the
B-21
long-range
strike
family
of
systems.
3.
Increase
Air
Force
airlift
and
aerial
refueling
capacity
to
support
agile
combat employment operations that
generate
combat sorties
from a highly
dispersed
posture in
both Europe and
the Pacific.
4.
Develop and buy
larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50
nm to
200 nm)
that are
sized to
maximize
targets per
sortie for
stealth aircraft flying
in
contested
environments
against
target
sets
that
could exceed
100,000 aimpoints.
5.
Accelerate the development
and production
of the
Sentinel intercontinental
ballistic missile to
reduce the
risk inherent
in an aging Minuteman
III
force
in
light
of
China’s
nuclear
modernization
breakout.
6.
Increase
the number
of EC-37B
electronic warfare aircraft
from 10
to 20
in
order to
achieve
a
minimum
capacity
to
engage
growing
threats
from China
across the electromagnetic spectrum.
•
Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts.
Increasingly
capable adversaries
require
new
capabilities
to
enable
victory
against
those
adversaries.
1.
Attain
an
operationally
optimized
advanced
battle
management
system
as the
Air Force
element of
the DOD
Joint All
Domain Command
and Control
enterprise.
2.
Produce
the
next-generation air
dominance
system of
systems (air
moving target indication,
other sensors, communications, command and
control,
weapons, and
uninhabited aerial vehicles).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
3.
Achieve
moving
target
engagement
capability
and
capacity
against
sea,
surface, and
ground mobile
targets at
the scale
necessary to meet
the needs of the National Defense Strategy.
4.
Build
resilient
basing,
sustainment,
and
communications
for
survivability in a contested environment.
5.
Establish a vigorous
and
sufficiently funded
electromagnetic
spectrum operations
recovery
plan
to
make
up
for
more
than
20
years
of
neglect
of this mission
area.
U.S.
MARINE
CORPS
The U.S. Marine
Corps (USMC)
is the
maritime land
force of
the Department
of
Defense
and
Department
of the
Navy.
It
serves
a
critical
role
as
an
expedition- ary
amphibious
force
that
can
project
power from
sea
to
shore
and
beyond
while
performing other
specialized
missions like
securing
America’s diplomatic
out- posts
abroad.
Between
the
terrorist
attacks of
September 11,
2001, and
the
conclusion
of
U.S.
military operations in
Afghanistan in August 2022, the Marine Corps engaged in
extended
operations ashore as
directed by
the Secretary of
Defense,
leaving it
with
little
opportunity or
ability
to
train
for
and
execute
the
naval
and
amphibious operations
for
which
it
is
uniquely
suited and
directed
by
law.
This
lengthy
diver- gence
from its
primary
mission led
to deep concern
that the
Corps had
become a
“second
land
army,”
prompting
senior
Marine
Corps
leaders
to
push
for
the
service to return to
the sea. In addition, the USMC spent nearly two decades fighting
coun- terinsurgency
wars
in
Afghanistan
and
Iraq
and
developed
capabilities
that
were
specifically geared
to those
fights but
have limited
utility in
scenarios
involving evenly
matched
and
advanced
enemies
or
amphibious
operations
that
are
neces- sary
for the
projection of naval
power.
As a result,
Marine Corps
Commandant
General David
H. Berger
developed and
began
to
implement
Force
Design
2030,31 a
plan
that,
if
completed,
would be
the
most
radical transformation
of
the
Marine Corps
since World
War
II.
The
suc-
cessful
implementation
of
this force
redesign, coupled
with reforms
in
the
Marine
Corps’
personnel
system and
the
Navy’s
amphibious shipbuilding
plans, will
be critical
to ensuring
the Corps’
future combat
effectiveness.
Needed
Reforms
•
Divest systems
to implement
the Force
Design 2030
transformation.32
Divesting
equipment that is
less relevant
to
distributed,
low-signature operations
in a
contested
maritime environment
will make
funds available
for
modernization.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
1.
Transform USMC
force
structure.
a.
Eliminate all
USMC
law enforcement
battalions.
b.
Transform
at
least
one
Marine
Infantry
Regiment
into
a
Marine
Littoral Regiment.
c.
Reduce
the size
of remaining
infantry
battalions.
2.
Divest
systems
or equipment
that
are better
suited
to heavier
U.S.
Army
units.
a.
Maintain divestment
of
M1 Abrams
tanks.
b.
Eliminate
the majority
of
tube artillery
(M777)
batteries.
c.
Reduce
the
number
of
Advanced
Amphibious
Assault
Vehicles
and
the number of their replacements.
3.
Use
funds
made
available
by
divestment
of
systems
to
support
new
systems that
are geared
to the likely needs
of future
conflicts.
a.
Increase
the number of rocket artillery batteries (HIMARS).
b.
Increase
the number
of
upgraded
Light
Armored
Vehicle (LAV)
companies.
c.
Increase
the
number
of
Unmanned
Aerial
Systems
and
anti-air
systems (including counter-UAS systems).
d.
Develop
long-range strike
missiles
and anti-ship
missiles
for the
Corps.
e.
Modernize
USMC infantry
equipment.
•
Transform the
USMC personnel paradigm.
More than
other services,
the USMC
relies
heavily
on
junior
noncommissioned
officers
(NCOs)
to
staff key
positions across the
force but
especially in
combat arms.
For example,
E-4s
routinely
hold squad
leader billets
when the
Army normally
has
E-6s
in those billets.
The
nature
of
more
distributed operations
and
the
increasingly complex
responsibilities of a
Marine Corps
rifle squad
and platoon
under Force Design 2030
will only
put more
responsibility on the
backs of
squad leaders
and platoon
sergeants, increasing the
need for
more senior
Marines in those critical
positions. Additionally, the
Corps needs
to improve
its retention
of junior
NCOs after
their first
enlistments
(the Marines
have much lower rates of reenlistment than other
branches).33
1.
Align
the
USMC’s
combat
arms
rank
structure
with
the
U.S.
Army’s
(squad
leader billets
are for
E-6s, and
platoon
sergeant billets
are for
E-7s).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
2.
Create
better
incentives
to
retain
talented
junior
NCOs,
especially
in
infantry and other critical military occupational specialties.
3.
Reduce
unnecessary
deployments
to
increase
dwell
time
in
order
to
enable more robust primary military education.
•
Align Navy
amphibious
shipbuilding with Force
Design 2030.
The U.S.
Navy
has
struggled
for
decades
to
maintain
an
amphibious
fleet
that
could support
USMC war
plans around
large-scale amphibious operations.
In addition,
amphibious
shipbuilding
has
often
had
to
compete
against
other
priorities within
a constrained budget and
limited
shipbuilding capacity.
1.
Develop
and
produce
light
amphibious
warships
(LAWs)
to
support
more
distributed
amphibious
operations,
especially
in
the
Pacific.34
2.
Maintain
between
28
and
31
larger
amphibious
warships
as
opposed
to the
25
specified
in
current
Navy
shipbuilding
plans
and
the
38
specified
before 2020.35
U.S.
SPACE
FORCE
U.S.
space forces
conduct global
space
operations to sustain
and enhance
air, land,
and
sea
effectiveness,
lethality,
and
superiority
by
providing
secure
broad-
band global communications
(precision position, navigation, and timing accuracy); attack
warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time
intelligence, surveillance,
and
reconnaissance
information); and their
assured
continuity of
operations both by defending
U.S. assets and by conducting offensive operations
that
are
capable
of
imposing
unacceptable
losses
on
adversaries
that
might
seek to attack
them.
The
U.S. Space
Force (USSF)
was
established
to
assure
continuous global
and
theater
combat
support
from
space,
to
deter
attacks against
U.S. space
assets, and
to
prevail
in
space
should deterrence
fail. The
USSF posture
was
conceived
as
a
balance of
offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities designed for
maximum
effectiveness.
Needed
Reforms
•
Reverse the
Biden
Administration’s defensive posture.
The
Biden
Administration has
eliminated
almost
all
offensive
deterrence
capabilities and
instead
will
rely
solely
on
defensive
capabilities
of
disaggregation,
maneuver,
and
reconstitution—the
most
costly,
the
slowest,
and
ultimately the
most fragile architecture selection.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
1.
Reestablish
offensive
capabilities
to
guarantee
a
favorable
balance
of
forces, efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum,
and seriously
complicate
enemy
calculations
of
a
successful
first
strike
against
U.S.
space assets.
2.
Restore architectural
balance in U.S. space forces, both offensive and
defensive, to
restore
deterrence dominance efficiently
and quickly.
3.
Rapidly
expand
space
control
capability,
to
include
cis-lunar
space
(the
region beginning
at
geosynchronous
altitude and
encompassing
the moon), to provide
early warning
of an
enemy attack.
4.
Seek
arms
control
and
“rules
of
the
road”
understandings
only
when they
are
unambiguously
in
the
interests
of
the
U.S.
and
its
allies,
and
prohibit their unilateral implementation.
•
Reduce overclassification.
The USSF must move beyond the Cold War–
era
culture
of
secrecy
and
overclassification that
surrounded
military
space to
facilitate greater coordination
and
synchronization of
efforts across
the government and commercial sectors.
Declassify
appropriate
information about
terrestrial
and on-orbit
space capabilities that threaten the U.S. space
constellation, as well as those being pursued by our
competitors, to secure the principled right to counter them
offensively.
•
Implement policies suited to a mature USSF.
No longer a “newborn,”
the USSF has
entered
its
fourth
year
of
existence,
and
the
lessons
learned
can
be incorporated
across all
facets of
the force
to increase
its
effectiveness.
1.
Restructure
from
the
current
“unity
of
effort”
structure
to
“unity
of command.”
2.
Lead
the
U.S.
government’s
development
of
a
clear
and
unambiguous
declaratory
policy
that
the
United
States
will
operate
at
will
in
space
and
enforce these
operations
with capabilities that ensure
effective deterrence
and the
ability to
impose our
will if
necessary.
3.
End
the current
study phase
of concept
development and issue
necessary
guidance
for
the
development
and
fielding
of
offensive
capabilities.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
4.
Alter
the Space
Development
Agency’s current
“fail-early”
approach and
transition
to
a
methodology
that
maintains
aggressive
timelines
but with
significantly greater engineering
rigor, with
special
attention to
sustainment, support,
and fully
integrated space operations.
5.
Increase
the
number
of
general
officer
positions
to
ensure
the
Space Force’s
ability
to
compete
for
resources
on
a
common
basis
with
the
other services.
6.
Explore
creation of
a Space
Force Academy
to attract
top aero–astro
students, engineers,
and
scientists
and
develop
astronauts.
The
academy could
be attached
initially to
a large
existing
research university
like
the
California
Institute of Technology
or MIT,
share faculty
and funding,
and eventually
be
built
separately
to
be
on
par
with
the
other service
academies.
U.S.
CYBER
COMMAND
USCYBERCOM was
established in 2010 by the Department of Defense to unify
the
direction
of
cyberspace
operations, strengthen
DOD
cyberspace
capabilities,
and
integrate
and
enhance
U.S. cyber
expertise. Cyber
capabilities and
threats are
evolving
rapidly. Accordingly, a conservative Administration should be
especially
sensitive
to
and
prepared
to
meet
the
challenges
presented by
bureaucratic silos,
inappropriately
rigid
tactical
doctrine, and
strategic thinking’s
historic tendency
to lag behind technological
capability.
The
preliminary evidence
from the
war
in
Ukraine suggests
that existing
cyber doctrine
and certain
capability and target
assumptions may be
incorrect or
mis- placed.
The following
recommendations
therefore
presuppose
that
there
will
be
a rigorous “lessons learned”
analysis and review of existing U.S. doctrine in light of
the battlefield evidence.
Needed
Reforms
•
Ensure that
USCYBERCOM is properly
focused.
Mission
creep
is
leading to
wasteful
overlap with
the Department of Homeland
Security,
National Security
Agency, Department
of
Defense,
and
Central
Intelligence
Agency.
1.
Separate
USCYBERCOM
from
the
National
Security
Agency
per
congressional
direction.
2.
Conduct
effective
offensive
cyber-effects
operations
at
the
tactical
and
strategic levels.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
3.
Expand
defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President
Trump's
classified
National
Security
Presidential
Memorandum
13, “United
States Cyber
Operations
Policy.”36
4.
End
USCYBERCOM’s
participation in
federal
efforts to
“fortify”
U.S.
elections to
eliminate the
perception that
DOD
is
engaging in
partisan
politics.
•
Increase
USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness.
1.
Accelerate
the
integration
of
cyber
and
electronic
warfare
(EW)
doctrine and
capabilities,
abiding by
the time-tested norms
of combined-arms warfare.
2.
Mandate
that
development
teams
will
include
both
coders
and
soldiers,
aircrew, and
sailors with
kinetic
experience at the
platoon level.
3.
Break
the
paradigm of
cyber
authorities held
at
the strategic
level.
4.
Increase
cyber
resilience by,
for example,
protecting the
Nuclear Command,
Control,
and
Communications
Network
and
the
Air
Force’s Cyber
Resiliency
Office for
Weapons
Systems (CROWS).
5.
Expand
coordination
of joint
operations
with allies.
6.
Implement the Government
Accountability Office’s recommendation
that
the DOD
Chief
Information
Officer,
Commander
of
USCYBERCOM, and
Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information
Network
“align policy
and
system
requirements
to
enable
DOD
to
have enterprise-wide
visibility
of cyber
incident
reporting
to
support
tactical,
strategic, and military strategies for response.”37
•
Rationalize strategy
and
doctrine.
1.
Update
the
October
2022
National
Security
Strategy
to
define
DOD
roles and
responsibilities
beyond
existing platitudes.
2.
Apply
traditional
deterrence
strategies
and
principles
for
using
cyber/
EW in
retaliation
for foreign
cyberattacks and/or EW
actions
against
U.S.
infrastructure
and
citizens.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
FORCES
Even
though
America’s
conventional
war
in
Afghanistan was
a
failure,
Special Operations
Forces
of
the
United States
Special Operation
Command (USSOCOM)
executed
an
extremely
effective
counterterrorism
campaign: There
has
not
been another
major attack
on the
homeland,
global terrorist
threats are
reduced and
managed,
collaboration
with
international
partners
is
effective,
and
units
under
USSOCOM
are the
most
capable
and
experienced
warfighters
in
two
generations.
There is
a movement
to reduce
the scope
and scale
of USSOCOM’s
mission in
favor
of
other
service
priorities
in
great-power
competition.
This
would
be
a
mis-
take
because
USSOCOM
can
be
employed
effectively
in
great-power
competition. It
makes sense
to capitalize
on USSOCOM’s
experience and repurpose
its mis-
sion
to include
irregular
warfare
within
the
context
of
great-power
competition,
thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of
achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our
national defense and to the defense of our
allies
and
partners
around
the
globe.
Irregular
warfare
should
be
used
proactively to
prevent state
and nonstate
actors from
negatively
affecting U.S. policies
and objectives while simultaneously
strengthening our regional
partnerships. If we
maintain
irregular
warfare’s
traditional
focus
on
nonstate
actors,
we
limit
ourselves
to addressing
only
the
symptoms
(nonstate
actors),
not
the
problems
themselves
(China,
Russia, North
Korea, and
Iran).
Needed
Reforms
•
Make irregular warfare a
cornerstone of security
strategy.
The
U.S. can
project strength
through
unified
action
with
our
Interagency,38 allies,
and partners
by utilizing
irregular
warfare capabilities
synchronized with
elements
of national
power.
Broadly
redefining
irregular
warfare
to
address
current state
and
nonstate
actors is
critical to
countering irregular
threats
that range
from the
Chinese use
of economic
warfare to
Russian disinformation
and Islamist
terrorism. A broad
definition of irregular warfare
in the
National
Security Strategy
would allow
for a
whole-of- government
approach,
thereby providing
resources and
capabilities to
counter
threats
and
ultimately
serve
as
credible
deterrence
at
the
strategic and
tactical levels.
1.
Define
irregular
warfare
as
“a
means
by
which
the
United
States
uses
all
elements
of
national
power
to
project
influence
abroad
to
counter
state
adversaries, defeat hostile
nonstate
actors, deter
wider
conflict, and
maintain peace in great-power competition.”
2.
Characterize
the
state
and
nonstate
irregular
threats
facing
the
U.S.
by
region in the National Security Strategy.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
3.
Direct
that irregular
warfare
resources,
capabilities, and
strategies be
incorporated
directly
into
the
overall
National
Defense
Strategy
instead of
being relegated
to a supporting document.
4.
Establish
an
Irregular
Warfare
Center
of
Excellence
to
help
DOD
train,
equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core
competency
across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and
conflict.
•
Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally.
DOD, in
conjunction
with
the
Interagency,
allies,
and
partner
nations,
must
work
proactively to
counter China’s
BRI around
the globe.
1.
Task
USSOCOM
and
corresponding
organizations
in
the
Pentagon
with conceptualizing, resourcing, and
executing
regionally based
operations to
counter the
BRI with
a focus
on nations
that are
key to our
energy policy,
international
supply chains,
and our
defense industrial base.
2.
Use
regional and
global
information operations to
highlight Chinese violations
of
Exclusive
Economic
Zones,
violations
of
human
rights,
and coercion
along
Chinese
fault lines
in
Xinjiang
Province,
Hong
Kong,
and
Taiwan
in
addition
to China’s
weaponization
of
sovereign
debt.
3.
Directly
counter
Chinese
economic
power
with
all
elements
of
national
power in
North America,
Central
America, and
the Caribbean
to maintain
maritime freedom
of movement
and protect
the digital
infrastructure of nations in the region.
•
Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to
protect
the homeland.
A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information,
economic, and counterterrorist
irregular warfare capabilities should
be utilized
to protect
the homeland.
1.
Include
the
designation
of
USSOCOM
as
lead
for
the
execution
of
irregular warfare
against hostile
state and
nonstate actors
in the National
Defense Strategy.
2.
Demonstrate
a
willingness
to
employ
offensive
cyber
capabilities
against
adversaries who
conduct
cyberattacks against U.S.
infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
3.
Employ a “name and
shame” approach by making information regarding
the
names
of
entities
that
target
democratic
processes and
international
norms available in a transparent manner.
4.
Work
with
the
Interagency
to
employ
economic
warfare,
lawfare,
and
diplomatic pressure
against hostile
state and
nonstate
actors.
5.
Maintain
the
authorities
necessary
for
an
aggressive
counterterrorism
posture against threats to the homeland.
NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE
Nuclear
deterrence is
one
of
the
most
critical elements
of
U.S.
national security,
as
it
forms a
backstop to
U.S. military
forces. Every
operational plan
relies on
the
assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first
acquired nuclear
weapons,
Administrations
of
both parties
have pursued
a
strategy
designed to
deter
nuclear
and
non-nuclear
attack; assure
allies; and,
in
the
event of
nuclear employ-
ment,
restore
deterrence at the
lowest possible
cost to
the U.S.
Today, however,
America’s ability
to meet
these goals
is
increasingly challenged by
the growing
nuclear threats
posed by
our
adversaries.
•
China
is pursuing
a strategic
breakout of
its nuclear forces,
significantly shifting
the
nuclear
balance
and
forcing
the
U.S.
to
learn
how
to
deter
two
nuclear
peer
competitors
(China
and
Russia)
simultaneously
for
the
first time in
its history.
•
Russia
is
expanding
its
nuclear
arsenal
and
using
the
threat
of
nuclear
employment as
a coercive
tactic in
its war
on Ukraine.
•
North
Korea
is advancing
its
nuclear capabilities.
•
Iran
is
inching closer
to
nuclear capability.
Meanwhile,
all
U.S.
nuclear capabilities
and
the
infrastructure
on
which they
rely date from
the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next
Admin-
istration will
need to
focus on
continuing the
effort to
modernize the
nuclear triad
while
updating
our
strategy
and
capabilities
to
meet
the
challenges
presented by
a more threatening nuclear
environment.
Needed
Reforms
•
Prioritize nuclear
modernization.
All components of the
nuclear triad
are far
beyond
their
intended
lifetimes
and
will
need
to
be
replaced
over
the
next
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
decade.
This effort
is
required
for
the
U.S. to
maintain its
nuclear triad—and
will
be
the
bare
minimum needed
to
maintain
U.S. strategic
nuclear deterrence.
1.
Accelerate
the
timelines
of
critical
modernization
programs
including
the
Sentinel
missile,
Long
Range
Standoff
Weapon
(LRSO),
Columbia-class
ballistic
missile
submarine,
B-21
bomber,
and
F-35
Dual
Capable
Aircraft.
2.
Reject
any
congressional
proposals
that
would
further
extend
the service
lives
of
U.S.
capabilities
such
as
the
Minuteman
III
ICBM.
3.
Ensure sufficient
funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP),
including the
B61-12, W80-4,
W87-1 Mod,
and W88
Alt 370.
•
Develop the
Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile-Nuclear
(SLCM-N).
In
2018, the
Trump
Administration proposed restoring
the SLCM-N
to help
fill a
growing gap
in
U.S.
nonstrategic
capabilities
and
improve
deterrence
against limited
nuclear attack.39
The Biden
Administration
canceled this
program
in
its 2022
Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR).40 The next President
should support
and
accelerate
funding
for
development
of
the
SLCM-N
with
the goal
of deployment
by the
end of
the decade.
•
Account for
China’s nuclear
expansion.
To ensure
its ability
to deter
both
Russia
and
the
growing
Chinese
nuclear
threat,
the
U.S.
will
need
more than
the bare
minimum of
nuclear
modernization. President Biden’s
2022 NPR
described
the
problem
but
proposed
no
recommendations
to
restore
or maintain
nuclear deterrence.
1.
Consider
procuring
more
modernized
nuclear
systems
(such
as
the
Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned.
2.
Improve
the
ability
of
the
U.S.
to
utilize
the
triad’s
upload
capacity
in
case of a crisis.
3.
Review
what
capabilities in
addition to
the SLCM-N
(for example,
nonstrategic weapons
or
new
warhead
designs)
are
needed
to
deter
the unique
Chinese threat.
•
Restore the
nuclear
infrastructure.
The
United States
must restore
its necessary
nuclear
infrastructure
so
that
it
is
capable
of
producing
and maintaining
nuclear weapons.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
1.
Accelerate
the
effort
to
restore
plutonium
pit
production,
which
is
essential both
for
modern
warhead
programs
and
for
recapitalizing
the
stockpile.
2.
Continue
to invest
in rebuilding
infrastructure, including facilities
at the National
Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development.
3.
Restore
readiness
to
test
nuclear
weapons
at
the
Nevada
National Security
Site
to
ensure
the
ability
of
the
U.S.
to
respond
quickly
to
asymmetric technology surprises.
•
Correctly orient arms control.
The U.S. should agree to arms control
agreements
only if
they
help
to
advance
the
interests
of
the
U.S.
and
its
allies.
1.
Reject
proposals
for
nuclear
disarmament
that
are
contrary
to
the
goal
of bolstering deterrence.
2.
Pursue
arms
control
as
a
way
to
secure
the
national
security
interests
of
the U.S.
and its
allies rather
than as
an end
in itself.
3.
Prepare
to
compete
in
order
to
secure
U.S.
interests
should
arms
control
efforts continue to fail.
MISSILE
DEFENSE
Missile defense
is a critical component of the U.S. national security
architecture.
It can help to
deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as
intended, take
adversary
“cheap shots”
off the
table, and
limit the
perceived
value of
mis- siles
as
tools
of
coercion.
It also
allows
space
for
diplomacy
during
a
crisis
and
can
protect
U.S. and
allied
forces,
critical
assets,
and
populations
if
deterrence
fails.41 Adversaries
are relying
increasingly on missiles
to achieve
their aims.
•
China
and Russia,
in addition
to their
vast and
growing
ballistic missile
inventories, are
deploying
new
hypersonic
glide
vehicles
and
investing
in
new ground-launched,
air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that
uniquely challenge the
United States
in different
domains.
•
North
Korea
has
pursued
an
aggressive
missile
testing
program
and
is
becoming increasingly belligerent toward
South Korea
and Japan.
•
Iran
continues
to
maintain
a
missile
arsenal
that
is
capable
of
striking
U.S.
and allied
assets in
the Middle
East and
Europe, and
its rocket
launches demonstrate that
it
either
has
or
is
developing
the
ability
to
build
ICBMs.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Missile defense
has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In
light
of
these growing
threats, the
incoming Administration
should treat
missile defense as a
top priority.
Needed
Reforms
•
Champion the benefits of missile defense.
Despite its deterrence
and damage-limitation
benefits,
opponents
argue
incorrectly
that
U.S.
missile defense
is
destabilizing because
it
threatens
Russian
and
Chinese
second- strike
capabilities.
1.
Reject
claims made
by the
Left that
missile
defense is
destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own
advanced missile defense systems.
2.
Commit
to
keeping
homeland
missile
defense
off
the
table
in
any
arms
control negotiations with Russia and China.42
•
Strengthen homeland
ballistic
missile defense.
The
United States
currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as
part of its Ground-based Midcourse
Defense
(GMD)
system
to
defend
the
homeland
against North
Korea,
but
as
North
Korea
improves
its
missile
program,
this system
is at
risk of
falling behind
the threat.43
1.
Buy
at
least
64
of
the
Next
Generation
Interceptor
(NGI),
which
is
more advanced
than the
GBI, for
an eventual
uniform fleet
of
interceptors.44
The
Biden Administration currently plans
to buy
only 20.
2.
Consider
additional
steps to
strengthen the
GMD system
such as
a layered missile
defense
or
a
third
interceptor
site
on
the
East
Coast.
•
Increase the
development of
regional
missile defense.
As the
Ukraine conflict amply
demonstrates,
U.S.
regional
missile
defense
capabilities
are very
limited. The
United States
has been
unable to
supply our
partners reliably with
any
capabilities,
and
the
number
and
types
of
regional
missile
defense platforms
are
less
than
the
U.S.
needs
for
its
own
defense.
The
U.S. should
prioritize procurement of
more regional
defense systems
such as Theater High Altitude
Area Defense
(THAAD),
Standard Missile-3,
and Patriot missiles.
•
Change U.S. missile defense policy.
Historically, the U.S.
has chosen
to
rely
solely
on
deterrence
to address
the
Russian
and
Chinese
ballistic
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
missile
threat to
the
homeland
and
to
use
homeland
missile defense
only against rogue
nations.
1.
Abandon
the
existing
policy
of
not
defending
the
homeland
against Russian
and
Chinese
ballistic
missiles
and
focus
on
how
to
improve
defense as
the Russian
and Chinese
missile threats
increase at
an unprecedented
rate.45
2.
Invest
in future
advanced
missile defense
technologies like directed
energy
or
space-based missile
defense
that
could
defend
against
more numerous
missile threats.
•
Invest in
new
track-and-intercept capabilities.
The advent
of hypersonic missiles
and
increased
numbers
of
cruise
missile
arsenals
by threat
actors poses
new challenges
to our
missile defense
capabilities.
1.
Invest
in
cruise missile
defense
of the
homeland.46
2.
Accelerate
the
program
to
deploy
space-based
sensors
that
can
detect
and track missiles flying on nonballistic trajectories.47
3.
Accelerate
the
Glide
Phase
Interceptor,
which
is
intended
to
counter
hypersonic weapons.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The
mission of
the Department
of Defense
is to
provide the
military
forces needed
to deter
war
and
ensure
our
nation’s
security.
This
chapter
provides
a
blueprint
to
ensure
that
the
Department
can
meet
our
national security needs. Its
preparation was a collective enterprise of individuals involved
in the 2025 Presidential Transition
Project. All
contributors
to this
chapter are
listed at
the front
of this
volume, but
Sergio de
la Pena
and Chuck DeVore
deserve
special
mention.
The
author
alone
assumes
responsibility
for
the
content
of
this
chapter,
and no
views expressed herein
should be
attributed to
any other
individual.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S.
Constitution, Preamble,
https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023).
2.
U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8,
https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/
(accessed February 16, 2023).
3.
U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2,
https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/
(accessed February 16, 2023).
4.
Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81,
117th
Congress,
December
27,
2021,
Division
A,
Title
X,
§
1004,
https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/
PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).
5.
H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public
Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021,
Division G, Title IX, §§
70901–70953,
https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16,
2023).
6.
S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December
23, 2016, Division A, Title IX,
§ 901,
https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000.
pdf
(accessed
February
16,
2023).
7.
H.R.
3622,
Goldwater–Nichols
Department
of
Defense
Reorganization
Act
of
1986,
Public
Law
No.
99-433,
99th Congress, October 1,
1986,
https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf
(accessed February
16, 2023).
8.
U.S. Department
of Defense,
Defense
Security Cooperation
Agency,
Historical
Sales Book,
Fiscal Years
1950–2021, p. 7,
https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
9.
Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales:
Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service
Report
for Members
and Committees
of Congress
No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/
RL31675.pdf
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
10.
Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales
Process,”
The
Hill
Congress Blog, October 6, 2022,
https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15,
2023).
11.
See
Thomas
W.
Spoehr,
“The
Administration
and
Congress
Must
Act
Now
to
Counter
the
Worsening
Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage
Foundation
Issue
Brief
No. 5283, July 28, 2022,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/
default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Ronald
Reagan
Institute,
“Reagan
National
Defense
Survey,”
conducted
November
2021,
p.
4,
https://www.
reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf
(accessed February 16, 2023).
14.
See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting
the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation
Commentary, June 6, 2019,
https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing-
military-spouses.
15.
See
Jude
Schwalbach,
“Military
Families
Deserve
Flexible
Education
Options,”
Heritage
Foundation
Commentary, April
14, 2021,
https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve-
flexible-education-options.
16.
See Chapter
7,
“The
Intelligence Community,”
infra.
17.
The
Defense
Intelligence Agency
(DIA);
the
National
Security
Agency
(NSA);
the
National
Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency
(NGA);
the
National
Reconnaissance
Office
(NRO);
and
the
intelligence
and
counterintelligence
elements
of
the
military
services:
U.S.
Air
Force
Intelligence,
U.S.
Navy
Intelligence,
U.S.
Army Intelligence, and U.S.
Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and
oversight from the Under
Secretary of Defense
for
Intelligence (USDI).
18.
The
Office
of
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence
(ODNI)
and
the
Central
Intelligence
Agency
(CIA).
19.
The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of
Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and
counterintelligence elements of the
U.S.
Coast
Guard;
the
Department
of
Justice’s
Federal
Bureau
of
Investigation
and
the
Drug
Enforcement
Administration’s Office of
National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau
of Intelligence and
Research;
and
the
Department
of
the
Treasury’s
Office
of
Intelligence
and
Analysis.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
20.
Staff
Study,
IC21:
Intelligence
Community
in
the
21st
Century,
Permanent
Select
Committee
on
Intelligence,
U.S. House of Representatives,
104th
Congress, 1996, p. 71,
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf
(accessed February
15, 2023).
21.
Ronald
O’Rourke,
“Great
Power
Competition:
Implications
for
Defense—Issues
for
Congress,”
Congressional
Research Service
Report
for Members
and Committees
of Congress
No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93
(accessed February 15, 2023).
22.
U.S.
Government
Accountability
Office,
Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish
Oversight Expectations
and
to
Develop
Tools
That
Enhance
Accountability,
GAO-21-295,
May
2021,
https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
23.
The U.S.
military has
a long
history of
providing
support to
civil
authorities, particularly in
response to
disasters but for other
purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines
defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA)
as
“Support
provided
by
U.S.
Federal
military
forces,
DoD
civilians,
DoD
contract
personnel,
DoD
Component
assets,
and
National
Guard
forces
(when
the
Secretary
of
Defense,
in
coordination
with
the
Governors of
the
affected
States,
elects
and
requests
to
use
those
forces
in
Title
32,
U.S.C.,
status)
in
response
to requests for assistance
from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement
support, and other
domestic
activities, or
from qualifying
entities for
special events.
Also known
as civil
support.” U.S.
Department
of
Defense,
Directive
No.
3025.18,
“Defense
Support
of
Civil
Authorities
(DSCA),”
December
29,
2010,
p.
16,
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20
of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
24.
U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,”
https://www.army.mil/about/
(accessed February 17, 2023).
25.
“[T]he
Army’s
internal
assessment
must
be
balanced
against
its
own
statements
that
unit
training
is
focused
on
company-level operations
[reflective
of
counterintelligence
requirements]
rather
than
battalion
or
brigade
operations [much
less division
or corps
to meet
large-scale ground combat
operations against a
peer competitor such
as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade
combat teams would perform
in
combat
operations is an
open
question.” “Executive Summary” in
2023 Index
of U.S.
Military
Strength,
ed.
Dakota
L.
Wood
(Washington:
The
Heritage
Foundation,
2023),
p.
16,
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.
com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf
(accessed February 15, 2023).
26.
For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D.
Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States
Navy,” Heritage Foundation
Special
Report
No. 242,
February 18, 2021,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/
files/2021-02/SR242.pdf,
and
Ronald
O’Rourke,
“Navy
Force
Structure
and
Shipbuilding
Plans:
Background
and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service
Report for
Members and
Committees of
Congress
No. RL32665, December 21, 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665
(accessed February 15, 2023).
27.
The
Joint
Capabilities
Integration
and
Development
System
(JCIDS)
is
the
process
by
which
the
services
develop and
the
Joint
Staff
approves
the
requirements
for
major
defense
acquisitions.
See
Defense
Acquisition University,
“Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),”
https://www.dau.
edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
28.
The
board would
seek to
balance a
mix of
active military
and civilians
with expertise
in and
responsibility for major acquisitions
and former
military and
civilians with
experience in
strategy and
acquisitions.
The proposed composition
would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman,
with three-star level
membership
from
the
Joint
Staff,
the
Navy
and
Defense
Acquisition
Executives,
and
the
Naval
Sea
Systems
Command. In
addition,
there
would
be
four-star
retired
naval
officers/Navy
civil
servants
as
members,
one
each
named by
the
Chairmen
of
the
House
and
Senate
Armed
Services
Committees,
the
Secretary
of
the
Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would
be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy
who had previous senior
experience in the
defense
industry.
29.
See
James
Mattis,
Secretary
of Defense,
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States
of
America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge,
U.S. Department
of Defense,
https://
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
(accessed
February
17, 2023),
and U.S.
Department of Defense,
2022 National
Defense
Strategy of
the United
States of
America Including
the 2022
Nuclear
Posture Review
and the
2022 Missile
Defense Review,
https://oldcc.gov/
resource/2022-national-defense-strategy
(accessed February 17, 2023).
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
30.
U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational
Squadrons,” September 17, 2018,
https://www.
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/
(accessed February 17, 2023).
31.
General
David
H.
Berger,
Commandant
of
the
Marine
Corps,
“Force
Design
2030,”
U.S.
Department
of
the
Navy,
U.S.
Marine
Corps, March
2020,
https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20
Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460
(accessed February 17, 2023).
32.
Department
of
the
Navy,
United
States
Marine
Corps,
“Force
Design
2030,”
March
2020,
https://www.hqmc.
marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.
pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460
(accessed
February
15,
2023).
33.
Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are
Trying to Improve Retention,”
Marine
Corps Times,
November
15, 2021,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people-
like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/
(accessed February 15, 2023).
34.
Megan
Eckstein,
“Marines,
Navy
Near
Agreement
on
Light
Amphibious
Warship
Features,”
Defense
News,
October
5,
2022,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light-
amphibious-warship-features/
(accessed
February
16,
2023).
35.
Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer
Traditional Amphibious Warships,”
Defense
News, June 21, 2021,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional-
amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/
(accessed
February
16,
2023).
36.
See Sidney
J. Freedberg
Jr., “Trump
Eases Cyber
Ops, but
Safeguards
Remain: Joint
Staff,”
Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain-
joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz,
“White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use
of Cyberweapons,”
The
Wall Street
Journal, September 20, 2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-
confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729
(accessed
March
7,
2023);
and
Federation
of
American
Scientists,
Intelligence
Resource
Program,
“National
Security
Presidential
Memoranda
[NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump
Administration,” updated March 7, 2022,
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index.
html
(accessed March 7,
2023).
37.
U.S. Government
Accountability Office,
DOD Cybersecurity:
Enhanced
Attention Needed
to Ensure
Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately
Reported and
Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36,
https://www.gao.
gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023).
38.
See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency
Team,”
U.S.Military.com,
https://usmilitary.
com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20
other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20
to%20name%20a%20few
(accessed
February
17,
2023).
39.
U.S. Department of Defense,
Nuclear Posture
Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55,
https://media.defense.
gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF
(accessed
February
17,
2023).
40.
U.S.
Department
of Defense,
2022
National
Defense Strategy
of the
United States
of America
Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense
Review,
pp.
3
and
20.
41.
Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile
Defense,” in
2023
Index of
U.S. Military
Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The
Heritage
Foundation, 2023),
pp. 507–508,
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_
Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf.
42.
Matthew
R.
Costlow,
“The
Folly
of
Limiting
U.S.
Missile
Defenses
for
Nuclear
Arms
Control,”
National
Institute for Public Policy
Information Series, Issue
No. 505, October 18, 2021,
https://nipp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf
(accessed February 16, 2023).
43.
Forum
for
American
Leadership,
“Don’t
Hand
North
Korea
a
Win
in
the
Missile
Defense
Review,”
January
4, 2022,
https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat
(accessed February 16, 2023).
44.
Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile
Defense Right,”
Defense
News, January 4, 2021,
https://
www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense-
right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20
new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D
(accessed February 16, 2023).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
45.
Forum for American Leadership,
“How
Biden's
Missile Defense Review Can Succeed,” October 21, 2021,
https://
forumforamericanleadership.org/missile-defense-review
(accessed February 16, 2023).
46.
Tom Karako,
Matt
Strohmeyer, Ian
Williams, Wes
Rumbaugh, and
Ken Harmon,
North America
Is a
Region,
Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable
Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland,
Center
for Strategic and
International Studies, Missile Defense Project, July 2022,
https://csis-website-prod.
s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220714_Karako_North_America.pdf?VersionId=BhIKa8jHHF_
kV94NXRMx6D4m2o6LQqUf
(accessed
February
16,
2023).
47.
Rebeccah Heinrichs, “Why America Needs the Ability to Track
Enemy Missiles from Space,”
The
Hill, April 16, 2019,
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/438939-why-america-needs-the-ability-to-track-enemy-
missiles-from-space/
(accessed
February
16,
2023).
PRIMARY
RECOMMENDATION
Our primary recommendation
is that
the President
pursue
legislation to
dis- mantle the Department
of Homeland
Security (DHS).
After 20
years, it
has not
gelled
into
“One
DHS.”
Instead,
its
various
components’
different
missions
have outweighed
its
decades-long attempt
to function
as one
department, rendering the
whole
disjointed
rather
than
cohesive.
Breaking
up
the
department
along
its mission
lines
would
facilitate
mission focus
and
provide
opportunities
to
reduce overhead
and
achieve
more
limited
government. In
lieu
of
a
status
quo
DHS,
we recommend
that:
•
U.S. Customs
and Border Protection
(CBP) be
combined
with
Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); U.S.
Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS);
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and the
Department of
Justice (DOJ)
Executive
Office for
Immigration
Review (EOIR) and Office of
Immigration Litigation (OIL) into a stand- alone border and
immigration agency at the Cabinet level (more than
100,000 employees, making it the
third largest department measured by manpower).
•
The
Cybersecurity
and
Infrastructure
Security
Agency
(CISA)
be
moved
to
the Department of Transportation.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
The
Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) be
moved to
the Department of
the
Interior
or,
if
combined
with
CISA,
to
the
Department
of Transportation.
•
The
U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG)
be moved
to DOJ
and, in
time of
full-scale war
(i.e.,
threatening the
homeland),
to
the
Department
of
Defense
(DOD). Alternatively,
USCG
should
be
moved
to
DOD
for
all
purposes.
•
The
U.S. Secret
Service (USSS)
be divided
in two, with the
protective element
moved
to
DOJ
and
the
financial
enforcement
element
moved
to
the Department
of the Treasury.
•
The
Transportation
Security Administration (TSA)
be
privatized.
•
The
Science
and
Technology
Directorate
(S&T)
be
moved
to
DOD
and
the
Office
of
Countering
Weapons
of
Mass
Destruction
be
moved
to
the
FBI.
All of the remaining supporting
components could be dismantled because their functions already
exist in the moving components as well as the receiv- ing
departments. Cutting these costs would save the American
taxpayers significant sums.
Unless
and
until
this dismantling
recommendation
is
pursued and
achieved,
however,
DHS
will
statutorily continue
to
exist,
and
it
needs many
reforms. Accord-
ingly,
we
now
turn
to
recommended
changes in
DHS
as
it
exists
now.
MISSION
STATEMENT
The Department
of Homeland Security protects the American homeland from
and
prepares
for
terrorism
and
other
hazards in
both the
physical and
cyber realms, provides
for
secure
and free
movement
of
trade
and travel,
and
enforces
U.S.
immi- gration laws impartially.
OVERVIEW
The
Department of
Homeland Security
(DHS) was
created in
the
aftermath
of the
terrorist
attacks of
September 11,
2001, and
subsequent
mailings of
anthrax spores. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which created the department, states
that DHS’s
primary mission
is
to
prevent terrorist
attacks within
the
U.S.;
reduce
the
nation’s
vulnerability
to
terrorism; minimize
the
damage
from and
assist in
the recovery from any terrorist attacks; prepare and
respond to natural and manmade
crises
and
emergencies;
and
monitor
connections between
illegal drug
trafficking
and
terrorism,
coordinate efforts
to
sever
such connections,
and
interdict
illegal drug
trafficking.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Unfortunately for our nation, the
federal government’s newest department
became
like every
other
federal
agency:
bloated,
bureaucratic,
and
expensive.
It
also
lost
sight
of
its
mission
priorities.
DHS
has
also
suffered
from
the
Left’s
wokeness
and weaponization
against
Americans
whom
the
Left
perceives
as
its
political
opponents. To
truly secure
the homeland,
a conservative
Administration needs to
return the
department
to
the
right
mission,
the
right
size,
and
the
right
budget.
This
would include
reorganizing the
department
and
shifting
significant
resources
away
from several
supporting components to
the essential
operational components. Prior-
itizing border
security and
immigration
enforcement, including detention
and deportation, is critical
if we
are to
regain control
of the
border, repair
the historic
damage
done
by
the
Biden
Administration, return
to
a
lawful
and
orderly
immi-
gration
system, and
protect
the
homeland
from
terrorism
and
public
safety
threats.
This also
includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration
system into
one agency
to fulfill
the mission
more
efficiently.
The Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA) is
a DHS com- ponent
that the
Left has
weaponized to censor
speech and
affect
elections at the
expense
of
securing
the cyber
domain
and
critical
infrastructure,
which
are
threat-
ened daily.2 A
conservative
Administration
should
return CISA
to
its
statutory and
important but narrow mission.
The bloated DHS
bureaucracy and budget,
along with
the wrong
priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative
Administration to cut billions in spending
and limit
government’s role in
Americans’ lives. These
opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
(FEMA)
National
Flood Insurance
Program,
reforming
FEMA
emergency
spending to
shift the
majority of
preparedness
and response
costs to
states and
localities instead
of
the
federal
government,
eliminating
most
of
DHS’s
grant
pro- grams,
and
removing
all unions
in
the
department
for
national
security
purposes. A
successful DHS would:
•
Secure
and
control the
border;
•
Thoroughly enforce immigration
laws;
•
Correctly and
efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while
rejecting fraudulent claims;
•
Secure
the
cyber
domain
and
collaborate
with
critical
infrastructure
sectors
to maintain their security;
•
Provide
states
and
localities
with
a
limited
federal
emergency
response
and
preparedness;
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
Secure
our
coasts and
economic
zones;
•
Protect
political
leaders,
their
families,
and
visiting
heads
of
state
or
government; and
•
Oversee transportation security.
OFFICE
OF
THE
SECRETARY
(SEC)
In the next
Administration, the Office
of the
Secretary should take
on the
fol- lowing key issues
and challenges
to ensure
the effective
operation of
DHS.
Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel.
The Secretary of Homeland
Security
is
a
presidentially appointed
and
Senate-confirmed
political
appointee, but
for budgetary reasons,
he or
she has
historically been unable
to fund
a dedi- cated
team of political
appointees. A key
first step
for the
Secretary to
improve front-office functions
is
to
have
his
or
her
own
dedicated
team
of
political
appoin-
tees selected and vetted by
the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant
on
detailees
from other
parts
of
the
department,
to
help
ensure
the
completion
of the next
President’s agenda.
An Aggressive
Approach to
Senate-Confirmed
Leadership Positions.
While Senate confirmation is a
constitutionally necessary requirement for
appointing
agency
leadership,
the
next
Administration
may
need
to
take
a
novel
approach
to the
confirmations
process
to
ensure
an
adequate
and
rapid
transition. For
example, the next Administration arguably should place its
nominees for key positions
into similar
positions as
“actings” (for example,
putting in
a person to serve
as the
Senior Official
Performing the Duties
of the
Commissioner of CBP while that
person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE
or become the
Secretary).
This approach
would both
guarantee
implementation of the
Day
One
agenda
and
equip
the
department
for
potential
emergency
situations
while still
honoring the
confirmation
requirement. The department
should also
look to
remove
lower-level but
nevertheless important positions
that currently
require Senate
confirmation from the
confirmation requirement, although
this effort would
require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of
legisla- tion
that
closes
portions
of the
department
that
currently
have
Senate-confirmed
leadership).
Clearer, More
Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession.
Based on
previous experience,
the
department
needs
legislation
to
establish
a
more
durable
but politically
oriented line
of
succession
for agency decision-making
purposes. The
ideal
sequence
for line
of
succession
is
certainly
debatable,
except
that
in
cir-
cumstances
where a
career
employee
holds
a leadership
position
in
the
department,
that position
should
be
deemed
vacant
for
line-of-succession
purposes
and
the
next eligible
political
appointee
in
the
sequence
should
assume
acting
authority.
Further,
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
individuals
wielding acting
Secretary authority
should have
explicit
authority
to finalize
agency
actions, including regulations, to
ensure that
the
department’s homeland security mission is fulfilled.
Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices.
Pending a possible presidential
deci- sion
to
shrink
or
eliminate
DHS itself,
the
next
Administration
will
still
have
the obligation
to protect
the homeland
as required
by law.
The Secretary
therefore can
and
should
use
his
or
her
inherent,
discretionary
leadership
authority
to
“soft close”
ineffective and
problematic
corners
of
the
department.
While
those
corners are to
be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and
opera- tional responsibility
to mission-essential components of the department, including
the
Office
of
the
Secretary
itself. This
effort
not
only
would
make
the
department more
efficient, but
also would
support a
legislative move to
shrink or
dismantle the
department by showing
that the
agency can
fulfill
national
security–critical functions without its current bloated
bureaucracy.
Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel.
To strengthen
political
decision-making
and
ensure
that
taxpayer
dollars
are
being
used
legally and
efficiently,
the Secretary
should make
major changes
in the distribution of
career
personnel
throughout
the
department.
For
example,
personnel
from
parts of
the
department
undergoing
soft
closure
could
be
redistributed
to
what
will
be
workload-intensive corners
of
the
department,
including
national
security–critical and
transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement
capacity should be
removed
immediately
from
office
billets
and
deployed
to
field
billets
to
maxi- mize law
enforcement capacity.
Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding.
The next Adminis-
tration
should
take
steps
to
restore
lawfulness
and
integrity
to
the
department’s massive
regimen
of federal
grant
programs,
most
of
which
are
managed
and
dis- tributed
by the
Federal
Emergency Management
Agency. The
Secretary
should direct FEMA to
ensure that
all FEMA-issued
grant funding
for states,
localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors,
can demon- strate
that
they
are
in
compliance
with federal
law,
and
can
show
that
their
mission and
actions
support the
broader
homeland security
mission. All
applicants and
potential recipients of such
grant funding should be required to meet certain pre-
conditions for eligibility
(except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian
funding)
or
should
simply
be
considered
ineligible
for
funding.
Such
preconditions
should include
at least
the following:
•
Certification
by
applicants
that
they
comply
with
all
aspects
of
federal
immigration
laws, including
the
honoring
of
all
immigration
detainers.
•
Certification
by
applicants
that
they
are
both
registered
with
E-Verify
and
using
E-Verify
in
a
transparent
and
nonevasive
manner.
For
states
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
and
localities, that
would include
certification
that
all
components
of
that government,
and not
just the
applicant
agency, are
registered with and use
E-Verify.
•
If
the
applicant
is
a
state
or
locality,
commitment
by
that
state
or
locality
to
total
information-sharing
in the
context of
both federal
law
enforcement and
immigration enforcement.
This
would
include
access
to
department
of motor
vehicles and
voter
registration databases.
Non-Use of
Discretionary Guest Worker Visa Authorities.
To stop facili- tating the
availability of cheap foreign labor in order to support American
workers (particularly
poor and middle-class American workers) and follow congressional
intent, the Secretary
should explicitly cease using at least two discretionary author-
ities as
part of
his or
her broader
effort to
support
American workers.
•
The
Secretary
should
make
it
clear
that
he
or
she
will
not
use
the
Secretary’s
existing
discretionary authority to
increase the
number of
H-2B (seasonal
non-agricultural)
visas above
the statutorily
set cap.
•
The
Secretary
should not
issue any
regulations in support
of the
“H-2 eligible”
country
list,
the
effect
of
which
would
prevent
favoring
certain
foreign nationals
seeking
an
H-2
guest
worker
visa
based
simply
on
their
nationality.
Restoration of
Honesty and Transparency.
The Secretary should use his or
her inherent
authority
as
leader
of
the
department
to
follow
up
with
congressional
and other
partners
to
disclose
information
and
provide
the
transparency
that
has been obstructed
during the Biden Administration. The Secretary should proceed
from the assumption
that congressional inquiries and public information requests
were
unfulfilled and
then seek
to fulfill
them.
Replacement of
the Entire Homeland Security Advisory Committee.
The
Secretary should
plan to
quickly remove
all current
members of
the Homeland Security
Advisory Committee
and replace
them as
quickly as
is feasible.
U.S.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROTECTION
(CBP)
If all immigration
agencies are
not merged,
including USCIS
and ORR,
then an
appropriate third
alternative would be
to consolidate
ICE and
CBP to
form a combined
Border Security
and Immigration
Agency (BSIA).
This would
inte- grate critical interdiction,
enforcement, and investigative
resources, enhancing coordination
and
refocusing
collective
efforts
on
the
vast
and
complex
cross-bor- der
threats
impacting
our nation’s
health,
safety,
and
national
security.
It
would
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
also
simultaneously
add efficiencies
to our
nation’s
capacity to
facilitate lawful trade and travel.
The BSIA should
establish clear
mission
requirements, responsibilities, and
mandates
under existing
law
regarding
the
persistent
need
for
and
utilization
of
U.S. military
personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing
whole-of-gov-
ernment
efforts and
long-term strategy
to
secure
our
nation’s
borders effectively.
In
addition,
appropriate elements
within the
newly created
BSIA should
be
desig-
nated
as part
of the
U.S. National
Security and
Intelligence Community.
A conservative Administration should
eliminate any prohibitive guidance,
direction,
or mandate
from
DHS
or
the
Administration
that
curtails
or
limits
CBP from
publishing detailed border
security and
enforcement
data not
impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or
sources. DHS should
issue
a
regulation
mandating
that
CBP
publish
accurate
and
timely
border
security
data,
readily
available
to
the
public,
on
a
regular
basis
that
avoid
White House
and
DHS
leadership
review and
approval.
The White House
should grant
the authority
for CBP
and DHS
executives to utilize
component
aviation
assets
under
the
Office
of
Air
and
Marine
(OAM).
CBP
and DHS have worldwide
missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed
across
the
globe
and
in
every
state
in
the
U.S.
With
a
CBP
workforce
alone
of
more than
60,000 people
(240,000-plus
for DHS)
encompassing more than
a thousand
sea,
land, and
airports,
it
is
essential
that
the Commissioner,
Deputy
Commissioner,
Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to
facilities to maintain appropriate
situational
awareness across the
department’s vast mission
set and
interact with
the
expansive
workforce.
Although
CBP
operates
one
of
the
largest
aviation components of any
domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are
prohibited from
utilizing the
agency’s
aviation assets
to facilitate official travel.
Executives are
required to
fly on commercial
airlines, and this
requirement sig- nificantly
limits their
ability to
have
classified
communications and takes
them offline for extended periods of time.
Border
Patrol (BP)
and
OAM
should be
combined within
CBP. BP
has
more
than
20,000
personnel,
and
OAM
has
approximately
1,800. OAM’s
assets are
dedicated
in
support
of
BP
operations the
vast majority
of
the
time, yet
redundant approv-
als,
strategies,
and independent
hierarchal commands serve
as impediments
to efficient and practical resource deployments.
CBP
should restart
and
expand
use
of
the
horseback-mounted
Border Patrol.
As
part
of
this
announcement,
the
Secretary should
clear the
records and
personnel
files
of
those
who
were
falsely accused
by
Secretary
Alejandro Mayorkas
of
whip-
ping
migrants
and
issue
a
formal
apology on
behalf of
DHS
and
CBP.
The Secretary should
combine the
Office of
Trade (OT)
and Trade
Relations with
the
Office
of
Field
Operations
(OFO).
The
OT
is
the
smallest
of
CBP’s
compo-
nents, and
its
operational
counterpart,
OFO,
has
a
workforce
of
more
than
30,000.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
OT’s function
is interwoven with that of its OFO operational counterpart.
Combin-
ing
OT
with OFO
would achieve
streamlined operations
and
increase
OT’s capacity
and
capability
by
leveraging
OFO’s expansive
resources.
CBP, ICE, and
USCIS all
have authority to issue
Notices to
Appear (NTA)
to removable
aliens
in
their
presence,
which
begins
removal
proceedings.
In
most instances,
CBP should
turn illegal
aliens over
to ICE
for detention, and ICE
can then issue
any needed
NTA. CBP
should issue
NTAs only
in limited
situations for
humanitarian reasons, such as medical emergencies. In addition,
CBP should eliminate use of Notices to Report (NTR)
altogether.
CBP’s established national standards
of Transport, Escort, Detention, and
Search
(TEDS)
have
been
widely
interpreted and
expanded
by
lower
courts.
This
has
resulted
in unrealistic
and
differing
detention
standards
for
CBP
facilities
based on
the
jurisdiction within
which
they
fall,
negatively impacting
operations.
ICE has
suffered similarly. A single
nationwide detention standard should be codified that
prevents
individual
states from
mandating
that
federal
government agencies
adhere
to
widely
expansive and
ever-changing
sets of
standards. Such standards
should allow
the flexibility
to
use
large
numbers
of
temporary
facilities
such
as
tents.
The annual
costs associated with establishing and maintaining temporary
facil- ities
to address
the flow
of illegal
migration and associated
care,
transportation, and
processing
are
prohibitive,
and
CBP’s
budget
is
inadequate.
CBP
is
forced
to forgo
critical
mission-essential endeavors
to
fund
the
additional
associated
costs. Often,
this
requires
the reprogramming
of
funding
at
the
DHS
level,
which
has
a
negative impact on other DHS
components’ operations. This predictable cost that
has
to
be
paid
from
existing
CBP
and
DHS
funding
levels
reduces
CBP’s
operational
readiness
and
ability
to
accomplish
its
diverse
and
critical
missions
to
protect
the American
people.
The next
President
should
request
a
realistic
budget
that
fully pays for
these costs.
Increased
funding is needed for BP to hire additional support personnel,
which
would
relieve
uniformed BP
agents from
administrative
duties
associated with
processing
aliens and
allow them
to return
to their
national
security mission.
Congress should
increase funding for facility upgrades at strategic land Ports
of Entry
(POEs),
including expanding
state-of-the-art
technology
such as
Non-Intru-
sive
Inspection
equipment. Today,
the
cartels
exploit the
aging facilities
and
lack
of
adequate technology to smuggle illicit drugs, contraband, and
more successfully through our nation’s POEs.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (ICE)
Needed
Reforms
Since
the
formation
of
DHS,
ICE
has
increasingly been
tasked with
auxiliary missions that
have little or nothing to do with either immigration or customs
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
enforcement.
To
return
ICE
to
its
primary
mission, any
new
Administration
that wishes to
restore the
rule of
law
to
our
immigration
enforcement efforts
should:
•
Order ICE
to stop
closing out
pending
immigration cases and
apply the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as
written by Congress.3
The Biden
Administration
closed out
tens of
thousands of
immigration cases that
had
already
been
prepared
and
were
slated
for
expedited
removal
processing
or
hearings
before
the
U.S.
Immigration
Court.
This
misguided
action constituted
an egregious
example of
lawlessness
that allowed
thousands of
illegal
aliens
and
other
immigration
violators
to
go
free
in
the
United
States.
•
Direct ICE to stop ignoring criminal aliens identified
through the
287(g)
program.4
Ultimately,
Congress
should prevent
ICE from
ignoring criminal
aliens
identified
by local
law
enforcement
agencies
that
are
partners
in the
287(g)
program.
However,
before
congressional
action,
ICE
should
be
directed to
take custody
of
all
aliens with
records for
felonies, crimes
of
violence,
DUIs, previous
removals, and
any
other
crime that
is
considered
a
national
security or
public safety
threat as
defined under
current laws.
•
Eliminate T and U visas.
Victimization should not be a basis for an
immigration benefit.
If an
alien who
was a
trafficking or
crime victim
is actively and
significantly cooperating with
law enforcement
as a
witness, the
S
visa
is
already
available
and
should
be
used.
Pending
elimination
of
the T
and U
visas, the
Secretary
should significantly
restrict
eligibility for each visa to
prevent fraud.
•
Issue
clear guidance
regarding
detention and bond
for aliens.
Thousands
of illegal
aliens
are allowed
to
bond out
of
immigration detention
only to disappear
into the
interior of
the United States
where many
commit crimes and many
others
disappear, never
to be
heard from
again. This
occurs
primarily
because
of
poorly
worded
bond
regulations,
contradictory
bond policy
memoranda, and poor
practices for
managing
released
aliens
and
the
Alternatives to
Detention (ATD)
Program, which
requires significant
reform.
•
Prioritize national
security in
the Student
and Exchange
Visitor Program
(SEVP).
ICE
should end
its current
cozy deference
to educational
institutions and
remove
security risks
from the
program. This
requires working
with the
Department of State
to eliminate
or
significantly reduce
the number of
visas issued
to foreign
students from
enemy nations.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Most
of
the
foregoing
can
be
accomplished
rapidly and
effectively
through exec-
utive
action
that
is
both
lawful
and
appropriate. Additionally,
ICE
should
clarify who
is responsible for
enforcing its
criminal and
civil
authorities. It should
also remove self-imposed
limitations on
its nationwide jurisdiction.
•
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Special Agents in
the 1811 series should enforce Title 8 and 18 crimes as the
biggest part of their
portfolio.
Alien smuggling, trafficking, and
cross-border crime as
defined under Title 85
and
Title 186
should be
the focus
of ICE operations.
•
The role
of ICE
Deportation
Officers should
be clarified.
ICE
Enforcement
and
Removal
Operations
(ERO)
should
be
identified
as
being primarily
responsible for
enforcing
civil
immigration
regulations,
including the
civil arrest,
detention, and
removal of
immigration
violators anywhere
in
the
United
States,
without
warrant
where
appropriate, subject
only
to
the civil
warrant
requirements of
the INA
where
appropriate.
•
All ICE memoranda identifying “sensitive zones” where ICE
personnel are prohibited from operating should be
rescinded.
Rely
on the
good judgment
of officers
in the
field to
avoid
inappropriate
situations.
•
To maximize the efficient use of its resources, ICE should
make full use of
existing Expedited Removal (ER) authorities.
The agency has
limited
the
use
of
ER
to
eligible
aliens
apprehended
within 100
miles
of
the
border. This is not a statutory requirement.
New
Policies
U.S.
national security
and
public
safety interests
would be
well-served if
ICE
were
to
be
combined with
CBP
and
USCIS, as
mentioned above.
Additionally,
ICE/
HSI,
along with
CBP, should
be
full
participants in
the
Intelligence
Community.
The
use
of
Blackies Warrants
should be
operationalized
within
ICE. These
civil
search
warrants
are
commonly
used for
worksite enforcement
when agents
have probable
cause
that illegal
aliens are
employed at
a
business.
This would
stream- line
investigations.
Safeguarding Americans will require
not just securing the border, but con- tinuous vetting and
investigations of many aliens who exploited President
Biden’s
open
border
for
potentially nefarious
purposes,
including
some
Afghan evacuees
sent directly
to the U.S. during
America’s disastrous withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Budget
•
Congress should mandate and fund additional bed space for alien
detainees.
ICE
should be
funded for
a significant increase in
detention space, raising the
daily available
number of
beds to
100,000.
•
Congress should
fund ICE
for at
least 20,000
ERO officers
and 5,000
Office of the Principal
Legal Advisor
(OPLA)
attorneys.
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES
(USCIS)
U.S.
Citizenship and
Immigration Services
(USCIS) is
the
agency
tasked with
administering
the legal
immigration and
certain
temporary visa
programs.
Needed
Reforms
Since January
2021, USCIS’s priorities have been misaligned, and this has
trans- formed
it into
an open-borders agency, ignoring
the critical
role that
it plays
in national
security,
public
safety,
and
safeguarding
the
integrity
of
our
immigration system.
USCIS
should
be
returned
to operating
as
a
screening
and
vetting
agency.
Regulatory efforts
have focused
on easing
asylum
eligibility in
a manner
that is
guaranteed to exacerbate
asylum fraud
as people
surge at
the border.
Emphasis also has been
placed on
removing legal
barriers to
immigration,
such as
the use
of
public benefits.
These
actions
violate
statutes,
erode
congressional
intent,
and provide
a significant
magnet for
continued
illegal immigration.
Additionally,
USCIS resources
have been
misappropriated to focus
more on
creating and expanding large-scale
parole and
temporary
status programs
that violate the law
and are otherwise contrary to congressional intent instead of
focus- ing
on
a
more
secure
and
efficient
process for
those
who
are
seeking
benefits.
The
ever-increasing number
of
applications
filed
has
made
it
difficult
to
vet
applica- tions
adequately for
eligibility,
fraud, and
specific
national security
and public
safety problems.
The Fraud Detection
and National
Security
Directorate (FDNS)
is currently
a small
directorate
with
assigned
officers
reporting
through
the
chain
of
command
in
the
field,
and
this
has
led
to
stovepiping, lack
of
coordination
in
national
policy,
and
inconsistencies throughout
the
agency.
To
prioritize
vetting
and
fraud
detection,
FDNS should
undergo
a
structural
shift
focused
on
direct
reporting
from
the
field to headquarters,
reclassification of leadership, and FDNS directives taking
prece- dence over
those of other component entities. Correcting the current
misalignment of
agency
priorities
and resources
should
begin
with
this
primary
shift
in
focus
to
vetting
and
fraud
detection.
These actions
would
reform
the
agency,
returning
it to
its screening
and vetting
mission in
protecting the
homeland.
Other
structural changes should include reimplementation of the USCIS
denat-
uralization
unit—an effort
to
maintain
integrity in
the
system
by
identifying
and
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
prosecuting
criminal and
civil
denaturalization cases, in
combination with the
Department of Justice, for
aliens who obtained citizenship through fraud or other
illicit
means. Additionally,
USCIS should create
a criminal enforcement
compo- nent
within the
agency to
investigate
immigration benefits fraud
under Title
8 (perhaps
requiring additional
legislative
and regulatory
authorities for the
offi- cers
themselves)
and
to
prosecute
cases
through
Special
Assistant
U.S.
Attorneys
(SAUSAs)
with
substantive
knowledge
in
the
field.
Particular
attention
should
be
given
to
addressing
increasing
incidents
of
forced
labor
trafficking
in
temporary work
visa programs.
While the Biden
regulatory agenda has focused on at least two major rules—the
credible
fear rule
and
the
public charge
rule—USCIS has
utilized other
policy and
internal
procedural
mechanisms to extend
employment authorization to
large groups of people who are in the country without
legal status. The agency has
taken
quiet
steps
to
cut
corners
and
lessen
adjudicatory
standards.
During
a
tran- sition period, a
complete audit of agency policies, memoranda, and management
directives
issued during
the
Biden
Administration
should
be
completed,
and rescis- sion
documents
should be
prepared for
issuance
within the
first few
days of
the incoming Administration.
Additionally,
regulatory
documents
should
be
drafted to
review
or
reverse
all
regulations promulgated
during
the
Biden
Administration.
New
Policies
To
advance the
national interest,
the
three
core immigration
agencies—USCIS,
ICE, and
CBP—should remerge
and
have
immigration elements
outside of
DHS
(such as ORR of HHS) included. The fragmented immigration enforcement
frame- work
that developed
in the
wake of
the Homeland
Security Act
has weakened
each
agency
and
should
be
remediated. Combining
these
critical
agencies
would strengthen
their
capabilities, ensure
cooperation,
and
promote
information-shar-
ing. Agency
responsibilities and the delineation of authorities, such as
inconsistent use
of
deferred
action and
issuance
of
NTAs
by
each
agency,
have
long
been
a
point
of
contention
that would
be
addressed
much
more
easily
if
they
were
recombined into
a single entity.
Alternatively,
new policies for USCIS as it currently exists should focus on
mat- ters
that can
be addressed through
administrative
action.
•
The
workforce
should
be
realigned
and,
as
necessary,
retrained
on
base
eligibility and
fraud detection
rather than
speed in
processing.
•
Training
should
be
returned
to
Federal
Law
Enforcement
Training
Centers
(FLETC), which
would
underscore the
enforcement
role of
USCIS as
a vetting
agency, and
be rebranded accordingly.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
•
Management
Directives and policies
should realign
to ensure
that the
workforce, while
adaptable
and
able
to
handle
the
bulk
of
the
USCIS
mission,
is not
allowed
to
be
pulled
off
mission
work
to
focus
on
unlawful
programs (DACA,
mass
parole
for
Afghans,
Ukrainians,
Venezuelans,
etc.),
which
divert
resources away
from nuclear
family and
employment programs.
The regulatory
agenda should include the immediate submission of notices of
proposed
rulemaking
for
the
Trump
Administration’s
public charge
rule (includ-
ing aspects from its original notice
of proposed rulemaking), temporary work visa reform, employment
authorization reform rules, asylum bars rule, and a
third-country
transit
rule.
At
a
minimum,
an
enhanced
regulatory
agenda
should include
rules
strengthening the
integrity
of
the
asylum
system,
parole
reform,
and U
visa
reform
that
prioritizes
relief
for
victims
of
heinous
crimes
and
ensures
that we
protect the
truest and
most deserving victims of
crime.
Not all policy
changes require formal rulemaking, however, as internal guidance
documents are generally exempt under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).7 In
this subregulatory
space, USCIS
policy
memos
and
operational
guidance
should reduce
the
validity
of
employment
authorization
documents
and
end
the
COVID flexibilities,
including
the reliance
on
biometrics
reuse.
USCIS
should
also
enforce existing
regulations by rejecting incomplete applications and petitions,
ensuring both that
they are completed before accepted for filing and that FDNS
signs off on all
approved
applications
and petitions
before
approval
notices
are sent
to
the
alien
or petitioner. Other efforts should be focused on adjudication standards
returning to
nearly 100
percent
interview requirements
for all
appropriate
cases.
The incoming
Administration should
spearhead an
immigration legislative agenda
focused
on
creating
a
merit-based
immigration
system
that
rewards
high- skilled
aliens
instead
of the
current
system
that
favors
extended
family–based
and
luck-of-the-draw
immigration. To that
end, the
diversity visa lottery
should be
repealed,
chain
migration
should
be
ended
while
focusing
on
the
nuclear
family, and
the existing employment
visa program
should be
replaced with
a system
to award visas
only to
the “best
and brightest.”
Internal
efforts to
limit employment
authorization
should
be
matched
by
con-
gressional
action to
narrow statutory
eligibility to
work in
the
United
States and
mitigate
unfair
employment competition for
U.S. citizens.
The oft-abused
H-1B program
should
be
transformed
into
an
elite
program
through
which
employers
are vying
to
bring
in
only
the
top
foreign
workers
at
the
highest
wages
so
as
not
to
depress
American
opportunities.
Additionally,
Congress
should:
•
Improve the
integrity
of the
temporary
work visa
programs;
•
Repeal
Temporary
Protected Status
(TPS)
designations;
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
Permanently
authorize and
make
mandatory E-Verify;
and
•
End
parole
abuse by
legislating
specific parole
standards.
USCIS
should make
it clear
that where
no court
jurisdiction exists, it
will not
honor court decisions that
seek to undermine regulatory and subregulatory efforts. Finally,
USCIS still requires access to all relevant national security
and law enforce- ment databases in the same vein as any other
agency in the intelligence space. This is a key concept
that should be addressed as USCIS is returned to functioning
primarily as
a vetting
agency.
Budget
USCIS
is
primarily
fee-funded, operating
on
revenue
derived by
those who
are seeking immigration benefits, work permits, and
naturalization. The total agency
budget
requested
for
fiscal
year (FY)
2023, including
both fees
and
a
small appropri-
ation,
is
slightly
less than
$6
billion.8 The
bulk
of
funds are
derived from
application
fees
through
the
Immigrant
Examinations Fee
Account. As
a
general
principle, adju-
dication
of
applications
and
petitions
should be
paid by
applicants, not
American
taxpayers.
It is
critical
that
any
changes
in
the
budget,
even in
the
wake
of
a
realigned
agency
combined
with ICE
and
CBP,
should
retain
a
fee-funded
model.
Given the Obama and Biden
Administrations’ lack of will, fees should be
increased
agencywide
to
keep
in
step
with
inflation
and
the
true
cost
of
the
adju-
dications. The
incoming
Administration should immediately
submit a
fee rule that
reflects such an
increase. Aside from
an increase
in all
fees, the
rule should
drastically limit the
availability for fee
waivers and
should
implement a
fee for asylum
applications.
Additionally,
Congress
should
allow
for
a
10
percent
across-
the-board increase
in all
fees for
all fee
rules to
account for
the fact that
new fee rules
always lag behind
budget
requirements.
USCIS
should strive
to
increase
opportunities
for
premium processing,
a
ben-
efit
by which
applicants can
expedite their
processing
times. While
this places
time
burdens
on
adjudicators,
it
provides
an
opportunity
for
a
significant
influx of
money
into
the
agency,
which is
not
currently
available.
While
simply
raising fees
to the necessary
levels to
make the
agency run
efficiently
would be
prefera- ble,
without
the
need
for
expanded
premium processing,
this
short-term
measure should
be utilized,
particularly if
longer-term fee rules
are
unsuccessful.
At
least until
USCIS is
caught up
on
all
case backlogs,
all
applicants
rejected for
any
benefit
or status
adjudication
should be
required
to
leave
the U.S.
immediately. Ordinary
process can
resume once
all case
backlogs have
been
adjudicated.
Finally,
USCIS should
pause the
intake of
applications
in a
benefit
category when
backlogs
in
that
category
become
excessive.
Once
USCIS
adjudicators
can
decrease
that caseload
to
a
manageable
number,
application
intake
should
resume.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Personnel
USCIS
should be
classified as
a national
security–sensitive
agency, and
all of its
employees should be classified as holding national
security–sensitive posi- tions. Leaks must
be investigated
and punished
as they
would be
in a
national security
agency,
and
the
union
should
be
decertified.
Any
employees
who
cannot
accept
that
change
and
cannot
conform
their
behavior
to the
standards
required by
such
an
agency
should
be
separated.
USCIS’s D.C.
personnel
presence
should be
skeletal, and
agency
employees with operational
or security
roles should
be rotated out to offices throughout the United States.
These USCIS employees should live and work in the communities
that are most affected by their daily duties and decisions.
NECESSARY
BORDER
AND
IMMIGRATION
STATUTORY,
REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES
The current border
security crisis
was made possible by
glaring loopholes
in our immigration system. The
result was a preventable and predictable his- toric increase in
illegal and
inadmissible
encounters along our
southern
border. This pulled limited resources from the front lines of
our nation’s borders and away
from their
national
security mission,
releasing a
vast and
complex set of
threats into our country. To regain our sovereignty, integrity,
and security, Congress must pass meaningful legislation to close
the current loopholes and prevent future Administrations from
exploiting them for political gain or per- sonal ideology.
Legislative
Proposals
•
Title 42 authority in Title 8.
Create an authority akin to the Title 42
Public
Health
authority
that
has
been
used
during
the
COVID-19
pandemic to
expel illegal
aliens across
the border
immediately when certain
non- health
conditions
are
met,
such
as
loss
of
operational
control
of
the
border.
•
Mandatory
appropriation for border
wall system
infrastructure.
The monies
appropriated
would
be
used
to
fund
the
construction
of
additional
border wall
systems,
technology, and
personnel in strategic
locations in accordance with the Border Security Improvement Plan (BSIP).
•
Appropriation for
Port of
Entry
infrastructure.
Border security is not addressed
solely by
systems in
between the
ports of
entry. POEs
require technology and
physical
upgrades
as
well
as
an
influx
of
personnel
to
meet
capacity
demands and
act
as
the
literal
gatekeepers
for
the
country.
This
is the
first
line
of
defense
against
drug
and
human
smuggling
operations.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
Unaccompanied
minors
1.
Congress
should repeal
Section 235
of the William
Wilberforce Trafficking
Victims
Protection
Reauthorization Act
of 2008
(TVPRA),9
which
provides numerous
immigration
benefits to
unaccompanied alien children
and
only
encourages
more
parents
to
send
their
children
across
the
border
illegally and
unaccompanied.
These
children too
often become
trafficking victims, which
means that
the TVPRA
has failed.
2.
If
an alternative to repealing
Section 235
of the TVPRA
is necessary,
the section should be
amended so
that all
unaccompanied
children, regardless
of
nationality, may
be
returned
to
their
home
countries
in
a safe
and
efficient
manner.
Currently,
the
TVPRA
allows
only
children from
contiguous
countries
(Canada and
Mexico)
to
be
returned
while every
other
unaccompanied minor
must be
placed into
a lengthy
process
that
usually
results
in
the
minor’s
landing
in
the
custody
of
an illegal
alien family member.
3.
Congress
must end
the Flores
Settlement Agreement by
explicitly setting nationwide terms and standards for family and unaccompanied
detention
and
housing.
Such standards
should
focus
on
meeting
human needs
and should
allow for
large-scale use of
temporary
facilities (for
example, tents).
4.
Congress
should amend
the
Homeland
Security
Act
and
portions
of the
TVPRA to
move detention
of alien
children
expressly from
the Department of Health
and Human
Services to
DHS.
•
Asylum
reform
1.
The
standard for
a credible
fear of persecution should
be raised
and aligned
to
the
standard
for
asylum.
It
should
also
account
specifically
for credibility
determinations that are
a key
element of
the asylum claim.
2.
Codify
former
asylum bars
and
third-country transit
rules.
3.
Congress
should
eliminate
the
particular
social
group
protected
ground
as
vague
and
overbroad
or,
in
the
alternative,
provide a
clear
definition with
parameters
that
at
a
minimum
codify
the
holding
in
Matter
of
A-B-
that
gang
violence
and
domestic
violence
are
not
grounds
for
asylum.10
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
•
Parole
reform.
Congress
should
end
the
widespread
abuse
of
parole
in
contravention of
statute and
return it
to its
origins as
an
extraordinary remedy
for very
limited
purposes.
•
NGOs and processing.
Congress should halt funds given to
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to process and transport
illegal aliens
into and
throughout the
United States.
Such funds
and infrastructure, including the
DHS joint
processing centers, should
be redirected to secure the border, detain aliens, and
provide space for immigration court proceedings.
•
Other pathways for border crossers.
While Congress should
use its oversight
authority
to
ensure
that
Expedited
Removal
is
used
to
the
fullest extent
and
followed
to the
letter
of
the
law,
other
paths
for
border
crossers should
be included
in a legislative package.
1.
Migrant protection protocols.
Update the statutory language
providing
the
basis
for
the
Remain
in
Mexico
program
as
needed
to withstand
judicial
scrutiny and
executive
inaction.
2.
Asylum Cooperative Agreements.
While the agreements themselves
must
be
negotiated,
Congress
should
mandate
that
the
executive
branch work
faithfully to
negotiate and
execute ACAs
and set
parameters
to
ensure that
an
unwilling
executive cannot
renege on
an
existing
agreement or abandon the
effort.
3.
Other expedited pathways.
Congress should explicitly permit
programs
akin to
the
Prompt
Asylum
Claim
Review
(PACR)
and
Humanitarian Asylum
Review Process
(HARP)
programs.
•
Employment
authorization
1.
Congress should
reassert control of employment authorization, which is
subject
to
rampant
regulatory
abuse, and
limit
it
to
certain
categories
of
legal immigrants and non-immigrants.
2.
Congress
should
also
permanently
authorize
E-Verify
and
make
it mandatory.
•
State and
local law
enforcement
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
1.
Congress
should
unequivocally
authorize state
and local
law enforcement to
participate
in
immigration
and
border
security
actions in
compliance with Arizona v.
United States.11
2.
Congress
should
require
compliance
with
immigration
detainers
to the
maximum
extent
consistent
with
the
Tenth
Amendment
and
set
financial
disincentives
for
jurisdictions
that
implement either
official or
unofficial sanctuary policies.
•
Prosecutorial discretion.
Congress should restrict the authority for
prosecutorial discretion
to
eliminate
it
as
a
“catch-all”
excuse
for
limiting
immigration
enforcement.
•
Mandatory detention.
Congress should eliminate ambiguous
discretionary language in
Title 8
that aliens
“may” be
detained and
clarify that
aliens “shall”
be detained.
This language,
which contrasts
with other
“shall detain”
language
in
statute,
creates
unhelpful
ambiguity
and
allows
the executive
branch to
ignore the
will of
Congress.
Regulations
•
Withdraw Biden
Administration regulations and
reissue new
regulations in the following areas:
1.
Credible Fear/Asylum
Jurisdiction
for Border
Crossers.
2.
Public
Charge.
•
T-Visa and U-Visa reform.
Unless and
until T
and U
visas are
repealed, each
program needs
to
be
reformed
to
ensure
that
only
legitimate
victims of
trafficking
and
crimes
who
are
actively
providing
significant
material
assistance to
law enforcement
are eligible
for spots
in the
queue.
•
Repeal
TPS
designations.
•
H-1B reform.
Transform the program into an elite mechanism
exclusively to
bring
in
the
“best
and
brightest”
at
the
highest
wages
while
simultaneously ensuring
that
U.S.
workers
are
not
being
disadvantaged
by the
program.
H-1B
is
a
means
only
to
supplement
the
U.S.
economy
and
to
keep
companies competitive,
not
to
depress U.S.
labor markets
artificially in
certain
industries.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
•
Employment authorization.
Along with the legislative proposal, take
regulatory action
to
limit
the
classes
of
aliens
eligible
for
work
authorization.
Executive
Orders
•
Pathways
for
border
crossers
1.
Direct
the Department
of State
and the
Department of Homeland
Security
to reinstate
Asylum
Cooperative
Agreements
with
Northern
Triangle Countries immediately.
2.
Recommence
negotiations
with
Mexico
to
fully
implement
the
Remain
in Mexico Protocols.
3.
Reinstate,
to
the
extent
possible,
expedited
pathways
with
full
credible
fear/immigration
court process
(PACR and
HARP).
4.
Prohibit
the
use
of
Notices
to
Report,
the
use
of
any
funds
for
travel
into the
interior of
the United
States, and
government flights or
transportation for aliens.
5.
Mandate
that ICE
use all
detention space
in full
compliance with
Section
235
of
the
INA,
issue
weekly
reports
on
detention
capacity,
and
provide
authority
for
low-level
temporary
capacity
(for
example,
tents) once
permanent space is full.
6.
Eliminate
the
use
of
ATD
for
border
crossers
except
in
rare
cases
and
only with
the explicit
authority of
the Secretary.
7.
Prohibit
the use of parole
except in
matters that
are certified
by the
Secretary
of
Homeland
Security
as
requiring
action
for
humanitarian
or significant
public benefit
reasons, and
prohibit the
use of
parole in
any categorical
circumstance.
•
Enforcement
1.
Restrict
prosecutorial
discretion
to
eliminate
it
as
a
“catch-all”
excuse
for limiting immigration enforcement.
2.
Mandate
the
use
of
E-Verify
for
anyone
doing
business
with
the government.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
3.
Designate
USCIS
as
Intelligence
Community–adjacent,
ensuring
that
it
has access
to national
security and
law enforcement
databases.
4.
Rescind
all
memoranda
limiting
enforcement
of
immigration
laws
including those identifying sensitive zones.
5.
End
ICE’s
widespread
use
of
termination
and
administrative
closure
of
cases in immigration court.
•
Averting
or
curtailing
a
mass
migration
event
1.
Provide
that whenever
the Secretary
of Homeland
Security
determines that an
actual or
anticipated mass migration
of aliens
en route
to or
arriving off
the
coast
of
the
U.S.
presents
urgent
circumstances
requiring an
immediate
federal response,
the Secretary
may make,
subject to
the approval
of
the
President,
rules and
regulations
prohibiting
in
whole
or in
part the
introduction of persons
from such
countries or
places as
he or she shall designate
in order
to avert
or curtail
such mass
migration and for such
period of
time as
is deemed
necessary, including through the
expulsion of
such aliens. Such
rule and
regulation making shall
not be subject
to the
requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act.
2.
Provide
that
notwithstanding
any
other
provision
of
law,
when
the Secretary
makes
such
a
determination
and
then
promulgates,
subject
to the
approval
of
the
President,
such
rules
and
regulations,
the
Secretary
shall have
the authority to waive
all legal
requirements of Title
8 that the
Secretary, in his
or her
sole
discretion, determines are necessary
to avert or curtail the mass migration.
Subregulatory
Matters
•
USCIS
priorities/structural
changes
1.
Ensure
that
focus
is
returned
to
vetting,
base
eligibility
of
applicants,
and fraud detection.
2.
Realign
the Fraud
Detection and
National
Security Directorate
(FDNS) to
ensure
agencywide
consistency
on
implementation
of
fraud
detection and
vetting policies.
3.
Review
and
repeal
any
internal
agency
memo
that
is
inconsistent
with
the priorities described in this chapter.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
•
287(g) program.
Issue
a memo
prohibiting
any jurisdiction
that applies
from being denied access
to the
program unless
good cause
is shown.
•
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities.
Issue Department
Management
Directive (and ICE
companion Directive) to
refocus HSI
on
immigration offenses
and
criminal
offenses typically
associated with
immigration
(for
example,
human trafficking).
All
criminal
investigative work
without
a
clear
nexus to
the
border
or
otherwise
to
Title
8
should
be turned
over to
the appropriate
federal agency.
•
Blackie’s Warrants.
ICE
OPLA, ERO,
and HSI
should issue
a joint
internal memo on operationalizing
Blackie’s Warrants for
immediate use on
worksite
enforcement
and
other
appropriate
investigations
and
operations.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
(FEMA)
Needed
Reforms
FEMA
is
the
lead federal
agency in
preparing for
and
responding
to
disasters, but
it
is
overtasked, overcompensates
for
the
lack of
state and
local preparedness
and
response,
and
is
regularly in
deep debt.
After passage
of
the
1988 Stafford
Act,12 the
number
of
declared
federal disasters
rose dramatically
as
most
disaster costs
were shifted from states and local
governments to the federal government. In
addition,
state-friendly
FEMA
regulations,
such
as
a
“per
capita
indicator,”
failed to
maintain the
pace of
inflation and
made it
easy to
meet disaster
declaration thresholds.
This
combination has left
FEMA
unprepared in
both readiness and funding for the truly
catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed.
Reform of
FEMA requires
a greater
emphasis on
federalism and
state and
local preparedness, leaving
FEMA
to
focus
on
large,
widespread
disasters.
Under
the Stafford
Act, FEMA
has the
authority to adjust
the per
capita indi-
cator
for
damages,
which
creates
a
threshold
under
which
states
and
localities
are
not eligible for public
assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per
capita
indicator
has
not
kept
pace
with
inflation,
and
this
over
time
has
effectively
lowered the
threshold for public
assistance and caused
FEMA’s
resources to
be stretched
perilously
thin.
Alternatively,
applying
a
deductible
could
accomplish a
similar
outcome
while also
incentivizing
states
to
take
a
more
proactive
role
in their
own
preparedness and
response
capabilities.
In
addition,
Congress
should change
the
cost-share
arrangement
so
that
the
federal
government
covers
25
per- cent
of
the
costs
for
small
disasters
with the
cost
share
reaching
a
maximum
of
75 percent for
truly catastrophic disasters.
FEMA is also
responsible for the
National Flood
Insurance
Program (NFIP), nearly
all of
which is
issued by
the federal
government.
Washington provides
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
insurance
at
prices
lower than
the
actuarially
fair rate,
thereby subsidizing
flood insurance.
Then, when
flood costs
exceed NFIP’s
revenue, FEMA
seeks taxpay-
er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in
2017, Congress canceled $16 billion
in debt
when FEMA
reached its
borrowing
authority limit. These subsidies
and bailouts
only encourage
more
development in
flood zones,
increasing the potential
losses to
both NFIP
and the
taxpayer. The
NFIP should
be wound down and replaced
with private insurance starting with the least risky
areas currently identified by the program.
Budget
Issues
FEMA manages all
grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states,
localities, and
special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided
more
than
$56
billion
in
preparedness
grants
for
state,
local,
tribal,
and
territorial
governments.
For
FY
2023,
President
Biden requested
more
than
$3.5
billion
for
federal
assistance
grants.13 Funds
provided
under these
programs do
not
provide
measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more
than any objective needs,
political
interests appear to
direct the
flow of
nondisaster
funds.
The principles
of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states
better understand
their unique
needs and
should bear
the costs
of their
particularized
programs.
FEMA
employees
in
Washington,
D.C.,
should
not
determine
how
bil-
lions
of
federal
tax
dollars
should
be
awarded
to
train
local
law
enforcement officers in Texas,
harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement
migrant shelters
in Arizona.
DHS
should
not
be
in
the
business
of
handing
out
federal
tax dollars:
These grants
should be
terminated. Accomplishing this,
however, will
require action
by Members
of Congress
who repeatedly
vote to
fund grants
for political reasons. The
transition should focus
on building
resilience and return on
investment in line with real threats.
Personnel
FEMA currently
has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator
should
be confirmed by the
Senate; other
political
leadership need not
be con-
firmed by
the
Senate.
Additionally,
FEMA’s
“springing
Cabinet
position”
should
be
eliminated, as
this
creates
significant
unnecessary
challenges
to
the
functioning
of the
whole
of
DHS
at
points
in
time
when
coordinated
responses
are
most
needed.
CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
(CISA)
Needed
Reforms
CISA
is supposed
to have
two key
roles: (1)
protection of
the federal
civilian government
networks
(.gov)
while
coordinating
the
execution
of
national
cyber defense
and sharing
information with non-federal
and
private-sector
partners
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
and (2)
national coordination of critical infrastructure security and
resilience. Yet
CISA has
rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong,
the most recent
and most
glaring
example being
censorship of so-called
misinformation and disinformation.
CISA’s
funding and
resources
should align
narrowly with
the foregoing
two mission
requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chem-
ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be
moved to FEMA; its school security functions should be
transferred to state homeland security offices;
and CISA
should refrain
from
duplicating cybersecurity
functions done
elsewhere at the Department
of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S.
Secret Service.
Of
the
utmost
urgency is
immediately ending
CISA’s
counter-mis/disinforma- tion
efforts. The
federal
government cannot be
the arbiter
of truth.
CISA began
this
work because
of
alleged
Russian
misinformation
in
the
2016
election,
which
in fact turned out to be a
Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Commu-
nity,
including
the
NSA
or
DOD,
should
counter
foreign
actors.
At
the
time
of
this writing,
release
of the
Twitter
Files
has
demonstrated
that
CISA
has
devolved
into
an
unconstitutional censoring
and
election
engineering
apparatus
of
the
political Left.
In any
event, the
entirety of
the CISA
Cybersecurity
Advisory Committee
should be
dismissed on Day
One.
For election security,
CISA should
help states
and localities
assess whether
they
have good
cyber
hygiene
in
their
hardware
and
software
in
preparation
for
an
election—but nothing
more.
This
is
of
value
to
smaller
localities,
particularly
by flagging
who
is
attacking
their websites.
CISA
should
not
be
significantly
involved closer
to an
election. Nor
should it
participate in
messaging or
propaganda.
U.S.
COAST GUARD
(USCG)
Needed
Reforms
The
U.S. Coast
Guard fleet
should be
sized to
the
needs
of
great-power
compe- tition,
specifically focusing efforts
and investment
on protecting
U.S. waters,
all while seeking to
find (where
feasible) more
economical ways
to perform
USCG missions.
The
scope
of
the
Coast
Guard’s
mission
needs
to
be
focused
on
protecting
U.S. resources
and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive
Economic Zone
(200
miles
from shore).
USCG’s budget
should address
the
growing
demand for it
to
address
the
increasing
threat from
the
Chinese
fishing fleet
in
home
waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing
this will
require reversing
years of
shortfalls in
shipbuilding,
maintenance,
and
upgrades
of
shore
facilities as
well as
seeking more
cost-effective
ship
and
facility
designs.
In
wartime,
the
USCG
supports the
Navy, but
it
has
limited capability
and capacity
to support
wartime
missions outside
home waters.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
New
Policies
The Coast Guard’s
mission set
should be
scaled down
to match
congressio- nal
budgeting
in
the
long
term,
with
any
increased
funding
going
to
acquisitions based
on
an
updated
Fleet
Mix
Analysis.
The current
shipbuilding
plan
is
insuf- ficient
based
on
USCG
analysis,
and the
necessary
numbers
of
planned
Offshore Patrol
Cutters
and National
Security
Cutters
are
not
supported
by
congressional
budgets.
The
Coast
Guard
should
be
required
to
submit
to
Congress
a
long-range
shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding
Plan. Ideally this should
become part
of the
Navy plan
in a
new
comprehensive naval long-range
shipbuilding plan
to ensure
better
coherency in
the services’
requirements.
Outside
of
home
waters, and
following the
Caribbean and
Eastern Pacific,
the Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the
nation’s expansive Pacific
waters to
counter growing
Chinese
influence and
encroachment.
Expansion of
facilities in
American Samoa
and basing
of cutters
there is
one clear step
in this
direction and
should
be
accelerated;
looking
to
free
association
states
(Palau,
the Federated
States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands)
for enhanced
and persistent
presence,
assuming
adequate
congressional
funding,
is another such
step.
The Secretary of
the Navy
should convene
a naval
board to
review and
reset requirements for
Coast
Guard
wartime
mission
support.
To
inform
and
validate these
updated
requirements, the
Chief
of
Naval
Operations
and
the
Coast
Guard
Commandant should
execute
dedicated annual
joint wartime
drills focused
on USCG’s
wartime
missions
in the
Pacific
(the
money
for
these
activities
should
be allocated
from DOD).
An interagency
maritime
coordination office
focused on
developing
and
overseeing
comprehensive
efforts
to
advance
the
nation’s
mari- time
interests and
increase its
military and
commercial
competitiveness should be established.
Given
the
USCG’s
history of
underfunded missions,
if
the
Coast Guard
is
to
con-
tinue
to
maintain
the
Arctic
mission, money
to
do
so
adequately
will be
required
over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to
shifting the Arctic mission
to the
Navy. Either
way, the
Arctic mission
should be
closely coordinated
with our
Canadian, Danish, and
other allies.
Personnel
USCG
is facing
recruitment challenges similar
to those
faced by
the military
services.
The Administration
should
stop
the
messaging
on
wokeness
and
diversity
and focus
instead
on
attracting
the
best
talent
for
USCG.
Simultaneously,
consis- tent
with
the
Department
of Defense,
USCG
should
also
make
a
serious
effort
to re-vet
any promotions
and hiring
that occurred
on the
Biden
Administration’s watch while
also
re-onboarding
any
USCG
personnel
who
were
dismissed
from service
for
refusing
to take
the
COVID-19
“vaccine,”
with
time
in
service
credited
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
to
such
returnees. These
two
steps
could be
foundational for
any
improvements in the
recruiting process.
U.S.
SECRET SERVICE
(USSS)
Needed
Reforms
The
U.S. Secret
Service must
be
the
world’s best
protective agency.
Currently, the
agency is
distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial
investigations. The
result has
been a
long series
of
high-profile
embarrassments
and
security fail-
ures, perhaps
most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala
Harris
to
be
inside the
Democratic National
Committee office
on
January
6,
2021,
while a pipe
bomb was
outside. Despite
the
great
size and
scope of
the
January
6
inves-
tigation,
this
high-profile incident of
danger to
a protectee
remains
unresolved.
The failures of
the USSS
protective mission are
too numerous
to list
here. A
December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight
Committee listed dozens
of such incidents
as well
as needed
recommendations for reform.14 This chapter adopts those
findings and recommendations in whole, especially the
finding
that
USSS’s
dual-mission structure
detracts
from
the
agency’s
protective
capabilities.
At the time of
that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work
hours on
protection-related
activities as opposed
to
investigative
activities. USSS was
established initially to
investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved
over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For
example, as this chap-
ter
was
being
written,
all 15
of
the
USSS’s
most
wanted
individuals
were
wanted for
financial
crimes, many
of them international
in nature.
Notably,
the
last
head of
the
agency
left not
for
a
protection-related
job,
but
to
be
the
Chief Security
Officer of
social media
company SnapChat.
This is
a
pattern
that has developed over the years, with agents seeking to
burnish their online financial
crimes
credentials to secure
corporate security jobs.
Coupled with
some of
the lowest morale in
the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of
the primacy of its protective mission.
New
Policies
USSS should transfer to the
Department of Justice and Department of the
Treasury
all
investigations
that
are
not
related
to
its
protective
function.
It
should
begin the
logistical
operation
of
closing
all
field
offices
throughout
the
country
and
internationally to
the
extent
they
are
not
taken
over
by
Treasury
or
Justice.
USSS agents
stationed
outside of
Washington, D.C., should
be transferred
to work
in Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement
field
offices
where
they
would
continue
to
be
the
“boots
on
the
ground”
to follow
up
on
threat
reports
throughout
the
country and
liaise with
local law
enforcement for
visits by
protectees.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
The only investigations
not related
to USSS’s
protective function that
agents should
pursue
would
be
directed
by
HSI
and
relate
to
tracking
the
financial
crimes
associated
with
illegal
immigration.
This
should
include
tracing
remittances,
any
funds
that
are
used
to
pay
coyotes
or the
cartels,
and
payments
by
businesses
to illegal
aliens and
all other
crimes
associated with
illegal
immigration.
USSS should keep
visitor logs
for all
facilities
where the
President works
or resides.
The Biden
Administration
has
evaded
such
transparency
with
President
Biden spending
a
historic
amount
of
time
for
a
President
at
his
Delaware
residence.
This has
left
the
American
people
in
the
dark
as
to
who
is
influencing
the
highest levels
of their own government.
Budget
The suggested reforms
would result
in a
significant
USSS budget
reduction, primarily because the agency would relinquish dozens of physical offices
through- out
the
U.S.
and
internationally.
Some
amount
of
savings
should
be
used
to
fix
the
personnel
problems
and
for
recruitment
initiatives
aimed
at
individuals
who
are inclined to
join a protection-focused agency.
Personnel
As documented
extensively in the above-referenced 2015 bipartisan congressio-
nal
report,
low
morale
and
high
turnover are
key
drivers
of
USSS
problems. With
their
mission
focused on
protection,
agents would
no longer
spend the
bulk of their
time developing unrelated
skillsets. Instead, USSS
agents could
hone their
protection skills and
pursue a
protection career path
in the
agency rather
than quickly leaving USSS
for
high-paying corporate security jobs.
The Uniform Division
(UD) of
USSS requires
a significant
staffing
increase. As
documented in
the bipartisan report, understaffing
results in
unpredictable and
long hours,
which in
turn result
in high
turnover, which only
compounds the problem.
Another
key issue
is that
UD officers
lack the
ability to
enforce
criminal laws outside
the immediate vicinity of
the White
House. As
the District of
Columbia is
a
federal
jurisdiction
and
currently
is
beholden
to
the
trend
of
progressive
pro- crime
policies, UD officers
should enforce
all applicable laws. The
result would
be to
allow UD
officers to
gain more
law enforcement experience—an
attractive credential that would improve morale.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
(TSA)
The TSA model
is costly
and unwisely
makes TSA
both the
regulator and
the regulated organization
responsible
for
screening
operations.
As
part
of
an
effort to
shrink federal
bureaucracies
and bring
private-sector know-how to
govern- ment
programs,
TSA
is
ripe
for
reform.
The
U.S.
should
look
to
the
Canadian
and
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
European
private models
of
providing
aviation screening
manpower to
lower TSA
costs
while
maintaining security.
Until it
is
privatized,
TSA
should
be
treated
as
a
national
security provider,
and
its
workforce should
be
deunionized
immediately.
TSA
could
privatize the
screening function
by
expanding
the
current
Screening Partnership
Program
(SPP) to
all
airports.
TSA
would
turn screening
operations
over
to
airports
that would
choose security
contractors that
meet TSA
regulations
and
would
oversee
and
test
airports for
compliance. Alternatively,
it
could
adopt
a
Canadian-style
system, turning
over screening
operations to
a
new
government corporation
that contracts
screening service to
private
contractors.
Contractors would
bid
to
provide
their
services
to a
set
of
airports
in
a
particular
region,
likely with
around
10
regions
nationally. TSA
would
continue
to
set
security
regulations
and test
airports
for
compliance,
and
the
new
corporation
would
establish
any
oper-
ating
procedures
or customer
service
standards.
With
either
model,
the
intelligence
function
for
domestic
travel patterns
should remain
with the
U.S. government.
The
federal government
could expect
to
save
15
percent–20
percent from
the
existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly
larger. Service to travelers
should also improve.
MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORATE
(MGMT)
The
Management Directorate is
unnecessarily large because
each individual
component also
maintains
its
own
respective
management
office.
Too
much
over- lap
and red
tape exist
between
headquarters (HQ)
and components
with regard to
such functions as
hiring,
information
technology, and
procurement.
Finance is
unique
given
that
HQ
needs
to
address
reprogramming,
and
component
bud- gets
need
to
roll
up
into
all-department budgets.
The
Directorate
requires
intense
reform, the
specifics
of
which
should
be
further
assessed
given
its
expansive
nature.
Front Office (FO).
Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep
understanding of
operational management—but who
have some
experience in government
because
they
will
need
to
understand
the
nuance
of
Reduction
in
Force (RIF),
appropriations hurdles
when
dealing
with
U.S.
government
reorganization,
etc.—to
sit
in
the
MGMT
FO
(reporting
to the
Secretary,
ultimately
either
S1
or
S2).
One
of
these
advisers
should understand
U.S.
government
employment
law
and
be
prepared
to relocate
personnel
and
downsize
offices
accordingly.
This
includes
reverting
to
the
original
understanding
of
the
function
of
individuals
appointed to
the
Senior
Executive
Service:
competent
managers
who
can
work
capably
with
any
subject
matter and
in
any
location.
Over
the
first
few
months
of
the
Administration,
the
advisers’ role
should be to
assess what
structural and
procedural changes
are
appropriate.
They should dissect
the
current
standing Management
Directives and
the
approval
processes in
place to
implement
and/or change
them; Office
of the Chief Human
Capital Officer’s processes and
procedures; hurdles to
the Office
of Chief
Procurement
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Officer’s
procurement of
innovative technology;
and
the
facilities plan,
including
the
consolidation
into the
St.
Elizabeth’s
campus. They
should also
be
prepared
to
help
implement any
end
to
unionization of
DHS
components
in
response
to
an
executive
order pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15
Office
of
the
Chief
Financial Officer
(OCFO).
DHS
responsibilities
to
work
with
Congress
have
been
split between
the
Office
of
Legislative
Affairs (OLA)
and
OCFO.
OLA
deals with
the
authorizing
committees on
policy issues,
and
OCFO
works with the
appropriations
committees
on budget
planning,
execution,
and
reprogramming.
This
split creates
communication and visibility
issues within
DHS and
inconsistency
in answers to
Congress.
This
is
an
issue
not only
within
the
HQ
model,
but
also
through-
out the
components.
Either appropriations
personnel
should
be
moved
to
OLA
and
there
should
be a
“dotted
line”
reporting
structure to
OCFO,
or
a
policy
that
OLA per-
sonnel
must be
included
on
communications
to
Congress
should
be
implemented.
To
avoid “answer
shopping” by
congressional
staff,
particularly appropriations
staff,
all
budget
communications
from
the
OCFO,
including from
the
CFO
him/ herself,
should
first be
provided to
the
Director
of
OLA
to
ensure
consistency of
information,
messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that
the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary
to avoid inaccuracies and
inconsistencies in messaging.
Federal Protective
Service (FPS).
FPS
needs federal
agents to
develop, share,
and
receive
operational
information
and
maintain
direct
contact
with
the
Secretary
in the
midst
of
heightened
threats.
Before
the
summer
2020
civil
unrest,
position-
ing FPS
under
MGMT
was
justified,
but
given
the
current
climate,
they
should
not be
reporting
through
MGMT.
This
may
be
especially
problematic
if
a
Management
Directorate
Under
Secretary
lacking
law
enforcement
or
military
experience
is
in
place
when
a
situation
like summer
2020
arises.
FPS
should
report
to
the
Secretary
as
other
components
(e.g.,
FLETC)
do.
This
would
add
little
to
the
Secretary’s
current
burden
unless
or
until
civil
unrest
arises,
at which
point
reporting
to
the
Secretary
creates
a direct
line
between
the primary
DHS
decision-maker
(S1
or
S2)
and
the
FPS
Director.
Regarding operational communication, there should be
information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which
are
applicable
under
specific
circumstances
where
fed- eral facilities
are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park
Police, and
FBI.
Agreements
with
U.S.
Capitol
Police
and
Supreme
Court
Police
should also
be
considered, but
it
is
noteworthy
that
those
entities
are
jurisdictionally
out-
side
of
the
executive branch.
OFFICE
OF
STRATEGY,
POLICY,
AND
PLANS
(PLCY)
Department-Level Reforms.
PLCY should perform a complete inventory,
analysis,
and
reevaluation
of
the
department’s
domestic
terrorism
lines
of
effort to
ensure that
they are
consistent
with the
President’s priorities,
congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional
rights.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
PLCY
should likewise
do
a
complete inventory,
analysis, and
evaluation of
any
of
the
department’s
work, in
coordination with
social media
outlets, to
censor or
otherwise
change or
affect
Americans’ speech. PLCY
should
comprehensively report
on and
publish this
history in
full so
that the
American
people can
know the
facts.
The
department
should remove
all
personnel
who
participated
in
any of this
activity.
The
department has
significant authority
and
budget
to
provide
grants for
var-
ious
purposes.
This effort
is
diffused
across components
and
lacks
central policy thought
and
coordination.
PLCY should
set
a
departmentwide
policy
that estab- lishes
how
granting
choices are
to
be
made and
is
consistent
with the
President’s priorities.
PLCY should
clear all
granting
decisions to ensure
that they
are con-
sistent with the new policy.
PLCY-Wide Reforms. PLCY
should work with Congress to streamline the department’s reporting
requirements. Because
there has
not been
a departmen-
tal
reauthorization
bill
and
these
requirements
have
been
added
piecemeal
over
two
decades,
they significantly
overlap
and
even
conflict—wasting
resources
and
distracting from
the
department’s
mission.
PLCY
should
seek
the
elimination
of the
Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review.
Issue-Area
Reforms.
PLCY should bolster
its
Immigration
Statistics program and
make
it
the
one-stop
shop
for
the
timely
production
of
all
department
immi- gration
statistics and analysis.
OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS
(I&A)
The Office of Intelligence and
Analysis should be eliminated both because it has not
added value
and because
it has been weaponized
for domestic
politi- cal purposes.
The Intelligence
Community (IC)
already
provides raw
intelligence
to DHS
components. In
addition,
the
FBI,
National
Counter
Terrorism
Center,
and
other agencies
where
necessary
already provide
holistic
threat
assessment
products
to
federal, state, local,
tribal, and territorial governments as well as to private-sector
entities at
both
the
classified
and unclassified
levels
where
appropriate.
I&A’s work
as
an
interlocuter between
the
IC
and
DHS
components’
individual
intelligence
operations
on
the
one
hand
and
government
and the
private
sector
on
the
other, as
well
as
between
the
IC
and
the
components, is
at
best
duplicative.
At
worst,
it
is
used
and
discussed
in the
media
as
a
political
tool,
resulting
in
more
harm
than good
to the
U.S. government
and IC
writ large.
The
Cybersecurity
and
Infrastructure
Security
Agency, which
is
not
a
member
of
the
IC,
should create
cyber intelligence
products in
a
collaborative
fashion with the
National Security
Agency and
U.S. Cyber
Command. Such
efforts would
lead
to timelier usable classified and unclassified products for stakeholders
that exceed the quality and
capability of I&A’s
efforts. This
same principle applies to
other
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
components
as
well:
CBP, TSA,
etc. all
have their
own
intelligence
operations and are
better situated
with their
subject-matter
experts
to
make
their own
assessments. The
National
Operations Center
(NOC) within
the Office
of Operations
Coor- dination
(OPS)
should
absorb
those
select
I&A
functions
and
tactically
proficient
personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical
support to the National
Vetting
Center). The
remainder of
I&A should
be eliminated.
The OPS
entity should
maintain
IC
status,
and
the
only
intelligence
mission
set
should
be
to
provide
situational
awareness
and
the
dissemination
of
operational
information
or raw
intelligence
(no
analysis
or
products)
at
classified
and
unclassified
levels
to
executive
leadership
across the
department, not
outside of
DHS.
OFFICE
OF THE
GENERAL
COUNSEL (OGC)
Needed
Reforms
OGC
should advise
principals as
to
how
DHS
can
execute its
missions within the
law
instead
of
advising
principals as
to
why
they cannot
execute regulations,
policies, and programs.
Instead
of
each
component’s chief
counsel reporting
to
the
Headquarters Gen- eral
Counsel (with
a
solid
line) and
indirectly to
his
or
her
component
head (with a
dotted line),
the
accountability
should be
reversed. Due
to
the
different missions
throughout
the department, the components
can better
manage the
legal issues
of
their specific
mission
than
headquarters
can.
Thus,
the
chief
counsel
(or
equiv- alent)
of each
component
should report
directly to
the component head, report
indirectly
to the
DHS
General
Counsel,
and
be
accountable
to
the
component
head.
The
report
to
the
General
Counsel
is
to
ensure
consistency of
advice
across
DHS. OGC should
hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in
turn
supervise
career staff
and
manage
their
output.
DHS’s
mission
is
politically charged,
and
the
legal
function
cannot be
allowed
to
thwart
the
Administration’s
agenda
by
providing
stilted or
erroneous legal
positions and
decision-making.
OGC
should serve
as
the
center of
the
response
to
the
legal challenges
facing the department
to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of
issues facing the department.
It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal
positions taken by the
department, including those arising in litigation, congressio-
nal oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector
General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and
Congressional Research Service and pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act.
OGC should invest
in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage
the
department’s
e-discovery. This would
be beneficial
both in
litigation and in
responding
to congressional
oversight.
Removing delays
in
e-discovery
processing would
also
reduce
the
issuance
of
subpoenas
to
the
department
and the
generation of negative press
for the
Administration that comes
from delayed
responses.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
The
old
practice
of
relying
on
Executive
Secretary taskings
to
pull
documents for
congressional
requests does
not
work:
It
is
slow, the
metrics for
what documents are
gathered and
how
are
unclear, and
the
components
do
not
gather responsive
material
in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the
Office of
the Chief
Information Officer or
a relevant
technological element within
the department that can
pull responsive
communications quickly.
OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA); OFFICE
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA); AND OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIP AND
ENGAGEMENT (OPE)
DHS’s
external
communications
function
should be
consolidated and
reformed
so
that the
President’s agenda
can
be
implemented more
effectively. The
Office of
Partnership
and
Engagement
should be
merged into
the
Office
of
Public
Affairs. In
many Cabinet
agencies, outreach to
companies and partner
organizations is similarly
performed
by
the
Office
of
Public
Affairs.
This
would
also
accomplish
a
needed
DHS
organizational and
management
reform
to
decrease
the
number
of direct
reports to the Secretary.
Both
public
and
legislative
affairs staff
in
the
components should
report directly to
their respective
headquarters equivalent.
This would
help to
avoid a
failure by the
department to
speak with
one
voice.
It
would
also allow
the
component
staff to
perform
more efficiently,
overseen by
expert managers
in
their
trade. This
would also
allow DHS
to respond
to crises
effectively by shifting
staff as
needed to
the most
pressing
issues
and
better
use
underutilized
staff
at
less
active
components.
Only
political appointees
in
OLA
should interact
directly with
congressional
staff on
all inquiries, including budget and appropriations matters. To
prevent congres-
sional staff from
answer shopping among HQ OLA, the DHS OCFO, and components,
DHS
legislative
affairs appropriations
staff should
be
moved
from MGMT
OCFO into OLA.
Regarding components,
budget/appropriations
staff
should move
from
component
budget
offices
into
component
legislative affairs
offices.
Because dozens
of congressional committees and subcommittees either have or
claim
to
have jurisdiction
over some
DHS
function,
DHS
staff
from the
Secretary on
down spend
so much
time
responding to
congressional
hearing and
briefing requests, letters, and questions for the record
that they are left with little time to
do their
assigned job
of protecting the
homeland. The
next President
should reach an
agreement with congressional leadership to limit committee
jurisdiction to
one
authorizing committee and one
appropriations committee in
each cham-
ber.
If congressional
leadership
will
not
limit
their
committees’
jurisdiction
over
DHS,
DHS
should
identify
one authorizing
and
appropriations
committee
in
each chamber
and answer only to it.
To focus more
precisely on
the DHS mission,
OLA staff
should also
identify outdated
and
needless
congressional
reporting
requirements
and
notify
Congress
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
that DHS will
cease reporting
on such
matters. For
other
congressional reports, OLA
should
implement
a
sunset
date
so that
Congress
must
regularly
demonstrate the need for specific data.
In
both OPA
and
OLA,
a
change
in
mission
and
culture
is
needed.
The
clients
of
both components
are
the
President and
the
Secretary,
not
the
media, external
organizations,
or Congress. OPA and OLA should change from being compliance
correspondents for outside entities airing grievances to serving
as messengers and advocates
for the President and the Secretary.
OFFICE
OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION
(OPS)
OPS
was
originally
conceived by
then-Secretary
Jeh
Johnson as
an
entity
tasked with coordinating cross-DHS assets on an as-needed
basis using a joint operations
approach. This role is particularly challenging because of the disparate
nature of mission sets across
DHS.
OPS
should
absorb
a
very
small number
of
tactical
intelligence professionals
from I&A as
the
rest
of
I&A
is
shut
down. Such
intelligence officers
would be
a
subordinate
element
within OPS
placed within
the
National
Operations Center.
The
intelligence
officers
would provide
tactical intelligence
support for
upcoming or
ongoing opera- tions
in
addition
to
liaising
with their
agency/component
counterparts.
There would
be
no
strategic intelligence
analysis done
as
part
of
OPS
or
its
new
I&A
sub-element.
In
addition
to
facilitating
all-of-DHS coordination
on
a
task-by-task basis,
OPS would
be responsible
for ongoing
situational awareness for
the Secretary
and
Deputy
Secretary.
In
addition to
long-term staffing,
OPS
would
have cycling
billets from
each of
the
major agencies
and components
to facilitate
its most
effective
working rela-
tionships across DHS.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (CRCL) AND PRIVACY
OFFICE (PRIV)
The
Homeland
Security Act
established only
an
Officer
of
CRCL,
not
an
office.
The
only substantive
function Congress
then assigned
to
the
officer was
to
review
and
assess
information alleging abuses
of civil
rights. Since
then, Congress
and CRCL itself
have
significantly
expanded CRCL’s
scope and
size well
beyond its
original
intent
or
helpful
purpose.
CRCL
now
operates
and
views
itself
as
a
quasi- DHS
Office of
Inspector
General. This
results in
a considerable waste of
limited component resources, which
are routinely
tasked to
address
redundant, overly
burdensome, and
uninformed
demands
from
CRCL.
It
is
therefore
important
to recalibrate
CRCL’s scope and reach.
The organizational
structure of
both CRCL
and the
Privacy Office
should be
changed
to
ensure
proper
alignment
with the
department’s
mission.
The
Office
of
General
Counsel should
absorb
both
CRCL’s
and
PRIV’s
necessary
functions
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
and staff.
Although the CRCL Officer and the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)
Officer/Privacy
Officer are
statutory, their
offices are
not
mandatory.
CRCL and
PRIV
Officers and
employees
should report
to a
Deputy General
Counsel, who
would be a political appointee.
The CRCL Officer should focus on
equal employment opportunity (EEO) compliance and the
civil
liberties function
and
investigate matters
only within
Headquarters or support
components. Operational components’ civil liberties offi-
cers
should
investigate
incidents
regarding
their
own
agencies.
The
CRCL
Officer should
ensure
that
all
civil
liberties
or civil
rights
complaints
are
sent
to
the
Office of
Inspector General (OIG)
for review.
If the
OIG chooses
not to
investigate, the CRCL Officer should only
provide supportive information on possible courses of
action for complainants.
The
PRIV
Officer
and
FOIA
Officer should
focus on
FOIA, Privacy
Compliance
Policy,
and
Privacy
Incident Response.
The
Deputy
General Counsel
should provide
guidance to DHS
leadership regarding Privacy Compliance and Privacy Incident
Response. To
ensure that
only U.S.
persons and
Lawful Permanent
Residents are
provided
protections as
required by
the
Privacy
Act, all
DHS
issuances
should be
updated
to
reflect
that DHS
protects the
privacy of
individuals as
required by
the Privacy Act
(U.S. persons
and
lawful
permanent residents);16 the
Judicial
Redress
Act
of
2015;17 and
any
U.S.–European
Union Data
Protection and
Privacy Agreement.
Because of the lack of public
trust in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
CRCL
and
PRIV
staff should
no
longer
review intelligence
products or
provide guidance
on any
intelligence products or
reports.
A consistent, clear, and singular
message is necessary for DHS’s mission. Therefore,
all
communications and/or
meetings with
any federal,
state, local,
or nongovernment
groups should be limited to the Deputy General Counsel. In addi-
tion, given the narrower scope of work, OGC should disband the
outside advisory
boards
and
the
more
than
50
working
groups
in
which
CRCL
and
PRIV
currently participate.
Finally,
CRCL and
PRIV
should
no
longer
issue
bulletins
or
periodicals.
OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION OMBUDSMAN
(OIDO) AND OFFICE OF THE CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES OMBUDSMAN (CISOMB)
OIDO.
The
Office of
the Immigration Detention
Ombudsman
should
be
eliminated.
This requires
a statutory
change in
Section 106
of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2020.18
OIDO was designed
to create
another
impediment to
detention
through an
additional layer of so-called
oversight. Several agencies already perform detention
oversight.
ICE
conducts
internal
audits
of
facilities
and
investigates
complaints
against ICE
agents
through
the
Office
of
Professional
Responsibility.
Similarly,
CBP
accepts
individual
complaints
regarding
facilities
through
the
Joint
Intake
Center
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
and
manages complaints
against agents
through the
OPR. In
addition, CRCL,
OIG,
GAO,
and
Congress
all
perform
detention oversight.
These multiple
bodies place
unmanageable
and
unreasonable
burdens on
ICE
to
manage several
sometimes inconsistent
audits/inspections at the same time.
If
OIDO remains
a DHS
component, the Secretary
should
immediately issue
a direc-
tive
stripping CRCL
of
its
immigration portfolio.
OIDO is
in
a
better position
with
dedicated
resources
and
immigration
experts to
perform this
function than
CRCL is.
Allowing
both offices
to
conduct
detention oversight
is
duplicative
and
wasteful.
The
Secretary should
conduct a
thorough review
of
the
effectiveness
of
Direc-
tive
0810.1,19 which
is
widely
interpreted as
requiring a
wholesale referral
of
cases
to
OIG.
In
reality,
OIG
investigates
only a
small fraction
of
them
and
often
sits on cases
for
longer
than the
five-day window
specified in
the
directive.
Meanwhile, the
other agencies
wait in
limbo to
execute their
duties.
CISOMB.
The Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman
should
be
eliminated.
The
DHS
bureaucracy is
too
large,
and
the
Secretary has
too
many direct reports. CISOMB’s policy functions can be performed (and
sometimes
already
are) by
OIG
and
GAO. The
specialized case
work can
be
moved
into USCIS
as a
special unit,
much like
the
IRS
Taxpayer Advocate.
This would
require a
stat- utory change to
Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.20
If CISOMB continues as a DHS
component, a policy should be issued that prohibits CISOMB from
assisting illegal aliens to obtain benefits. Currently,
approximately
15
percent–20
percent
of
CISOMB’s
workload
consists
of
helping
DACA applicants obtain and
renew benefits, including work authorization. This is not
the
role
of
an
ombudsman.
In
addition,
the
government
should
be
a
neutral
adjudicator, not
an advocate
for illegal
aliens.
AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS
It
is
critical
to
the
achievement of
the
President’s
policy objectives
that all
agen-
cies and departments touching immigration policy work in sync with one
another.
While
there are
numerous areas
in
which
such cooperation
is
critical,
immigration
has
proven to
be
the
most
difficult.
Accordingly, several
objectives
will be
necessary for each of
the following departments.
•
Department of
Health and
Human Services:
Agree
to move
the Office of
Refugee
Resettlement (ORR)
to DHS
or,
alternatively, implement an
aggressive
and regular
effort
by
the
Secretary
of
HHS
to
ensure
that
ORR
is fully
pursuing
presidential
objectives in
support of
DHS.
•
Department of Defense:
Assist in aggressively building the border wall
system on America’s southern
border. Additionally, explicitly acknowledge and
adjust
personnel and
priorities to
participate
actively in
the defense
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
of
America’s borders,
including using
military personnel
and
hardware
to prevent illegal
crossings between
ports of
entry and
channel all
cross-border traffic to
legal ports of entry.
•
Department of Justice:
Agree to move the Executive Office for
Immigration Review
and the
Office of
Immigration
Litigation to DHS and/or,
alternatively, to treat
the
administrative law
judges
(immigration judges
and Board
of Immigration
Appeals) as
national
security personnel,
decertify
their
union,
and
move
to
increase
hiring
significantly
to
enable
the processing
of more immigration cases.
•
Department of State:
Allow DHS to lead international engagement in
the
Western
Hemisphere
on
issues
of
security
and
migration.
Additionally,
quickly and
aggressively address recalcitrant
countries’ failure to
accept
deportees
by
imposing
stiff sanctions
until deportees
are
in
fact accepted
for return (not just
promised to be taken).
•
Department
of
Housing
and
Urban
Development:
Ensure
that
only
U.S.
citizens and
lawful permanent
residents utilize
or
occupy
federally subsidized
housing.
•
Department of Education:
Deny loan access to those who are not U.S.
citizens
or lawful
permanent
residents,
and
deny
loan
access
to
students
at schools that
provide in-state tuition to illegal aliens.
•
Department of
Labor:
Eliminate
the two
(of four)
lowest wage
levels for
foreign workers.
•
Department of
the Treasury:
Implement all necessary
regulations both to
equalize
taxes between
American
citizens
and
working
visa
holders
and
to
provide
DHS
with
all
tax
information of
illegal
aliens
as
expeditiously
as
possible.
•
Intelligence Community:
Cooperate in the shrinking or elimination of
the I&A
role in
the IC
while
replacing it
with CBP
and HSI
representation to the IC.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
I had the honor of coordinating the efforts of the experts listed
as contributors to this
book, nearly
all of
whom have
spent more
time inside
or interacting with the
Department of Homeland
Security than myself. I
wrote only
a small portion
of the
chapter and
relied on
the
contributors’ experience and
expertise to give the chapter both its depth and policy
impact. No views expressed herein should be attributed to any
single contributor.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
H.R.
5005,
Homeland
Security
Act
of
2002,
Public
Law
No.
107-296,
107th
Congress,
November
25,
2002,
§
101(b)(1),
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
2.
See,
for
example,
“Elon
Musk
Slams
CISA
Censorship
Network
as
‘Propaganda
Platform,’”
Kanekoa
News, December 28, 2022,
https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
3.
H.R.
2680,
An
Act
to
Amend
the
Immigration
and
Nationality
Act,
and
for
Other
Purposes,
Public
Law
No.
89-236,
89th
Congress,
October
3,
1965,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79-
Pg911.pdf
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
4.
Added
to the
Immigration and
Nationality Act
by the
Illegal
Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No.
104-208,
104th
Congress,
September
30,
1996,
Division
C,
https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/
PLAW-104publ208.pdf
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
5.
8
U.S.
Code,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
6.
18
U.S.
Code,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
7.
5
U.S.
Code
§§
551–559,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
8.
Table,
“United
States
Citizenship
and
Immigration
Services
Budget
Comparison
and
Adjustments
Appropriation and
PPA
Summary,”
in
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland
Security,
United
States
Citizenship
and
Immigration
Services,
Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and
Immigration
Services,
Budget Overview,
Fiscal Year
2023 Congressional
Justification,
p.
CIS-4,
https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_
Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20
%24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20
President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed
March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services
Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5.
9.
H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No.
110-457, 110th Congress,
December
23,
2008, § 235,
https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW-
110publ457.pdf
(accessed March
15,
2023).
10.
Matter
of
A-B-,
Respondent,
27
I&N
Dec.
316
(A.G.
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/
download
(accessed
January
18,
2023).
11.
Arizona
v.
United
States,
567
U.S.
387
(2012),
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/
(accessed
January
18,
2023).
12.
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act
[Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974]
[As
Amended
Through
P.L.
117–328,
Enacted
December
29,
2022],
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
13.
U.S. Department
of Homeland
Security,
Federal Emergency
Management Agency,
Department
of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget
Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional
Justification, p. FEMA-24,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20
Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
14.
Report,
United
States Secret
Service: An
Agency in
Crisis,
Committee
on
Oversight
and
Government
Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9,
2015,
https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf
(accessed
January
18,
2023).
15.
5 U.S.
Code
§
7103,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
16.
S.
3418, Privacy
Act of 1974, Public
Law No.
93-579, 93rd
Congress,
December 31,
1974,
https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
17.
H.R.
1428,
Judicial
Redress
Act
of
2015,
Public
Law
No.
114-126,
114th
Congress,
February
24,
2016,
https://www.
congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf
(accessed
March
15,
2023).
18.
H.R.
1158,
Consolidated
Appropriations
Act,
2020,
Public
Law
No.
116-93,
116th
Congress,
December
20,
2019,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158
(accessed
January
18,
2023).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
19.
U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management
Directive No. 0810.1, June 10,
2004,
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general.
pdf
(accessed
March 15,
2023).
20.
H.R.
5005,
Homeland
Security
Act
of
2002,
Public
Law
No.
107-296,
107th
Congress,
November
25,
2002,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005
(accessed
January
18,
2023).
T
he
U.S. Department
of
State’s
mission is
to
bilaterally,
multilaterally,
and
regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities;
to serve U.S.
citizens
abroad; and
to
advance
the
economic,
foreign policy,
and
national
security
interests
of
the
United States.
Since
the
U.S.
Founding, the
Department of
State has
been the
American gov-
ernment’s
designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and
peoples
throughout the
world. Country
names, borders,
leaders, technology,
and
people
have
changed
in
the
more than
two
centuries
since the
Founding, but
the
basics
of
diplomacy
remain the
same. Although
the
Department
has
also
evolved throughout
the
years,
at
least
in
the
modern era,
there is
one
significant
problem that
the
next
President must address to be
successful.
There are scores of fine diplomats
who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and
interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all
Administrations, there
is a
tug-of-war
between Presidents
and
bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under
conservative Presidents, due
largely to the fact that large swaths of the State
Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree
with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.
It
should not
and
cannot
be
this
way: The
American people
need and
deserve a
diplomatic machine fully
focused on
the national interest
as defined
through the election of
a President
who sets
the domestic
and
international agenda
for the
nation. The
next
Administration
must
take
swift
and
decisive
steps
to
reforge the
department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that
serves the
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
President
and, thereby,
the
American
people. Below
is
the
basic but
essential road-
map for achieving these repairs.
HISTORY
AND
CONTEXT
Founded
in 1789,
the Department
of State
was one
of the
first
Cabinet-level agencies
in the new
American
government. The
first Secretary
of State,
Thomas Jefferson,
oversaw
a
small
staff,
diplomatic
posts
in
London
and
Paris,
and
10
con- sular
posts.1
Today,
the Department of State
has almost
80,000 total
employees (including
13,517
foreign
service employees
and
11,683
civil
service
employees)
in 275
embassies, consulates, and
other posts
around the
world.2
In
theory, the
State Department
is
the
principal agency
responsible for
carrying
out
the
President’s
foreign policy
and
representing
the
United
States in
other nations and
international
organizations.
To
the
extent consistent
with presidential
policy and
federal
law, the
department also
supports U.S.
citizens and
businesses in
other nations
and vets
foreign nationals seeking temporary or permanent entrance to the
United States. The
State
Department also
provides
humanitarian, security, and
other
assistance
to
non-U.S. populations
in
need,
and
otherwise
advances and
supports U.S.
national interests
abroad.
Properly led,
the
State
Department can
be
instrumental
for
commu-
nicating
and
implementing
a
foreign
policy vision
that best
serves American
citizens.
As
the
U.S.
Commission on
National Security/21st
Century (the
Hart–Rudman Commission)
observed more
than 20
years ago,
the State
Department is
a “crip-
pled
institution”
suffering
from
“an
ineffective
organizational
structure
in
which
regional
and functional
policies
do
not
serve
integrated
goals,
and
in
which
sound
management,
accountability, and leadership
are lacking.”3 Unfortunately,
this critique remains accurate.
The State Department’s failures are
not due to a lack of resources. As one
expert
has
observed,
the department
“has
significantly
more
at
its
disposal
than was
the
case
at
the
end
of
the
Cold
War,
in
the
mid-1990s,
and at
the
height
of
the Iraq
and
Afghanistan wars.”4 A
major
source,
if
not
the
major
source,
of
the
State
Department’s
ineffectiveness
lies in
its
institutional
belief that
it
is
an
independent
institution
that knows
what is
best for
the
United
States, sets
its
own
foreign policy,
and
does not
need direction from an
elected
President.
The next
President can make the State Department more effective by
providing
a clear foreign
policy vision, selecting political officials and career
diplomats that will enthusiastically turn that vision into a
policy agenda, and firmly supporting
the State Department as it makes the
necessary institutional adjustments.
POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC
LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT
Focusing
the State
Department on the
needs and
goals of
the next
President
will require
the
President’s
handpicked political
leadership—as
well
as
foreign
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
service
and civil
service
personnel who
share the
President’s
vision and
policy agendas—to
run the
department. This can
be done
by taking
these steps
at the outset
of the next Administration.
Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process.
Notwithstanding the
challenges
and
slowness
of
the
modern
U.S.
Senate
confirmation
process,
the
next President
can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to
place State Department
appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation.
Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate
senior political leadership and would force
the Senate
to act
on nominees’
appointments instead of
being allowed to
engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s
function- ality
for weeks,
months, or
even years.
Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process.
The next Administration
should
assert
leadership
over,
and
guidance
to,
the
State
Department
by
placing
political appointees in
positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including
senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and
Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the
next Administration should also increase the
number of
political
appointees to manage
it.
To the extent
possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected
by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s
Office of Presiden-
tial
Personnel (depending
on
the
timing of
selection) and
be
in
place the
first day
of
the
Administration.
No
one
in
a
leadership
position on
the
morning
of
January
20
should hold
that position
at
the
end
of
the
day.
These recommendations
do
not
imply
that
foreign service
and
civil
service officials
should be
excluded from
key
roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately
relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is
that as many political appoin-
tees
as possible
should be
in place at
the start
of a
new
Administration.
Support and Train Political Appointees.
The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its
resources to ensure regular coordination among all political
appointees, which
should
take
the
form
of
strategy
meetings,
trainings,
and
other events.
The secretary
should also
take reasonable
steps to
ensure that
the State
Department’s political
appointees are connected
to other
departments’ political appointees,
which is
critical for
cross-agency
effectiveness and morale.
The sec-
retary should capitalize on
the more
experienced political appointees
by using them
as the foundation
for a
mentorship program for
less
experienced political
appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and
operational rather
than
incidental
or
occasional,
and
it
must
be
treated
as
a
crucial
dimension for
the next Administration’s success.
Maximize the Value of Career Officials.
Career foreign service and civil
service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise
and commit- ment to
the
President’s mission. Indeed,
the State
Department has thousands
of employees
with
unparalleled
linguistic,
cultural,
policy,
and
administrative
skills,
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
and
large numbers
of
them
have been
an
enormous
resource to
the
Secretaries
of State under
which they
have served.
The
secretary
must find
a
way
to
make
clear to
career
officials that
despite prior
history and
modes of
operation,
they need not
be adversaries of
a conservative
President, Secretary of
State, or
the team of political
appointees.
Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide.
All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation
at the
start of
a new
Administration. Previous Republican
Administrations have
accepted
the
resignations
of
only
the
political
ambassadors
and allowed
the
foreign
service
ambassadors
to
retain
their
posts,
sometimes
for months
or years
into a
new
Administration.5 The next Administration
must go
further: It should both
accept the
resignations
of all
political ambassadors and
quickly
review
and
reassess
all
career
ambassadors.
This review
should
commence well
before the
new
Administration’s first day.
Ambassadors
in countries
where U.S.
policy or
posture would
substantially change
under
the
new
Administration,
as
well
as
any
who
have
evinced
hostility
toward
the incoming
Administration
or its
agenda,
should
be
recalled
immediately. The
priority
should be
to put
in place
new
ambassadors who
support the
Presi- dent’s agenda
among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil
service personnel,
with no
predetermined percentage among
these
categories. Political
ambassadors with
strong
personal
relationships
with
the
President
should
be
pri-
oritized
for key
strategic
posts
such
as
Australia,
Japan,
the
United
Kingdom,
the United
Nations, and
the North Atlantic
Treaty
Organization (NATO).
RIGHTING
THE
SHIP
Ensuring the State Department is
accountable for serving American citi-
zens
first
will
require—at
a minimum—that
the
following
steps
be
implemented
immediately:
Review Retroactively.
Before
inauguration, the President-elect’s
department transition
team
should
assess
every
aspect
of
State
Department
negotiations
and
funding
commitments. Upon
inauguration,
the
Secretary
of
State
should
order
an
immediate
freeze on
all
efforts
to implement
unratified
treaties
and
international
agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance
disbursements, domestic and
international
contracts and
payments,
hiring and
recruiting decisions, etc.,
pending
a
political
appointee-driven
review
to
ensure
that
such
efforts
comport
with the
new
Administration’s
policies.
The
quality
of
this
review
is
more
import- ant
than speed.
The posture
of the
department during this
review should
be an
unwavering desire to
prioritize the American people—including a recognition that
the federal
government must
be a
diligent
steward of
taxpayer
dollars.
Implement
Repair. The State
Department must change its handling of international agreements
to restore constitutional governance. Under prior
Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the
department caused
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
numerous
logistical challenges
in
negotiating,
approving, and
implementing trea- ties
and
agreements.
This is
particularly true
under the
Biden Administration.
For
example,
under
the
Biden Administration,
the
State
Department was
considered
sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that
its political leadership
invoked its
Circular 175
(C-175)
authority to
delegate its
diplomatic capacity
to other agencies
such as
the Department
of Homeland
Security.
At
time of
publication, the
State Department
is
negotiating
(or
seeking
to
nego-
tiate)
large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at
considerable economic and
other costs to the American people. Although such agreements
should be
evaluated and
approved as
are treaties,
the Biden
Administration is likely to
simply call
them
“agreements.” The
Biden State
Department not
only approves but
also
enforces
treaties
that
have
not
been
ratified
by
the
U.S.
Senate. This
practice must
be thoroughly reviewed—and most
likely
jettisoned.
The
next President
should recalibrate
how
the
State Department
handles trea-
ties
and
agreements, primarily by
restoring constitutionality to
these
processes. He
or she
should
direct
the
Secretary
of
State
to
freeze
any
ongoing
treaty
or
inter- national
agreement
negotiations and assess
whether those
efforts align
with the new
President’s
foreign policy
direction. The
next
Administration should
also direct the secretary to order an immediate
stand-down on enforcement of any
treaties
that
have
not
been
ratified
by
the
Senate,
and
order
a
thorough
review
of the
degree
to
which
such
enforcement
has
impacted
the
department’s
functions,
policies, and use of resources.
The
Secretary of
State, in
cooperation with
the
Office
of
the
Attorney General
and
the White
House
Counsel’s Office,
should also
conduct a
review to
identify “agreements”
that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public
mean- ing
of
the
Constitution,6 and
suspend
compliance pending
presidential transmittal of
those agreements
to
the
Senate for
advice and
consent. The
next Administration
should
also
move
to
withdraw
from treaties
that have
been under
Senate consider-
ation
for
20
years
or
more,
with the
understanding
that
those treaties
are
unlikely
to
be ratified. Under circumstances
in which
ratification of a
stale treaty
before the
Senate still
serves national
interests, the treaty
letter of
transmittal and sub-
mission should be updated for
current circumstances. The Secretary of State must
revoke
most
outstanding C-175
authorities
that
have
been
granted
to
other
agen-
cies during previous
Administrations, although such revocations should be closely
coordinated with the
White House
for logistical
reasons.
Coordinate with Other Agencies.
Interagency engagement in this new
environment must
be
similarly
adjusted
to
mirror
presidential
direction.
Indeed,
coordination among
federal
agencies is
challenging even in
the most
well-oiled Administrations.
Although
such coordination
is
inescapable
and
sometimes
produc-
tive, agencies
tend
to
leverage
each
other’s
resources
in
ways
that
occasionally
have
off-mission consequences
for
the
agency
or
agencies
with
the
resources.
Ideally,
the
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Secretary
of
State
should work
as
part
of
an
agile foreign
policy team
along with
the National Security
Advisor, the
Secretary of
Defense, and
other agency
heads to
flesh
out
and
advance
the
President’s
foreign policy.
Bureaucratic stovepipes
of
the
past should be less important than commitment to, and
achievement of, the President’s
foreign
policy
agenda.
The
State
Department’s role
in
these
interagency discussions
must
reflect
the
President’s
clear direction
and
disallow
resources and
tools to
be
used
in
any
way
that
detracts from
the
presidentially
directed mission.
Coordinate with Congress.
Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority
to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong
interest
in
key
aspects
of
American
foreign
policy.
The
department
must
therefore
take particular
care
in
its
interaction
with
Congress,
since
poor
interactions
with Congress,
regardless
of intentions,
could
trigger
congressional
pushback
or
have other
negative
impacts on
the
President’s agenda.
This will require
particularly strong leadership
of the
Department of State’s
Bureau of Legislative
Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should
ensure
full
coordination
with
the
White
House
regarding
congressional
engage- ment
on
any
State
Department
responsibility.
This
may
lead
to,
for
example,
the
President
authorizing
the
State
Department
to
engage
with
Members
of
Congress
and relevant
committees
on
certain
issues
(including
statutorily
designated
con- gressional
consultations), but to
remain “radio
silent” on
volatile or
designated issues on
which
the
White
House
wants
to
be
the
primary
or
only
voice.
All
such
authorized
department
engagements
with
Congress
must
be
driven
and
handled
by political
appointees
in
conjunction
with
career
officials
who
have
the
relevant
expertise and are willing to
work in concert with the President’s political appoin-
tees on particularly sensitive matters.
Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat.
The State Department recently
opened
the
Office
of
China
Coordination, or
“China
House.”
This
office
is
intended
to bring
together
experts
inside
and
outside
the
State
Department
to
coordinate
U.S.
government relations
with China
“and advance
our
vision
for
an
open, inclu-
sive
international
system.”7 Whether
China House
will streamline
U.S. government
communication,
consensus, and
action on
China
policy—given the presence
of other
agencies with
strong
competing or
adverse
interests—remains to be
seen. The unit
is dependent on adequate
and competent
staff being
assigned by
other bureaus within the State Department.
Nonetheless,
the
concept
is
one
a
Republican
Administration
should
support
mutatis
mutandis.
The Chinese
Communist
Party (CCP)
has been
“at war”
with the U.S. for
decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the
gov- ernment, the
State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic
effort accordingly. The centralization
of efforts
in one
place is
critical to
this end.
Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements.
Arguably, the department’s
most
noteworthy
challenge
on
the
global
stage
has
been
its
handling
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
of
immigration and
domestic security
issues, which
are
inextricably
related. The
State
Department’s apparent posture toward these two issues, which are
of para-
mount importance
to
the
American people,
has
historically
been that
they are
of lesser importance
than other
issues and
that they
can
be
treated as
concessions in
broader
diplomatic engagements. In
other
instances
in
which
access to the
U.S.
in the
form of
immigrant (permanent) and
nonimmigrant (temporary) visas
could potentially
serve
as
diplomatic
leverage,
it
is
almost
never
used.
To
some
degree,
the State
Department
and
many
of
its
personnel
appear
to
view
the
U.S.
immigra- tion
system
less
as
a
tool
for
strengthening the
United
States
and
more
as
a
global welfare
program.
To
ensure the
safety, security,
and
prosperity
of
all
Americans, this
must change. Below
are
several
key
areas
in
which
the
department’s
formal and
informal postures
must
adjust
to
reflect
the
current
immigration and
domestic security
environment:
•
Visa reciprocity.
The United States should strictly enforce the
doctrine of reciprocity
when
issuing
visas
to
all
foreign
nationals.
For
too
long,
the
U.S.
has provided
virtually
unfettered access
to foreign
nationals from
countries
that do
not
respond
in
kind—including
countries
that
are
actively
hostile to
U.S. interests
and nationals.
Mandatory
reciprocity will
convey the necessary reality
that other
countries do
not have an
unfettered right
to
U.S. access
and
must
reciprocally offer
favorable visa-based
access to
U.S. nationals.
The
State Department’s
reaction time
to
other
countries’ changes in
visa policies
with respect
to
the
U.S. must
be
streamlined
to
ensure
it
can
be updated in real time.
•
Section 243(d)
visa
sanctions.
Visa
sanctions under
section 243(d)
of the
Immigration and
Nationality Act
(INA),8
enacted
into law
to motivate
countries to accept
the return
of any
nationals who have
been ordered
removed from
the
U.S.,
should
be
quickly
and
fully
enforced.
Recalcitrant countries
that
do
not
accept
receipt
of their
returned
nationals
will
risk
the suspension
of issuance
of
all
immigrant
visas,
all
nonimmigrant
visas, or
all
visas.
These
country-specific
sanctions
should
remain
in
place
until
the sanctioned
country
accepts the
return
of
all
its
removal-pending
nationals and
formally
commits
to
future,
regular
acceptance
of its
nationals.
Black- letter
implementation of this
law will
demonstrate a heretofore
lacking
seriousness
to
the
international
community
that other
nations must
respect
U.S.
immigration laws
and
work
with federal
authorities to
accept returning
nationals—or lose access to the
United States.
•
Rightsizing refugee admissions.
The Biden Administration has
engineered
what is
nothing
short
of
a
collapse
of
U.S.
border
security
and
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
interior immigration enforcement.
This Administration’s humanitarian crisis—which
is arguably
the greatest
humanitarian crisis in
the modern
era,
one which
has
harmed
Americans
and
foreign
nationals
alike—will
take many
years
and
billions
of
dollars
to
fully
address.
One
casualty
of
the
Biden
Administration’s
behavior will
be
the
current form
of
the
U.S. Refugee
Admission Program (USRAP).
The
federal
government’s obligation to
shift national
security–essential
screening
and vetting
resources
to
the
forged
border
crisis
will
necessitate an
indefinite
curtailment of
the
number
of
USRAP
refugee
admissions.
The State
Department’s
Bureau
of
Population, Refugees,
and
Migration,
which administers
USRAP,
must
shift
its
resources
to challenges
stemming
from the
current
immigration situation
until the
crisis can
be contained
and refugee-focused
screening
and
vetting
capacity
can
reasonably
be
restored.
•
Strengthening
bilateral and
multilateral
immigration-focused agreements.
Restoration of both domestic security and the integrity of
the
U.S.
immigration
system
should
start
with
rapid
reactivation
of
several key
initiatives in
effect at
the conclusion of the
Trump
Administration. Reimplementation
of the
Remain in
Mexico policy,
safe
third-country agreements,
and other
measures to
address the
influx of
non-Mexican asylum
applicants at
the United
States–Mexico
border must
be Day
One
priorities.
Although the
State
Department must rein
in the
C-175 authorities
of
other
agencies,
the
Department
of
Homeland
Security
should retain
(or
regain)
C-175
authorities for
negotiating
bilateral
and
multilateral
security agreements.
•
Evaluation of
national
security–vulnerable
visa programs.
To
protect the
American
people,
the
State
Department,
in
coordination
with
the
White House
and other
security-focused agencies, should
evaluate
several key
security-sensitive visa
programs
that
it
manages.
Key
programs
include,
but should
not be
limited to,
the Diversity Visa
program, the
F (student) visa program,
and J (exchange
visitor) visa
program. The
State
Department’s evaluation
must ensure
that these
programs are
not only consistent
with White House immigration
policy, but
also align
with its
national
security obligations and resource limitations.
PIVOTING
ABROAD
Personnel
and management
adjustments are crucial
preludes to
refocus the
State Department’s mission,
which is implementing the President’s foreign policy
agenda
and,
in
so
doing,
ensuring
that the
interests
of
American
citizens
are
given
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
priority. That
said, the next President must significantly reorient the U.S.
govern-
ment’s posture toward friends and adversaries alike—which will
include much more
honest
assessments about
who are
friends and
who are
not. This
reorien- tation
could represent the
most
significant shift
in core
foreign policy
principles and
corresponding action since
the end
of the
Cold War.
Although
not
every
country or
issue area
can
be
discussed in
this chapter,
below
are examples
of several
areas in
which a
shift in
U. S.
foreign policy
is not
only import-
ant, but
arguably existential.
The
point
is
not
to
assert
that everyone
in
the
evolving
conservative
movement,
or,
in
some cases,
the
growing
bipartisan consensus,
will agree with
the
details
of
this
assessment. Rather,
what is
presented below
demon- strates
the
urgency of
these issues
and
provides
a
general
roadmap for
analysis.
In
a
world
on
fire,
a
handful
of
nations
require heightened
attention. Some
rep- resent existential threats to the safety and security
of the American people; others
threaten
to hurt
the U.S.
economy; and
others are
wild cards,
whose full
threat scope is
unknown
but
nevertheless
unsettling.
The
five
countries
on
which
the
next
Administration should
focus
its
attention
and
energy
are
China,
Iran,
Venezuela,
Russia, and North Korea.
The People’s
Republic of
China
The designs of
the People’s
Republic of
China (PRC)
and the
Chinese Com-
munist Party,
which runs
the PRC,
are serious
and dangerous.9 This tyrannical country with a
population of more than 1 billion people has the vision,
resources, and
patience
to
achieve
its
objectives.
Protecting
the
United
States
from
the
PRC’s
designs
requires
an
unambiguous
offensive-defensive
mix,
including
protecting American
citizens
and their
interests,
as
well
as
U.S.
allies,
from
PRC
attacks
and abuse
that undermine
U.S.
competitiveness,
security, and
prosperity.
The United States
must have
a
cost-imposing
strategic response to
make Bei-
jing’s aggression unaffordable,
even as the American economy and U.S. power grow.
This
stance
will
require
real,
sustained,
near-unprecedented
U.S.
growth;
stronger partnerships;
synchronized economic
and
security
policies;
and
American
energy
independence—but
above
all,
it
will
require
a
very
honest
perspective
about
the nature
and designs
of the
PRC as
more of
a threat
than a
competitor.10
The
next President
should use
the State
Department and
its array
of resources
to reassess
and
lead this
effort,
just
as
it
did
during
the
Cold
War.
The
U.S.
government
needs
an
Article
X
for
China,11 and
it
should
be
a
presidential mandate.
Along with
the
National Security Council, the State Department should draft an Article
X, which should be a
deeply
philosophical look
at the
China
challenge.
Many
foreign policy
professionals
and
national leaders,
both in
government and
the
private
sector, are
reluctant to
take decisive
action regarding
China. Many
are vested in
an
unshakable
faith in
the
international
system and
global norms.
They
are
so
enamored
with them
they cannot
brook any
criticisms or
reforms, let
alone
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
acknowledge
their
potential
for
being
abused by
the
PRC.
Others refuse
to
acknowl-
edge
Beijing’s
malign activities
and
often
pass off
criticism as
conspiracy theories.
For
instance, many
were quick
to dismiss
even the
possibility that COVID-19
escaped
from
a
Chinese
research
laboratory.
The
reality,
however,
is
that
the
PRC’s actions
often
do
sound
like
conspiracy
theories—because
they
are
conspiracies.
In addition,
some
knowingly
or not
parrot
the
Communist
line:
Global
leaders
includ- ing
President Joe
Biden, have
tried to
normalize or
even laud
Chinese
behavior. In
some
cases,
these
voices,
like
the
global
corporate
giants BlackRock
and
Disney,
directly
benefit
from doing
business with
Beijing.
On the other
hand, others
acknowledge
the dangers
posed by
the PRC, but
believe
in
a
moderating
approach
to
accommodate
its
rise,
a
policy
of
“compete where
we must,
but cooperate
where we
can,”
including on issues
like climate
change. This strategy has
demonstrably failed.
As
with all
global struggles
with Communist
and
other
tyrannical regimes,
the
issue
should
never
be
with
the
Chinese
people but
with the
Communist dictator-
ship
that oppresses them and threatens the well-being of nations
across the globe.12 That
said,
the
nature of
Chinese power
today is
the
product
of
history,
ideology,
and
the
institutions
that have
governed China
during the
course of
five millennia,
inherited
by the
present
Chinese leaders
from the
preceding
generations of the CCP.13 In short, the
PRC challenge
is rooted
in China’s
strategic
culture and
not just the
Marxism–Leninism
of the
CCP, meaning
that internal
culture and
civil society will
never deliver a more normative nation. The PRC’s aggressive
behavior can only be
curbed through
external
pressure.
The
Islamic Republic
of
Iran
The ongoing protests
in the
Islamic
Republic of
Iran (Iran),
which are
widely viewed
as
a
new
revolution, have
shown
that
the
Islamic
regime,
which
has
been
in power since 1979 when
Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader, is at its weakest
state
in
its
history
and
is
at
odds
not
only
with
its
own
people
but
also
its
regional
neighbors.
Iran
is
home
to
a
proud
and
ancient
culture,
yet
its
people
have
strug-
gled to achieve democracy and
have had to endure a hostile theocratic regime that vehemently
opposes
freedom.
The
time
may
be
right
to
press
harder
on
the
Iranian
theocracy,
support
the
Iranian
people,
and
take
other
steps
to
draw
Iran
into
the community
of free and modern nations.
Unfortunately,
the Obama
and Biden
Administrations have propped
up the
brutal Islamist theocracy
that has hurt the Iranian people and threatened nuclear
war. For example, the Obama
Administration’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action,
commonly
referred
to
as
the
Iran
nuclear
deal,
gave
the
Islamic
regime
a
crucial
monetary
lifeline
after
the
Green
Movement
protests
in
2009,
which,
while
ultimately
unsuccessful,
did
succeed
in
weakening
the
regime
and
showing
the world
that younger
Iranians want
freedom.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Instead
of pressuring
the Iranian
theocracy to move
toward
democracy, the Obama
Administration threw the
brutal regime
an economic
lifeline by
giving hundreds
of
billions
of
dollars
to
the
Iranian
government
and
providing
other
sanc-
tions
relief.
This
economic
relief did
not
moderate
the
regime,
but
emboldened
its brutality,
its
efforts
to
expand
its
nuclear
weapons
programs,
and its
support
for
global
terrorism.
Former President
Obama
has
admitted
his
lack
of
support
for
the
Green
Movement
during his
Administration
was
an
error
and
blamed
it
on
poor advisors—yet
those
same
advisors
are involved
with
the
Biden
Administration’s
insistence
on
reducing
pressure
on
the
theocracy
and
resurrecting
a
nuclear
deal. The next
Administration should neither preserve nor repeat the mistakes
of the Obama
and Biden
Administrations. The correct
future policy
for Iran
is one
that
acknowledges
that
it
is
in
U.S.
national
security
interests,
the
Iranian
people’s human
rights
interests,
and a
broader
global
interest
in
peace
and
stability
for
the Iranian
people to
have the
democratic government they
demand. This
decision to
be
free
of
the
country’s
abusive leaders
must
of
course
be
made
by
the
Iranian people,
but
the
United
States
can
utilize
its
own
and
others’
economic
and diplo- matic
tools to
ease the
path toward
a free Iran and
a renewed
relationship with
the
Iranian
people.
The
Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela
Once
a
model
of
democracy
and
a
true U.S.
ally, the
Bolivarian Republic
of
Ven-
ezuela
(Venezuela)
has
all
but
collapsed
under the
Communist regimes
of
the
late Hugo
Chavez and
Nicolas Maduro.
In the 24 years
since Hugo
Chavez was
first elected
Venezuelan
president
in
1999,
the
country
has
violently
cracked
down
on
pro-democracy
citizens and
organizations,
shattered its once
oil-rich
economy, empowered
domestic
criminal
cartels,
and
helped
fuel
a
hemispheric
refugee
crisis.
Venezuela has
swung from
being one
of the
most
prosperous, if not
the
most prosperous, country
in
South
America
to
being
one
of
the
poorest.
Its
Communist
leadership has
also drawn
closer to
some of
the United
States’
greatest interna-
tional
foes,
including
the PRC
and
Iran,
which
have
long
sought
a
foothold
in
the Americas.
Indeed,
Venezuela
serves
as
a
reminder
of
just
how
fragile
democratic
institutions
that
are
not
maintained
can be.
To
contain
Venezuela’s
Communism and
aid
international partners,
the
next
Administration
must
take
important
steps to
put
Venezuela’s Communist
abusers
on
notice
while
making
strides
to
help
the Venezuelan
people.
The
next
Administration must
work
to
unite
the
hemisphere
against
this significant
but
underestimated
threat in
the
Southern
Hemisphere.
Russia
One
issue today
that starkly
divides conservatives
is
the
Russia–Ukraine
con- flict.
The common
ground seems
to be
recognition
that presidential
leadership in 2025 must chart the course.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
One
school
of
conservative
thought
holds
that
as
Moscow’s
illegal
war
of
aggression
against
Ukraine
drags
on,
Russia
presents
major
challenges
to
U.S.
interests, as
well as
to peace,
stability, and
the post-Cold
War security
order in
Europe. This
viewpoint
argues for
continued U.S.
involvement including
military
aid,
economic
aid,
and
the
presence
of
NATO
and
U.S. troops
if necessary.
The end
goal of
the conflict
must be
the defeat
of Russian
President
Vladimir
Putin
and
a
return
to
pre-invasion
border
lines.
•
Another
school
of
conservative
thought
denies
that
U.S.
Ukrainian
support is
in
the
national
security
interest
of
America
at
all.
Ukraine
is
not
a
member
of the
NATO alliance
and is one of
the most
corrupt
nations in
the region.
European nations
directly
affected by
the conflict
should aid
in the
defense of
Ukraine,
but
the
U.S.
should
not
continue
its
involvement.
This
viewpoint
desires a
swift end
to the
conflict
through a
negotiated settlement between
Ukraine and Russia.
•
The
tension
between
these
competing
positions
has
given
rise
to
a
third
approach.
This
conservative
viewpoint eschews
both
isolationism
and
interventionism.
Rather,
each
foreign
policy
decision
must
first
ask
the question:
What
is
in
the
interest
of
the
American
people?
U.S.
military engagement
must
clearly fall
within
U.S.
interests;
be
fiscally
responsible;
and
protect
American
freedom,
liberty,
and
sovereignty,
all
while
recognizing
Communist
China as
the
greatest
threat to
U.S. interests.
Thus, with
respect to
Ukraine,
continued U.S.
involvement must
be
fully
paid for;
limited to
military
aid
(while
European
allies
address
Ukraine’s
economic needs);
and
have
a
clearly
defined national
security strategy
that does
not
risk
American lives.
Regardless of viewpoints, all sides
agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is unjust
and that
the Ukrainian
people have
a right to
defend their
homeland. Furthermore,
the conflict
has severely
weakened
Putin’s military
strength and
provided a
boost to
NATO unity
and its
importance to European
nations.
The next conservative
President has
a generational
opportunity to
bring res-
olution
to
the
foreign
policy
tensions
within
the
movement
and
chart
a
new
path
forward that recognizes
Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. interests
in the 21st century.
The
Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea
Peace
and
stability
in
Northeast
Asia are
vital interests
of
the
United States.
The Republic
of Korea
(South Korea)
and Japan
are critical
allies for
ensuring a
free and
open
Indo–Pacific. They
are
indispensable
military,
economic,
diplomatic,
and
technology
partners.
The
Democratic
People’s
Republic
of
Korea
(DPRK,
or
North
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Korea)
must be
deterred from
military conflict.
The
United
States cannot
permit the
DPRK to
remain a
de facto
nuclear power
with the
capacity to
threaten the
United
States
or
its
allies.
This
interest
is
both
critical
to
the
defense
of
the
Amer- ican
homeland
and
the
future
of
global
nonproliferation. The
DPRK
must
not
be permitted
to
profit
from
its
blatant
violations
of
international
commitments
or
to threaten
other nations
with nuclear
blackmail. Both interests
can only
be served
if
the U.S.
disallows
the
DPRK’s
rogue
regime
behavior.
OTHER
INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENTS
Western
Hemisphere
The
United States
has
a
vested interest
in
a
relatively united
and
economically
prosperous
Western Hemisphere.
Nonetheless, the
region now
has
an
overwhelm- ing
number
of
socialist
or
progressive
regimes, which
are
at
odds with
the
freedom
and growth-oriented policies of the U.S. and other neighbors and
who increasingly
pose
hemispheric
security threats.
A
new
approach is
therefore needed,
one
that
simultaneously allows the U.S. to re-posture in its best
interests and helps regional
partners enter
a new
century of
growth and
opportunity.
The
following
core policies
must be
part of
this new
direction:
•
A “sovereign Mexico” policy.
Mexico is currently a national security
disaster.
Bluntly stated,
Mexico
can
no
longer
qualify
as
a
first-world
nation; it
has functionally lost
its
sovereignty to
muscular
criminal cartels
that effectively
run the
country. The
current dynamic
is not good for
either
U.S.
citizens or
Mexicans, and
the
perfect
storm created
by
this
cartel state
has
negative
effects that
are damaging
the entire
hemisphere. The next
Administration must
both adopt
a posture
that calls
for a
fully sovereign
Mexico and
take
all
steps
at
its
disposal
to
support
that
result
in
as
rapid
a fashion as
possible.
•
A fentanyl-free frontier.
The same cartels that parasitically run
Mexico are also
working with
the PRC
to fuel
the largest
drug crisis
in the
history of
North
America.
These
Mexican
cartels
are
working
closely
with
Chinese
fentanyl precursor
chemical
manufacturers,
importing those
precursor chemicals
into Mexico,
manufacturing
fentanyl on
Mexican soil,
and
shipping
it
into
the
United
States and
elsewhere. The
highly potent
narcotic is
having an
unprecedented lethal impact
on the
American
citizenry. The
next
Administration must
leverage
its
new
insistence
on
a
sovereign
Mexico and
work with
other Western
Hemisphere
partners to
halt the
fentanyl crisis
and put a
decisive end
to this unprecedented
public health
threat.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
A hemisphere-centered
approach to
industry and
energy.
The
next
Administration has a
golden
opportunity to
make key
economic changes that will not only provide tremendous economic opportunities
for Americans
but will
also serve
as an
economic boon
to the entire Western
Hemisphere.
First,
the United
States must
do everything
possible, with both
resources and messaging, to
shift global
manufacturing and industry
from more
distant points
around the
globe
(especially from the
increasingly hostile and
human
rights-abusing
PRC)
to
Central
and
South
American
countries.
“Re-hemisphering”
manufacturing
and
industry closer
to
home
will not
only
eliminate
some
of
the
more
recent supply-chain
issues that
damaged the
U.S. economy
but will
also represent
a significant
economic
improvement for parts
of the
Americas in
need of growth
and
stabilization.
Similarly,
the United
States must
work with
Mexico, Canada,
and other
countries to
develop a
hemisphere-focused
energy policy
that will
reduce reliance on distant
and manipulable
sources of
fossil fuels,
restore the
free flow
of energy
among
the
hemisphere’s
largest
producers,
and
work
together to
increase energy
production,
including for
nations that
are looking
for dramatic economic expansion.
•
A “local” approach to security threats.
Western Hemisphere
nations, including
those in
the Caribbean,
arguably have
stronger
cultural and
historical ties
to the
United States
than most
other countries
and regions in
the world. Yet
Central and
South America
are moving
rapidly into
the sphere
of
anti-American, external
state
actors,
including
the
PRC,
Iran,
and Russia.
Specific
countries in
the Americas,
such as
Venezuela, Colombia,
Guyana,
and
Ecuador,
are
either
increasingly regional
security threats
in
their own
rights or
are vulnerable to hostile
extra-continental powers. The U.S.
has an
opportunity to lead
these
democratic neighbors
to fight
against the
external
pressure of
threats from
abroad and
address local
regional
security
concerns.
This
leadership
and
collaboration
must
span
all tools
at
the
disposal
of U.S.
allies
and
partners,
including
security-focused
cooperation.
Middle
East and
North
Africa
The
next Administration
must re-engage
with Middle
Eastern and
North Afri- can
nations and
not
abandon
the
region.
Without U.S.
leadership, the
region may
tumble
further into
chaos or
fall prey
to American
adversaries.
This recommen- dation
requires a multi-dimensional strategy.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
•
First,
the U.S.
must prevent
Iran from
acquiring
nuclear technology
and delivery capabilities
and
more broadly
block Iranian
ambitions. This means, inter
alia,
reinstituting and
expanding Trump Administration
sanctions; providing
security
assistance for
regional
partners; supporting,
through public diplomacy and
otherwise, freedom-seeking Iranian
people in
their
revolt against
the
mullahs;
and
ensuring
Israel has
both the
military means
and
the
political
support and
flexibility to
take what
it
deems
to
be
appropriate
measures to
defend itself
against the
Iranian regime
and its
regional proxies Hamas,
Hezbollah, and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.
•
Second,
the next
Administration should build
on the
Trump Administration’s
diplomatic successes by
encouraging other Arab
states, including Saudi Arabia,
to enter
the Abraham
Accords.
Related policies
should include
reversing, as
appropriate, the Biden
Administration’s degradation
of the
long-standing partnership with
Saudi Arabia.
The Palestinian
Authority
should
be
defunded.
A
further
key
priority
is
keeping Türkiye
in
the
Western
fold
and
a
NATO
ally.
This
includes
a vigorous outreach
to
Türkiye
to
dissuade
it
from
“hedging”
toward
Russia
or
China,
which
is
likely
to
require
a rethinking
of
U.S.
support
for
YPG/PKK
[People’s
Protection
Units/Kurdistan
Worker’s Party]
Kurdish forces,
which Ankara
believes are
an existential threat to
its security.
For the
foreseeable future— and
much
longer
than
one
new
Administration—Middle
Eastern
oil
will
play
a key
role in
the world
economy.
Therefore, the U.S.
must continue
to
support its
allies
and
compete
with
its
economic
adversaries,
including
China. Relations
with
Saudi
Arabia
should
be
strengthened
in
a
way
that seriously
curtails Chinese influence in Riyadh.
•
Third,
it is in the
U.S. national
interest to
build a
Middle East
security pact
that includes
Israel,
Egypt,
the
Gulf
states,
and
potentially
India,
as
a
second
“Quad” arrangement.
Protecting freedom
of
navigation
in
the
Gulf
and
in
the
Red
Sea/Suez
Canal is
vital to
the
world
economy and
therefore to
U.S. prosperity
as well.
In North
Africa,
security cooperation
with European allies, especially
France, will
be vital to
limit growing
Islamist threats
and
the
incursion
of
Russian
influence
through
positionings
of
the Wagner
Group.
•
The
U.S. cannot
neglect a
concern for
human rights
and minority
rights, which must be
balanced with
strategic and
security
considerations. Special attention must
be paid
to challenges
of religious
freedom,
especially the
status
of
Middle
Eastern
Christians
and other
religious
minorities,
as
well
as the
human
trafficking endemic
to the
region.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Africa’s
importance to U.S.
foreign policy
and strategic interests is
rising and
will only continue to grow. Its explosive population growth,
large reserves of
industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping
routes, and its collective
diplomatic
power
ensure
the
continent’s
global
importance.
Yet
as
Afri-
ca’s
strategic
significance
has grown,
the
U.S.’s
relative
influence there
has
declined.
Terrorist activity on the
continent has increased, while America’s competitors are
making significant gains for
their own
national
interests. The
PRC’s companies
dominate the
African
supply
chain
for
certain
minerals
critical
to
emerging
tech- nologies.
African
nations comprise
major
country-bloc elements
that shield
the PRC
and
Russia
from
international
isolation
for
their
human
rights
abuses—and
African nations
staunchly
support
PRC
foreign
policy
goals
on
issues
such
as
Hong Kong
occupation, South China
Seas dispute
arbitration, and Taiwan.
The
new
Administration
can
correct
this strategic
failing of
existing policy
by prioritizing
Africa
and
by
undertaking fundamental
changes in
how
the
United States works
with African nations.
At
a
bare
minimum, the
next Administration
should:
•
Shift
strategic
focus
from
assistance
to
growth.
Reorient the
focus
of
U.S. overseas
development assistance away from stand-alone humanitarian
development
aid and
toward
fostering free
market systems
in African
countries by
incentivizing
and facilitating
U.S. private
sector
engagement in these countries. Development
aid alone
does little
to develop
countries and
can
fuel
corruption
and violent
conflict.
While
the
United
States
should
always
be
willing
to
offer
emergency
and humanitarian
relief,
both
U.S.
and
African
long-term interests
are
better
served by
a
free
market-based,
private growth-focused strategy to
Africa’s
economic challenges.
•
Counter malign
Chinese
activity on
the continent.
This
should include
the development of
powerful public
diplomacy
efforts to
counter Chinese
influence campaigns with
commitments to freedom
of speech
and the
free flow of
information;
the creation
of a
template
“digital hygiene”
program that African countries
can access
to sanitize
and protect
their sensitive
communications
networks from
espionage by
the PRC
and other
hostile actors; the
recognition
of
Somaliland
statehood
as
a
hedge
against
the
U.S.’s
deteriorating position
in Djibouti;
and a
focus on
supporting American companies
involved
in
industries
important
to
U.S.
national
interests
or
that have
a competitive
advantage in Africa.
•
Counter the furtherance of terrorism.
African country-based
terrorist groups
like Boko
Haram may
currently lack
the capability to attack
the
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
United
States, but
at
least
some of
them would
eventually try
if
allowed
to consolidate
their
operations and
plan such
attacks. The
immediate
threat they
pose
lies
in
their
abilities
and
willingness
to
strike
American
targets
in their
regions of
operation or
to harm
U.S. interests
in other
ways. The
U.S. should support capable
African
military and
security
operations through the
State
Department and
other federal
agencies
responsible for granting foreign
military
education, training,
and security
assistance.
•
Build a coalition of the cooperative.
Rather than thinning
limited federal resources
by spreading funds across
all countries
(including some that
are unsupportive
or
even
hostile
to
the
United
States,)
the
next
Administration
should focus
on those
countries with
which the
U.S. can
expect a
mutually beneficial
relationship.
After being
designated
focus countries
by the
State
Department,
such nations
should receive
a full
suite of
American engagement.
That said,
the next
Administration
should still
maintain a
baseline level
of contact
even with
those countries
with which
it has
less- than-fruitful
relationships
in
order
to
encourage
positive
developments
and
to be
in position to seize
unexpected diplomatic
opportunities as they arise.
•
Focus
on core
diplomatic activities, and
stop promoting
policies birthed in the American culture wars.
African nations are particularly (and
reasonably)
non-receptive to the
U.S. social
policies such
as abortion
and
pro-LGBT
initiatives
being
imposed
on
them.
The
United
States
should focus
on core
security, economic, and
human rights
engagement
with African partners and
reject the
promotion of
divisive
policies that
hurt the
deepening of shared
goals between
the U.S.
and its
African
partners.
Europe
American
foreign policy
has
long
benefited from
cooperation with
the
countries
of
Europe
(generally, the
EU), and
any
conservative
Administration
should
build on this
resource. Yet
the
transatlantic
relationship is
complex, with
security, trade,
and political dimensions.
First,
the
Europe,
Eurasia, and
Russia region
is
made
up
of
relatively wealthy
and
technologically advanced societies that should be expected to
bear a fair share
of both
security needs and global security architecture: The United
States cannot
be
expected
to
provide
a
defense
umbrella for
countries unwilling
to
contribute
appropriately.
At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales
Pledge
of 2
percent of
gross domestic
product toward
defense by
NATO members.
The new
Administration will also
want to
encourage
nations to
exceed that
pledge.
Second,
transatlantic
trade
is
a
significant part
of
the
global economy,
and
it
is
in
the
U.S.
national interest
to
amplify
it,
especially
because this
means weaning
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Europe of its
dependence on China.
However, there
are also
transatlantic
trade tensions
that
disturb
the
U.S.–EU
relationship
and
that
have
been
evident
across
Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review
of trade arrangements between
the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses
are
treated
fairly
and
to
build
productive
reciprocity.
Outside
the
EU,
trade
with
the
post-Brexit U.K.
needs
urgent
development
before
London
slips
back
into
the orbit of
the EU.
Third,
in the
wake of
Brexit, EU
foreign policy
now takes
place without
U.K. input, which
disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has
historically been
aligned
with
many
U.S.
positions.
Therefore,
U.S.
diplomacy
must
be
more attentive
to
inner-EU
developments,
while
also
developing
new
allies
inside
the
EU—especially the
Central
European countries
on the
eastern flank
of the EU, which are
most
vulnerable to
Russian
aggression.
South
and Central
Asia
Many key American interests and
responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically,
continuing to advance
the bilateral
relationship with India to
mutual benefit
is a
crucial
objective for U.S.
policy. India
plays a
crucial role
in countering
the
Chinese
threat
and
securing
a
free
and
open
Indo–Pacific.
It is a critical
security
guarantor for
the key
routes of
air and
sea travel
linking East and West
and an
important
emerging U.S.
economic
partner. For
instance, the 2019 Department of Defense
Indo–Pacific Strategy
Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of
global trade and commerce, with nearly half
of the
world’s 90,000
commercial
vessels and
two thirds
of global
oil trade
traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the
fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14
Meanwhile,
the
threat
of
transnational
terrorism remains
acute. The
humiliat-
ing
withdrawal
of
U.S.
troops from
Afghanistan after
a
20-year
military campaign
has
created new
challenges. It
has provided
an opportunity
to reset
the deeply
troubled U.S.–Pakistan
relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy
in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions
regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose
risks to regional stability, especially because both
countries are nuclear powers.
The State Department’s
role in
strengthening the regional
security and
eco- nomic
framework
linking the
U.S
and
India
is
crucial.
In
addition,
the
department has
important
functional responsibilities in
dealing with
a range of
threats from
nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While
American statecraft should
also
seek
to
improve
bilateral
relations
throughout
the
region,
U.S.
policy
must be clear-eyed and
realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and
the
military–political
rule
in
Pakistan.
There
can
be
no
expecta- tion
of normal relations with either.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
The priority for
statecraft is advancing
the U.S.–Indian
role as
a cornerstone
of
the Quad,
a
cooperative
framework
including
the
U.S.,
India,
Japan,
and
Aus- tralia.
The
Quad
is
comprised
of the
key
nations
in
coordinating
efforts
for
a
free and
open
Indo–Pacific. It
is
an
overarching
group
that
nests
the
key
U.S.
bilateral and
trilateral
cooperative efforts that
facilitate U.S. collaborative
efforts across
the
Indo–Pacific.
The
State
Department
should
also
encourage
the
“Quad-Plus”
concept that allows other
regional powers to participate in Quad coordination on
issues of mutual interest. Further, the State Department must
support an inte- grated federal effort to deliver a revamped regional strategy for South
Asia, as well as
leading the
execution of
key tasks
to implement
the strategy.15
The
Arctic
Because
of Alaska,
the U.S.
is an
Arctic nation.
The Arctic
is a vast expanse
of land
and
sea
rich
in
resources
including
fish,
minerals,
and
energy.
For
example, the
region is
estimated to
contain 90
million
barrels of
oil and one-quarter
of the
world’s undiscovered
natural
gas
reserves.16 The
Arctic
is
lightly
populated: Only
4
million
people in
the
world
live above
the
Arctic
Circle, with
more than
half of those
living in
Russia. Only
around 68,000
people in
Alaska live
above the
Arctic
Circle.17 However,
the sheer immensity of the Alaskan Arctic means its population
density
is less
than one
person per
square mile.18
The
United States
has
several
strong interests
in
the
Arctic region.
The
rate
of melting
ice during
summer months
has led
to increased
interest not
only from
shipping
and
tourism
sectors,
but
also
from
America’s
global
competitors,
who are
interested in exploiting
the region’s
strategic
importance and
accessing its
bounty of natural resources.
In
the
not-too-distant
future, there
will be
a
growing
interest in
the
Arctic
from both state and
non-state actors alike. China has been open about its interest
in the region, primarily as a
highway for trade but also for its rich natural resources.
While
the
PRC’s
increasing
intervention
in
Arctic
affairs
is
a
bit
strained
because it
does
not
have
an
Arctic
coastline,
Russia does—and
Russia
has
made
no
secret of
its view
that the
Arctic is
vital for
economic and
military
reasons. Russia
has invested heavily
in new and refurbished Arctic bases and cold-weather equipment
and
capabilities.
The
north
star
of
U.S.
Arctic
policy
should
remain
national
sov- ereignty,
safeguarded through
robust
capabilities
as
well
as
through
diplomatic,
economic, and legal attentiveness.
The
next Administration
should embrace
the
view
that NATO
must acknowl- edge
that it
is,
in
part, an
Arctic alliance.
With the
likely accession
of
Finland
and
Sweden
to
NATO,
every Arctic
nation except
for
Russia
will be
a
NATO
member state.
NATO has
been slow
to appreciate
that the
Arctic is
a theater that
it must
defend, especially
considering Russia’s brazen aggression against Ukraine. NATO
must
develop
and
implement
an Arctic
strategy
that
recognizes
the
importance
of
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
the
region and
ensures that
Russian use
of
Arctic
waters and
resources does
not exceed a reasonable
footprint.
The U.S. should
unapologetically pursue American
interests in the
Arctic by
promoting economic freedom in
the region. Economic freedom spurs prosperity,
innovation, respect
for the
rule of
law, jobs,
and
sustainability. Most
important, economic
freedom can
help to
keep the
Arctic stable
and secure.
The
U.S. should
work to
ensure that
shipping lanes
in
the
Arctic remain
avail- able to all
global commercial traffic and free of onerous fees and
burdensome administrative,
regulatory,
and military
requirements. While this
should be
the next
Administration’s policy
with
respect
to
all
countries
that
might
seek
to
block free-flowing
commercial
traffic,
the
next
Administration
will
clearly
have
to
exert
substantial attention toward Russia.
Both
the
U.S.
Coast Guard
and
the
U.S. Navy
are
vital
tools to
ensure an
unmo- nopolized Arctic.
It is imperative that the Navy and Coast Guard continue to
expand their
fleets,
including planned
icebreaker
acquisitions, to assure
Arctic access
for
the
United
States
and
other
friendly
actors.
The
remote
and
harsh
con-
ditions
of
the
Arctic
also
make
unmanned
system investment
and
use
particularly
appealing
for
providing
additional
situational
awareness,
intelligence,
surveillance,
and reconnaissance.
The
Coast
Guard
should
also
consider
upgrading
facilities,
such as
its Barrow
station, to
reinforce its
Arctic
capabilities and demonstrate
a greater commitment to the region.
The
People’s Republic
of
China
has
declared
itself a
“near-Arctic state,”
which is
an imaginary
term
non-existent in
international
discourse. The United
States should work
with like-minded Arctic nations, including Russia, to raise
legitimate concerns
about the
PRC’s
so-called Polar Silk-Road
ambitions.
Concerning
Greenland, the
opening of
a
U.S.
consulate in
Nuuk is
welcome. A
formal
year-round
diplomatic presence is
an effective
way for
the U.S.
to better
understand local
political and
economic
dynamics. Furthermore,
given Green-
land’s
geographic
proximity
and
its
rising
potential
as
a
commercial
and
tourist location,
the
next
Administration should
pursue
policies
that
enhance
economic ties
between the
U.S. and
Greenland.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Defending
and
protecting
the
American
people and
advancing their
interests
requires
the
United
States to
engage in
a
broad
spectrum of
bilateral and
multilateral
relationships,
including
participating
in
international
organizations.
Working with
other
governments
through international
organizations
like
the
United
Nations
(U.N.)
can
be
tremendously useful—but
membership in
these organizations
must always be
understood as
a
means
to
attain
defined goals
rather than
an
end
in
itself.
Engagement
with international
organizations
is
one
relatively
easy way
for
the
U.S. to defend
its interests
and to
seek to address
problems
in
concert with other
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
nations,
but it
is not
the only
option—and
American diplomats
should be
clear- eyed
about international
organizations’
strengths and weaknesses.
When such
institutions act
against
U.S.
interests,
the
United
States
must
be
prepared
to
take
appropriate steps
in
response,
up
to
and
including
withdrawal.
The
manifest
failure
and corruption
of
the
World
Health
Organization
(WHO)
during
the
COVID-19
pandemic is an example of the
danger that international organizations pose to U.S.
citizens and interests.
The next Administration must end
blind support for international organi- zations. If an
international organization is effective and advances American
interests, the United States should support it. If an
international organization is ineffective or
does not
support
American interests,
the United
States should
not support it. Those
that are
effective will
still require
constant
pressure from
U.S. officials to
ensure that
they remain
effective. Serious consideration
should also
be
given
to
withdrawal
from
organizations
that
no
longer
have
value,
quietly undermine
U.S.
interests
or goals,
or
disproportionately
rely
on
U.S.
financial
con- tributions
to survive.
The
Trump
Administration’s
“tough love”
approach to
international
organiza-
tions
served
American
interests.
For
example,
the
Trump
Administration
withdrew
from,
or
terminated
funding
for,
the
United
Nations
Human
Rights
Council,
the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the
United Nations
Relief and
Works
Agency,
and
the
WHO.
The
results
were
redeployment of
taxpayer
dollars
to
better
uses—and
other organizations
“getting
the
message”
that the
United
States
will
not
allow
itself
and
its
money
to
be
used
to
undermine its
own interests.
The Biden Administration
reversed many
of these
decisions.
Currently, U.S.
funding for international organizations is more than $16 billion
in fiscal year 2021—a
sharp
increase
from $10.8
billion
in
fiscal
year
2015.19 Millions
of
American
taxpayer
dollars go
to
support
policies and
initiatives that
hurt the
United States
and American citizens.
The next Administration should
direct the Secretary of State to initiate a comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis of U.S. participation in
all international
organizations. This
review
should
take
into
account
long-standing
provisions
in federal
law that
prohibit the
use of
taxpayer
dollars to
promote
abortion, popu- lation control,
and terrorist
activities, as well
as other
applicable restrictions on
funding
for
international organizations
and
agencies
with
a
view
to
withholding
U.S.
funds
in
cases of
abuses.
International
organizations
should
not
be
used to
promote radical
social pol- icies
as
if
they were
human rights
priorities. Doing
so
undermines
actual human rights
and
weakens
U.S. credibility
abroad. The
next Administration
should use
its voice, influence, votes, and
funding in international organizations to pro- mote
authentic
human rights
and respect
for
sovereignty based
on the binding
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
international obligations contained
in treaties that have been constitutionally ratified
by the
U.S.
government. It
must promote
a strict
text-based interpreta- tion of
treaty
obligations that
does not
consider human
rights
treaties as
“living instruments” both
within
the
State
Department
and
within
international
organi-
zations that receive U.S.
funding, including by making respect for sovereignty and
authentic human rights a litmus test of personnel decisions and
elections processes within international organizations.
The
U.S. Commission
on
Unalienable
Human Rights
focused on
the
primacy
of
civil and
political
rights in
its inaugural
report, which
remains an
important guidepost for
bilateral
and
multilateral
engagements
on
human
rights.
The
com-
mission’s report is a roadmap
for revamping and reenergizing U.S. human rights
policy
and
should
be
the
basis
for
both
structural
and
policy
changes
throughout the
State
Department.20
All
U.S.
multilateral engagements must
be reevaluated
in
light of
the
work
of
the
commission,
and
initiatives
that
promote
controversial
policies must
be halted
and rolled
back.
It
is
paramount
to
create
a
healthy
culture of
respect for
life, the
family, sover-
eignty, and
authentic human rights in international organizations and
agencies. To support
this goal,
the
U.S.
led
an
effort during
the
Trump
Administration
to
forge a consensus
among like-minded
countries in
support of
human life,
women’s health,
support
of the
family as
the basic
unit of
human society,
and defense
of national
sovereignty.
The result
was
the
Geneva
Consensus Declaration
on
Women’s
Health
and
Protection
of the
Family.21 All
U.S.
foreign
policy engagements
that were
pro-
duced
and
expanded
under the
Obama and
Biden Administrations
must be
aligned
with
the
Geneva
Consensus Declaration
and
the
work of
the
U.S.
Commission on
Unalienable Human Rights.
The
U.S. government
should not
and
cannot
promote or
fund abortion
in
inter-
national
programs or multilateral organizations. Technically, the United
States can prevent
its
international funding from
going toward
abortions, but
the U.S.
will have
a greater
impact
by
including
like-minded
nations
and
building
on
the
coali- tion
launched
through
the Geneva
Consensus
Declaration,
with
a
view
to
shaping the
work of
international
agencies by
functioning as
a united
front.
The COVID-19
pandemic made it painfully clear that both international organi-
zations—and some countries—are only too willing to trample human
rights in the
name
of
public
health.
For example,
the
WHO
was,
and remains,
willing
to
support
the
suppression of
basic
human
rights,
partially
because
of
its
close
relationship
with human
rights abusers
like the
PRC.
The next Administration should
unequivocally embrace the premise that
humanity
and
the
international
community
can
simultaneously
tackle
pandem- ics
and other
emergent
health threats
without
impeding the
rights of
people. It
must
also
become
a
vocal
surrogate
for
people
in
countries
where
rights
are
being
suppressed in
the name
of health.
This will
likely require
greater
restrictions on
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
the
supply of
federal dollars
to
the
WHO
and
other health-focused
international
organizations pending
adjustment of
their
policies.
The
United States
must return
to
treating
international
organizations
as
vehi-
cles
for promoting American interests—or
take steps
to extract
itself from
those organizations.
SHAPING
THE
FUTURE
Development
of
a
grand foreign
policy strategy
is
key
to
the
next Administra-
tion’s
success, but
without
addressing structural and
related issues
of the
State Department, this
strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for
a
significant
restructuring
of
the
State
Department
specifically
and
foreign
assis-
tance programs generally,
stating that funding increases could only be justified if
there was greater confidence
that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly,
the
exact
opposite has
occurred. The
State Department
has
metastasized
in
structure
and
resources,
but
neither
the
function
of
the
department nor
the
use
of
taxpayer
dollars has
improved. The
next Administration
can
take
steps to
remedy these
deficiencies.
The State Department’s greatest
problem is certainly not an absence of resources.
As noted,
the department
boasts tens
of thousands of employees
and billions
of
dollars
of
funding—including
significant
amounts
of
discretionary
fund- ing.
It also
exists among
a broader
array of
federal
agencies that
are
duplicative, particularly when
it
comes
to
the
provision
of
direct
and
indirect
foreign
assistance.
Realistically,
meaningful
reform
of
the
State
Department
will
require
significant
streamlining.
Below
are
some
key
structural
and
operational
recommendations
that
will be
essential
for
the
next Administration’s
success, and
which will
lay
crucial
founda- tions for other
necessary reforms.
•
Develop a reorganization strategy.
Despite periodic attempts by
previous
Administrations
(including
the
Trump
Administration)
to
make more than
cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has
remained
largely unchanged
since the
20th century.23 The
State
Department will
better serve
future
Administrations, regardless of
party, if
it were
to
be
meaningfully streamlined.
The
next
Administration
should
develop a complete
hypothetical reorganization
of
the
department—one
which would
tighten
accountability to political
leadership, reduce overhead,
eliminate
redundancy,
waste
fewer
taxpayer
resources,
and
recommend
additional
personnel-related
changes for
improvement of
function.
Such
reorganization
could
be
creative,
but
also
carefully review
specific
structure-related
problems
that have
been documented
over the
years.
This
reorganization
effort would
necessarily assess
what office
closures
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
can
be
carried out
with and
without congressional
approval. Timelines
for
action
on
these
fronts should
be
developed
accordingly, but
speed should
be a priority.
•
Consolidate foreign
assistance
authorities.
Foreign
assistance is a
critical
foreign policy
tool that
is too
often
disconnected from the
federal government’s
practice of
foreign policy.
Bureaucrats
spend significant
energy resisting the
use of
non-emergency foreign assistance
to leverage
positive results
for the
United States,
even though
it is
a perfectly
reasonable
proposition. The
coordination of
foreign
assistance dollars is
also
difficult
because the
foreign
assistance
budget
and
foreign
loan
issuance
authorities are
divided across
numerous
Cabinet departments,
smaller agencies, and other offices.
The
next
Administration should take
steps to
ensure that
future foreign
assistance clearly and
unambiguously supports the
President’s foreign policy agenda.
For example,
the next
administrator of the
U.S. Agency
for International
Development, which is
technically subordinate to
the State Department, should be authorized to take on the
additional role of
Director of
Foreign
Assistance with the
rank of
Deputy
Secretary and oversee
all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during
the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by
the
Obama
Administration—would
empower
the
dual-hatted
official to
better align and
coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across
the federal government. The next Administration should also
evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance
are in
the
national
interest and,
if not,
develop a
plan to
consolidate
foreign assistance authorities.
•
Make
public
diplomacy and
international broadcasting serve
American interests.
A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to
communicate
with
not
only
governments
but
with
the
peoples
of
the
world. Indeed,
in some
ways,
communicating directly with
the public
is more
important than
communicating
with
governments,
particularly
in
times
of governmental
conflict or
disagreement.
Public diplomacy
has
historically been,
and
remains,
vital to
American
foreign
policy
success.
Unfortunately,
U.S.
public diplomacy,
which largely
relies on
taxpayer-funded
international broadcasting outlets, has
been deeply
ineffective in recent
years.
The
U.S. government’s
first foray
into international
broadcasting started
with
the
Voice of
America radio
broadcast in
1942, which
was
intended
as
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
a
tool to
communicate
directly with
the people
of Europe
during World
War II. During the next
half-century, America’s international broadcasting
efforts
both
expanded
and increased
in
sophistication
as
the
United
States shifted
out of
its “hot”
war in
Europe and
into the
Cold War
with the
Soviet Union. U.S.
international broadcasting prowess,
and the
confident willingness
to
communicate the
correctness
of
American
ideals
in
the
face of
global
resistance, arguably
hit its
peak near
the conclusion
of the
Cold War in the late 1980s.
Since
the
fall
of
the
Berlin Wall
in
1989
and
the
subsequent collapse
of
Soviet
and Eastern Bloc Communism,
factors
including
the false
appeal
of
a
so-called peace
dividend triggered
a
slide
in
the
U.S. ability
to communicate
a pro-freedom
message to
the rest of
the world
and in
its commitment to do
so. Ironically,
this slide
accompanied the rise
of the Internet
and mobile phone
technologies, which arguably
facilitated the most
significant
revolution
in
human
communication
since
the
invention
of the printing
press.
The
United States
must reassert
its public
diplomacy
obligations by
restoring
its international
broadcasting
infrastructure
as
part
of
the
broader
U.S.
foreign policy
framework, consolidating
broadcasting resources
and
recommitting
to
people-focused
and
pro-freedom
messaging and
content.
•
Engage in cyber diplomacy.
Cyberspace has become an arena for
competition between
the U.S.
and nations
that seek
and export
digital
authoritarianism.
Cyberspace
protection
is
critical
to
national
security
and deserving
of commensurate
diplomatic resources. Defined
as “the
use of
diplomatic tools
to
address
issues
arising
in
and
through
cyberspace,”
cyber
diplomacy
is a
key
part
of
the
U.S.
government’s
toolkit
for
preventing
and addressing
cyber threats.24
The
model for
cyberspace
that the
U.S. espouses
is based
on democracy
and
freedom of
information.
It
is
“an
open,
interoperable,
secure,
reliable,
market-drive,
domain that
reflects democratic
values and
protects privacy.”25 Russia
and China,
meanwhile, are authoritarian
regimes that
use the
Internet to limit
public
opposition and
control
information. They have created
technological tools to
enforce
dominance over
their peoples,
and
at
the U.N.
and
international organizations dealing
with
cyberspace, they
strive
to
push
standards
that
assist
their
totalitarian
efforts
and
undermine
Western nations.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Simultaneously, Russia, China,
and lesser
adversaries exploit the
more open
networks
of
countries
like
the
U.S.
to
undermine
democracy
through
disinformation
and
propaganda.
They
have
attempted
to
influence
U.S. elections;
enabled or
encouraged
actors to
exploit cyber
vulnerabilities
to
commit theft
of
real
or
intellectual
property; and
have challenged
U.S.
governmental,
military,
and
critical
infrastructure
networks
with targeted
malware.
In
short, the
cyberspace era
has gradually
evolved from
one of
exploration, innovation,
and
cooperation to
one that
retains these
features but
is also marked
by aggressive competition
and persistent
threats. To
meet this reality, the
State
Department must
move beyond
its traditional model of
attempting to establish
non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable
cyberspace behavior. The
State
Department should
work with
allies to
establish a
clear framework
of enforceable
norms for
actions in
cyberspace, moving
beyond the
voluntary norms
of the
United Nations
Group of
Governmental Experts.26
The
State Department
should also
assist the
Department of
Defense to
go
“on
offence” against
adversaries. “Deterrence
as
a
strategic approach
has
not
stemmed
the
onslaught
of
cyber
aggression below
the
level
of
armed
conflict.”27 The
traditional
U.S. defensive
approach based
on
deterrence
followed by reaction
to
crossed
“red lines”
is
no
longer effective.
Adversaries can
evade
this
strategy
through multiple
tactical lines
of
action
below the
level of
armed
conflict, and
such actions
have a
cumulative strategic
effect. The
State Department’s
role
should be
to
work
with allies
and
engage
with adversaries
when
necessary
to
draw
clear lines
of
unacceptable
conduct. Global
financial infrastructure,
nuclear
controls, and
public health
are
particularly
important
areas
in
which
consensus may
even be
found across
ideological lines.
These
mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined
with others to
establish a
presidentially
directed and
durable U.S.
foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
The next
conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to
restructure
the
creation
and
execution
of
U.S.
foreign policy
so
that
it
is
focused on
his
or
her vision for
the
nation's
role in
the
world.
The
policy
ideas and
reform recommen-
dations
outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State
Department can contribute to
this objective.
In the main,
this chapter
refocuses
attention away
from the
special
interests and
social
experiments
that
are
used
in
some
quarters
to
capture
U.S.
foreign
policy.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
The
ideas and
recommendations
herein
are
premised
on
the
belief that
a
rigorous
adherence
to
the
national interest
is
the
most enduring
foundation for
U.S. grand
strategy in the 21st century.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders
and staff of the 2025
Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The
Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would
like to acknowledge the
following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James
Carafano, Spencer Chretien,
Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans,
Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael
Pillsbury, Max Primorac,
Reed Rubenstein, Brett
Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John
Zadrozny.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S. Department of State, “About the U.S. Department of
State: Our History,”
https://www.state.gov/about/ (accessed March 9, 2023).
2.
The
balance
of
employment
is
2,149
eligible
family
members
and
50,223
locally
employed
staff.
U.S.
Department of State, “GTM
Fact Sheet: Facts About Our Most Valuable Asset—Our People,”
Global Talent
Management, December
31,
2022,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GTM_Factsheet1222.
pdf
(accessed
March
9,
2023).
3.
U.S.
Commission
on
National
Security,
Road
Map
for
National
Security:
Imperative
for
Change,
Phase
III
Report,
February 15, 2001, p. x,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
4.
See
Brett
D.
Schaefer,
“How
to
Make
the
State
Department
More
Effective
at
Implementing
U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder
No.
3115, April 20, 2016,
https://www.heritage.org/political-
process/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign.
5.
Historically, roughly
one-third
of
ambassadorial
appointments
have
been
political
appointments,
although
Republican Administrations
have generally had a higher ratio of political appointments than
Democratic
Administrations.
6.
U.S.
Constitution,
art.
2,
sec.
2,
cl.
2.
7.
News release, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of
China Coordination,” U.S. Department of State, December 16, 2022,
https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/
(accessed March
9,
2023).
8.
Immigration and
Nationality
Act,
8
U.S.
Code
§
1101
et
seq.,
§
1253.
9.
See Michael
Pillsbury,
The Hundred
Year Marathon:
China’s Secret
Strategy to
Replace the
United States
as a
Global Superpower
(NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016).
10.
For
additional
context
regarding
how
countering
China
fits
in
a
more
robust
U.S.
strategy,
see
James
Jay
Carafano et al., “Foreign
Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder
No. 3715, July 21,
2022,
https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-policy-strategy-post-biden-era.
11.
The
Article
X
for
China
would
follow
George
Kennan’s
Article
X
for
U.S.–Soviet
competition.
See
George
F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet
Conduct,”
Foreign
Affairs, July 1947,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct
(accessed
March
22,
2023).
12.
Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint
for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next
Decades,” Heritage Foundation
Special
Report
No. 221,
February 20, 2010,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/
report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades.
13.
Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,”
Vanderbilt Journal
of
Transnational Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2001),
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1686&context=vjtl
(accessed March
9, 2023).
14.
U.S.
Department
of
Defense,
Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and
Promoting a
Networked Region, June 1, 2019,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-
DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF
(accessed
July
28,
2022).
15.
See Jeff Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage
Foundation
Backgrounder
No. 3721, August 29, 2022,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/south-asia-new-strategy.
16.
Emma Bryce, “Why Is There
So Much Oil in the Arctic?”
Live Science, August 3, 2019,
https://www.livescience.
com/66008-why-oil-in-arctic.html (accessed February 9, 2023).
17.
“Changes in the Arctic: Background
and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service
Report
for
Congress, updated January 26, 2021, p. 6,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/177 (accessed
March
9,
2023).
18.
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland
Security,
Science
and
Technology,
“Snapshot:
Overcoming
the
Tyranny
of Distance in the Arctic,”
April 20, 2020,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/20/
snapshot-overcoming-tyranny-distance-arctic
(accessed February 9, 2023).
19.
U.S.
Department
of
State,
“U.S.
Contributions
to
International
Organizations,
2021,”
September
20,
2022,
https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2021/
(accessed March 9, 2023), and
U.S.
Department
of
State,
“U.S.
Contributions
to
International
Organizations,
2015,”
November
1,
2016,
https://
www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2015/
(accessed March 9, 2023).
20.
U.S. Department
of State,
Report on the Commission of Inalienable Rights,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
21.
“Geneva
Consensus
Declaration
on
Promoting
Women’s
Health
and
Strengthening
the
Family,”
October 22, 2021,
https://www.theiwh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GCD-Declaration-2021-2.pdf
(accessed
March
13,
2023).
22.
U.S.
Commission
on
National
Security,
Road
Map for
National
Security.
23.
U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” November
2004,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/
perfrpt/2004/html/39764.htm
(accessed March
9, 2023);
U.S. Department
of State,
“Organization Chart,” November
2016,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/263637.pdf
(accessed
March
9,
2023);
U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” February 2020,
https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/Dept-Org-Chart-Feb-2020-508.pdf
(accessed
March
9,
2023);
U.S.
Department
of
State,
“DOS Org Chart August 2021,”
August 2021,
https://www.state.gov/department-of-state-organization-chart/
dos-org-chart-august-2021/
(accessed March 9, 2023); and U.S. Department of State,
“Organization Chart,”
May 2022,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/DOS-Org-Chart-5052022-Non-Accessible.
pdf
(accessed
March
9,
2023).
24.
Emily
O.
Goldman,
“Cyber
Diplomacy
for
Strategic
Competition:
Fresh
Thinking
and
New
Approaches
Are
Needed on
Diplomacy’s
Newest Frontier,”
Foreign Service
Journal,
June 2021,
http://afsa.org/cyber-
diplomacy-strategic-competition
(accessed March
9, 2023).
25.
Emily
Goldman,
“From
Reaction
to
Action:
Adopting
a
Competitive
Posture
in
Cyber
Diplomacy,”
Texas
National Security
Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Fall 2020),
https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TNSR-Vol3-
Iss4-Goldman.pdf
(accessed March
9, 2023).
26.
United
Nations
General
Assembly,
“Group
of
Government
Experts
on
Advancing
Responsible
State
Behaviour in
Cyberspace
in
the
Context
of
International
Security,”
A/76/135,
July
14,
2021,
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/A_76_135-2104030E-1.pdf
(accessed
March
10,
2023).
27.
Goldman,
“Cyber
Diplomacy.”
MISSION
STATEMENT
To arm a future
incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools
necessary
to
fortify
the
United
States Intelligence
Community; to
defend against
all foreign
enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign
nation, devoid of
all political
motivations; and to
maintain
constitutional civil
liberties.
OVERVIEW
The United
States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate
bureaucracy spread
throughout 18
independent
and Cabinet
subagencies.1 According
to the
Office of
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence
(ODNI),
the
IC’s
mission
is
“to
col-
lect,
analyze,
and deliver
foreign
intelligence
and
counterintelligence
information to
America’s
leaders so
they can make
sound decisions
to protect
our country.”2
An
incoming conservative
President needs
to
use
these intelligence
authorities
aggressively
to
anticipate
and
thwart
our
adversaries,
including Russia,
Iran, North
Korea,
and
especially
China, while
maintaining
counterterrorism
tools that
have demonstrated
their
effectiveness. This
means
empowering the
right
personnel to
manage,
build,
and
effectively
execute
actions
dispersed
throughout
the
IC
to deliver
intelligence in
an
ever-challenging
world.
It
also
means
removing
redun-
dancies, mission creep, and
IC infighting that could prevent these collection tools
from providing objective,
apolitical, and empirically backed intelligence to the IC’s
premier customer: the President of the United States.
Today,
as Abraham
Lincoln
famously said,
“The occasion
is piled
high with
difficulty, and
we
must
rise
with
the
occasion….
[W]e
must
think
anew,
and
act
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
anew.”3 The
Intelligence
Community maintains
an
incredible
capacity to
achieve
its
mission,
but
both
the
IC
and
the
somewhat antiquated
infrastructure
that
sup-
ports
it
often
place too
high a
priority on
yesterday’s threats
and
methodologies instead of
trying to identify possible future threats or the methodologies
that might be
needed to
combat them.
The IC also often
spends too
much time
over- correcting for past mistakes. The unintended
consequences include hesitancy, groupthink,
and an
overly
cautious approach
that allows
personal
incentives to drive
preset courses.
The
IC
must
be
perceived
as
a
depoliticized
protector
of
America’s
civil rights and
security. The
American people
are
understandably
frustrated by
the
fact
that those
who abuse
power are
rarely held
to account
for their
actions. This
must change,
beginning
with leadership
that
is
both
committed
to
ensuring
that
these
agencies
faithfully
execute
the
laws
of
the
land
under
the
Constitution
and
resolved
to punish
and
remove
any
officials
who
have
abused
the
public
trust.
The
IC
must
also start
to
look
forward, not
backward. A
concerted, disciplined,
leadership-led
initiative
must be
undertaken to
refocus and
shift IC
prioritization,
funding, and
authorities to
new
and
emerging threats,
technologies,
and
methodol- ogies if the United States is to prevail against
its global adversaries.4 Unfortunately,
America’s
major strategic
threat is
a nation-state
peer and
possibly ahead
of the
U.S.
in
strategic
areas. An
incoming President
must understand
that today’s
intel- ligence
competition could well
require
analyzing
technologies the
U.S. does
not have or compartmentalizing certain information as was
done during the Cold War
because
of
intelligence penetration.
A
future
President’s
ability
to
drive
the resources
needed to defeat another nation-state giant should therefore be
the focus of near-term IC reforms.
OFFICE
OF THE
DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE (ODNI)
The ODNI was
established in the
aftermath of
the attacks on
9/11 and
intelli- gence
failures
leading
up
to
the
2003
U.S.
war
in
Iraq.
The
office
and
its
functions stem
from authorities established under executive orders promulgated
by President George
W. Bush
in 2004,
followed by
statutory
authorizations in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).5
Proponents
of
an
ODNI hoped
to
establish
reforms similar
to
the
Goldwater– Nichols
Department of Defense (DOD) reforms of the 1980s, which
identified recurring
problems
within
DOD’s
command-and-control
architecture
and
led
to unified
Combatant Commands with
the Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs
of Staff
as the senior
ranking
member
of
the
armed
forces
and
principal
military
adviser
to
the
President.
The ODNI
was
envisioned
as
a
small
but
powerful
IC
coordinating
agency led
by
a
Director
of
National
Intelligence
(DNI).
As
the
President’s
principal
intelligence
adviser,
the
DNI
would
lead
and
provide
oversight
of
the
President’s
intelligence
authorities while
wielding a
cudgel—budget
and appointment
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
authorities—to break institutional
silos that had caused past intelligence inte- gration
failures.
Originally
envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as a strengthened,
authoritative
position,
the
final
congressionally
negotiated
product signed
by
President
Bush
has led to ambiguous and vague authorities that are dependent on who is
selected
as
DNI
and
Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
Director and
their level
of
support
from
the White
House and
National
Security Council
(NSC). 9/11
Commission Executive
Director
Philip
Zelikow
warned
in
a
2004
hearing
that
creating
a
new
agency “lacking any existing
institutional base…would require authorities at least as strong as
those we
have proposed
or else
it would
create a
bureaucratic
fifth wheel
that
would
make
the
present
situation
even
worse.”6 The
ODNI
has
become that
bureaucratic fifth wheel
about which
Zelikow warned.
For
example,
under the
Bush Administration’s
initial legislative
proposal, the
CIA
Director
would have
been under
the
“authority,
direction, and
control” of
the DNI
and no
longer the
head of
an autonomous agency. Additional
mechanisms envisioned
full
budget
authority
for the
DNI,
including
within
DOD’s
intelligence
components, as opposed to coordinating authority. Through
arduous “sau-
sage-making” and relatively
quick negotiations, lawmakers produced statutorily vague
authorities
that
traded
away
the
DNI’s
ability
to
direct
budgetary
authority
across the
entire
IC,
including
DOD,
and
left
the
CIA
a
subordinate
but
indepen- dent
agency
with
duties
to
report
to
the
DNI
without
explicit
directing
authority.
These statutory
developments were what
led President
Bush’s first
choice to serve
as DNI,
Robert Gates,
to turn
down the
position. In
discussions
with the
White House
over
the
post,
Gates
noted
that
the
“legislation
weakened
the
lead- ership
of the
community” and that
“instead of
a stronger person,
you ended
up with a
weaker person
because the
DNI had
no troops
and no
additional powers really
on
the
budget,
hiring,
and
firing.”7 Gates
noted
that
success would
require the
President to
“make explicit
publicly that
the DNI
is head
of the
Intelligence Community,
not some
budgeter or
coordinator,”
and that
“[t]he
position’s only
prayer
of
success
is for
the
president
to
say
plainly…how
he
sees
the
job.
Without
his
explicit
mandate…the endeavor
is
doomed
to
fail.”8
One
of
the
two
DNIs
confirmed by
the
Senate
during the
Trump Administra-
tion,
John
Ratcliffe, acknowledged that
Gates’s
theoretical concerns
became the
practical reality that he inherited:
Prior DNIs
were the
head of
the IC
only on
paper and
were routinely
accustomed to
yielding IC
actions and
decisions to
the
preferences of the
CIA
and
other
agencies.
My ability
to
begin
reversing
that
capitulation
was
accomplished solely because
President Trump made it repeatedly clear to the
entire
national
security
apparatus
that
he
expected
all
intelligence
matters to
go through the DNI.9
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
To help further the legislative
intent behind IRTPA, DNI Ratcliffe advised during
the transition
of incoming
Biden DNI
Avril Haines
that the
DNI should be
the only Cabinet-level
intelligence official.10
While
his
recommendation was adopted
and
has
corrected
the
previously
allowed
imbalance
by
making
the
DNI
the
only
Cabinet
official
and
head
of
the
IC
at
the
table,
the
ODNI’s
effectiveness
and direction
leave much
to be
desired.
A
conservative President
must decide
how
to
empower an
individual to
oversee and
manage the
Intelligence Community effectively.
To be
successful, the DNI
and
ODNI
must
be
able
to
lead
the
IC
and
implement
the President’s
intelligence
priorities.
This
includes
being
able
to
exercise
both
budget
and
personnel
authority and being
able to rely on timely, useful feedback from subordinate
components of the
IC, many
of which
are located
within other
Cabinet
agencies.
The
ODNI needs
to
direct,
not
replicate
in-house, the
other IC
agencies’ analytic,
operational,
and management functions.
Considerations like
mismanagement of
human resources, joint-duty
assignments, and accelerated
growth in
senior personnel can cause
a President
to dictate
to his
incoming DNI
a desire to
slash redundant
positions
and
expenditures
while
simultaneously
giving
the
DNI
the authority
to
drive
necessary
changes throughout
the
IC
to
deal
with
the
nation’s
most compelling threats,
including those emanating from China. As John Ratcliffe
has
noted,
“These
are
essential
to the
DNI
having
the
abilities
and
authorities
to
effectively direct,
coordinate,
and
tackle
the
immense
national
security
challenges
ahead for
the
Intelligence Community
as intended
under IRTPA.”11
Otherwise,
other Cabinet
and
subordinate
IC
agencies
will continue
to
regard
the
ODNI
as
an
annoyance and
not
as
a
positive
contributor to
the
National
Intel- ligence Program (NIP) budget. They will continue to
work around or circumvent
ODNI leadership decisions with appropriators and the Office of Management
and
Budget
(OMB) or
seek to
wait out
an
Administration
or
DNI
to
prevent
a
policy
or intelligence
priority from reaching fruition.
Intelligence
and
interagency
coordination has improved
significantly since 9/11.
Nevertheless,
interagency rivalries and
festering
issues continue
to cause
duplication of
effort
on
intelligence
analysis
and
technology
purchases
as
well
as
overclassification and
ever-increasing
compartmentalization.
Additional
issues
include
the
abuse
of
mandated
onboarding
approval
and
reciprocity
timelines
by some
agencies, recruitment and
retention failures, and
a lack
of will
to remove
underperforming or
timely
adjudicate the
misconduct of
senior managers
and other
employees.
Finally,
future IC
leadership must
address the
widely promoted
“woke” cul-
ture that has
spread throughout the federal government with identity politics
and “social
justice” advocacy
replacing such
traditional American
values as
patriotism,
colorblindness, and
even workplace competence.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
12333
IRTPA
was
passed
in
the
aftermath of
the
9/11
attacks against
the
homeland.
It was
intended to
improve the
sharing of
information
among the
elements of
the IC,
recognizing
that
the
nature
of
the
threats
we
now
face
blurs
the
lines
between foreign
and domestic
intelligence
in detecting and countering
national
security threats
against
the
homeland.
An
equally
important
objective
in
passing
the
most
significant
intelligence reform since
the National
Security Act
of 194712
was
cre- ation
of
the
position
of
DNI,
charged
with
assuming
two
of
the
three
principal
roles that
formerly
belonged to
the Director
of Central
Intelligence (DCI): serving
as principal
intelligence
adviser
to
the
President
and
leading
the
IC
as
an
enterprise.
Nearly two
decades later,
the DNI’s
record of
effectiveness in improving
the sharing
of
information
and
operating
the
IC
as
an
enterprise
is
mixed.
Implemen-
tation of
the DNI’s
roles as
leader of
the IC
and principal
intelligence adviser to
the
President
has been
challenging.
However,
despite
flaws
in
the
legislation
and intelligence
agencies’
bureaucratic
jockeying
that
undermine
the
DNI,
it
is
impos- sible
to know
what would
emerge if
Congress were
to revisit
the act.
Seeking a
legislative
solution
therefore
might
carry
with
it
more
risks
than
benefits.
Instead, an
incoming
conservative President’s immediate
focus should
be on
modifying
Executive Order 12333, the
President’s direction for implementing IRTPA.13
Executive
Order 12333
was
last
amended on
July 30,
2008, by
President George
W. Bush.14
The
revisions were
aligned with
IRTPA with
significant
emphasis on having
the IC
address the
threats to
the homeland
from
international
terrorism and the proliferation
of weapons
of mass
destruction. There is
scant mention
of cyber
threats
and
the
evolving
national
security
challenges
posed
by
China,
Russia, and
other U.S.
adversaries.
By extension,
the revised
order fell
short of
stipulat- ing
how the
DNI
would
execute
his
authority
to
organize
the
IC
in
a
manner
that improves
the delivery
of timely
intelligence to a
wide array
of customers.
Executive
Order 12333
should be
amended to
take account
of the changing landscape
of
threats
and
improve
the
functional
aspects
of
America’s
intelligence
enterprise. To
that end,
a revised
order should:
•
Address
the threats
to the
United States
and its
allies in
cyberspace.
These threats
range from
cyberwarfare to information
operations. The amended order
should clearly
delineate the
roles and
responsibilities
of the
various
U.S.
government
cyber
missions,
including
the
recently
created
National Cyber
Director’s Office and
power centers
at the
NSC, while
protecting the
privacy and
civil
liberties of U.S.
citizens.
Under
the
DNI’s
direction, the
cyber mission
should explicitly
identify how information
in
the
cyber domain
will be
shared promptly
with the
warfighters,
from law
enforcement agencies
to
the
broader IC
and
state,
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
local,
and tribal
elements. The
order should
consider
stipulating what to do
with DOD
cyber agencies,
most notably
the NSA,
in terms
of strategic
(for
example,
the
President
and
the
DNI)
vs.
tactical
support
(for
example,
support for
the warfighter)
in conjunction
with ongoing
congressionally mandated
reviews of
the future dual-hatted
relationship.
•
Enhance the
DNI’s role
in overseeing
execution of
the National Intelligence
Program budget
under the
President’s
authority.
This should be
done in
a manner
that is
consistent with Congress’s
intent as
embodied in
IRTPA. Under
the executive
order as
written today,
the DNI “shall oversee and
direct the
implementation of the
National
Intelligence Program.”
In practice,
the DNI’s
authority to
oversee
execution of
the IC’s budget
remains
constrained
by
an
inability
to
address
changing
intelligence
priorities
and
mandate
the implementation
of
appropriated
NIP
funding
to higher
intelligence priorities.
The
DNI should
have the
President’s direction to
address
emerging but
catastrophic threats
such as those posed
by bioweapons.
Clarifying how much budget
authority the DNI
has in
conjunction (within the
limits of
congressional appropriations)
with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to
move around
money and
personnel is
crucial, but
positions will
not always be fungible. It
will probably
be necessary
to hold
IC leadership
accountable at intransigent agencies
and to
restructure areas through executive
orders in
close
conjunction with OMB,
as needed.
•
Clarify the
DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the
IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic
missions.
The exponential
growth
in open-source
information,
often called
OSINT,
is not disputed.
In
the IC,
the
use of
publicly
available information,
notwithstanding
the
authorities
within IRTPA
for
the DNI
to
manage OSINT,
remains disaggregated.
The explosion
of
private-sector intelligence
products
and
expertise
should signal
to
IC leadership
that
duplicative efforts
are
unnecessary
and
that limited
resources
should be
focused
on problematic
collection
tasks.
The
IC
should
avoid duplication
of
what
is
already
being done
well in the
private sector
and
focus
instead on
complex questions
that cannot
be
answered by
conventional
and frequently
increasing numbers of
commercial
tools and
capabilities.
If necessary,
for lack
of results
from the
National Open Source Committee,
the DNI
should appoint
the Principal
Deputy Director
of
National
Intelligence
(PDDNI)
as
chairman
to
prioritize and
promote
accountability for the
IC’s 18
agencies toward
this effort.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
•
Prioritize security
clearance
reform.
Security
clearance
reform has
made
significant progress
under
Trusted
Workforce
2.0,
a
governmentwide
background
investigation
reform
that
was
implemented
beginning
in
2018 with
the
goal
of
creating
one system
with
reciprocity
across
organizations.
This
included allowing
movement from
periodic reinvestigations
toward a
Continuous Vetting (CV)
program with
automated
records checks,
adjudication of
flags, the
“mitigat[ion of] personnel
security
situations before
they
become
a
larger
problem,”
or
the
suspension
or
revocation
of clearances.15 However,
human resources onboarding operations in major
agencies
such as
the CIA,
FBI, and
NSA remain
to be
resolved.
As
executive
agent for
security
clearances, the DNI
must require
results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce
the 48-hour reciprocity guidance,
and target
human resources
operations that fail
to attract
and expediently
onboard
qualified
personnel.
Additional
“carrots
and
sticks” from
executive order
reform
language, including
moving the
Security Services
Directorate
from NCSC
to ODNI
with elevated
status, may
be necessary.
It is
unacceptable for agencies
to hinder
opportunities for cross- agency
assignments, use public–private
partnerships inefficiently because
of constraints
on the
transferability of security
clearances, and lose
future talent because
of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting
to
speed
the
onboarding
of personnel
with
much-needed
expertise
is
vital
to the IC’s
future.
•
Ensure the DNI’s authority.
The DNI’s authority should be similar to
an orchestra
conductor’s. An
incoming
conservative President will
appoint whomever he chooses
as DNI,
but there
should be
agreement
between the
incoming
DNI and
President
with
advice
and
counsel
from
the
Presidential
Personnel Office
on selecting
positions
overseen by
the DNI
throughout subordinate
agencies, as
well as concurrence
by relevant
Cabinet
officials and
the
CIA.
This
exists
by
executive
order,
but
many
Presidents,
PPOs,
and Cabinet
agency
heads
do
not
follow
executive
order guidance
and
necessary
norms. The
importance of trust,
character, and the
ability to
work together to achieve
a joint
set of
intelligence goals established
by the
President cannot
be
overstated: It
is
a
mission
that
can
be
accomplished
only
with
the conductor
and his
orchestra
playing in
sync.
•
Provide additional support for such economic and supply
chain– focused
agencies as the Department of Commerce.
Information sharing
and feedback
can help
subagencies like the
Commerce
Department’s
Bureau
of
Industry
and
Security
to
improve
their understanding
of
the
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
threat
from China
and thereby
counter it
more
effectively. They can
also aid
the
development
of
export
control
mechanisms
and
potential
outbound investment
screening
where
necessary.
Brief, specific
governance
language
should
be
considered
that would
apply counterterrorist
authority models
to the
broader
functions of
the U.S.
government insofar as
they are
needed to
counter 21st century nation-state threats.
The success of
any DNI
rests with
support from
the President. Any revised
Executive
Order 12333
must
serve
to
express
unequivocal
support
for
the
DNI
in executing
the mandates
that an
amended order
would provide.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
(CIA)
The CIA is a
foreign intelligence collection service tasked with collecting
human intelligence (HUMINT),
providing all-source intelligence analysis and report- ing,
and conducting covert action
when required
to do
so by
the President.
The CIA
has
its
roots
in
the
Office
of
Strategic
Services
(OSS),
which
the
United
States
established during World War
II as a paramilitary and intelligence collection orga- nization.
After World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS,
and the CIA was
established in
law by
the National
Security Act
of 1947.
As with every
agency in government, the President's election sets a new agenda
for
the country.
Public
servants must
be mindful
that they
are required
to help the
President implement that
agenda while
remaining
apolitical, upholding the
Constitution and
laws
of
the
United
States,
and
earning
the
public
trust.
The
Pres- ident
requires a
CIA that provides
unbiased and
apolitical
foreign intelligence
information and,
when
necessary, can
act capably
and
effectively on
any covert
action findings.
Executing the Mission.
The
CIA’s
success depends
on
firm
direction from
the
President and solid internal CIA Director–appointed leadership. Decisive
senior
leaders must commit to carrying out the President’s agenda and
be willing to take calculated
risks. Therefore:
•
The next President-Elect and incoming
Presidential Personnel Office
should
identify
a
Director
nominee
who
can
foster
a
mission-driven
culture by
making
necessary personnel
and structural changes.
•
The President-Elect should choose a Deputy
Director who, without needing
Senate
confirmation, can immediately
begin to
implement the
President’s agenda. This
includes
halting all
current hiring
to prevent
the
“burrowing in”
of
outgoing
political personnel.
Additional appointees
should be placed within the
agency as needed to assist the Director in supervising its
functioning.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
•
The
Director
and
Deputy
Director
should
request
briefings
on
all
CIA activities and
presence overseas, as well as any CIA-controlled access
programs and
existing covert
action
findings, without
exception.
•
The
Director and
Deputy
Director should
meet with
all
directorates and mission centers,
prioritizing those that
are aligned
most closely
with the
President’s priorities
and calibrating
collection and operations
based on the
President’s
intelligence requirements. This
includes any
areas where the
CIA might
be conducting
its own
diplomacy
parallel to
official State
Department policy.
It must
be clear
that the
CIA’s liaison
relationships overseas
must follow
and
not
contradict
those
set
at
the
policy
level
by
the President
through the State Department.
The
other principal
offices responsible
for
executing
the
CIA’s
mission include the
Directorate of Operations, Directorate of Analysis, Directorate
of Science and
Technology,
Directorate of
Support, and
Directorate of
Digital Innovation.
If
senior
leadership
finds any
program or
operation to
be
inconsistent
with the
President’s agenda,
the Director
should
immediately halt
that program
or operation.
Reining in
Bureaucracy. The
CIA’s
bureaucracy continues
to grow.
Because mid-level
managers lack accountability, there are areas in which personnel
are not responsive
to
any
authority,
including
the
President.
The
President
should
instruct the
Director to
hire or
promote new
individuals to
lead the
various
directorates and mission centers.
This new
crop of
mid-level leaders should
carry out
clear directives from
senior CIA leadership, which means more accountability and new
ways of
thinking to
benefit the
mission.
In
addition, the
President should
task the
Director with
significantly
broadening
recruitment,
expediting onboarding
practices, and
shifting resources
away from
headquarters, including terminal generalist GS-15s when OPM
buyouts, forced rotations,
or up-and-out personnel policies
are set
for particular
positions. The CIA must
find creative
ways to
align mission
requirements
with hiring
needs, recruit diverse sets
of individuals
with unique
backgrounds, and become
more open to
hiring
private-sector experts directly
into senior
positions. In addition,
the Director should break the
cabal of bureaucrats in D.C. by permanently moving
various
directorates,
such
as
Support
and
Science
and
Technology,
out
of
Virginia
and possibly
open
campuses
outside
of
D.C.
where
analysts
and
other
experts
could
contribute virtually.
Redirecting
Resources. Certain CIA
employees and offices have focused on
promoting
divisive
ideological
or
cultural
agendas
and
fostering
a
damaging
cul- ture
of risk
aversion and
complacency.
As soon
as possible,
the Director
should divert resources from any activities that promote
unnecessary and distracting social
engineering. The
Director
should
implement
changes
in
promotion
criteria
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
that
reward individuals
for
creative
thinking and
quality of
recruitments and
prod- ucts
rather than
numeric
metrics or
the achievement of
benchmarks that are
not essential to the mission.
Not all careers
in espionage are created equal, and the Director should
incentiv-
ize
and
reward applicants
who
are
willing to
accept high
risks over
those who
are
climbing the ranks simply by doing business as usual. The Director should
refocus
the
CIA
to
an
OSS-like
culture and
mandate that
all
CIA
employees acquire,
as
a
condition of
securing senior (GS-14+) rank, additional or enhanced language
skills, technical
or cyber
expertise, or
field training
or serve
in overseas
assignments.
COVERT
ACTION
Covert
action can
be
a
valuable tool
in
helping
further the
President’s foreign policy
agenda if
implemented in
concert with
other forms
of
government
power.
As
codified
in
the
U.S. Code,
“the term
‘covert action’
means an
activity or
activities
of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military con- ditions
abroad,
where it
is
intended
that the
role of
the
United
States Government
will
not
be
apparent
or
acknowledged
publicly….”16
The
President initiates
a
covert
action with
a
written
finding that
explains why “such an
action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy
objectives of the
United
States
and
is
important to
the
national
security of
the
United
States.”17 The
statute
assumes the
President will
use the
CIA as
the principal
action element
to achieve the objectives
of covert
action
findings; however,
the President
need not
feel
constrained
to
utilize
only
the
CIA:
“[E]ach
finding
shall
specify
each
depart- ment,
agency, or
entity of
the United
States
Government authorized to fund
or otherwise participate in
any significant
way in
such action.”18
For example, the
Department of Defense
maintains certain clandestine
capa- bilities
under
Title
10
authorities
that
may
resemble
but
far
exceed
in
scale
similar
capabilities
outside
of
DOD.
Generally,
such
DOD
capabilities
can
be
employed
outside a combat theater only if they are determined to be
traditional military activities.
In practical terms, this
means that
many DOD
capabilities,
including those
in
the
space
and
cyber
domains,
can be
employed
only
after
the
initiation
of armed
conflict.19
Given
the range
of global
threats the
United States
faces today,
the President should consider
whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should be used
to support potential covert actions.
The
problem, unfortunately,
is
that
certain elements
in
the
State Department,
IC,
and DOD
trade on
risk aversion
or political
bureaucracy to delay
execution of the President’s
foreign policy
goals. A
future
conservative President should
therefore identify
individuals on the
transition team who
are familiar
with the
implementation of
covert action
with a
view to
placing them
in key
NSC, CIA,
ODNI,
and
DOD
positions.
These
knowledgeable
teams
can
assist
in
any
review of
current covert
actions and,
potentially,
planning for
new actions.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Immediately
after the inauguration, the President should task the NSC’s
Senior Director for Intelligence Programs with conducting a
60-day review of any current
covert
action
findings,
including their
effectiveness;
evaluating
new
covert
actions
that
might
be
needed to
implement the
President’s foreign
policy goals;
and
report-
ing back to the President. Such an assessment should be
conducted independently
of
the
agencies responsible
for
the
actions under
review. As
part of
the
review,
the
Senior
Director
for
Intelligence
Programs should
identify which
departments or agencies,
such as
the
CIA
or
DOD,
are
best
equipped to
achieve the
objectives set
out
in new
and existing
findings.
After the
60-day review, the President should demand creative thinking and
a clear
strategy as
to how
covert action
fits within
the
President’s broader
foreign policy
strategy,
to
include
possibly
modifying
or
rescinding
any
current
findings,
drafting new findings, and
streamlining or eliminating needless bureaucracy, par-
ticularly at State, to
facilitate more expeditious decisions on tactical covert action.
Careful thought should
be given to the metrics by which the effectiveness of covert
action programs
will be
measured to
ensure the
appropriate use
of government
resources and
to guard
against the
possibility of covert
action’s being
used with
little scrutiny in
ways that
are
inconsistent with
overt foreign
policy goals.
ODNI
AND CIA
ORGANIZATIONAL
RECOMMENDATIONS
The ODNI and
CIA operate
under authority
provided by
the Central Intelli-
gence
Agency
Act
of
1949,20 which
means
they
have greater
latitude than
the
rest
of the
federal government with respect to the hiring and firing of
personnel. Both organizations
and other
areas of
the IC
have struggled
from a
human
resources and
talent
management
standpoint
to
recruit,
onboard,
and
maintain
personnel
in a
timely
fashion
to
fill
the
IC’s
ever-changing
needs.
At
a
time
when
the
Intelli-
gence Community
needs
significantly
more
personnel
with
the
proper
technical,
language-capable, and diverse
backgrounds, including applicants from elements of
the
business
community,
the
incoming
Directors
of
both
agencies
need
to
make this
effort a top priority.
Past
DNIs’ Chiefs
of
Staff
and
additional
front-office staff
historically have
come from
outside the
IC, commonly under
a misconstrued
“staff-reserve” structure that is intended to avoid a Schedule C designation
within the IC. The Director
should handpick qualified, properly cleared personnel for
front-office and mana-
gerial
leadership
positions,
such
as
the
DNI’s
Chief
of
Staff
and
heads
of
Legislative
Affairs and
Strategic
Communications,
to
oversee
those
divisions
with
career
IC staff
reporting to them.
The
incoming DNI
and
CIA
Director should
also consider
changes in
the
Senior
National Intelligence Service
(SNIS)/Senior Intelligence Services (SIS). Senior
officers should be required
to sign mobility agreements that allow ODNI and CIA leadership
to
move
them
within
the
IC
every
two
years
if
necessary.
Many
qualified
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
and
distinguished senior officers serve throughout the IC, but some
long-serving
generalist
officers no
longer perform
at
a
high capacity,
are
management-driven,
do
not
serve
the
IC’s
changing
needs, and
limit
junior
officers’
prospects for
growth and
advancement.
An incoming
Administration
should consider
studying and
implementing
additional requirements as
a condition
for promotion
to GS-15/
SNIS/SIS and
explore
concepts
such
as
“Up
and
Out”
beginning
at
the
GS-14/15 levels
and above
for some
fields.
The IC should
evaluate areas
of bloat
and
underperforming cadre
and work
with
OPM
on
authority
for voluntary
separation
buyouts.
Allowing
ODNI
and
CIA
leadership to shrink size and
reduce duplication of effort while promoting healthy
turnover
within
their
senior
ranks
would
encourage
new
ideas
and
perspectives
from mid-career officers and, potentially, from employees hired
from outside their agencies.
The
ODNI
and
CIA
should
maximize
their
direct-hire
and
incen- tive-building
authorities to
bring
in
talented
and
properly
cleared
individuals
to serve
in positions
requiring
technical, language,
and cyber
expertise.
Finally, the
human resources and talent management systems for onboarding
purposes
at the ODNI, CIA, and some other elements of the IC are
fundamentally broken. For example, according to current CIA
Director William Burns, it recently
took
more than
600 days,
on average,
for a
CIA applicant
to receive
his or
her necessary
security
clearance.21 Although
security
clearance procedures
have been
somewhat
improved in
recent years
and
Burns
has
committed
CIA
to
reducing that
to no more than
180 days, degradation in other areas of the process has limited
the IC’s
capacity to
attract
qualified and needed
expertise.
PREVENTING THE
ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE FOR PARTISAN PURPOSES
The
intelligence function must
be protected
from bottom-up
and top-down
politicization
if
it
is
to
play its
proper role
in
our
national security
decision-mak- ing
process.
Unfortunately,
both
types of
politicization
have
occurred recently
to the
detriment of
the Intelligence
Community’s
reputation and credibility.
More important, the politicization of intelligence risks
contributing to policy fail-
ures
(as
we
saw
with
the
Iraq
War)
or
even
undermining our
democratic
system here at
home.
In
particular, the
IC
must
restore confidence
in
its
political neutrality
to
rectify
the
damage done
by
the
actions of
former IC
leaders and
personnel regarding
the
claims of Trump–Russia collusion following the 2016 election and the
suppression of the Hunter
Biden laptop
investigation
and media
revelations of its
existence during the 2020 election. But the problem is not confined to the
executive branch
struggle
between
the
IC
and
policymakers;
it
also
relates
to
the
IC’s
relationship with
Congress
as
evinced
by
DNI
James
Clapper’s
failure to
answer
honestly
in response
to
congressional
questions about
government
surveillance programs.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
The
ODNI
and
CIA
are
undergoing a
crisis of
confidence based
on
several
factors.
First,
President
Barack Obama’s
CIA
Director,
John Brennan,
gravely damaged
the CIA by
minimizing the
Directorate of
Operations and
exploiting intelligence
analy-
sis
as
a
political weapon
after he
left office.
Brennan's role
in
the
letter signed
by
51
former
intelligence
officials before
the 2020
election is
unclear, but
in dismissing
the
Hunter
Biden
laptop
as
“Russian
disinformation,”
the
CIA
was
discredited,
and
the
shocking
extent of
politicization
among
some
former
IC
officials
was
revealed.
Restoring respect for the IC as an independent provider of
information and analysis
while also
ensuring that
it is
responsive to
the legitimate needs of
poli- cymakers
will
require
reinforcing
essential
norms
and
institutions.
However,
we
should
also recognize
that
achieving
the
perfect
balance
that
avoids
the
pathologies
of too
much
distance
or
too
much
closeness
and
responsiveness
to
policymakers is
not
only
difficult,
but probably
impossible.22 Thus,
given
the
very nature
of
the
business
and
the
political process,
much will
depend on
the
promotion
of
certain
norms
or
virtues
on
both
sides of
the
principal–agent
relationship.
Specifically:
•
The
DNI and
CIA Director
should use
their
authority under the
National Security
Act
of
1947
to
expedite
the clearance
of
personnel
to
meet
mission needs
and remove
IC employees
who have
abused their
positions of
trust. An area
of particular concern is
that personnel
under
investigation for
improprieties have been
allowed to
retire before
internal
investigations have been completed.
Directors of
both agencies must
instill further
confidence in
their
workforces, Congress,
and the American people
that they
can
and
will
deal
effectively
with
personnel
that
fail
to
live
up
to
their oath
to
the
Constitution, adhere
to
ethical
and
moral
standards
as
expected by
America’s
taxpayers,
and faithfully
execute
the
law.
•
The
President
should
direct
the
DNI
and
the
Attorney
General,
by
direction
of the
respective
Inspectors General and
IC Analytic
Ombudsman, to conduct a
further audit
of all
IC equities
of past politicization and
abuses
of
intelligence information.
For
example,
a
recent
IC
ombudsman
analysis during
the 2020
election cycle
noted, “If
our political
leaders in
the White House
and Congress believe
we are
withholding intelligence because
of organizational turf wars
or political
considerations, the legitimacy
of the
Intelligence Community’s work is lost.”23
•
The
President
should immediately
revoke the
security
clearances of any former
Directors, Deputy Directors,
or other
senior
intelligence officials
who discuss their
work in
the press
or on
social media
without prior
clearance
from
the
current
Director.
IC
agencies,
including
the
CIA,
should
minimize
their public
presence
and
vigorously
investigate
any
and
all
leaks
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
of
information,
classified or otherwise.
The ODNI
and CIA
should fire
or refer
for
prosecution
any
employee
who
is
suspected
of
leaking
information,
and penalties
should
include
the
removal
of
pension
benefits
for
those
who are
found
guilty.
Additional
tools are
needed
to
prevent
leaked
intelligence
from being
used as
a weapon
in policy
debates by
IC leaders or
decision- makers in the executive branch or Congress.
•
In
addition, the
Department of
Justice should
use all
of the
tools at
its disposal to
investigate
leaks
and
should
rescind
damaging
guidance
by Attorney
General Merrick
Garland that
limits
investigators’ ability to
identify
records of
unauthorized
disclosures
of
classified
information
to the
media.
Personnel
have
sufficient
access
to
legitimate
whistleblower
claims
under
protections
provided by
Inspectors General
and
Congress.
The Director
and IC
must prioritize
hiring
additional
counterintelligence and security personnel to assist in this effort.
•
Military
and civilian
IC training
should include
stronger
emphasis on
the
norm
of
political
neutrality,
including
a
mandatory
course
on
professionalism
and
repercussions
for
abuse
in
the
execution of
duties in
all degree
programs at
the National Intelligence
University.
•
Intelligence
leaders
need
to
model
norms
of
neutrality
and
respect
for
the
decision-making
authority of
the
President,
appointed
officials,
and
Congress.
This
includes
building
trust
with
key
decision-makers
by
not
using their positions
and
privileged
access
to
information
to
influence
policymaking
indirectly
or
directly
in
an
inappropriate
fashion
(especially
by
engaging
in
threat
inflation).
IC
leaders
should
practice
extreme
restraint
in
engaging
with
the
public
and
the
media.
They
should
seek
to
work
in
the
shadows
rather
than
in
the
limelight.
Potential
restrictions
on
such
appearances
could supplement
this
norm,
preventing
political
leaders
from
using
IC
officials
to support
an
Administration
position
as
they
do
with
military
leaders.
•
Retired
IC
leaders
should
similarly
support
the
neutrality
norm
by
not
becoming public figures.
•
Congress
should not
use IC
leaders as
pawns in
policy
struggles with
the President
or the
other
party
during
their
appearances
before
committees
of
the
House
and
Senate.
While Congress
has
a
proper
oversight
role,
it
should
distinguish between
information that needs
to be
public and
information that
should be
discussed in
private with
members of
the IC.
A DNI
should call
“balls and strikes”
to those
on both
sides of
the aisle
on Capitol
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Hill
who
attempt
to
weaponize
the
use
of
selective
intelligence to
feed political
narratives.
•
Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a
practice by
which
intelligence
leaders
are
selected
for
their
policy
views
or
political
loyalties instead
of their
skilled
expertise.24
Presidents
should also
avoid public rebukes and
pressure from
the
intelligence profession, which
can include
intimidation
and
bullying,
to
shape
IC
analysis.
This
will
be
easier
if IC
leaders live
by the
norms of
neutrality and
thus are
not seen
as political
actors, for whom
political responses are
deemed
necessary.
•
Intelligence
leaders
and
professionals
should
never
“cook
the
books”
for Presidents
or
change
or
shape
their
analysis
to
preserve
access
or
status.25
FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT
(FISA)
A future
President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek-
ing
reforms and
accountability
for
any
abuses
of
its
authorities. When
discussing
FISA
and
what
changes may
need to
be
made,
it
is
important to
note and
recognize that
there are
stark
differences among the
individual FISA authorities.
Section 702 of
FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists,
spies,
cyber
hackers,
and
other
bad
actors
(but only
if
they
are
non-U.S.
persons) when
their
communications
pass through
the United
States. While
this authority
may lapse
if
Congress
does
not
resolve
the
issue
by
the
end
of
2023,
Section
702
should
be
understood
as an
essential
tool
in
the
fight
against
terrorism,
malicious
cyber actors,
and Chinese
espionage. These are
two major
national
security priorities
for an incoming President,
and it is imperative that the need to use properly main-
tained and accountable
authorities to counter
these
challenges be
recognized.
Section
702
is
a
vital
program that
often provides
the
lion’s
share of
intelligence used
in
the
President’s
Daily Brief
(PDB).27 An
independent
review by
the
Privacy
and
Civil
Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB)
found that
it
was
not
abused.
Nev- ertheless,
Congress
should review
the
PCLOB’s
upcoming 2023
report to
help it determine
whether any
reforms or
codification of
recent administrative
changes in FISA
processes are needed.
Other
authorities in
Title I
and
Title
III, often
referred to
as
“traditional”
FISA, have elicited
valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence
collection authority in
recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign
adviser Carter Page, for
example, the
FBI and
the Department of Justice
concealed vital information from a
specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled
with
errors.
An
incoming
conservative
President should
consider
reforms
designed to prevent
future
partisan
abuses
of
national
security
authority.
A
package
of
strong
provisions to
protect
against such
partisanship
might include:
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
Stiffer penalties and
mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are
aimed at domestic political targets,
•
Tighter
controls
on
otherwise
lawful
intercepts
that
also
collect
the
communications of domestic political figures,
•
An express
prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence
authorities, and
•
Reforms
to
improve
the
accountability
of
the
Justice
Department
and
the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
To
keep intelligence
credentials from
being used
for
partisan
purposes, former
high-ranking
intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain
subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter
them from tying their political
stands
or
activism
to
their
continuing privilege
of
access
to
classified
government information.
The IC
should be
prohibited
from monitoring
so-called domestic disinformation.
Such activity
can easily
slip into
suppression of an
opposition party’s
speech,
is corrosive
of
First
Amendment
protections,
and
raises
questions about
impartiality when the IC chooses not to act.
CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS,
AND
RESOURCES
The term “whole of government” is
all too frequently overused, but in responding
to the
generational threat posed
by the
Chinese
Communist Party, that
is exactly
the approach
that our
national
security apparatus
should adopt.
CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China
Mission Center focused
on these
efforts, but
it can
be successful
only if
it is
given the
necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and
resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how
seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center
is unclear.
A critical strategic question for an
incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be:
How, when,
and with
whom do
we share
our classified
intelligence? Understanding
when
to
pass
things
to
liaisons
and for
what
purpose
will
be
vital to
outmaneuvering China in
the
intelligence sphere.
Questions for
a President
will include:
•
What
is
our
overarching
conception
of
the
adversarial
relationship
and
competition?
•
How
does
intelligence-sharing fit
into
that conception?
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Some
Members of
Congress have
said that
intelligence
relationships such as
the
Five
Eyes28 should
be
expanded
to
include
other allies
in
the
Asia–Pacific in,
for example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take
into account the fact that any
blanket
expansion
would necessarily
involve protecting
the
sources
and
methods
of
a
larger and
quite possibly
more diverse
group of
member countries
that might
or
might
not
have
congruent
interests.
That
being
said,
however, a
future
conservative
President should consider what resources and information-sharing
relationships could
be
included
in
an
ad
hoc
or
quasi-formal
intelligence
expansion (for
example, with the Quad)
among nations
trying to
counter the
threat from
China.
Significant technology, language
skills, and financial intelligence resources
are
needed
to
counter
China’s capabilities.29 The
IC
was
caught flat-footed
by
the
recent
discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable
hypersonic missile.
No
longer
can
America’s
information and
technological
dominance
be
assumed.
China’s
gains and
intense focus
on emerging
technologies have taken
it in
some areas from being
a near-peer
competitor to probably
being ahead
of the
United States.
China’s centralized government allocates
endless
resources (sometimes
inefficiently) to its
strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which
combine government, military,
and
private-sector
activities on quantum
infor- mation sciences and
technologies, artificial intelligence
(AI), machine
learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics.
The
IC
must
do
more
than understand
these advancements:
It
must
rally non-
government and allied partners and
inspire unified action to counter them. In
addition,
to
combat
China’s
economic
espionage,
authorities
and
loopholes
in
the
Foreign Agents Registration
Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed
in conjunction with the Attorney
General.
Many
issues
within
the
broader
government can
be
tied
back to
a
more
general congressional
understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of
committee
jurisdictions and the
responsibilities of executive
agencies to
brief on
the
nature
of
the
threat.
Broader
committee
jurisdictions
should
receive
additional
intelligence
from
IC
agencies
as necessary
to
inform
China’s
unique
and
more
com- prehensive
threat
across
layers
of
the
U.S.
government
bureaucracy
and
economy. Former
DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it
related to China by
20 percent.
“When people
ask me
why I
did that,”
he explained
in an
interview, “I say, ‘Because
no one
would let
me increase
it by
40%.’ I
had an
$85 billion combined annual
budget for
both the
national
intelligence program and
military
intelligence
program.
My
perspective
was,
‘Whatever
we’re
spending
on countering
China, it
isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence
standpoint, the need
to
understand
Chinese motivations,
capabilities,
and
intent
will
be
of
paramount importance
to
a
future
conservative
President.
It
is
therefore also
of
paramount
importance
that the
“whole of
government” be
rowing together.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY
CENTER
(NCSC)
The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter-
est
in
possibly
updating
the
codified
language
underpinning
much
of
the
nation’s
counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to
exist, but the rise of
China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the
governmental sphere to
technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state,
and local espionage threats at
a level
our country
has never
seen. The
asymmetric
threat includes cyber, nontraditional
collection, and issues
involving legitimate busi-
nesses serving as collection platforms.
Barring statutory changes that could
occur before 2025, a future conserva-
tive
President
should further
empower
and
resource
the
IC
by
executive
order
or through
suggested
changes in
the
Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act (CEA)
of
2002.32 NCSC
was
given
some authority
for
outreach
efforts on
behalf of
the
IC for
counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S.
government best
practices, but
there remain
significant
deltas between
Title 50
and non–Title
50 entities’ protections. Primary
operational elements should
remain at
the FBI
and
CIA, with
the
Bureau
and
NCSC
collaborating
on
nongovernmental
outreach. While
there is
no need
to create
a separate
agency, a
future
President and
DNI should amplify
NCSC’s
authorities
and
roles
with
respect
to
counterintelligence
strategy,
policy,
outreach,
and
governance,
including
supporting
necessary
Joint Duty
Assignments (JDA) for
FBI and
CIA personnel.
At the
same time,
the FBI
requires significant
additional resources and
legal
authorities to
fulfill its
statu- tory
role as the
lead
operational
counterintelligence
agency in
dealing with
the ever-growing
threats posed
by our
adversaries.
The CEA
should be
updated to
include
foreign
espionage efforts
aimed at
universities.
Corporate
America, technology companies, research institutions, and
academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational
fight to protect our national
security
interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and
intellectual prop- erty
as well
as the
broader
rules-based order—all while
avoiding the
tendency to
cave to
the left-wing
activists and investors
who ignore
the China
threat and
increasingly dominate the
corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security
Higher Education
Advisory Board
and the
National
Security Business
Alliance Council
should
be
prioritized
with
leadership
from
the
NCSC,
the
FBI,
or
a
com- bination
of both entities.
When the CCP steals at least $400
billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty
each year,
it is
time to
devote some
strategic
thinking to
exactly how
and to
what
degree
counterintelligence
efforts
can
help
to
protect
America’s
commercial endeavors.
If
Chinese
strategic
technology
gains
are
happening
almost
entirely
in
transnational commercial
space,
for
example,
and
the
private
sector
is
also
gath- ering
and
analyzing
some critical
intelligence,
these
essential
data
points
should assist
in national-level counterintelligence efforts.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
The NCSC was
created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat
Integra- tion Center (TTIC),
which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
pursuant to
President
George W.
Bush’s
Executive Order
13354.33 The
NCTC
was
an
organization of
approximately
three
dozen
detainees
from
across the
U.S.
government with a
mandate to
integrate
counterterrorism intelligence and
missions, including terrorist screening.
Eventually:
In November
2014 the
Director of
National
Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC
by combining
[the Office
of the
National
Counterintelligence Executive]
with the
Center for
Security
Evaluation, the Special
Security Center and the
National
Insider Threat
Task Force,
to effectively
integrate and align
counterintelligence
and security
mission areas
under a
single organizational construct.
The
Director
of
NCSC
serves
in
support
of
the
DNI’s role
as
Security
Executive
Agent
(SecEA)
to
develop,
implement,
oversee
and integrate
personnel security initiatives
throughout the U.S.
Government.34
NCSC
has
added
value
in
such
areas
as fusing
cross-community
intelligence for
terrorism watchlisting purposes
and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of
the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration
should focus
NCTC
on
integrative tasks,
many
of
which
cannot
be
carried
out
elsewhere in
the
IC,
but
should
not
use
personnel
and resources
for
redundant
analyses
that duplicate
the work
of such
other IC
entities as
the FBI
and CIA.
ADDITIONAL AREAS
FOR
REFORM
Analytical Integrity.
The
“tradecraft”
of intelligence
analysis is
mostly a
col- lection of
lessons
learned
over
decades
about
what
works
and
does
not
work
in
a
profession
whose high-stakes
work
is
performed
by
thousands
but
that
also
bears
little
outside
scrutiny
and
provides
few
metrics
by
which
to
gauge
success
or
failure on
a regular basis.
These lessons
have
accumulated from:
•
The
perceived
misuse
of
intelligence
by
consumers
as
was
the
case
with
respect
to
war-related
assessments
in
the
Johnson
and
Bush
Administrations;
•
Failures
such
as
the
failures
to
warn
of
the
collapse
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
the specific threat of 9/11;
•
Successes
in
piecing
together
tactical
and
often
technical
puzzles
such
as
estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and
•
Strategic
victories
such
as
anticipating
critical
geopolitical
developments
that have been years in the making.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Historically,
this tradecraft
has
been
passed on
in
the
form of
unwritten rules
learned
on
the
job
and
in
agency-specific
training
classes,
but
increasingly
since
the intelligence
reforms
of
2004,
they
have
been
codified
IC-wide
under
the
direction of
the Deputy Director
of National
Intelligence for Mission
Integration.
A
RAND study
of
U.S.
intelligence tradecraft
notes that
the
“vast
majority of
intelligence
analysts reside outside the Central Intelligence Agency and do
work that is tactical,
operational, and current.”35
The study goes on to note
that the Defense
Intelligence Agency
(DIA)
has
as
many
analysts
as
the
CIA
has
and
that the
National
Security
Agency (NSA)
has
several
times
as
many
analysts,
as
does
the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), indicating both the
breadth of
the
IC’s
technical
collection
and
its
emphasis
both
on
developing
analysts
who
can interpret secret human or
technical intelligence in quick-turnaround pieces and on
countering tactical, asymmetric threats like terrorism.
During
the
Cold
War, however,
there was
a
more
balanced analytic
focus with
greater
emphasis on
strategic intelligence
issues as
a
means
of
outcompeting
the Soviet
Union. This
kind of
analysis deals
not only
in secrets,
but also
in myster-
ies—making well-founded
but
ultimately
unknowable
predictions
about
future actions
by
a
competitor
or adversary.
The
tradecraft
necessary
to
succeed
in
stra- tegic
analysis
requires
substantive
regional
and
topical
expertise
developed
over the years
to supplement experience in the daily collection and
understanding of secrets. Institutionally, it also requires that
agencies’ analytic processes be open
to discussion, debate,
and dissent
because
analysts must
work together
to describe
a
probable
range
of
future
outcomes
and
warn
about
unproven
current threats
rather than using the collection to solve a single puzzle with a
defin- itive answer.
Regarding
its mission
to follow
longer-term issues, the
IC is
falling short
in resourcing and in
openness to dissenting opinions, which (if taken seriously) can
help
responsible officials respond more
effectively to threats
and threat
actors. The
IC
Analytic
Ombudsman
has
expressed
concern
that
hyperpartisanship
“has
threatened
to undermine
the
foundations
of
our
Republic,
penetrating
even
into the
Intelligence Community.”36
For example, the
Ombudsman noted
in a
report on
the IC’s
handling of
elec- tion-threat analysis in 2020 that, in his view, CIA
officials had deliberately
downplayed
dissenting
views
and
coordination
comments
expressed
by
experts at
the
National
Intelligence
Council
and
elsewhere
who
felt
there
was
evidence
of Beijing’s
intent to exert at least some influence on the 2020 election as
opposed to the
consensus view
that Beijing
did not interfere in
U.S. elections.
Senior CIA
analysts and leaders made
it “difficult
to have
a healthy
analytic
conversation in a
confrontational environment” while violating multiple official
IC tradecraft standards. By
not allowing dissents or considering alternatives, the CIA
exercised “undue
influence
on
intelligence.”37 Subsequent
exposure
of
China-linked
online
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
influence
and
the
FBI’s warnings
about continued
efforts through
the
2022
mid- terms highlight
the
folly
of
undue
certainty without
consideration
of
alternatives. On
election influence and other controversial issues, such as the
origin of COVID-19,
analysts
at
the
most
powerful
intelligence
agencies
have
increasingly tended
to
use
the
leeway
they
have
been
given
to
insert
their
political
views into
their
work
in
order
to
influence
(if possibly
even
control)
the
analytic
process.
They
do
this
in
ways
that
attempt
to
squash
dissent
and
impair
the
creation
of a
culture
in which
entrenched
views
are
challenged
and
unpopular
analytical
lines
can
sur-
vive
or
not
according to
their merits.
To help the United States and its
leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal,
economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s
capability
to
conduct
strategic
intelligence
analysis
that
is
relevant
to
policymak- ers
in both parties
must be
rebuilt and
strengthened.
Because Beijing
may be
a peer or even exceed
U.S.
capabilities in
some areas,
the post-9/11
analytic focus
on quick-turnaround secrets
is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must
take
place
for
the
United
States
to
stay
ahead
of
whatever new
threats China may pose.
An
incoming
conservative President
will have
the opportunity
to signal
the demand for such strategic products and prioritize
their production through
communications
to
intelligence
leaders
and
formal
mechanisms
such
as
shifting
priorities
within
the
National
Intelligence
Priority
Framework
and
structuring
the
President’s Daily
Brief.
The
incoming
DNI
should
also
emphasize
implementing
the recommendations in the
Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv-
ity,
the
inclusion
of dissenting
viewpoints,
and
more
serious
efforts
to
hold
senior
leaders
accountable
for
backchannel
attempts
to
change
or
suppress
analytic
views.
Accounting
for
the
long
history
of
intelligence
failures
and
surprises,
an
incom-
ing
conservative President
must
appreciate
the
ambiguity,
complexity,
limits,
and assumptions
inherent
in intelligence
assessments.
Intelligence
often
deals
with
the human
dimension
in
complex
decision
systems within
a
foreign
country
or
organi-
zation, and
this
makes
consistently
accurate
predictions
difficult
if
not
impossible
to develop.
Seeing
something
and
understanding
what
you
are
seeing
are
two
dif-
ferent
things,
so a
President
should
consistently
and
patiently
press
the
IC
about
its
potential
biases, assumptions,
methodology, and
sourcing.
With regard to election-threat
analysis and politically controversial topics,
agency
leaders
should take
seriously
the
Ombudsman’s
admonition
that
we
need
to
maintain
tradecraft
standards
across
all
countries
and
topics
by
ensuring
that
equitable standards apply
across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put
forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications
of intelligence conclusions.
“Obligation to
Share” and
Real-Time
Auditing Capability.
The fed-
eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by
being more
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
forward-leaning
in
sharing
cyber threat
intelligence with
private-sector
partners and
the public,
emphasizing
that the
protective
nature of
such
information is of
value
only
if
put
into
the
right
hands
at
the
right
time.
Since
critical
infrastructure
and
services
are overwhelmingly
owned,
managed,
and
defended
by
the
private sector
in
the
United
States,
there has
been
an
increasing
emphasis
on
declassify- ing
intelligence
and
sharing
actionable
information
with
private-sector
partners,
often through
industry-specific
Information
Sharing
and
Analysis
Centers
(ISACs);
regional
meetings
of
government
and
private-sector
experts
called
InfraGard,
run by the FBI; direct
public notification from the Department of Homeland Security,
the
FBI,
and
(increasingly) the
NSA;
and
more
discreet
one-on-one
engagements led
by the collecting agencies.
These programs
properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber-
security
for Americans; in practice,
however, the
intelligence
shared by
the U.S. government
through
these
venues
is
too
often
already
known
or
no
longer
relevant
by the time it makes its way
through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition,
government-shared
information often
needs
to
take
advantage
of
the
opportunity to
provide
contexts, such
as attribution, trends,
and size
of the
observed cyber
problem.
As
warranted,
additional
context
should
be
provided
to
the
private
sector as a
matter of routine.
To continue improving
the U.S.
government’s ability to
defend the
country’s most
vital networks,
the IC
must adopt
an “obligation
to share”
policy
process, including the capacity for “write to release”
intelligence products whereby
newly
discovered
technical
indicators,
targeting,
and
other
intelligence
relevant to
cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or
to targeted entities
within
48
hours
of
their
collection—which
is
how
counterterrorism
intel-
ligence has been managed for
years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this
policy, agency
heads should
still have
the
flexibility to withhold
intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to
report regularly to
Congress
on
the
number
of
and
justification
for
exceptions.
This
policy
would make
sharing
intelligence and
defending
networks
the
default,
as
it
already
is
in the
rest
of
the
cybersecurity
community
outside
the
IC,
to
improve
the
quantity,
relevance, and timeliness of
defensive information while ensuring accountability for
top leaders
when they
must withhold
this
information.
One
of
the
most significant
challenges within
the
IC
is
presented
by
the
need to share
information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence
enterprise. The
only long-term
solution to
the
understandable tension
between the
need to share
information and
the need
to protect
intelligence
sources and
methods is
a robust real-time
auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized
access. Under an identity management system with real-time
audit, even the most sensi-
tive
information acquired
by
America’s
intelligence
agencies
can
be
shared,
and
the access
to and
use of
that
information are
appropriately
monitored. Establishing
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
a real-time auditing
capability is essential
to decreasing
the risk
for the
heads of
intelligence
agencies
in
meeting
their
statutory
requirements
to
ensure
that
they
protect sources and methods
associated with the classified information their agen-
cies collect.
Overclassification.
There
is broad
consensus
across the
U.S.
government and among
stakeholders
that
the
system
for
classifying,
declassifying,
and
otherwise
marking and
handling
sensitive
information
is
at
a
crossroads.
Exorbitant
amounts
of classified
data
are
created
daily,
and
agency
personnel
often
mistakenly
choose classification
as
the
default
selection
to
ensure
national
security.
At
the
same
time,
the effectiveness of
downgraded and carefully declassified information to support
foreign
policy
efforts has
been
borne
out
in,
for
example,
alerting
the broader
world
of
Russia’s
buildup
and
likely
plans
for
its
invasion
of
Ukraine.
Two
executive
orders
principally
govern
how the
U.S.
government
handles
clas- sified and sensitive information.
•
Executive Order 13526,
“Classified National Security
Information,” issued
in
2009,38 prescribes
the
classification
levels
and
procedures
for declassification.
•
Executive Order
13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in
2010,39 aimed
to
establish
a
uniform
program
for
managing
all
unclassified
information
that requires
safeguarding or dissemination
controls.
The current system
for
declassifying
classified national security
information (CNSI)
is
extraordinarily analog,
requiring
experts’
review
of
individual
records.
Declassification
policies are
based on
human review
of paper
and need
to con-
template and handle the
proliferation and volume
of digital
records created
by agencies.
The U.S.
government
will
soon
reach
the
point
at
which
manual
review
is
impossible. The
declassification
of
CNSI
should
support
key
U.S.
national
security
objectives, reflect mission
priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural
function. Reforms should include:
•
Tighter
definitions
and
greater
specificity
for
categories
of
information
requiring protection.
•
More
stringent
policies
to
effect
significant
reductions
in
the
number
of
Original
Classification Authorities (OCAs).
•
Stricter
accountability
measures
at
the
OCA
level
and
more
detailed
security classification guides.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
Enhanced
metrics for
accuracy
of classification.
•
A
general
simplification of
the
overall system
for
the benefit
of
users.
On
the
back
end, an
ODNI-run
declassification
process that
is
faster,
nimbler,
default-to-automated,
and larger-scale
should be
a priority.
Additionally,
investments in
IT
are
required to
deal with
the
growing
volumes
of
CNSI
collected
and
produced
in
the
digital age,
along with
many years’
worth of existing
analog and digital holdings that could provide valuable
historical insights. An
incoming
Administration needs to
explore options
to prioritize funding for
innovation
in declassification
management:
for
example,
by
establishing
a
budget
line item specifically for
the modernization of declassification or designating fund-
ing for
program
classification management as
a
special-interest item.
The
Administration will also need to transition to using technology,
including
tools and
services for managing Big Data (which provide a robust
electronic record
repository, making
information within
and
across
agencies easier
to
organize
and locate
and
facilitating more
rapid review
and release
capabilities for records
of emerging interest); artificial
intelligence/machine
learning
(which, when
incor- porated into existing business practices, enables
machine interpretation of
unstructured
text
and
data,
applies
decision
support
technology
to
enable
more consistent
classification decisions,
and
expedites
reviews
between
agencies);
and expansion
of Commercial
Cloud services
(which
facilitate the
rapid testing
and deployment
of new
tools and
technologies).
However,
technology
is
not
a
panacea;
human
expertise in
information
holdings and
routine
validation
of
the
technology
will
always
be
necessary.
With
or
with- out
machine
assistance, agencies
will
require
more
people
and
more
varied
skill sets
to
improve
their ability
to
meet
the
electronic
records
era’s
classification
and declassification
demands
and
serve
an
incoming
Administration’s
goals.
Broader U.S. Government and IC Intelligence Needs.
Increasingly, con-
flicts among
U.S.
adversaries such as
China, Russia,
Iran, and
North Korea
are conducted
in
the
realms
of
technology
and
finance.40 This
challenge
requires new
tools,
authorities,
and technological
expertise
across the
U.S.
government, par-
ticularly at the
Commerce
Department’s Bureau
of Industry
and Security
(BIS) and the
Committee on
Foreign
Investment in the
United States
(CFIUS), which
is housed at the Treasury Department.
An incoming conservative President
should task his DNI and Secretary of
Commerce
with
increasing
coordination,
the
resources
needed
for
BIS
and
SCIF
capacity, and proper and
necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of
multifaceted adversaries such as China. This would include
additional work with private-sector
expertise, granting clearances
to niche
sector experts
and United
States citizen commercial
and financial
partners as
needed.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Cover in the Digital Age.
Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear
that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence
officers is difficult
in
the
digital
age.41 The
truth
is
that as
our
daily
activities are
conducted
predominantly
in
the
digital domain,
our
antiquated
system for
providing cover
to
undercover
officers has
lagged woefully
behind the
threat from
foreign adversaries.
The
DIA, CIA,
and FBI
are
increasingly aware of
this threat
and are
devoting resources to the
problem. Their
back-office
infrastructure, however, is
such that
they
are still
using
methods
for
providing
cover
from
decades
past
that
put
valuable
intelligence
officers
at
unnecessary
risk.
How
intelligence
officers
and
their
fami- lies
are
taught
to
use
smartphones and
social
media,
travel,
conduct
banking,
and
take
and
share
pictures—even how
and
when
they
are
paid—can
make
it
difficult to
protect
identities.42
Legends,
fake
backstories, and identities
are often
weak, incomplete, and unable
to stand
up to
a basic
Google search.43
Officers
operat- ing under nonofficial
cover are
offered even
less
protection and training
to help
them
succeed.
In
addition,
ubiquitous technical
surveillance (UTS)
techniques being
refined by
technologies
emanating from
the
regimes
in
China
and
Russia
will continue
to
be
highly
challenging
for
intelligence
officers. An
incoming Administration
will need to
double down
on
resourcing
and
training
so
that
members of
the
IC
will have
the expertise
they
need to
operate clandestinely
(and successfully)
against hard
targets.
Privacy
Shield.
For many years,
the European
Union (EU)
has tried
to force
U.S. companies
operating
in
Europe
to
follow
its
data
privacy
regulations.
Misleading claims
in
the
2013
Snowden
leaks destroyed
the
initial
Safe
Harbor
Framework44 that
allowed
American companies
to
transfer
data across
the
Atlantic;
its
succes-
sor,
the
Privacy
Shield Framework,45 was
struck
down
by
European
courts on
the grounds that
it
provides
insufficient protections
for
EU
citizens against
hypothet- ical U.S.
government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the
intelligence services
of
EU
member
states
from
the
standards
applied
to
the
U.S., suggesting
that
trade
protectionism may
be
the
real
motive
behind
data
privacy
regulations.
In
2022, the
Biden Administration
negotiated a
new
agreement,
the
Trans-At-
lantic
Data
Privacy
Framework,46 intended
to
withstand
European legal
challenges. Given
the fate
of its
predecessors, it is
not certain
that it
will survive.
Executive Order
14086,
“Enhancing
Safeguards
for
United
States
Signals
Intelligence
Activi- ties,”47
implements
this new
framework by
attempting to
align signals
intelligence collection
practices with
European
privacy regulations.
At most,
the executive
order’s changes will
be helpful
support for
the framework in future
European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in
the gears of important intelli- gence programs.
An incoming
conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus-
sels
has
always
arbitraged the
difference between
being a
military ally
against, for
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
example, Russia
and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United
States.
Restrictions
on
data
exports have
been part
of
the
trade conflict,
but
now
they could
seriously harm
our military and intelligence capabilities. Moreover,
restrictions on
U.S.
intelligence collection hurt
the Europeans
themselves, especially as
the United States
shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine with Europeans.48
Europe is telling the United States
to meet intelligence oversight standards that
no European
country meets.
At the
same time,
exports of
data to
China are
unexamined and (so
far) free
from legal
challenges. That violates
World Trade
Organization
agreements
as
an
arbitrary
and
discriminatory
data
protection
stan-
dard. It is a betrayal by a
nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that
struck down prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in
constitutional law
but
in
a
treaty
among
European
nations.
If
the
EU
accepted
an
international
agreement that data may flow
to the United States under a more reasonable stan-
dard
than
the
one
adopted
by the
court,
that
interpretation
would
be
binding,
at least as a
gloss on the earlier treaty.
The
United States
has
never
seriously pushed
back against
the
EU;
now
is
the
time.
An
incoming
President should
ask
for
an
immediate
study of
the
implemen-
tation
of
Executive
Order 14086
and
suspend
any
provisions
that unduly
burden intelligence
collection.
At
the
same time,
in
negotiations
with the
Europeans, the
United
States should
make clear
that the
continued sharing of
intelligence with EU member
states depends
on successful resolution of
this issue
within the
first two years
of a
President’s
term. It
is time
for a
real solution,
not the
30 years
of stopgaps imposed by Brussels.
President’s Daily Brief (PDB).
An incoming conservative President
should make clear
what the
President’s
Daily Brief
is and
is not.
The PDB
should be
for the President
specifically, with a much narrower distribution and addressing
areas of
strategic
concern.
During
the
transition,
the
future
National
Security
Advisor,
along with
the
DNI,
should
conduct
a
review
of
current
PDB
recipients
and
deter- mine
which should
remain
recipients when
the
President’s term begins.
Instead
of
being
used as
the
statement
of
record
for
the
agencies, the
PDB
often
misses
the
areas
of
interest
for
Presidents
and
their
senior advisers.
The
President
should
want
the
PDB
to
focus
on
providing
the
information
needed for
the
often
imperfect
and complex
decisions that
a President
needs to
make, which
should always be based
on the
best
intelligence that
can be
gathered. Where
consensus and
agreement
are
possible,
an
IC-coordinated
product
is
excellent,
but
insights
provided
by
properly
channeled
dissent
can
lead
a
President
to
ask
relevant
ques- tions of
his DNI and IC.
A
future DNI
determines the
PDB
briefer
based on
recommendations
made
by the
Deputy
Director of
National
Intelligence for
Mission
Integration (MI).
His- torically,
briefers
have
come
from
the
CIA,
but
a
future
President
and
DNI
should
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
consider
a
primary
briefer or
a
rotation
of
briefers
from other
IC
elements.
Addi- tionally,
the
entirety of
the
PDB
staff and
production should
be
located
at
ODNI.
National Intelligence Council (NIC).
The National Intelligence Council is
the
IC’s
premier
analytic
organization
and
includes
more
than
a
dozen
National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs),
each of whom leads the IC’s analysis within a regional
(China, Russia,
Iran, etc.)
or functional
(cyber,
counterproliferation,
economics, etc.) mission area. This includes authoring National
Intelligence Estimates on
major
strategic
issues with
the
entire
IC,
overseeing
and
deconflicting
the
annual
analytic plans of each agency,
and weighing in on day-to-day major analytical issues,
sometimes individually (for
example, by writing the NIC’s strategic memos or pro-
viding detailed expert
briefings to the
President before major
decisions).
Historically
part of
the CIA,
the NIC
was reorganized
into the
ODNI as
was the PDB.
It retains the
CIA’s objective
analytic
culture and
is staffed
primarily with CIA officers;
however, as
many as
25 percent
of its NIOs over
the decades
have
come from
academia
or
the
private
sector,
bringing
in
much-needed
outside
expertise to
collate and
understand
intelligence with perspective
and skills
that are not
necessarily nurtured within the IC. In recent years, there has
been a greater emphasis
on
encouraging officers
from
other
agencies—particularly
the
DIA,
NSA, and
FBI—to serve
as NIOs
or as
their deputies.
To
encourage greater
analytic independence
and
debate,
the
incoming
Admin-
istration
should
require
that
non-CIA
officers comprise
at
least
50
percent
of
the
NIC’s
membership and
that the
first-among-equals
NIC
Chairman is
an
outsider
from
one
of
the
three
major
IC agencies
with
reporting
responsibility
to
the
PDDNI.
Opening these senior analytic roles to the best analysts regardless of
agency would also
encourage
the
continued
maturation
of
analytic
cadres
and
tradecraft
at
those
agencies and give them an
equal voice in interagency analytical disputes, which in
turn
would
give
the
President
access to
the
best
thinking
and
a
variety
of
sources and
perspectives
from across
the entire
IC rather
than from
the CIA
alone.
IC Chief Information Officer.
The Intelligence Community Chief Informa-
tion
Officer
(ICCIO) directs
and
oversees
all
aspects
of
the
classified
IT
budget
for
all
of
the
IC’s
18
elements.
As the
DNI’s
principal
adviser
for
technology,
the
ICCIO
must
be
well-versed in
technology,
acquisitions,
operations,
and
intra-agency
coop-
eration
to advance
our
technical
prowess
and
simultaneously
direct
a
bureaucracy
that, left
unchecked, will serve
each element’s
own
preferences. To
ensure that
procured and implemented
technology and policy
reflect the
Administration’s agenda,
the ICCIO
must have
the support
of the
DNI and
possess the
ability to
command
cooperation
between
and
promote
interoperability
across
IC
members.
Because of
the unique
responsibilities entrusted to
this position,
incumbency has seesawed between
political appointees and
career
civilians; due
to its
con- gressionally capped salary,
the position
is often
filled by
an SES-level member
administratively
detailed to
support the
DNI. At
times, the
ICCIO is
incorrectly
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
referred
to
as
the
ODNI
CIO. By
law, and
to
secure
unbiased execution
across all
of
the
IC’s 18
elements, the
same individual
may
not
serve as
ICCIO and
ODNI CIO.
They are two distinct positions.
Critical areas and IC IT portfolio
priorities for the ICCIO include but are not limited to:
•
Transparent
accounting
and
allocation
of
IT
investments
across
the
IC,
including commercial cloud computing
and storage
(C2E);
•
Recognized
and
uniform
security
access
for
people,
systems,
and
capabilities
to enable interoperability across IC elements;
•
5G/6G
data
transmission
and
network
interoperability,
which
is
vital
to
IC
element operations;
•
Artificial intelligence
and
machine
learning;
•
Quantum cryptography
and
post-quantum encryption
(PQE);
and
•
Cybersecurity
infrastructure where Biden Administration changes have
realigned and
reassigned
management oversight and
IT
architecture responsibilities
to NSA
and DHS/CISA, conflicting with
ICCIO- delineated roles.
An incoming
Administration should appoint the ICCIO as a primary member of
the
DNI
staff along
with the
ODNI General
Counsel, IC
Chief Financial
Officer, and
ODNI Chief
Operating Officer.
The
President-Elect should require immediate reviews of the progress
in imple-
menting
post-quantum encryption
at
a
minimum for
IC
and
Defense systems
but preferably
throughout
the
government.
The
President’s
National Security
Memo-
randum specifying “the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is
feasible
by
2035”49 needs
to
be
revised
in
light
of
the
magnitude of
the
threat.
Accounting for
the investment
that will
be needed
to secure
IT systems
for national
security should be a top priority.
ODNI, CIA, and IC Technology Issues.
In recent years, the IC has had a
mandate
from
multiple
Administrations
to
advance
technology
needs
for
intelli-
gence—needs that have seen
massive changes as a result of such threats as China’s
advancements
in
technology
and data
infrastructure.
Many
of
the
projects
coming
out of ODNI and CIA’s Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T) focus on expen-
sive, AI-driven open-source work, but there is likely duplication of
effort in areas where
the private
sector and
entrepreneurs are already
making
progress.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
The
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) and S&T
should
focus
primarily
on challenging
technology
problems. Avoiding
duplication
of what
is
already
being
done
well
in
the
private
sector
in
such
areas
as
practical
defense
cyber
intelligence and
artificial
intelligence
research
would
help
to
focus
the
agen- cies
on the
complex shadow
tasks at
hand while
simultaneously
freeing limited
resources for advancement in other areas.
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and PIAB Intelligence
Oversight Board.
The
President’s
Intelligence Advisory
Board (PIAB)
is
charged
with pro-
viding
the
President
with an
independent source
of
advice
on
the
IC’s effectiveness
while offering insights into the IC’s future plans. The Board is
meant to have access
to
all
information
needed to
perform its
functions and
to
have
direct access
to
the
President.
The
Intelligence Oversight Board
is a
standing
committee within
the PIAB.
These
entities
should
be
tasked
with
giving
independent,
informed
advice and
opinion
concerning
major matters
of
national
security
focused
on
long-term,
enduring issues central to advancing and protecting American
interests. This should include
taking
a
broader,
deeper
look
at
critical
trends,
developments,
and
their
implications for
U.S.
national
and
economic
security
relying
on
unclassified
and open-source information.
The
Importance of Space.
With
China
developing
increasingly capable space
and
counterspace technologies
and
Russia
taking
more
aggressive
action
in
space, space
has emerged
as the latest warfighting
domain. In
response, the
DNI cre-
ated
the
Office
of
the
Space
Executive
(OSX)
in
2018
as
an
experiment
to
promote greater
integration of
IC space
activities
without incurring
excessive
overhead. The DNI mandated
greater
collaboration across
the enterprise
without adding
personnel, altering
authorities, and increasing
budgets.
The
Space Executive’s
design reflects
the
original
design principles
of
the
ODNI.
The
ODNI
was
explicitly not
designed to
be
a
departmental headquarters
with com-
mand
and
control of
the
18
agencies’ vast
bureaucracies.
Rather,
it
was
designed to
be small
and
lightweight with
a mission
to coordinate
and integrate
the criti-
cal
activities
of
the
IC’s
18
agencies
without
creating
new
bureaucracy.
That
goal
should
remain
in
force,
and
calls
by
outside
entities
or
Congress
to
add
new
centers and
layers should be rejected.
The
Office of
the
Space
Executive has
been recognized
as
an
effective governance
model
and has spawned similar efforts, including the Election Threats
Executive, Economic
and
Threat
Finance Executive,
and
Cyber
Executive. With
this in
mind, the
following initiatives should
be pursued:
•
Expand collaboration with partners.
For
too many
decades, the
IC and
DOD
have
acquired
and
operated
satellites
independently.
To
improve
their ability
to
meet
the
threat
posed by
China and
Russia, the
IC and DOD should:
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
1.
Explore new methods for
better
integrating our space assets,
2.
Examine the
possibility
of joint
programs,
and
3.
Fully
utilize
unique
Title
10
and
Title
50
authorities
to
execute
space
defense (and offense) strategies jointly.
Additionally,
the IC should support
building
international
alliances with
like-minded partners beyond
the Five
Eyes
intelligence-sharing
nations. Increasingly,
potential
allied nations
(and
their
commercial
companies)
are
developing
innovative
space
capabilities
to
augment
and
strengthen
the
U.S. space
defense and intelligence posture.
•
Refocus space-related intelligence collection.
The
IC has
developed a
space
threats collection posture predicated
on three
assumptions:
1.
The
best
information
on
developing
space
threats
comes
from
collection
against the adversaries’ military institutions on Earth,
2.
There
should
be
a
clear
dividing
line
between
DOD’s
intelligence
activities and the IC’s, and
3.
Only
government-developed
“exquisite”
capabilities
can
inform
threat
analysis and
decision-making
effectively.
Developments
by our adversaries and
the emergence
of a
vibrant commercial
space
marketplace
over
the
past
decade
have
rendered
all
three
assumptions false
and even
dangerous. The
IC must
therefore
refocus and invest
in methods
that will
enable it
to characterize
accurately the threats that
already exist
in space,
not just
on the
ground; break
down barriers
to
information
sharing and
collaboration
with the
DOD; and
embrace commercially
derived
capabilities
that
can
be
adapted
to
a
national
security
mission—all while
emphasizing the need
to protect
critical supply
chains and the
cybersecurity
needs that
result from
an increasingly
government– commercial low Earth orbit.
Our
nation’s
economic and
national
security depends
on being
able to
advance
America’s
leadership
position
in
space,
which
is
eroding
in
the
face of
increasing threats from
adversaries and our
own inaction.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
AN
UNFINISHED
EXPERIMENT
The Intelligence
Community, including specifically the
role of
the DNI
and ODNI, is an
unfinished experiment. The envisioned design principle was a
conser- vative
one:
a
small,
network-centric model
for
enterprise
coordination
as
opposed to
a large monolithic
bureaucracy like DHS.
The ODNI,
however, has
reverted in
some ways
to a
bureaucratic and hierarchical
model
characterized by
limited effectiveness.
Historically,
the CIA
has undercut
the DNI
and maintains
primacy in
the IC hierarchy,
especially
regarding
the
White
House.
An
incoming
conservative
Pres- ident
can right
the ship
and return
the IC
governance model to
first
principles by using
a limited
but empowered
leadership and coordination
design to
serve the
nation’s
intelligence
and
national
security
needs
while
reclaiming
the
public
trust with fiscal
responsibility, political neutrality, personnel accountability,
tech- nological
prowess,
and necessary
human
capital
needed
to
counter
the
immense
nation-state and
asymmetrical threats facing
our country.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The preparation
of this
chapter was
a collective enterprise
of individuals
involved
in
the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. No particular
policy statement, reform recommendation, or other view
expressed herein
should be
attributed to any
individual contributor or
to the
author.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
“Two independent agencies—the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the
Central Intelligence
Agency
(CIA);
Nine
Department
of
Defense
elements—the
Defense
Intelligence
Agency
(DIA),
the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the
National
Reconnaissance Office
(NRO),
and
intelligence
elements
of
the
five
DoD
services;
the
Army,
Navy,
Marine
Corps, Air Force, and Space
Force. Seven elements of other departments and agencies—the
Department of Energy’s
Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; the Department
of Homeland Security’s Office of
Intelligence and
Analysis
and
U.S.
Coast
Guard
Intelligence;
the
Department
of
Justice’s
Federal
Bureau
of
Investigation and the Drug
Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence;
the Department of
State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.”
Office of
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence,
“What
We
Do:
Members
of
the
IC,”
https://www.dni.
gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic (accessed March 8, 2023).
2.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
“Mission,”
https://www.intelligence.gov/mission#:~:text=The%20
Intelligence%20Community's%20mission%20is,law%20enforcement%2C%20and%20the%20military (accessed February 24,
2023).
3.
Abraham
Lincoln, Second Annual Message
to Congress, December 1,
1862,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/second-annual-message-9 (accessed March 6, 2023).
4.
Christopher
Porter,
“Seven
Questions
the
Next
President
Will
Need
the
Intelligence
Community
to
Answer to Win the Technology
Competition with China,” LinkedIn, March 14, 2023,
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/
seven-questions-next-president-need-intelligence-community-porter/?trackingId=Dl9RF5CnSwWnAO7r9gg
HiQ%3D%3D (accessed March 18, 2023).
5.
H.R. 2845,
Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Public Law No. 108-458, 108th Congress,
December
17,
2004,
https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/publ458/PLAW-108publ458.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2004).
6.
Testimony of Philip Zelikow, Executive Director, National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
in
hearing,
Assessing America’s Counterterrorism’s
Capabilities, Committee
on
Governmental
Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 108th Congress,
2d
Session, August 3, 2004, p.
55,
https://ia802906.us.archive.org/31/items/gov.
gpo.fdsys.CHRG-108shrg95506/CHRG-108shrg95506.pdf
(accessed
March
19,
2023).
7.
Michael
Allen,
Blinking Red:
Crisis and
Compromise in American
Intelligence After 9/11
(Dulles,
VA:
Potomac
Books,
2013), p.
155; Interview with Robert
Gates, April
19, 2012.
8.
Allen,
Blinking
Red,
p. 154; Robert Gates e-mail to Andy Card, January 11, 2005;
handwritten note from Robert Gates, January 20, 2005.
9.
Interview
with
John
Ratcliffe,
December
15,
2022.
10.
Ibid.
11.
Ibid.
12.
S.
258,
National
Security
Act
of
1947, Public
Law
No.
80-253,
80th
Congress,
July
26,
1947,
https://govtrackus.
s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf
(accessed
March
6, 2023).
13.
President
Ronald
Reagan,
Executive
Order
12333,
“United
States
Intelligence
Activities,”
December
4,
1981,
in
Federal
Register,
Vol.
46,
No.
235
(December
8,
1981),
pp.
59941–59954,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-1981-12-08/pdf/FR-1981-12-08.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2023).
14.
President George W. Bush,
Executive Order 13470, “Further Amendments to Executive Order
12333, United States
Intelligence Activities,” July 30, 2008, in
Federal
Register, Vol.
73, No. 150 (August 4, 2008), pp.
45325–45342,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-08-04/pdf/E8-17940.pdf (accessed March
6,
2023).
See
also
President
George W.
Bush,
Executive
Order
13355,
“Strengthened
Management
of
the
Intelligence
Community,”
August
27,
2004,
in
Federal
Register,
Vol.
69,
No.
169
(September
1,
2004),
pp. 53593–53597,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20051.pdf
(accessed March 6, 2023).
15.
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Counterintelligence and
Security Agency, “Trusted Workforce 2.0 and Continuous
Vetting,”
https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/cv/
(accessed March 9,
2023).
16.
50 U.S.
Code
§
3093(e),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093 (accessed
February
24,
2023).
17.
50 U.S.
Code §
3093(a).
18.
50 U.S.
Code §
3093(a)(4).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
19.
Michael
E.
DeVine,
“Covert
Action
and
Clandestine
Activities
of
the
Intelligence
Community:
Selected
Definitions,”
Congressional
Research
Service
Report for Members and Committees of
Congress
No. R45175,
updated November
29,
2022,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf
(accessed
February
24,
2023).
20.
H.R.
2663, Central
Intelligence
Agency Act
of 1949,
Public Law
No. 81-110,
81st Congress,
June 20,
1949,
https://
govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2023).
21.
Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More
Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News
Network, October 27, 2021,
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/
intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18,
2023).
22.
See
James
J.
Wirtz,
“The
Intelligence
Policy
Nexus,” in
Loch
K.
Johnson,
ed.,
Strategic
Intelligence, Volume 1:
Understanding
the Hidden
Side of
Government
(Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts,
“Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are
Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No.
1
(October 1978), pp.
61–89.
23.
Letter from
Barry A.
Zulauf, IC
Analytic
Ombudsman, Office of
the Director
of National
Intelligence, to Senator
Marco
Rubio,
Acting
Chairman,
and
Senator
Mark
Warner,
Vice
Chairman,
Select
Committee
on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate,
“RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021,
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/
ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf
(accessed
March
14,
2023).
24.
Joshua
Rovner,
Fixing
the Facts:
National
Security and
the Politics
of Intelligence
(Ithaca,
NY:
Cornell University Press, 2011), pp.
30–31.
25.
Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?”
Intelligence and
National
Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58.
26.
S.
1566,
Foreign
Intelligence
Surveillance
Act
of
1978,
Public
Law
No.
95-511,
95th
Congress,
October
25, 1978,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed
March
6,
2023).
27.
The Cipher Brief, “702
Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of
Benjamin Powell,
former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence,
stating that FISA 702 provides “between
40 and 60 percent” of the
intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief
(accessed March 18, 2023).
28.
An
intelligence
alliance
that
includes
Australia,
Canada,
New
Zealand,
the
United
Kingdom,
and
the
United States. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence
and Security Center, “Five
Eyes Intelligence Oversight
and Review Council (FIORC),”
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we-
work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc
(accessed March 10,
2023).
29.
Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the
Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.”
30.
H.R. 1591, An
Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by
Agencies to Disseminate
Propaganda in the United
States
and for Other Purposes,
Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938,
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2023).
31.
Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe
Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021,
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased-
cia-following-lead-china-threat/
(accessed
March
11,
2023).
32.
H.R. 4628,
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law
No. 107-306, 107th Congress,
November
27, 2002,
Title
IX,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2023).
33.
President
George
W.
Bush,
Executive
Order
13354,
“National
Counterterrorism
Center,”
August
27,
2004,
in
Federal
Register,
Vol.
69,
No.
169
(September
1,
2004),
pp.
53589–53592,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2023).
34.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are:
History of
NCSC,”
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history
(accessed March 11, 2023).
35.
Gregory F.
Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard,
Assessing the
Tradecraft of Intelligence
Analysis, RAND
Corporation, National Security Research Division
Technical
Report, 2008, p. 6,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
36.
Letter from
Barry A.
Zulauf, IC
Analytic
Ombudsman, Office of
the Director
of National
Intelligence, to Senator
Marco
Rubio,
Acting
Chairman,
and
Senator
Mark
Warner,
Vice
Chairman,
Select
Committee
on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate,
“RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021,
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/
ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf
(accessed
March
6,
2023).
37.
“Independent
IC
Analytic
Ombudsman’s
[Report]
on
Politicization
of
Intelligence,”
attached
to
January
6, 2021, Zulauf letter.
38.
President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified
National Security Information,” December 29,
2009, in
Federal
Register, Vol. 75,
No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf
(accessed
March
7,
2023).
39.
President
Barack
Obama,
Executive
Order
13556,
“Controlled
Classified
Information,”
November
4,
2010,
in
Federal
Register,
Vol.
75,
No.
216
(November
9,
2010),
pp.
68675–68677,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf
(accessed
March
7,
2023).
40.
Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is
Changing the World,”
Foreign
Policy, November 19, 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war-
semiconductors-export-controls-biden/
(accessed
February
28,
2023).
41.
Scott Stewart,
“The Risk
to Undercover
Operatives in the
Digital Age,”
Stratfor Worldview,
October 29,
2015,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age
(accessed February 24, 2023).
42.
Lauren
Pitruzzello,
“Human
Intelligence:
Former
CIA
Officer
Talks
About
Espionage
in
the
Digital
Age, University of Delaware
UDaily,
March
22, 2012,
https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda-
grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023).
43.
Jenna
McLaughlin
and
Zach
Dorfman,
“‘Shattered’:
Inside
the
Secret
Battle
to
Save
America’s
Undercover Spies
in
the
Digital
Age,”
Yahoo
News,
December
30,
2019,
https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside-
the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html
(accessed
February 24, 2023).
44.
U.S.
Federal
Trade
Commission,
“U.S.–Safe
Harbor
Framework,”
https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/
privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework
(accessed March 11, 2023).
45.
“Fact
Sheet:
Overview
of
the
EU–U.S.
Privacy
Shield
Network,”
U.S.
Department
of
Commerce,
https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_
sheet.pdf
(accessed
March
11,
2023).
46.
“Fact Sheet: United States and
European Commission Announce
Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The
White
House,
March
25,
2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/
fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11,
2023).
47.
President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086,
“Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence
Activities,” October 7,
2022, in
Federal Register,
Vol. 87,
No. 198
(October 14,
2022), pp.
62283–
62297,
(accessed
March
7,
2023).
48.
Warren P. Strobel, “Release
of
Ukraine Intelligence
Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,”
The Wall
Street Journal,
updated
April 4, 2022,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents-
new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001
(accessed February 24, 2023).
49.
President Joseph R. Biden
Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States
Leadership in Quantum
Computing
While
Mitigating
Risks
to
Vulnerable
Cryptographic
Systems,”
The
White
House,
May
4, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-
memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-
to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20
States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed
March 12, 2023).
See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order
14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory
Committee,” May 4,
2022, in
Federal Register,
Vol. 87,
No. 89
(May 9,
2022), pp.
27909–27911,
https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf
(accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact
Sheet: President Biden
Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum
Technologies,” The White House,
May 4,
2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact-
sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/
(accessed March 12, 2023).
Mora
Namdar
MISSION
STATEMENT
The
mission of
United States
Agency for
Global Media
(USAGM) is
to
inform,
engage,
and connect people around the world in support of freedom and
democ- racy.1 However,
this mission
statement does
not reflect
the current
work of
the agency. The mission
is noble,
but the
execution is
lacking. To
fulfill its
mission, USAGM should
also
aim
to
present
the
truth
about
America
and
American
policy—
not parrot
America’s
adversaries’
propaganda
and
talking
points.2
OVERVIEW
Originally formed
as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) in 1994, the BBG
changed its
name in
2018 to
the United
States Agency
for Global
Media. The
USAGM is
a sub-Cabinet agency of the
U.S. government with a budget of just under $1 billion. The
agency oversees
two government
broadcasting networks: the
Voice of
America (VOA)
and
the
Office
of
Cuba
Broadcasting (OCB).
USAGM also
oversees 100
percent of
the
grant funding for several “independent” grantee organizations, including
the Middle
East
Broadcasting Network
(MBN), Radio
Free Asia
(RFA), Radio
Free Europe/Radio
Liberty
(RFE/RL), and
the
newly
formed Open
Technology Fund
(OTF).3
•
The Voice
of America
provides
news and
information in
48 languages to a
weekly
audience
of
more
than
326
million
people
worldwide.
For
more
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
than
80 years,
VOA journalists have supplied
news and
information about the
U.S.,
audience-specific
regions
of
interest
and
concern,
and
the
world
at
large.
VOA
radio
and
television
signals are
broadcast
to
approximately
3,500
affiliates, and
satellite
transmissions reach countries
where free
speech is
banned or where
civil society
is under
threat.4
VOA
uses digital,
web, and
mobile media
as
well,
which, while
sometimes
useful
in
propagating
valuable information
globally, has
created specific
violations of
the agency’s prohibition against broadcasting to the domestic
U.S.
audience—particularly
with
regard to
flagrantly political
content, as
has
been the
practice with
recent and
current VOA
content
directors and managers.5
The
network once
had a
generally
well-received brand value, but
it has
deteriorated under decades
of poor
leadership and a
loss of
its once-prized unbiased reporting.
There are
bright spots
within VOA,
but mismanagement and declining
production values have
diluted its
once- great
reputation
as a
singular
voice
in
American
news
broadcasting
abroad.
•
The Office of Cuba Broadcasting
oversees Radio and
Television Martí, a
multimedia
hub
of
news,
information,
and
analysis
that
provides
the
people of
Cuba
with
programs
through satellite
television,
radio,
and
digital
media. These
programs
present news
and information about Cuba’s
oppressive government
from
the
outside
world that
would
otherwise
be
heavily restricted.6 The
OCB
remains
a
critical
avenue
of
truth
to
the
Cuban
people but
has
been
threatened
with
crippling
budget
and
operational
constraints,
including empathetic attitudes toward
Communist Cuban
leadership coupled
with
organizational
hostility toward
the OCB
by certain
elements of
USAGM
leadership.
During
the
Biden
Administration,
the
OCB
has
been threatened
with closure,
while also
suffering
chilling reductions
in force.7
•
The Middle East Broadcasting Network
is an Arabic-language
news organization
with a
weekly
audience of
27.4 million
people in
22 countries
in the Middle East
and North
Africa. The
MBN consists
of two television networks,
radio,
websites,
and
social
media
platforms.
Together,
they
deliver news
and analysis
on the region, American
policies, and
Americana. The
MBN has
correspondents
throughout the Middle
East and
North Africa.8
•
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
is a private, nonprofit, multimedia
broadcasting
corporation that
serves as
a surrogate
media source
in 27
languages and
23
countries,
including
Afghanistan,
Iran,
Pakistan,
Russia, and
Ukraine.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Founded
in
the
early days
of
the
Cold War
(Radio Free
Europe in
1949
and
Radio
Liberty
in
1953)
and
merged
in
1976,
Radio Free
Europe and
Radio
Liberty were
intended to
execute edgy
and daring
information
operations
and
unrestricted news
reporting deep
behind the
Iron Curtain.
Unfortunately, like
other
broadcast organizations under
USAGM, RFE/RL
has
surrendered
much
of
its
rich
history
to
an
approach
that
favors
political
trends as
opposed
to
operations
that
support
and
represent
America
abroad. While
there are
some bright
spots within
RFE/RL, much
of the
network has
redundant
programming
with
certain
VOA
language
services,
often
with competing,
counterproductive, or dissimilar
messaging.
The
recent
addition of
RFE/RL’s
Hungarian-language service, Szabad
Európa,
falls
outside
the
intended
scope of
RFE/RL’s
charter
by
targeting
a democratically
elected, pro-American European and NATO ally.
Not
least, RFE/RL
has
been
plagued by
several serious
espionage-related
security risks within its ranks.9
•
Radio Free
Asia
is
a private,
nonprofit
multimedia news
corporation that brings
news
and
uncensored
content
to
people
in
six
Asian
countries
that restrict
free
speech,
freedom of
the
press,
and
access
to
reliable
information.
RFA also
provides
educational
and
cultural
programming,
as
well
as
forums for
audiences
to
engage
in
open
dialogue
and freely
express
opinions.
RFA utilizes
on-the-ground reporters
and
networks
of
in-country
sources,
citizen journalists,
and
eyewitnesses who
provide
leads,
tips,
images,
and
video.10
Several
reports from
the
Office
of
the
Inspector General
(OIG) were
released
showing
waste
and
self-dealing,
including
security
vulnerabilities
and
RFA
lead-
ership
awarding
insiders millions
of
dollars
of
grant
funding.11 For
example,
as
the
OIG
stated
in
one
report, the
then-president
of
RFA
“established
the
Free-
dom2Connect
Foundation (Foundation)”
and
thereafter
“awarded two
contracts,
totaling
$1.2
million”
to
the
foundation she
herself founded.12 Furthermore:
[The] OIG
found that
RFA did
not comply
with Federal
procurement requirements
for grantees.
OIG identified
instances in
which RFA
and its
agents did
not
comply
with
OMB
[Office
of
Management
and
Budget]
conflict-of-interest
procurement requirements
for
grantees.
Specifically,
OIG found
that RFA
entered into
14 contracts, totaling $4.0
million (51 percent of
the amount
of OTF
FYs 2012
and 2013
project-related
contracts),
with organizations
that
had
some
affiliation
with
either
RFA
officials or
members of
OTF Advisory
Council.13
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
This
same leadership
proceeded to
wastefully form
the
Open
Technology Fund
as its
own independent
grantee with
the help
of USAGM
senior management
prior to
the tenure
of
Trump-appointed leadership.
•
The Open
Technology
Fund’s
goal
is to
provide
funding to
support the
research,
development,
and
implementation
of
Internet
freedom
technologies
that
circumvent censorship. OTF
was formed
under dubious
circumstances by
using
consolidation rules
to usurp
the mission
and funding of
USAGM’s
pre-existing Office
of Internet
Freedom (OIF),
which funded
far
more
diverse
technologies
with
much
greater
transparency.
OTF, however, operates
with far
less transparency and
strictly restricts
funding
to
“open
source” technology.
OTF
does
not
support
any
technology
with even
partially
“closed source”
code,
notwithstanding that
such
closed-source code would provide
more protection
against
hacking.
Although
OTF touts
large user
numbers, this
could not
be
substantiated upon requests for
information, and it
was discovered
by former
senior USAGM leadership that
OTF makes
extremely
small, insubstantial
donations
to much
larger
messaging
applications
and
technology
to
bolster its
unsubstantiated
claims.14
Despite
its vibrant
self-lobbying
and publicity efforts, OTF remains
a wasteful
and redundant
boondoggle. Its grantee
status
was
suspended
by Trump-appointed
USAGM
leadership
for
a
number of
reasons,
including
noncompliance with
its grant
terms and
for actions
that resulted in
several fraud
and waste
investigations.15
The
OIF, which
predates OTF,
was
historically
under USAGM’s
Office of Chief
Strategy Officer
and
for
years had
been performing
the
same
tasks as
OTF
within USAGM
headquarters
for the
benefit of
all USAGM broadcast
networks.
With much
greater
transparency,
OIF
succeeded
with
fewer
staff
while
simultaneously fielding
more
diverse
and
robust
technologies.
Absent a
meaningful organizational impact
analysis to
justify the
wastefulness
of the decision-making
process, OTF
usurped the
entire OIF
budget and
was set up as a
new grantee
organization.
Exacerbating
matters, OIF
was shut
down in
order to
provide massive
grants
to
the
opaque
activities
of
OTF
and
its
founding
leadership,
who
went
on
a
free-spending boondoggle
for
high-end
Washington,
D.C.,
office
space,
furnishings, and
top salaries
for its leadership team.
Numerous career
staff whistleblowers
came forward
to sound
the alarm
about OTF
to Trump-
appointed leadership,
citing
concerns about
the OIG
reports,
wasteful spending, and
other
substantive
performance matters.16
Nonetheless,
the
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Biden
Administration
reinstated
OTF
to
full operational
status and
ceased all
investigations immediately after
assuming
office.
ATTEMPTS
AT
REFORM
Late
in
the
Trump Administration,
following the
long-delayed Senate
confirma- tion
of
Michael Pack
as
USAGM
Chief Executive
Officer (CEO),17 agency
leadership
rapidly initiated long-overdue and necessary reforms,18 including security reforms
repeatedly
requested by
the
Office
of
Personnel
Management
(OPM) and
the
Office
of the
Director
of
National
Intelligence
(ODNI)
that
had
been
ignored
by
USAGM
leadership.19 Unfortunately,
as
was
the
case
with the
OTF, the
Biden Administration
immediately reinstated personnel who had been fired for gross
security violations, placing
the
agency
back into
its
previously
failed posture—one
that poses
a
danger
to national security.
The Firewall Saga. The
vital error in USAGM’s current organizational/cul-
tural calculus is the agency’s selective application of a journalistic
“firewall.” The
amorphous interpretation of a firewall shifts, depending on
which Administration is
in office
and who
is asking
questions.
Although a
firewall should ensure journalistic independence, it has been
used without
formal
regulation for decades
in order
to shirk
legitimate oversight of
everything
from promoting
adversaries’
propaganda to
ignoring
journalistic
safety.
Often,
the
“firewall”
is touted
when
journalists
are
either
promoting
anti-American
propaganda that parrots adversarial regime talking points or
promoting politically biased
viewpoints in
opposition to
the VOA
charter.20
Such
weak oversight,
alien to
any
other
large media
network or
news organi-
zation—particularly
one derivative of U.S.
foreign policy
and national
security goals—was
erroneously
enshrined
in
a
document
known
as
the
Firewall
Regula- tion.21
The Firewall
Regulation was entered into the
Federal Register on
the eve of
the
Senate
confirmation
of
President
Donald
Trump’s
USAGM
CEO,
Michael Pack.
It was
the
quintessential “midnight reg”
designed to
throttle the
statutory and
executive authority of the agency head. It stipulated that
agency management, by
standards
unknown
to
most
large
broadcast
companies,
was
forbidden
from engaging
in oversight
and direction
of content
in any
way—even false
content. It ran
counter to
the law,
including the
Smith–Mundt
Act,22
and
it was
harmful to the agency itself and to the foreign policy
and national security goals of the
U.S.
government.
Even
content that
went well
beyond fair
and
accurate
reporting on
U.S. domestic
and
political
problems could
not
be
reined in
by
front
office leadership
under the
Firewall
Regulation. Soon,
VOA’s White
House correspondent
was
posting
content
highly
critical
of,
and
personally insulting
to,
the
U.S. President—in
contradiction
of
VOA’s
own
journalistic
standards, policies,
and
procedures.
USAGM career
offi-
cials
considered
such content
sacrosanct and
bravely independent
“journalistic”
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
content
protected by
the
“spirit
of”
the
Firewall
Regulation—despite
ample evi-
dence to the contrary.
Late
in
the
Trump Administration,
USAGM political
leadership, following
an
intensive
U.S. Department
of
Justice
review, revoked
the
Firewall
Regulation over the
protests of
journalistic
organizations—none
more vociferous
than VOA
itself.23 While
the abuses
of the Firewall Regulation
are
particularly
disconcerting, they encompass
just
a
fraction
of
similar
overreaches
of
the
agency’s
journalistic
mission. Current
and
former
USAGM/VOA
leadership
who
wanted
to
maintain
virtually
zero accountability
and
oversight
waged
a
campaign
of
interference,
resistance,
and
disinformation to
stifle
change
at
the
agency.
Perhaps
not
coincidentally,
various
media outlets
with
relationships
to
former
and
future
USAGM
leadership
published near-daily
criticisms
of Trump
Administration
appointees
and
also
of
grantee
organi-
zation leaders
who
were
appointed
by
CEO
Pack
to
implement
long-overdue
reforms.24 Agency Mission
Failure.
Currently, the USAGM,
by and
large, is
not fulfilling
its mission,
which remains so ill-defined and ambiguous that it enables the
organi-
zation
to
go
about
its
business
largely unguided
with little
to
no
oversight. Rather
than
providing
news and
information in
an
accurate,
reliable way
that promotes
and supports
freedom and democracy, the agency is mismanaged, disorganized,
ineffective,
and rife
with waste
and redundancy.
These
shortfalls are
either oriented
toward, or
directly contribute
to,
the
agen- cy’s
media
organizations joining
the mainstream
media’s
anti-U.S. chorus
and denigrating the American
story—all in the
name of
so-called journalistic inde-
pendence. Indeed, content
during the Trump Administration was rife with typical
mainstream media talking
points
assailing the
President and his
staff. The
few bright
spots
within
VOA
and
the
OCB
are
often
stifled
instead
of
supported.
Top-
level
talent
often
leaves
the
agency
or
is
met
with
obstacles
rather than
support.25 Opportunities for modernization and effective strategy are ignored, and
wasteful spending
and
misallocation
of
resources
are
the
norm in
an
environment
in
which
nepotism
is rampant
and political
gamesmanship protects bad
actors.
Amanda Bennett26 was confirmed as USAGM CEO in
2022 after two years of
being
blocked
by
several
Members
of
Congress.
Legal
advocacy
organization
America First Legal
Foundation even wrote to President Joe Biden asking him to
withdraw
her
nomination,27 citing
several
severe national
security failures
while
she was director of VOA.28 Her
tenure as director during the Obama Administration
(and
her
holdover
into the
beginning of
the
Trump
Administration)
was
marred
with operational failures, security failures, and credibility failures.
Those failures are reportedly ongoing
during her
current tenure
as CEO.29
NECESSARY
REFORMS
Security
Issues. The Office of
Personnel Management30 and the Office of
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence
flagged
severe
security
failures
during
four
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
extensive
investigations of the USAGM, each conducted during a 10-year
period between
2010 and
2020.31 Security
personnel and
former agency
senior leadership
ignored
these issues
and allowed
them to
persist.32
In
brief, the
USAGM is
vulnerable to
exploitation by
foreign spies.
During the last
six
months
of
the
Trump Administration,
known foreign
intelligence opera-
tives
were
removed from
the
OCB
and
RFE/RL.
During the
10-year period
between 2010
and 2020,
both the
OPM and
the ODNI
found that
the USAGM’s
Office of
Security
(under the
Office
of
Management)
had
grossly
ignored
and
flouted
many of the federal
government’s most critical and long-standing information and
per- sonnel security protocols, regulations, and
practices.33
During the investigative period—in
which the findings were largely, if not wholly, ignored by
agency senior leadership—over 1,500 USAGM personnel (nearly 40 percent
of its
total
workforce) were
performing their Tier
3 and
Tier 5
national-security-sensitive
positions
with
falsified
and/or
unauthorized
suitabil-
ity-for-employment
determinations and with access to sensitive federal buildings
and
information systems.
In
many
cases,
records
(including
Social
Security
num- bers),
were falsified
or replaced
with notional
placeholders, and fingerprints
(in many
dozens
of
cases)
were
never
submitted
to
the
Federal
Bureau
of
Investigation
for basic background investigations.
By the time
these issues
were addressed by members
of the
Trump Adminis-
tration, more
than 500
personnel with unauthorized
access and
clearances had
left the
USAGM and
rolled into
other federal
agencies with
reciprocal clearance authorizations.
Many
others
disappeared
into
U.S.
society.
As
of
January
2021,
the USAGM
had not
yet determined
the whereabouts
of these
individuals.34
The
USAGM must
never again
be
entrusted
with delegated
authority over
its personnel
security
programs and
suitability determinations
until such
time as
it can
prove that
these failures
will not
happen again.
These
responsibilities must remain with the
Department of Defense and the Office of Personnel Management,
to which
they were
transferred in
the final
weeks of
the Trump
Administration.
Journalists’
Security.
Agency
journalists,
both
on
and
off
American soil,
have
faced danger,35 yet
their superiors have done little to protect them. Whistleblowers
and
Trump
Administration
officials found
that protection
of
USAGM
American
and
foreign
journalists employed
by
USAGM
networks and
grantee organizations
was severely lacking.
Against often-significant
resistance, political appointees forced action to
enable
broadcasters (who
were
under
verified
threats)
to
broadcast
from
remote
locations while
being protected
by federal
law enforcement
officers.
Likewise, political appointees met resistance from senior career
officials when insisting that
foreign-based
journalists
in
high-risk
countries
make
their
locations
known to
the
agency
in
the
event
they
required
rescue, extraction,
or
safe
housing.
Such
safety measures, argued
career officials, would somehow represent a violation of
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
journalistic
independence.
With only
rare exceptions,
resistance to
the
most
basic
journalist
safety
measures
was
the
knee-jerk response
from USAGM
career officials.
Wasting
Taxpayer Dollars. The
USAGM’S current operations, properly man- aged,
can be
conducted on
less than
$700 million
per year.
Prior to
the arrival of
President
Donald Trump’s
appointees
in
June
2020,
budgeting,
financial
responsi- bility,
and
spending
totaled over
$800
million
per
year,
with
virtually
no
oversight or
supervision.
Waste,
unnecessary spending,
nepotism
for
pet
projects,
redundant
programs,
and
unnecessary
hiring abounded.
Consolidation
and Reduction of Redundant Services.
Currently,
the USAGM
funds
numerous
redundant services
through
its
own
offices,
through
Voice of
Amer- ica
and
the
Office
of
Cuba
Broadcasting,
and through
its
grantees.
For
example,
VOA
has a Mandarin-language
service but also funds redundant services through Radio
Free
Asia.
VOA
also
has
a
Farsi-language
service
that
duplicates
one funded
through
Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. Surplus services in the same languages are often
unnecessary and counterproductive. Fiscal responsibility and
transparency should
return
to
the
USAGM,
with
consolidation
being
a
cornerstone
of
the
strategy.
As noted previously, the Open
Technology Fund duplicates activities that
already existed at the USAGM in the Office of Internet Freedom. Numerous
career whistleblowers
came
forward
to
sound
the
alarm
to
President
Trump’s
USAGM political
team about OTF’s abuse and overreach.36
Its opaque, expensive, and
unnecessary
usurpation
of an
existing
USAGM
office
is
an
egregious
example
of
government
waste and
illustrates
the
general
disdain
for
U.S.
taxpayers
that
is
rife
within
this
agency.
Full reinstatement
of
OIF
would
allow
full
agency
and
congres- sional
oversight into
how so-called
“Internet
freedom” money
is being
spent.37
J-1 Visa Program Abuses.
Rather than use the appropriate I visa38
intended
for
foreign
journalists,
the
USAGM
uses
the
J-1
“cultural
exchange”
visas
to
allow foreign
nationals to transition easily into jobs that American citizens
with cul- tural
and
linguistic
expertise
could
satisfy.
The
J-1
visa
is
intended
for
cultural
and academic
exchange
programs,
among
others—none
of
which
include
journalism.39 Additionally,
J-1
visas are
meant for
non-immigrant temporary exchanges.
The USAGM’s J-1
visa holders
often go
on to
apply for
permanent
residency, which
violates the intention of this visa.
Shortwave
Transmission Upgrades and Improvements.
Non-web-based
technologies that
are
proven
and
durable,
such
as
shortwave
radio
transmission
stations, have
been grossly
deemphasized in budgeting
in favor
of newer
web- based
technologies.
This
move
is
dangerously
short-sighted
and
puts
the
U.S.
at
a
perilous
strategic
disadvantage
in
the
event
of
a
major
conflict,
particularly
with Russia or
China.
There
is great
concern about
the
vulnerability of undersea
cable trunks
that make up
the Internet
cloud. The
vast majority
of global
Internet
traffic—95 per-
cent—is transmitted through these cables, including news
transmissions and
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
web-based content produced by the
USAGM’s broadcast networks. While the
robust
and
popular
use
of
the
Internet
is
ideal
during
peacetime,
during
times
of major
conflict,
widespread damage
to the
undersea cables
that carry
communi- cations across
the
globe
can
reasonably
be
expected.
Long-lasting
power
outages are
also likely, such as those Ukraine experienced in the aftermath
of Russia’s 2022
invasion.
The USAGM’s
responsibility for the only U.S. global shortwave radio
capability is
of
critical
strategic importance
if
America
is
to
carry its
message to
people seeking
information and
freedom within conflict zones. Shortwave technologies also make
it possible
to
carry
broadcasts in
areas where
Internet traffic
is
severely
restricted, as
it is
in many
authoritarian states today.
ORGANIZATIONAL
ISSUES
Personnel.
Personnel is one of the
biggest concerns for the USAGM and its
grantees.
Attracting
talented
staff
who
will
stay
and
letting
go
of
poorly
perform- ing
personnel
are
hurdles.
Additionally,
whistleblowers
have
come
forward
with numerous
credible
allegations of
illegal
nepotism and
improper
hiring practic-
es.40 Past
agency
leaders
have
ignored
national security
procedures when
hiring and have
failed to
adequately vet
staff.41 Government
hiring policies
and
federal
law
must be
followed, and
serious policy
changes must
be implemented
to end these
practices.
Relevant
Government Entities
•
The White
House.
As
an executive
branch agency,
the USAGM
ostensibly should report to
the President
and coordinate
activities with the
National
Security Council
(NSC)—especially
given
the
direct
and
implied
national
security aspects
of
the
agency’s messaging
globally. However,
there
currently is
no specific
office in
the White
House or
NSC liaison
for
the
USAGM.
The
original network,
VOA, functioned
under the
Office of
Coordinator of
Information as early
as 1941,
the War
Department’s Office of
War Information from 1942
to 1945,
the State
Department from 1945
to 1953, and
the U.S. Information
Agency from
1953 until
the creation
of the
independent
Broadcasting Board
of Governors
in 1999.
Although some
oversight and
management functions of
the agency
are provided
by the
State Department,
the
USAGM
otherwise
has
little
connectivity
to
larger
departments or
agencies and
even less
to the
White House.
With the
dissolution
of
the
U.S. Information
Agency in
1999, the
USAGM has
virtually been
under
its
own
supervision and
guidance. The
results have
been dismal.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
The State
Department.
VOA
was most
effective before and
during the
Cold
War
when
it
was
under
the
direct
supervision
and
control
of
the
War and
State
Departments, respectively.
If
VOA
is
not
put
in
the
direct
chain
of command
under
the
NSC,
serious
consideration
should
be
given
to
putting
VOA under
the
direct
supervision
of
the
Office
of
Global
Public
Affairs
at
the
Department
of State.
The
Office
of
Global
Public
Affairs
was
formed
during
the
Trump Administration
by
consolidation
of
the
State Department’s
Bureau
of
International
Information Programs
and
Bureau
of
Global
Public Affairs.
Ensuring
that taxpayer-funded
TV,
radio,
and
messaging
tells America’s
story
is imperative and should
be coordinated
with the
existing
foreign- language
social
media
platforms
at
the
State
Department.
Currently,
VOA’s
foreign-language TV
programming
is
unreliable
in
telling
America’s
story, given
its amorphous interpretation of
its
independence firewall
and its
waning
adherence
to certain
provisions
of
the
Smith–Mundt
Act
depending on
which
political party is
in office.
The
VOA firewall
is meant
to protect
broadcasters from government
interference with
content;
however,
USAGM
staff
have
abused
the
firewall and
used
it
as
an
offensive
measure to
block
oversight.
Additionally,
the Smith–Mundt
Act stipulates
that USAGM
services are
meant to
tell the
American
story
abroad—never
to
domestic
audiences—but
the
agency
has used
its
taxpayer
funding to
promote
partisan
messaging
in
the
U.S.
One
of the
most
egregious
examples
was
when,
in
2020,
it
bought
ads
on
its
foreign-
language
social
media
sites
to
disseminate
a
Biden
campaign
ad
and
targeted it
to a major
Muslim
population in
Michigan.42 Moreover,
VOA often
airs foreign
adversaries’
propaganda,
which
is
antithetical
to
its
congressionally
mandated
core
mission.
State Department
oversight
or
“command”
may
be one
way
to
ensure
that
VOA
and
the
rest
of
the
USAGM
returns
and
adheres to its
original mission.
Clear
lines
of
command
and
communications
between the
USAGM and
an
appropriate
office of
the
National
Security Council
are
also
sorely lacking,
as
has been
any reasonable accountability for
USAGM senior
leadership and
strategy.
The State
Department’s
Assistant
Secretary
for
Global
Public Affairs
and
Undersecretary for
Diplomacy
and
Public
Affairs
should
also be
in
the
accountability
loop
for
agency
actions.
While
the
U.S.
Secretary
of State
technically has a
seat on
the board
of the
agency, it
is a toothless
seat that is often deferred to the undersecretary and/or
assistant secretaries noted
above.
This
position
should
be
relevant
and
directive
when
U.S. foreign
policy and
strategic
communications are
at stake.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
For
example, the
years-long delay
in
confirming
the
Trump-appointed
CEO
left
disastrous holdover
leadership from
the
previous
Administration.
Employing
effective leadership,
even in
an
acting
capacity, while
a
new
CEO
is
awaiting
Senate confirmation
is
necessary
to
prevent
a
repeat
of
this
behavior.
•
Congress.
The
USAGM receives
its budget
and mandates
directly from
Congress.
Often,
changes
in
major
functions
at
the
agency
happen
because of
the lobbying efforts
of a
few connected
individuals—often grantees lobbying for
more funds
and less
accountability. Those changes
can and
do
handcuff leadership
from any
meaningful oversight.
An
overhaul
of
the
agency
with
review
from
Congress
to
modernize,
streamline, and
reduce waste
must be
done with
congressional support.
•
Key nongovernmental stakeholders, allies, and non-allies.
These include
industry
groups,
nonprofits,
trade
associations,
foundations,
and
activist
organizations,
for
example,
America First
Legal
Foundation,43 USAGM
Watch,44 BBG-USAGM
Watch,45 and
Whistleblower
Protection
Project.46
CONCLUSION
The
USAGM is
a
story
of
a
lost opportunity
both to
help restore
the
world’s
con- fidence in the promise and ideals of America and to
set a high mark for journalistic
integrity
and
unbiased
reporting. These
two
areas
have suffered
severely under
two
decades
of
USAGM
mismanagement
and
lack of
oversight. Finding
solutions to
these
problems
and
the
restoration of
the
agency’s
networks must
be
the
priorities of future
agency leadership.
To accomplish this,
the USAGM
must be
fully reformed
top to
bottom with
congressional and White House
support. The possibility of consolidating not only the agency’s
subparts, but bringing the entire agency under the supervision
of the NSC, the
State
Department, or both
would
dramatically aid
that reform.
If
the
de
facto
aim
of
the
agency
simply remains
to
compete
in
foreign
markets
using anti-U.S. talking points that parrot America’s adversaries’
propaganda, then
this
represents an
unacceptable burden
to
the
U.S. taxpayer
and
a
negative return
on
investment.
In
that
case, the
USAGM should
be
defunded
and
disestablished. If,
however, the
agency can
be reformed
to become
an effective
tool, it
would be
one
of
the
greatest
tools
in
America’s
arsenal
to
tell
America’s
story
and
promote freedom
and democracy
around the
world.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The preparation of this chapter was a collective effort involving
many individuals to
whom thanks
is owed.
These
individuals include, but
are not
limited to,
Victoria
Coates, Michael
Pack, Frank
Wuco, and several
brave
whistleblowers who
prefer not
to be
named. Their
efforts were
integral to
the chapter and
are greatly appreciated.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
E
Mike
Gonzalez
very Republican
President since Richard Nixon has tried to strip the Corpora-
tion
for
Public Broadcasting
(CPB) of
taxpayer funding.
That is
significant not
just
because it
means that
for
half
a
century,
Republican Presidents
have failed
to
accomplish what
they set out to do, but also because Nixon was the first
President
in
office
when National
Public Radio
(NPR) and
the
Public
Broadcasting Service
(PBS),
which the
CPB funds,
went on
air.
In
other words,
all
Republican Presidents
have recognized
that public
funding
of
domestic
broadcasts is
a
mistake.
As
a
35-year-old lawyer
in
the
Nixon White
House, one
Antonin Scalia
warned
that
conservatives
were being
“confronted
with a long-range problem of
significant social consequences—that is, the development
of a
government-funded
broadcast
system similar
to the
BBC.”47
All of which means that the next
conservative President must finally get this done and do it
despite opposition from congressional members of his
own
party
if
necessary.
To
stop
public
funding
is
good
policy
and
good
politics. The
reason is simple: President Lyndon Johnson may have pledged in
1967 that public broadcasting would become “a vital public
resource to enrich our homes, educate our families and to
provide assistance to our classrooms,”48 but public broadcasting
immediately became a
liberal forum
for public
affairs and journalism.
Not only is
the federal
government trillions of
dollars in
debt and
unable to
afford
the
more
than
half
a
billion
dollars
squandered
on
leftist
opinion
each
year, but
the
government
should not
be
compelling
the
conservative
half
of
the
country
to pay
for
the
suppression
of
its
own
views.
As
Thomas
Jefferson
put
it,
“To
compel
a
man
to
furnish
contributions
of
money
for
the
propagations
of
opinions
which he
disbelieves and abhors,
is sinful
and
tyrannical.”49
A DEMONSTRATED PATTERN OF BIAS
Conservatives
will thus
reward a
President who
eliminates this
tyrannical sit- uation.
PBS
and
NPR
do
not
even
bother to
run
programming
that would
attract conservatives.
As
Pew
Research
demonstrated in
2014, 25
percent of
PBS’s audi-
ence
is
“mostly liberal,”
and
35
percent is
“consistently
liberal.”
That is
60
percent
liberal
compared to 15 percent conservative (11 percent “mostly
conservative” and 4 percent
“consistently conservative”).50
NPR’s
audience is
even to
the Left
of that,
with 67
percent
liberal (41
percent “consistently
liberal”
and
26
percent
“mostly
liberal”),
compared
with
12
percent
conservative (3 percent and 9
percent “consistently conservative” and “mostly con-
servative,”
respectively).51 That
may
be
an
acceptable
business model
for
MSNBC
or
CNN, but
not for
a
taxpayer-subsidized broadcaster.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
DEFUNDING
THROUGH THE
BUDGETARY
PROCESS
Cutting off the CPB is logistically
easy. The solution lies in the budgetary process.
In 2022,
the CPB
submitted to the
Labor, Health
and Human
Services, Education,
and
Related
Agencies
Subcommittees
of
the
House
and
Senate
Appro-
priations Committees
its budget
justification for fiscal
year (FY)
2023. In
it, the
CPB
requested
that
Congress
give
it
a
$565
million
advance
appropriation—a
$40 million
increase
compared to
its FY
2022 funding.52 Unlike most other
agencies, the
CPB
receives
advance appropriations
that
provide
them
with
funding
two
years
ahead of time, which
insulates the agency from Congress’s power of the purse and
oversight. This special
budgetary
treatment is
unjustified and should
be ended.
The
47th President
can
just
tell the
Congress—through
the
budget he
proposes
and
through
personal contact—that
he
will
not
sign
an
appropriations
spending bill
that
contains
a
penny
for
the
CPB. The
President may
have to
use
the
bully pulpit,
as NPR and PBS
have teams of lobbyists who have convinced enough Members of
Congress to
save their
bacon every
time their
taxpayer subsidies
have been
at
risk
since the Nixon era.
Defunding CPB
would by no means cause NPR or PBS—or other public broad-
casters that benefit from CPB
funding, including the even-further-to-the Left Pacifica Radio
and American Public Media—to file for bankruptcy. The mem-
bership model
that the
CPB uses,
along with
the funding
from
corporations and
foundations that it
also receives,
would allow
these
broadcasters to
continue to
thrive. As George
Will wrote,
“If ‘Sesame
Street’
programming were
put up
for auction, the danger
would be
of getting
trampled by
the stampede of
potential bidders.”53 Indeed,
“Sesame Street”
is
on
HBO
now,
which shows
its
potential
as a money earner.
PUBLIC
INTEREST VS.
PRIVILEGE
Stripping
public funding would, of course, mean that NPR, PBS, Pacifica
Radio,
and
the
other leftist
broadcasters would
be
shorn
of
the
presumption that
they act
in
the public
interest and
receive the
privileges
that often
accompany so acting.
They
should
no
longer,
for example,
be
qualified
as
noncommercial
education
sta-
tions (NCE stations), which
they clearly no longer are. NPR, Pacifica, and the other
radio
ventures
have
zero
claim
on
an
educational
function
(the
original
purpose for
which they
were created
by President
Johnson), and the
percentage of on-air
programming that
PBS
devotes
to
educational
endeavors
such
as
“Sesame
Street”
(programs that
are themselves
biased to
the Left) is
small.
Being
an NCE
comes with
benefits. The
Federal
Communications Commis- sion,
for
example,
reserves
the
20
stations
at
the
lower
end
of
the
radio
frequency
(between 88
and 108
MHz on
the FM
band) for
NCEs. The
FCC says
that “only
noncommercial educational
radio stations are licensed in the 88–92 MHz ‘reserved’
band,” while both commercial and noncommercial educational
stations may
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
operate
in
the
“non-reserved”
band.54 This
confers
advantages, as
lower-frequency
stations can
be
heard
farther away
and
are
easier to
find as
they lie
on
the
left end
of
the radio
dial
(figuratively as well
as
ideologically).
The
FCC
also
exempts NCE
stations from
licensing fees.
It
says
that “Noncom-
mercial
educational
(NCE) FM
station
licensees and
full service
NCE television
broadcast station
licensees
are
exempt
from
paying
regulatory
fees,
provided
that these
stations
operate solely
on an
NCE basis.”55
NPR
and
PBS
stations are
in
reality
no
longer
noncommercial,
as
they run
ads
in everything but name for their sponsors. They are also noneducational.
The next
President
should instruct the FCC to exclude the stations affiliated with
PBS and NPR
from the
NCE
denomination and the
privileges that come
with it.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S.
Agency
for
Global
Media,
https://www.usagm.gov/
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
2.
Ben Weingarten, “Security
Failures USG Media Agency Prove Need to Hire Americans First,”
Newsweek,
August 10, 2020,
https://www.newsweek.com/security-failures-usg-media-Agency-prove-need-hire-
americans-first-opinion-1523895
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
3.
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Who We Are,”
https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/history/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
4.
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Voice of America,”
https://www.usagm.gov/networks/voa/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
5.
Daniel Lippman, “Deleted Biden
Video
Sets Off
a Crisis at Voice of America,”
Politico
July 30, 2020,
https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/07/30/deleted-biden-video-sets-off-a-crisis-at-voice-of-america-388571 (accessed March 20, 2023).
6.
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Office of Cuba
Broadcasting,”
https://www.usagm.gov/networks/ocb/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
7.
Rafael
Bernal,
“Bipartisan Group
Asks
Office
of
Cuba
Broadcasting
to Rescind
Layoffs,”
September
13,
2022,
The Hill,
https://thehill.com/latino/3641445-bipartisan-group-asks-office-of-cuba-broadcasting-to-rescind-
layoffs/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
8.
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Middle East Broadcasting
Networks,”
https://www.usagm.gov/networks/mbn/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
9.
U.S.
Agency for
Global Media,
Consolidation
Report,
p. 13,
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/
FA00/20210930/114085/HMKP-117-FA00-20210930-SD002.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
10.
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Radio Free Asia,”
https://www.usagm.gov/networks/rfa/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
11.
U.S.
Department
of
State
and
the
Broadcasting
Board
of
Governors,
Office
of
the
Inspector
General,
Audit
of
Radio Free Asia Expenditures, June 2015,
https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/aud-fm-
ib-15-24_1.pdf
(accessed
March
22,
2023).
12.
Ibid.
13.
Ibid.,
p.
16.
14.
Susan
Crabtree,
“‘Lax’
Internet
Freedom
Group
Balks
at
New
Pack
Oversight,”
https://www.realclearpolitics.
com/articles/2020/08/24/lax_internet_freedom_group_balks_at_new_pack_oversight_144043.html (accessed March 22, 2023).
15.
Ibid.
16.
Ibid.
17.
Nomination
of
Michael
Pack
to
the
Broadcasting
Board
of
Governors,
116th
Cong.,
2nd
Sess.
(2020),
https://
www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-congress/1590
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
18.
James
Robbins,
“More
Rot
at
America’s
Public
Diplomacy
Mouthpiece,”
The
Hill,
November
7,
2020,
https://
thehill.com/opinion/national-security/524924-more-rot-at-americas-public-diplomacy-mouthpiece/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
19.
U.S. Office
of Personnel
Management, Suitability Agency
Executive Programs,
Follow
Up Review
of U.S. Agency
for Global Media, July 2020,
https://bbgwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/OPM-SuitEA-
July-2020.pdf
(accessed
March 20,
203).
20.
If
the agency
were not
an extension
of U.S.
foreign policy
and national
security goals,
then its
staffing positions
would not be classified in their entirety as Tier 3 and Tier 5
national-security sensitive positions,
which
they are.
See U.S.
Agency for
Global Media,
Consolidation
Report, p.
13.
21.
Federal
Register, Vol.
85, No.
115 (June
15,
2020),
pp.
36150–36153.
22.
U.S.
Information and Educational Exchange Act of
1948 (“Smith–Mundt Act”), Public Law 80–402.
23.
Jessica Jerreat, “USAGM CEO Criticized
Over Move to Rescind Firewall
Regulation,” October 28, 2020,
https://
www.voanews.com/a/usa_usagm-ceo-criticized-over-move-rescind-firewall-regulation/6197671.html (accessed March 20, 2023).
24.
Byron York,
“America’s Lost Voice,”
Washington Examiner,
February 4,
2021,
https://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/politics/americas-lost-voice
(accessed March
20, 2023).
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
25.
Sasha Gong, “VOA Problems: Racism, Xenophobia, Mediocrity,
and Nepotism,” BBG-USAGM Watch, December
25, 2018, archived at
https://web.archive.org/web/20220105101300/https://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/voa-
problems-racism-xenophobia-mediocrity-and-nepotism/
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
26.
U.S. Agency
for
Global Media
Watch,
“Big
Mistake
in
Rewarding
Failed Voice
of
America
(VOA)
Managers
U.S. Agency for Global Media Managers,” November 11, 2022,
https://www.usagmwatch.com/big-mistake-
in-rewarding-failed-voice-of-america-voa-and-u-s-Agency-for-global-media-usagm-managers/
(accessed March 20, 2023).
27.
America First
Legal
Foundation,“AFL Asks Biden
Administration to Withdraw
Nomination of Amanda
Bennett Citing National
Security and Related Failures,” June 30, 2022,
https://aflegal.org/afl-asks-biden-
administration-to-withdraw-nomination-of-amanda-bennett-citing-national-security-and-related-failures/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
28.
U.S.
Agency for
Global Media,
Consolidation Report, p.
13.
29.
U.S. Agency for Global Media
Watch, “Extraordinary
Leadership Dysfunction at USAGM Continues,” October 4,
2022,
https://www.usagmwatch.com/extraordinary-leadership-dysfunction-at-usagm-continues/
(accessed
March 20,
2023).
30.
U.S.
Office
of Personnel
Management,
Follow-Up Review of the U.S. Agency for Global
Media
Suitability
Program.
31.
Ibid.
32.
U.S.
Agency for
Global Media,
Consolidation Report, p.
13.
33.
U.S.
Office
of Personnel
Management,
Follow-Up Review of the U.S. Agency for Global
Media
Suitability
Program.
34.
Robbins,
“More
Rot
at
America’s
Public
Diplomacy
Mouthpiece.”
35.
U.S. Department of Justice, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Kidnapping Conspiracy Charges Against an
Iranian
Intelligence
Officer
And
Members
Of
An
Iranian
Intelligence
Network,”
July
13,
2021,
https://www.
justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-kidnapping-conspiracy-charges-against-iranian
(accessed March 20, 2023).
36.
James
Robbins,
“The
Trouble
with
the
Open
Technology
Fund,”
Newsweek,
August
9,
2020,
https://www.
newsweek.com/trouble-open-technology-fund-opinion-1528998
(accessed March 20, 2023).
37.
Susan Crabtree, “Lax Internet Freedom Group Balks at New
Pack Oversight,” Real Clear Politics, August 24, 2020,
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/08/24/lax_internet_freedom_group_balks_at_new_
pack_oversight_144043.html
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
38.
U.S.
Department
of
State,
“Visas
for
Members
of
the
Foreign
Media,
Press,
and
Radio,”
https://travel.state.
gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/employment/visas-members-foreign-media-press-radio.html
(accessed March 20, 2023).
39.
Authorized positions for J-1
visas include:
au
pair, camp counselor, college/university student, government
visitor, intern,
international visitor, physician, professor, research scholar,
secondary school student, short-term
scholar, specialist, STEM
initiatives, summer work travel, teacher, and trainee. See U.S.
Department of State,
“Exchange Visitor Visa,”
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/study/exchange.html
(accessed March 20, 2023).
40.
News release, “McCaul Demands Answers on USAGM Personnel
and Management,” Foreign Affairs
Committee,
October 28,
2021,
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-demands-answers-on-
usagm-personnel-and-management/
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
41.
U.S. Agency for Global
Media
Watch, “USAGM: Past Leaders
Ignored National Security Procedures, Failed to
Adequately Vet Staff,” August
8, 2020,
https://www.usagmwatch.com/usagm-past-agency-leaders-ignored-
national-security-procedures-failed-to-adequately-vet-staff/
(accessed March 20,
2023).
42.
U.S. Agency for Global Media, “CEO Pack Launches
Investigation Into Pro-Biden VOA Content, U.S. Election
Interference,”
July
30,
2020,
https://www.usagm.gov/2020/07/30/ceo-pack-launches-investigation-into-pro-
biden-voa-content-u-s-election-interference/
(accessed
March
22,
2023).
43.
America First
Legal
Foundation, “AFL Asks
Biden
Administration to
Withdraw
Nomination of Amanda
Bennet Citing National
Security and Related Failures,” June 30, 2022,
https://aflegal.org/afl-asks-biden-
administration-to-withdraw-nomination-of-amanda-bennett-citing-national-security-and-related-failures/ (accessed March 20, 2023).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
44.
U.S.
Agency
for
Global
Media
Watch,
https://www.usagmwatch.com/
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
45.
BBG-USAM
Watch,
https://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
46.
Whistleblower
Protection
Project,
“Congress
Releases
Long-Awaited
Investigative
Report
on
Chronically Mismanaged USAGM,” February
9, 2022,
https://whipproj.org/congress-releases-long-awaited-usagm-
investigative-report-revealing-Agencys-chronic-mismanagement/
(accessed
March
20,
2023).
47.
National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, “Nixon Administration Public Broadcasting
Papers,
Summary
of
1971,”
February
23,
1979,
https://current.org/1979/02/nixon-administration-public-
broadcasting-papers-summary-of-1971/
(accessed
March
21,
2023).
48.
President
Lyndon
B.
Johnson,
State
of
the
Union
Address,
January
10,
1967,
https://www.infoplease.com/
primary-sources/government/presidential-speeches/state-union-address-lyndon-b-johnson-january-10-1967
(accessed March
21, 2023).
49.
Joyce Appleby
and Terence Ball, eds.,
Jefferson: Political Writings
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press,
1999), p.
390.
50.
Pew Research Center, “Where News
Audiences Fit on the
Political Spectrum,” October 21, 2014,
http://www.
journalism.org/interactives/media-polarization/outlet/pbs/
(accessed March 21,
2023.
51.
Ibid.
52.
Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
Corporation
for Public
Broadcasting Appropriation Request
and Justification FY 2023/FY
2025,
Submitted to the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and
Related
Agencies Subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee and the Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education
and Related
Agencies
Subcommittee
of
the
Senate
Appropriations
Committee,
March
28,
2022,
p. 2,
https://www.cpb.org/sites/default/files/appropriation/FY-2023-2025-CPB-Budget-Justification.pdf
(accessed
March
21,
2023).
53.
George
F. Will,
“Public
Broadcasting’s
Immortality Defies
Reason,”
The Washington Post, June
2, 2017,
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/public-broadcastings-immortality-defies-reason/2017/06/02/f5de02be-
46fe-11e7-a196-a1bb629f64cb_story.html?utm_term=.8df3a01f6ca6
(accessed March 21, 2023).
54.
Federal Communications Commission, “FM Radio,”
https://www.fcc.gov/general/fm-radio
(accessed March 21, 2023).
55.
Federal
Communications
Commission, “Regulatory Fee
Exemptions for FY
2021,”
FCC Regulatory
Fees Factsheet
No. DA-21-1142,
September 10,
2021, p.
2.
MISSION
The U.S. Agency
for
International
Development leads the
U.S.
government’s international development
and
disaster
assistance
programs.
USAID
helps
com-
munities
to lead
their
own
development
journeys
by
reducing
the
impact
of
conflict; preventing
hunger
and
the
spread
of pandemic
disease;
and
counteracting
the driv- ers
of violence,
instability, transnational crime,
and other
threats. In
alignment with
U.S. national
security
interests, the
agency
promotes American
prosperity through initiatives that
expand markets
for U.S.
exports;
encourage innovation; create
a
level
playing
field
for
U.S.
businesses;
and
support
more
stable,
resilient, and
democratic
societies
that are
less
likely
to
act
against
American
interests
and more
likely to
respect
family, life,
and religious liberty.
OVERVIEW
USAID
was
established during
the presidency
of John
F. Kennedy
pursuant to
the
Foreign
Assistance
Act of
19611 to
promote
the
foreign
policy, security,
and national interests
of the United States. At the height of the Cold War with the
Soviet
Union,
it
sought
to
halt
the
spread
of
Communism
by assisting
peoples
in
the
developing world in their
efforts to advance economically, socially, and politically.
The agency helped
to transition
Central and
Eastern Europe
from socialism
to free market–based
democracies. Today, USAID leads the U.S. government’s global
development
and humanitarian
disaster
assistance responses.
Over
the
years,
USAID expanded
the
number
of
countries
assisted, the
scope
and
size
of
its
activities,
and
especially
its
budget.
The
Trump
Administration
faced
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
an
institution marred
by
bureaucratic
inertia: programmatic
incoherence; waste-
ful spending;
and dependence on huge awards to a self-serving and politicized
aid industrial
complex of
United Nations
agencies,
international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and for-profit contractors. Once started, programs
continue almost
indefinitely—in many countries, for decades. USAID’s
multibillion-dollar humanitarian
programs
that
were
once
80
percent
in
response
to
natural
disasters are
now 80 percent
in response
to violent,
man-made crises
and have
become a
permanent and immiserating
feature of
the global landscape.
Under the Trump
Administration, USAID focused on ending the need for for- eign
aid
by
placing countries
onto a
Journey to
Self-Reliance.2 The
Administration
restructured
the
agency
to
reflect
this strategic
approach to
development, stream-
lined
procurement
procedures to
diversify its
partner base,
increased awards
to cost-effective local
(including faith-based) organizations, and improved inter- nal
governance. It instituted pro-life and family-friendly policies.
It promoted international
religious
freedom as
a pillar of
the agency’s
work and
built up
an unprecedented genocide-response infrastructure.
The
Biden
Administration has
deformed the
agency by
treating it
as a
global platform to
pursue
overseas
a
divisive
political
and
cultural
agenda
that
promotes
abortion,
climate
extremism,
gender
radicalism,
and
interventions
against
perceived
systemic
racism.
It
has
dispensed
with
decades
of
bipartisan
consensus
on
foreign aid
and
pursued
policies
that contravene
basic
American
values
and
have
antago-
nized our
partners
in
Asia,
Africa,
and
Latin
America.
It
has
decoupled
U.S.
assistance
from free-market
reforms
that
are
the
keystone
of
economic
and
political
stability and
has
teamed
with
global
institutions to
impose
central
planning
diktats
on
an
unprecedented scale.
Wasteful
budget
increases
requested
by
the
Administration and
appropriated
by
Congress
have outstripped
USAID’s
capacity
to
spend
funds
responsibly, and
U.S.
foreign
aid
has
been
transformed
into
a
massive
and
open-
ended
global
entitlement
program
captured
by—and
enriching—the
progressive
Left. The
next
conservative Administration should
scale back
USAID’s global
foot- print
by,
at
a
minimum,
returning
to
the
agency’s
2019
pre–COVID-19
pandemic budget
level.
It
should
deradicalize USAID’s
programs
and
structures
and
build on
the
conservative reforms
instituted by
the Trump
Administration. This will
require
working
closely
with
the
U.S.
Congress
to make
deep
cuts
in
the
interna-
tional affairs “150 Account”
while granting USAID greater flexibility in spending
its
appropriated
funds to
achieve better
developmental
outcomes.
KEY
ISSUES
Aligning U.S.
Foreign Aid to U.S. Foreign Policy.
U.S.
foreign aid
is too
often disconnected
from the strategy and practice of U.S. foreign policy. Its
coordination is
made
difficult
as the
aid
budget
is
divided
among
approximately
20
offices,
agen- cies,
and departments
that provide
some form
of foreign
assistance.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
The
USAID Administrator
should be
authorized to
take on
the
additional
role of Director
of
Foreign
Assistance (DFA)
with the
rank of
Deputy Secretary
at
the
Department
of
State
in
charge
of
all
U.S. foreign
assistance. The
DFA
role
would empower this
person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance
programs across
the U.S.
government and carry
out the
agenda of
the next con-
servative
President
more
effectively.
A
version
of
this
role
existed
during
the
last
two years of the George W.
Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration
eliminated it in 2009.
Countering China’s
Development Challenge.
Through
its
trillion-dollar Belt
and
Road
Initiative
(BRI), the
Peoples
Republic
of
China
(PRC)
has
directed
billions of
dollars in
loans and
investments to
advance its
geostrategic
objective of displacing the
United States
as the
premier global
power. The
PRC leverages
its
transactions—termed
“debt traps”
by many
critics—to
strengthen its global influence,
extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support
at international fora,
and access
ports and
bases for
its military.
In Latin
America, 25
of
29
countries
participate
in
the
BRI,
and
the
PRC
ranks
as
the
region’s
largest
trading partner.
Since
2005,
Chinese
state-owned
banks
have
issued
$138
billion in
loans to
Latin American
countries, and
other Chinese
entities have
invested an
additional $140 billion.
In Africa,
China has
issued $160
billion in
loans and
dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is
critical to global energy development.
The World Bank estimates that 60
percent of all BRI loans are in financial
distress,
leading
many countries
to
seek
emergency
financial
help
from
Western
donors. Chinese-funded
projects are known for employing substandard labor and
environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial
deci- sions
by
governments, advancing
China’s
geostrategic
interests,
and
creating
an
unequal
trade
relationship in
which
China
secures
raw
materials
from
developing
countries
and
sells
those
countries
manufacturing
products.
For
example,
Brazil,
a world leader in shoe
production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap
Chinese
imports. China’s
mercantilist
penetration of the
developing world and the
negative
consequences for
developing countries’ healthy
economic growth
have
undercut
U.S.
strategic
relationships
in
those
countries
and
wasted
billions in
U.S. foreign aid.
During
the
Trump
Administration,
USAID:
•
Inaugurated
a
robust
counter-China
response
called
Clear
Choice3 that
contrasted
America’s
development
approach
based
on
liberty,
sovereignty,
and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism
that
pursued
predatory financing schemes
and economic
and political
subordination to Beijing.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
Launched
its
first
Digital
Strategy4 to
promote
safe
5G
access
in
emerging
markets and
combat
Beijing’s efforts to
equip regimes
with tools
to
stifle
democracy.
•
Struck
bilateral
development
relationships
with
Japan,
Israel,
Kuwait,
Qatar,
the United
Arab Emirates,
and Taiwan
to support
projects in
sub-Saharan Africa,
Asia, Latin
America, and
the Middle
East.
•
Established
an
office
in
Greenland
to
help
counter
China’s
claims
of
being
“a
near
Arctic
state”
and
reoriented
its
programming
across
Asia—including
establishing
a
USAID
Mission
to
Central
Asia—in
line
with
America’s
Indo-
Pacific strategy.5
•
Joined
with the
U.S.
Department of
Homeland
Security and
National Oceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration to help
coastal
countries detect
and
halt
illegal,
unreported,
and
unregulated
fishing
and
confront
criminal
activities practiced
by
state-run
Chinese fishing
fleets that
violate international
norms, ravage
fishing
industries in
developing countries, worsen food
insecurity, rob vulnerable
communities of their
livelihoods, and deplete maritime resources.
USAID
built an
organizational
infrastructure
to
carry
out
its
multiple lines
of counter-China
operations. An agencywide
Clear Choice
Executive
Council and
USAID–U.S.
International
Development Finance Corporation
Working Group
reviewed
all
proposed
assistance
programs and
proposals
through
a
counter-China
lens. A senior
executive–level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the
Adminis- trator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China,
supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat.
The Biden
Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’s
counter-China
architecture
to waste
away,
subordinating our
national
security interests
to
progressive
climate
politics
in
which
Communist
China
is
viewed
as a global
partner.
The next
conservative Administration should restore and build on the
Trump
Administration’s
counter-China
infrastructure
at
USAID,
end
the
climate policy
fanaticism
that advantages Beijing, and
assess
bilateral aid
through the
lens of
U.S. national security interests,
rewarding those countries that resist China’s
debt
diplomacy.
It should
finance
programs
designed
to
counter
specific
Chinese
efforts in
strategically
important
countries
and
eliminate
funding
to
any
partner
that engages
with
Chinese
entities
directly
or
indirectly.
USAID’s
Bangkok-based
Regional Development
Mission for
Asia should
focus its
strategic
attention on
supporting
cross-border
initiatives designed to
counter Chinese
influence.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Climate Change.
Upon
taking
office, President
Biden issued
executive orders
to
“put
the
climate
crisis at
the
center
of
U.S.
foreign policy
and
national
security” and
mitigate
“the devastating
inequalities that
intersect with
gender, race,
ethnic-
ity,
and
economic
security.”6 USAID
subsequently
declared itself
“a
climate
agency”
and
redirected
its
private-sector
engagement
strategy—teaming
with America’s
corporate
sector to
wean countries
off
foreign
aid
through
private investment
and
trade—to
support
the
Administration’s
global policy
to
“transition
from fossil
fuels to renewable
energy.”
The Administration has incorporated
its radical climate policy into every
USAID
initiative. It
has
joined
or
funded
international
partnerships
dedicated
to
advancing the aims of the
Paris Climate Agreement and has supported the idea of
giving trillions
of dollars
more in
aid transfers
for “climate
reparations.”
The Biden
Administration’s
extreme climate
policies have
worsened
global food
insecurity
and
hunger.
Its
anti–fossil
fuel
agenda
has
led
to
a
sharp
spike
in
global
energy
prices.
Inflation
has
hit
the
poor
the
hardest
as
they
expend
a
higher proportion
of
income
on
food
purchases.
Farmers in
poor
countries
can
no
longer
afford to buy expensive
natural gas–based fertilizers that are key to achieving high
yields
of
food
production. Under
advice
from
climate
radicals,
the
government
of
Sri
Lanka
even
banned
chemical
fertilizers
entirely
without
having
any
replace- ments
in place.
The result
has been
hunger and
violent
political instability.
The aid industry claims that climate
change causes poverty, which is false. Enduring conflict,
government corruption, and bad economic policies are the
main
drivers
of global
poverty.
USAID’s
response
to
man-made
food
insecurity
is to
provide
more
billions
of
dollars
in
aid—a
recipe
that
will
keep
scores
of
poor countries
underdeveloped and dependent
on foreign
aid for
years to
come.
The impact on
Africa is
especially
acute. South
Africa, for
example,
relies on
coal-powered plants to
generate 80 percent of its power needs. It would need $26
billion
in
foreign
aid to
make
the
full
transition
away
from
coal.
Multiplying
this amount by
dozens of other countries on the continent, the financial
resources needed to
transition away
from fossil
fuels are
unachievable.
In Latin
America, countries
that
are
global
leaders
in
oil
and
gas
production
have
sharply
curtailed
their energy production in
line with climate activists, upending the hemisphere’s
major
source
of
export
revenues
and condemning
it
to
years
of
economic
and
polit- ical
instability.
USAID
should cease
its
war
on
fossil
fuels in
the
developing
world and
support the
responsible management of
oil and
gas reserves
as the
quickest way
to end wrenching
poverty
and
the
need
for
open-ended
foreign
aid.
The
next
conservative
Administration
should
rescind
all
climate
policies
from
its
foreign
aid
programs
(specifically
USAID’s
Climate
Strategy
2022–20307);
shut
down the
agency’s offices,
programs,
and
directives
designed to
advance the
Paris Climate
Agreement; and narrowly
limit funding
to
traditional
climate mitigation
efforts. USAID
resources
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
are
best deployed
to strengthen
the resilience
of countries
that are
most vulner-
able to climatic shifts.
The agency
should cease
collaborating with and
funding progressive
foundations,
corporations,
international
institutions,
and
NGOs
that advocate
on behalf of climate fanaticism.
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Agenda.
USAID installed advisers on
Diversity,
Equity,
and Inclusion
(DEI)
committees
“in
all
its
Bureaus,
Offices,
and [overseas]
Missions” and created “an agency-wide dashboard and DEI
scorecard for
all
bureaus,
offices,
and
missions”
to
track
staff
compliance
with
the
Adminis-
tration’s
DEI
directives.
A
Chief
DEI
Officer
oversees
this
DEI
infrastructure
and
sits
in
the
Administrator’s office.
DEI
directives
are
now
part
of
all
agency
policies
and are
incorporated
as
standard
clauses
in
all
contract
and
grant
awards.
Those seeking
to do
business with
the agency
must “describe
the approaches
they will
use
to diversify
their
partner
base.”8 USAID
often
ties
DEI
to
“gender and
climate
equity,”
corrupting
every aspect
of
the
agency’s overseas
work.
The
upshot has
been to
racialize the
agency and
create a
hostile work
environ-
ment for anyone who disagrees with the Biden Administration’s identity
politics.
This pursuit of
ideological purity threatens merit-based professional
advancement
for
staff
who
do
not
overtly
conform, hyperpoliticizes
what should
be
a
nonpartisan
federal
workplace
environment, creates
an
institutionalized
cadre of
progressive political
commissars,
corrupts the
award process,
and
discourages
potential con-
tractors and grantees that disagree
with this radical agenda from applying for USAID
funding.
The
next conservative
Administration
should
dismantle USAID’s
DEI
apparatus by
eliminating
the
Chief
Diversity
Officer position
along
with
the
DEI
advisers
and committees;
cancel
the
DEI
scorecard
and
dashboard;
remove
DEI
requirements
from contract
and
grant
tenders
and
awards;
issue
a
directive
to
cease
promotion of
the DEI agenda,
including the bullying
LGBTQ+ agenda;
and provide
staff a
confidential medium
through which
to adjudicate cases of
political
retaliation that
agency or
implementing
staff suffered
during the
Biden
Administration. It should
eliminate
funding
for
partners
that
promote
discriminatory
DEI
practices and
consider
debarment in egregious
cases.
As federal
departments and agencies cannot play partisan politics,
staff—irre- spective
of
hiring
mechanism—as well
as
implementers
and
grantees
that engage
in ideological
agitation on behalf of the DEI agenda should be dismissed, and
enti- ties should
be
debarred.
The
next
conservative Administration
should return
the
authority over all civil rights issues at USAID to the agency’s Office of
Civil Rights, which
is the
appropriate locus for
ensuring that
all Americans
have
guaranteed equality
of career
opportunity at USAID.
Refocusing Gender
Equality on
Women,
Children, and
Families.
Instead
of
protecting
women’s
and
children’s
unalienable
human
rights
and
propelling
their ability
to
thrive
in
society,
past
Democrat
Administrations
have
nearly
erased
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
what
females
are
and
what femininity
is
through
“gender” policies
and
practices. For instance, these Administrations have diluted
USAID’s focus on assisting vul- nerable
women,
children,
and
families
around the
globe by
adding protections
for and ideological
advocacy on
behalf of
progressive
special-interest
groups. USAID
now
aggressively
promotes abortion
on
demand
under the
guise of
“sexual and
reproductive
health
and
reproductive
rights,” “gender
equality,” and
“women’s
empowerment”
and
advocates
for
those
who
claim
minority status
or
vulnerability. Families are
the basic unit of and foundation for a thriving society. Without
women,
there
are
no
children,
and
society
cannot
continue.
As
evidenced
by
the
confirmation testimony of now-Associate Justice Ketanji Brown
Jackson, the progressive Left
has
so
misused
and
altered
the
definition
of
what
a
“woman”
is that
one of
our U.S.
Supreme Court
Justices was
unable to
delineate
clearly the
fundamental
biological and
sexual traits
that define
the group
of which
she is
a part.
USAID
cannot
advocate
for
and
protect
women
when
they
have
been
erased
globally
along with
the
values
and
traditional
structures
that
have
supported
them. The next
conservative Administration should rename the USAID Office of
Gender Equality
and Women’s
Empowerment (GEWE) as
the USAID
Office of
Women, Children, and Families; refocus and realign resources
that currently support
programs
in
GEWE
to
the
Office
of
Women,
Children,
and
Families;
redes- ignate
the Senior
Gender
Coordinator as
an
unapologetically pro-life politically
appointed
Senior Coordinator
of
the
Office
of
Women,
Children,
and
Families;
and eliminate
the
“more
than
180
gender
advisors
and points
of
contact…embedded
in
Missions
and
Operating
Units throughout
the
Agency.”9
In addition, the
next
conservative
Administration should rescind
President Biden’s 2022 Gender Policy and refocus it on
Women, Children, and Families and revise the
agency’s
regulation on
“Integrating Gender Equality
and Female
Empowerment in
USAID’s
Program
Cycle.”10 It
should
remove
all
references,
exam-
ples,
definitions,
photos, and
language on
USAID websites,
in
agency
publications and
policies, and in all agency contracts and grants that include
the following terms:
“gender,” “gender
equality,”
“gender equity,”
“gender
diverse individu-
als,”
“gender
aware,” “gender
sensitive,”
etc.
It
should
also
remove
references
to
“abortion,” “reproductive
health,” and “sexual and reproductive rights” and con-
troversial sexual education materials.
In
the
past,
the
word
“gender” was
a
polite
alternative to
the
word
“sex” or
term “biological
sex.” The
Left has
commandeered
the term
“gender,” which used
to mean either “male”
or “female,” to include a spectrum of others who are seeking to
alter
biological
and societal
sexual
norms.
The
promotion
of
gender
radicalism
is anathema
to
the
traditional norms
of
many
societies
where
USAID
works,
causes
resentment
by tying
lifesaving
assistance
to
rejecting
the
aid
recipient’s
own
firmly held
fundamental values regarding sexuality, and produces unnecessary
conster- nation
and confusion
among and
even outright
bias against
men.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
The next Administration should
ensure that USAID’s goal in service of its mission
is to
help protect
and propel
all members
of
society—women,
children, and
men—from
conception
to
natural
death.
To
do
so,
USAID’s
Office
of
Women,
Children,
and Families
should
strive
to
ensure
that
communities
have
their
basic
human
needs,
without
which
they
will
be
unable
to
thrive,
met
first
and
foremost. Basic human
needs
include
equal
and
safe
access
to
potable
water,
sanitation,
food,
education,
health care,
houses
of
worship,
justice,
pregnancy
and
family
resource centers,
working
capital,
electricity,
technology,
and
business
opportunities.
The
Office of Women, Children,
and Families should implement the Geneva Consen- sus
Declaration on
Women’s Health
and Protection
of the
Family and
prioritize
partnerships with
local
organizations,
including
faith-based
organizations
(FBOs).
Protecting Life
in Foreign
Assistance.
Protecting
life should
be among
the core
objectives
of
United
States
foreign
assistance.
Shortly
after
taking
office,
how- ever,
President Biden issued
a memorandum
that reversed
a myriad
of pro-life
policies and revoked the
Protecting Life in
Global Health
Assistance
(PLGHA) policy, widely known
as the
Mexico City
Policy. Biden
also restored
funding to
the United
Nations
Population
Fund
(UNFPA),
which
supports
and
implements
China’s
coercive abortion
and
sterilization
regimen.
PLGHA
requires
foreign NGOs,
as
a
condition of
receiving assistance,
to
agree
not
to perform
or actively
promote
abortions as
a method
of family
planning in
foreign countries.
Previous
pro-life Presidents
beginning with
Ronald Reagan
applied
these
conditions
to
family
planning
assistance,
but
President
Trump
for the
first
time
expanded
the
Mexico
City
Policy
to
protect
“global
health
assistance furnished
by
all
departments or
agencies”
(estimated
to
be
$8.8
billion
annually). The
Biden
Administration restored abortion
subsidies to
pro-abortion
NGOs including Planned
Parenthood International and MSI Reproductive Choices. In
reversing
PLGHA, Biden
declared
a
radical
assault
on
the
policy
of
protecting
life, choosing
instead to
promote
abortion on
demand around
the world
under the
guise
of
“sexual
and
reproductive
health
and
rights.”
USAID’s
priority
of
funding the
global
abortion
industry
negates
programs
that
promote
life,
women’s
health,
and
the
family.
Even
under PLGHA,
several loopholes
allowed support
for
the
global abortion
industry
to continue. International NGOs
that perform
and promote
abortions overseas
like
Population
Services
International,
Pathfinder,
PATH,
the
Population
Council, EngenderHealth, and WomanCare Global International
continued to receive funding
from
USAID
under
PLGHA
and
now,
under
Biden,
receive
tens of
millions more
in U.S.
taxpayer
dollars in
foreign
assistance annually without
any
oversight.
When the
United
Nations
Secretariat
promoted
abortion
and
abor-
tion-inducing drugs
under the
umbrella of
“sexual and
reproductive
health” as an
element of
its COVID-19
Global
Humanitarian Response
Plan in
May 2020, the
exemptions in PLGHA
for
humanitarian aid
and
multilateral organizations
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
illuminated
another loophole in the policy’s effectiveness in safeguarding
U.S. tax- payer
dollars from
being used
to promote
abortion.
Pro-abortion
groups also
have received
funds under
other categories
of
foreign
aid that
fall outside the scope of global health assistance, including
women-related
and
economic
assistance programs.
Members of
Congress have
advocated closing
these loopholes
by extending PLGHA to all foreign assistance through the
Protect- ing
Life in
Foreign
Assistance Act,
sponsored by Senator
Mike Lee
(R–UT) and
Representative
Virginia
Foxx
(R–NC).11 Current
law
in
the
Foreign
Assistance Act
gives
the President broad authority
to set
“such terms
and conditions as he
may determine”
on
foreign
assistance,
which
legally
empowers
the
next
conservative
President to expand this pro-life policy.
To
stop U.S.
foreign aid
from supporting
the
global
abortion industry,
the
next
conservative Administration should issue an executive order
that, at a minimum, reinstates
PLGHA and
summarily blocks
funding to
UNFPA but
also closes
loop- holes by
applying the
policy to
all
foreign
assistance, including
humanitarian aid,
and
improving
its
enforcement.
The
executive
order to
reinstate PLGHA
should be drafted
broadly to apply to all foreign assistance. It should
simultaneously rescind
President
Biden’s memorandum
entitled
“Protecting
Women’s
Health
at
Home and Abroad,” issued on
January 28, 2021.12 The new pro-life executive order
should apply
to foreign
NGOs, including
subgrantees and subcontractors,
and remove
exemptions
for
U.S.-based
NGOs,
public
international
organizations,
and
bilateral
government-to-government
agreements.
All
entities
funded
by
USAID,
both directly
and
indirectly,
should
report
their
compliance
with
the
PLGHA,
and
USAID
should
institute
penalties,
including
debarment
from
future
federal
funding,
for violations of it. The new
executive order also should instruct the Administrator
of
USAID
to
publish
reports on
implementation
of
the
PLGHA
by
both
prime
and sub-prime
recipients.
In
addition, the
Helms Amendment
should continue
to
be
applied, as
it
has
been
by
both
Republican
and
Democratic
Administrations
for
more than
50
years,
as
a
complete
ban on
the use
of taxpayer
dollars to
pay for
abortions
abroad.
International Religious Freedom.
Conservatives believe international
religious
freedom is
central
to
USAID’s
development
efforts.
President
Trump’s
Executive Order 13926 on “Advancing International Religious
Freedom”13
instructed
the
Secretary
of
State,
in
consultation
with the
USAID Administrator,
to
budget
at
least
$50
million a
year for
programs that
advance international
reli-
gious
freedom
and
“ensure
that faith-based
and
religious
entities, including
eligible
entities
in
foreign
countries, are
not
discriminated
against on
the
basis
of
religious identity
or religious
belief when
competing for
Federal
funding.”
Under
the
Trump
Administration,
the
agency set
up
a
senior-level Chief
Adviser for
International Religious Freedom who reported directly to the
Administra- tor
with
the
task
of
coordinating a
“whole-of-USAID”
approach
to
achieving
this
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
priority.
It created
a robust
genocide-response capability. USAID
affirmed the
agency’s
partnerships
with
faith-based
organizations
through
its
rule
on
“Partic-
ipation by Religious
Organizations in USAID Programs;”14 “Partnership
Guidance
and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for Faith Based
Organizations;”
and “Legal
Guidance and
Answers to
FAQs for
USAID Staff.”
Today,
USAID officials
and
their
progressive partners
have resisted
efforts to
promote
religious freedom,
especially as
it
relates
to
abortion
and
gender
ideology,
which
are
anathema
to
the
traditional societies
where USAID
funds programs
(in
addition
to
many
U.S. taxpayers).
U.S. Secretary
of
State
Antony Blinken
repudiated his
predecessor’s focus on
religious
freedom.
The next
conservative Administration must champion the core American
value of
religious
freedom, which
correlates significantly
with poverty
reduction, eco-
nomic
growth,
and
peace.
It
should
train all
USAID staff
on
the
connection between
religious
freedom and
development; integrate
it
into
all
of
the
agency’s
programs, including
the five-year
Country
Development and
Coordination Strategies due
for
updates
in
2025;
strengthen
the missions’
relationships
with
local
faith-based leaders;
and
build
on
local
programs
that are
serving
the
poor.
Congress
should
appropriate funding to USAID
specifically to support persecuted religious minori- ties
in line with Executive Order 13926.
Streamlining
Procurement and Localizing the Partner Base.
USAID is a grantmaking
and
contracting
agency
that
disburses
billions
of
dollars
of
federal
funding in developing countries
through implementing partners, such as U.N. agen-
cies,
international NGOs,
for-profit
companies,
and
local
nongovernmental
entities. In rare
instances, such as in Jordan and Ukraine, the agency provides
direct budget support
to
finance
the
operations
of
host-country
governments.
USAID
far
more often
counts
on
expensive
and ineffective
large
contracts
and
grants
to
carry
out
its
programs.
It justifies
these
practices
based
on
speed
and
a
lower
administrative
burden on its institutional capacity.
Partnering and
procurement reform was a pillar of the Trump Administration’s
effort
to
secure
better
development
results, cut
costs, and
advance the
Journey to
Self-Reliance
strategy of
exiting
countries from
aid. In
December 2018,
USAID launched its
first
Acquisition
and
Assistance
Strategy
to
streamline
procurement
processes; introduce
innovation into its
programming; and diversify
its partner
base away from large, expensive, and
partisan implementers.
The
strategy counted on local NGOs,
including faith-based entities
already on
the ground, to
provide the agency with
less costly
and more
effective alternatives to
the aid
giants. The
strategy also prioritized
global partnerships with the private sector—corporations,
investors,
diasporas,
and
private
philanthropies—the
source
of
real
capital
invest-
ment,
innovation, and
efficiencies
that can
maximize
the
impact
of taxpayer
dollars.
Under the Biden
Administration, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the aid
industrial complex
has recaptured
the agency
and stifled
further
reforms.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
The
next conservative
Administration
should
immediately implement
language
on
key
policy
topics as
standard provisions
in
all
grants, cooperative
agreements, and
contracts. These provisions
should include
language on
implementing
the Policy
on
Protecting
Life
in
Foreign
Assistance,
imposing
conditions
on
funding to
multilateral
organizations, and increasing
accountability and transparency.
To
ensure that
USAID exercises
its
existing
authorities to
streamline procure-
ment processes, the next
conservative Administration should name a political
appointee
as
the
agency’s
Senior
Procurement
Executive
and
Director
of
the
agen-
cy’s
Office
of
Assistance
and Acquisitions
(OAA)
in
the
Bureau
of
Management
(M). The
head
of
M/OAA
is
one
of
the
most
important
positions
at
USAID,
as
the
office
is
ground zero for controlling
the disbursement of U.S. foreign aid. The White House
should
empower
the
Administrator
and
his
or
her
designees
to
make
determina-
tions concerning
the
scale
and
scope
of
awards
and
increase
the
transparency
and
accountability of
subawards,
which
can
escape
public
scrutiny
and
promote
pro-
gressive policies during
conservative Administrations. USAID should use existing
authority
to
use
program
funds to
expand
its
roster
of
contracting
and
agreement officers
to
accelerate
the delivery
of
funds
for
disaster
responses
to
a
more
diverse
collection of implementers.
Accomplishing
the
next
conservative
Administration’s
policy goals
at
USAID
will
require that
political
appointees have knowledge
of,
responsibility for,
and visibility into the design and awarding of grants,
contracts, and cooperative
agreements. The
Administration
should
restore
the
Senior
Official
Accountabil- ity
Review
(SOAR)
or
create
a
similar
process
to
ensure
that
proposed
programs
above
a
certain
dollar threshold
in
Total
Estimated
Cost/Total
Estimated
Amount receive
a close
review by
policymakers in each
bureau and
office and,
for large
awards, in the
agency’s front
office.
“Localization”
is
a
buzzword within
the
aid
community but
correctly assumes
that
more
funding through
local organizations
produces better
aid
outcomes.
Shift-
ing
from
giant
U.S.-based implementers
has
proved
difficult to
achieve, however,
given
intense
internal bureaucratic
resistance; opposition
from the
aid
industrial
complex; and
foot-dragging from progressives, who view local NGOs—especially
faith-based
NGOs prominent
in
Africa
and
Latin
America—as obstacles
to
promot-
ing
abortion,
gender radicalism,
climate
extremism, and
other woke
ideas.
The President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has shown that
localization
at
scale
is
possible
within a
short
time
span.
Over
the
four
years
of
the Trump
Administration, the
multibillion-dollar
program increased
the amount of funding disbursed
to local
entities from
about 25
percent to
nearly 70
percent with
positive
overall
results.
This
model
should
be
replicated
across
all
of
USAID. In
addition,
the
next
conservative Administration
should
expand
use
of
the
New
Partnership Initiative
(NPI)
to
every
bureau
and
office;
reset
the
requirements
for
USAID’s
overseas
missions
to
craft
and
execute
NPI
action
plans;
and
assign
each
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
mission a
minimum percentage of its portfolio that must go to new,
underutilized,
and
local
partners. Crucial
to
the
strategy will
be
increasing
the
use
of
open
com- petition
that
lowers barriers
to
entry
and
fixed-amount
awards that
carry less
of a compliance
burden along
with eliminating
cost-plus reimbursement
contracts that
favor
large companies.
Before advancing
a
new
program, the
agency should
be required to
assess existing local activities to avoid undercutting or
duplicating
them. At
every opportunity,
USAID should
build on
existing local
initiatives.
Global Health.
The
United States
is the
world’s
largest funder
of global
health initiatives.
For
more
than
60
years,
the
American
people
have
offered
health
assis-
tance to
the
world
and
saved
millions
of
lives.
The
USAID
Bureau
for
Global
Health
(GH), the
second
largest
within
USAID,
oversees
a
multibillion-dollar
operation to
support
maternal and
child health;
voluntary
family planning; PEPFAR and
the
President’s Malaria
Initiative
(PMI)
(both
started
under
President
George
W.
Bush);
and
other
initiatives against
other
infectious
and
neglected
tropical
diseases. Effective
use
of
funds
is
essential
to maximize
care
for
the
world’s
neediest
people.
Countries with strong health institutions and sound public
health practices responded
quickly
to
and
recovered
more
rapidly
from
the
COVID-19
pandemic.
This demonstrates
the
importance
of
“localization,”
by
which
USAID
helps
gov- ernments
and the private sector in developing countries to strengthen
their own ability
to address
needed
training, services, accountability, and
organiza-
tional
capacity.
Unfortunately,
many USAID-funded
global health
activities remain
rooted in
patterns
that began
decades ago
and
measure
improvements in
terms of
inputs—
money
spent—instead
of
outcomes
achieved. From
the
1950s
to
1970s,
the
major
recognized
threats to
human health
were
infectious diseases
such as
polio and
smallpox, and USAID funded
programs “in” a country, not “with” a country. Mater-
nal and child health, food, water, and sanitation programs were often
intermittent. USAID
consistently
financed
population
control,
contraception,
and
abortion
as essential
to
“development.” Most
programs
focused
on
one
disease
or
condition but
had little integration with other global health activities.
Chronic diseases were
ignored.
Consequently,
the next conservative Administration should focus on updating
the
Global
Health Bureau’s
portfolio, emphasizing
a
comprehensive
approach to
supporting
women,
children, and families;
building
host-country
institutional capacity;
increasing
awards to
local and
faith-based
partners (expanding
what occurred
during the
Trump
Administration
with
the
NPI);
and
improving
USAID’s ability
to coordinate with local partners.
Updating
Funding Priorities.
The
Bureau should
identify and
eliminate out- dated
and
ineffective
concepts
and
focus
on
funding
innovation.
A
rigorous
review
is necessary
to
ensure
that
current
programs
and
funding
streams
avoid
wasting taxpayer
dollars
and
prioritize
what is
needed
now
and
what
works.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Focusing on
Holistic Health Care and Support for Women, Children, and
Families.
The
continued
high rate
of
maternal
and
infant
mortality is
a
persistent
global
tragedy.
Contrary
to
current
publicity, this
problem is
not
solved
by
abortion. Families
genuinely
cherish children.
The next
leadership at
USAID must
focus attention
on women and
children’s health (including
unborn
children) as
well as health
risks across
life spans,
including childhood infections,
cervical
cancer, adolescent
risks, and
family
stability, by utilizing
a coordinated
approach. The
Bureau should implement a
“Request for Application for Resilient Families” that
harvests collaborative funds
from siloed programs and makes individuals and the
family, not
diseases or
conditions,
the true
focus of
intervention.
Increasing
USAID
Collaboration
with
Faith-Based
Organizations.
FBOs
historically
have been much more successful in outreach to remote and
vulnerable
populations,
based on
trust built
through decades
of
service.
The
value
of
collab-
orating
with FBOs
was
demonstrated in the
October 2020
Evidence Summit
on Religious Engagement.
In
sub-Saharan
Africa,
FBOs
often
provide
more
than
80 percent
of health
care,
especially to
the extremely
poor. In
contrast, the
Global Health Bureau
historically has provided 85 percent of its funding to large
U.S. NGOs with
significant overhead
costs,
as
a
result
of
which
only
20
percent–30
percent
of funding
reaches people in need.15
Leveraging the
Strength and
Experience of
Presidential
Initiatives. Mil- lions
of people
are alive
today because
of the American people’s
investment in PEPFAR and
PMI. The
training,
laboratory, clinical
intervention, health educa-
tion,
data
collection, and
organizational
platforms
of
these
programs
became
the bedrock
for
responding
to the
COVID
pandemic.
It
is
time
for
these
programs
to become
part
of
an
integrated, strong,
and
sustainable
network
of
health
care
and
public health in developing
countries. A smooth transition to national ownership
and
funding,
however, will
require
better
coordination
of USAID’s
own
stovepiped programs
with PEPFAR and PMI.
Strengthening the Collection and Use of Data.
Good decisions are based on accurate
data. For
decades,
global health
programs have
relied mostly
on statis-
tical
modeling
(rather than
actual
data)
or
survey
data
(the
weakest
type
of
data). Poor
data quality
undermines
both the
evaluation and
improvement of
desired outcomes
achieved by
our global
health
programs. The
Trump
Administration implemented critical updates of PEPFAR’s systems for the collection and
reporting of data to
increase transparency and hold funded partners and overseas
missions accountable.
The next
conservative Administration should
apply these
reforms to all
of USAID’s
global health
programs.
Strengthening Private-Sector Engagement.
The Bureau’s Center for Inno- vation
and Impact (CII) should be empowered to expand networks of
private and faith-based health organizations that can develop
projects using develop- ment-impact
bonds,
capital
funds, and
innovative
technologies,
including
with
the
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
Millennium
Challenge Corporation
and
the
new
U.S.
International
Development Finance
Corporation.
More flexible
and agile
CII funding
will spur
innovation within the Bureau
and help
to enhance
countries’ self-reliance in
the provision
of health care.
Improving Bureau
Hiring,
Staffing, and
Recruitment Practices.
The
Global Health Bureau
should address its own management challenges by modifying
the high ratio of contractors
to direct hires, holding career leadership accountable
for
effective
management,
and
building
more
flexibility
in
emergency
responses. Bureau
personnel
suffer
from
“mission
drift,” burnout,
and
a
lack
of
vision.
New
directives, social
agendas,
and
extra
layers
of
review
have
obscured
core
activities and
caused talent
to leave
the agency.
Conservative
leadership must
return the
focus
to
development
and
improved
workforce
morale
and
focus
on
global
out- comes
and the
efficient use
of taxpayer dollars.
Holding the U.N., the World Health Organization (WHO), and Other
Mul- tilateral Organizations Accountable.
Leadership should designate a
political appointee
to
help
coordinate
cross-agency
efforts
to
hold
the
U.S.
government’s
multilateral
partners
(U.N. and
WHO
agencies
and
other
international
organiza-
tions) to
a higher
level of
financial and
programmatic
accountability, including assurances
that language
promoting
abortion will
be removed
from U.N.
docu- ments, policy statements,
and technical
literature. The United
States must
have more prominent
representation in international technical committees and regu-
lation-setting
organizations to ensure the proper execution of American
resources, the
preservation of
our
values,
the
protection
of
innovation,
and
the
vitality
of
our biomedical
sector.
Global Humanitarian Assistance.
The U.S. government
is the
world’s
largest humanitarian
actor,
annually
disbursing
billions of
dollars
in
lifesaving
assistance— food,
water, shelter,
emergency
health care,
and related
protection support—to tens of
millions of
vulnerable
people. Funded
by the
U.S. Congress
through the
International Disaster
Assistance
(IDA)
account,
USAID
pays
for
nearly
half
of
the
budget
of
the
Nobel
Prize–winning U.N.
World
Food
Programme
(WFP)
as
well as
dozens
of
simultaneous operations
that
range
from
responses
to
hurricanes
in Central
America to
tackling
outbreaks of Ebola
in Central
Africa and
caring for
millions of people
displaced by
ongoing
conflicts.
USAID’s
emergency
responses once
were focused
primarily on natural
cata- clysms
such
as hurricanes,
floods,
and
earthquakes.
Today, the
agency
spends
more
than
80
percent
of its
humanitarian
budget
on
chronic
man-made
crises.
Most
of
these
“emergency
responses”
began
years
ago
and
absorb
billions
of
dollars
annu-
ally
with
no
end
in
sight.
Every
year
sees
financial
demands grow
in
response
to
new
conflicts,
most recently
Ukraine.
The
budget
of
the
Bureau
for
Humanitarian
Assistance
(BHA)
has
doubled
compared
to just
a
few
years
ago,
and
BHA
can
no
longer
manage
its
funds
responsibly. A
politically
powerful
foreign
aid
industry
that
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
benefits
financially
from extending
and
expanding
these large-scale
programs for years,
even decades,
ensures little
scrutiny of
these ever-increasing
appropriations.
The
massive
growth in
“emergency” aid
distorts humanitarian
responses, wors-
ens
corruption in
the countries we support,
and
exacerbates the
misery of
those we intend to help.
The permanence
of this
assistance, particularly in
countries where
we
have
little
to
no
in-country
presence
and
must
rely
on
U.N.
agencies
to
self-monitor, has
morphed
into
a
co-governance
scheme
in
which
the
U.S.
govern- ment
effectively
finances the
social services
obligations of
corrupt regimes
that threaten
the United
States. These
governments
can then
redirect
scarce budget
resources
away from
costly
health
and
education
toward
financing
their
wars,
sup-
porting
terrorism,
repressing
their
citizens,
and
enriching
themselves.
Examples
of
this abuse
are
spread
throughout the
world.
•
Over
the
past
decade,
the
U.S.
government
has
expended
$14
billion
in
aid
to
Syria
where
the
bloody
regime
of
Bashar
al-Assad—a
close ally
of
Iran
and Russia—skims
nearly
half
of
foreign
aid
through
inflated
official
exchange
rates, the
diversion of
food baskets
to its military units,
and procurement
arrangements with compromised local contractors.
•
Yemen,
once
the
breadbasket
of
the
Arabian
Peninsula,
is
now
dependent
on
billions
of
dollars
of
aid
as
formerly
productive
Yemeni
farmers
cannot
compete
against
“free
food”
while
irrigation
systems
remain
in
disrepair,
leaving the
country to
suffer from
water shortages
during long
summer droughts
and
flooding
during
its
rainy
season.
Iran-backed
Houthi
rebels divert
substantial amounts of
aid to
support their
war efforts.
•
In
Afghanistan, the aid
infrastructure built over
20 years
of American
military presence
that three
Presidents wanted to
end collapsed
with the
failure of
U.S.-trained
Afghan
forces
to
repel
the
Taliban’s
2021
advances.
Yet
the
country
has
received
nearly $1
billion more
in
U.S.
humanitarian aid
since
the
Taliban’s takeover
and
absent
a
U.S.
embassy to
ensure that
it
is
not diverted
to the
Taliban and
other
terrorist groups.
•
In
Burma,
U.S.
aid
finances
all
of
the
food
and
medical
care
for
hundreds
of thousands
of
persecuted
Rohingya
that
the
military
regime
forces
to
live
in
open-air concentration camps.
•
In
northern
Iraq,
hundreds
of
thousands
of
Yazidis—targeted
for
genocidal
extermination
by
ISIS—remain
in
miserable
camps
unable
to
return
home because
of
the
Iraqi
government’s
refusal
to
clear
out
Iran-backed
militias
occupying their homeland.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
In effect, humanitarian aid is
sustaining war economies, creating financial incentives
for warring
parties to
continue
fighting, discouraging
governments from
reforming, and
propping up
malign regimes.
Nefarious
actors
reap
billions
of
dollars
in
profits
from
diversions of
our
human- itarian
assistance, but so do international organizations. The WFP
charges 36 percent in
overhead while Oxfam International’s overhead has reached 70
percent in
Yemen,
reflecting
the high
costs
of
foreign
staff,
security,
and
logistics.
With
pow-
erful
lobbies
in
Washington, D.C.,
and
in
leadership
positions
throughout
USAID
and
the
Department
of State,
the
aid
industry
adroitly
exploits
Congress’s
dispo-
sition to
increase
funding
year
on
year
to
assist
those
in
dire
need
but
provides
no evidence
to justify
the mounting
budget
requests.
In 2020, USAID’s leadership fused
formerly bifurcated food and nonfood emergency
relief
operations into
a single
Bureau for
Humanitarian
Assistance to
improve
the management
of
the
agency’s
largest
portfolio,
but
this
reform
was not sufficient to
address the problem. The next Administration should resize and
repurpose
USAID’s
humanitarian
aid
portfolio
to
restore
its
original
purpose
of
providing
emergency
short-term
relief,
prepare
vulnerable
communities
for
tran- sition,
and do
no harm
in the
following ways:
•
Work
with
Congress
to
make
deep
cuts
in
the
IDA
budget
by
ending
programs that
do more
harm than
good in
places
controlled by malign
actors,
such
as
in
Yemen,
Syria,
and
Afghanistan, where
our
aid
is
consumed by
fraud,
diversion, and partner
overhead costs.
•
Require
USAID and
the State
Department to devise
country-based exit strategies that
term-limit the duration
of
humanitarian
responses and transition
funding from
emergency to
development
projects. This will
require
robust diplomacy
to
press
host
governments
to
integrate
displaced
persons in
lieu of
keeping them
in expensive and
dehumanizing camps financed by the international community.
•
Transition
from
large
awards
to
expensive,
inefficient,
and
corrupt
U.N.
agencies, global
NGOs, and
contractors to
local,
especially faith-based, entities
that
are
already
operating
on
the
ground.
This
approach
provides
a far
less
expensive
and
more
effective
alternative
for
aid
delivery.
Local partners
more ably
navigate
corrupt environments
and are
more likely
to
steer vulnerable
populations away
from dependence
on
aid
toward
self-sufficiency.
•
Require
that
BHA
avail
itself
of
existing
IDA
authorities
that
it
fails
to
use, including
to
dispense
with
the
cost-reimbursement
model
that
disqualifies
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
undercapitalized local NGOs;
accept other
donor vetting
of local
partners; streamline
the
award-approval process;
and
expand
the
use
of
fixed-amount
awards to rein in cost overruns.
•
Direct
USAID’s
Bureau
for
Management
to
hire
more
procurement
officers
for
BHA
to
strengthen
the
Bureau’s
award
management
capacity
and
reduce
the
incentives to
issue large
awards to
aid industry
giants.
•
Allow
BHA
to manage
the
process of
hiring
Personal Services
Contractors.
•
Require
BHA’s
partners
to
adopt
stricter
vetting
procedures
to
prevent
aid
from being diverted to terrorists.
•
Increase
efforts to
obtain greater
contributions, not just
pledges, for
humanitarian
operations
from
other
donors
and
make
this
a
condition
for receiving
additional U.S. aid.
Leveraging
Foreign Aid to Unleash the Power of America’s Private Sector.
During
the
1960s,
when
USAID
was
launched, 80
percent of
financial flows
from the
United States
to the
developing world was
in the
form of
U.S. government
assistance. Today, that
figure is under 10 percent, overtaken by private investment,
remittances,
and
private
charities,
all demonstrating
the
power
of
America’s
pri-
vate
sector
to
promote
wealth-generating
economic
development
in
poor
countries.
Leaders
in
the
developing
world routinely
press
U.S.
officials
about their
preference for “trade and
investment, not aid.”
Instead, the Biden Administration is
leveraging private-sector financing to
promote
its climate
and
other
progressive
agendas
worldwide.
The
next
conser- vative
Administration
must return
USAID to
a foreign aid
model that
leverages its resources to promote private-sector solutions to the world’s true
development problems
and end
the need
for future
foreign aid.
Private
capital investment
in these markets is the greatest enabler of job creation
and sustainable economic growth throughout the
developing world.
A key tool of
American soft-power leadership is the U.S. Development Finance
Corporation
(DFC). Launched
in
December
2019, DFC
sought to
unleash the
power of America’s
private sector
to
advance
our
interests
by
providing
emerging markets
with
blended
financing opportunities
to
help
end
wretched
poverty, create
new markets
for U.S.-made
products,
strengthen bilateral
partnerships in strategic
parts
of
the
world,
and
offset
China’s
predatory loans
and
investments.
The
Trump
Administration launched a
USAID–DFC Working Group to maximize development
outcomes
and
review
individual
investment
projects
through
a
counter-China
lens and
ensure a
cohesive
interagency
development response.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
As development agencies,
USAID and
DFC must
do a
better job
of aligning
their respective activities
and closely
integrate both structurally
and operation-
ally. The easiest way to foster this alignment is to “dual hat”
the role of DFC’s chief development
officer
so
that
he
or
she
serves
simultaneously
in
both
institu- tions.
Like
all
U.S.
federal
bodies, DFC
should
be
restored
to
its
original
intent
of deploying
its commercial
risk-reducing financial services
instead of
its current misuse
as
another
global
vehicle
to
promote
economy-killing
climate
programs, meet
irrelevant
diversity
objectives,
and
overfocus
on
low-impact
or
misguided
gender-based
activities.
Branding. A deeply
embedded culture within the foreign aid bureaucracy
views
public
recognition of
U.S.
assistance
as
secondary
to
a
larger
philanthropic
mission and
is embarrassed
by the
American flag.
Citing vaguely
defined secu-
rity concerns, USAID’s
implementers—U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and
contractors—often fail
to
credit
the
American
people
for
the
billions
of
dollars
in
assistance
they provide
the
rest
of
the
world
even
as
they
engage
in
self-promoting
public relations
to raise
other donor
funds. This
approach has
negative
foreign policy
implications
as
China
relentlessly
promotes
its
own
self-serving
efforts
to gain
influence
and
resources.
Worst
of
all,
malign
actors
sometimes
appropriate credit
for
unbranded
U.S. assistance:
Houthi
terrorists,
for
example,
claim
to
pro-
vide
for
the
people
under
their
occupation
with anonymous
U.S.
humanitarian
aid. The
United States
is in
a struggle
for influence
with China,
Russia, and
other competitors,
and American
generosity must not
go
unacknowledged. The
next conservative Administration
should
build
on
the
Trump
Administration’s
brand- ing
policy,
which
revamped
ADS Chapter
320,
to
force
the
aid
bureaucracy
to
fully
credit
the
American
people for
the
aid
they
are
providing.
The
Senior
Advisor
for Brand
Management in the
Bureau for
Legislative and Public
Affairs (LPA)
(dis- cussed
infra)
should
be
a
political
appointee
who
is
responsible
for
maximizing
the visibility of U.S.
assistance by enforcing branding policy on every grant, coopera-
tive
agreement,
and
contract.
The
LPA
should
liaise
with
counterparts
at
the
U.S.
Agency
for
Global
Media
(USAGM)
to ensure
local
media
pickup
of
these
activities.
OTHER
OFFICES AND
BUREAUS
Office
of
Administrator.
The
next
conservative
Administration should leave
in
place
the
current
structure
of
two
presidentially
appointed,
Senate-confirmed
Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for
Management. The Deputy
Administrators and the Chief of Staff must be individuals with
extensive previous
service
in
the
executive
branch,
ideally
at
foreign-affairs
agencies,
and
be
fluent
in the
language and
practice of
federal
procurement.
Bureau for
Foreign Assistance. As
noted above, the next conservative Administration
should name
the USAID
Administrator
as Director
of Foreign
Assistance (F)
at the
Department of
State with
the rank
of Deputy
Secretary. It
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
should
reorient the
bulk of
F
staff
from focusing
on
the
formulation of
the
annual
President’s
budget proposal
to
the
execution of
already appropriated
resources. This
should include
eliminating
the duplicative
Mission and
Bureau
Resource Requests; speeding up the availability of appropriations by delivering to
Congress within
60
days
the
report
required
by
Section
653(a)
of
the
Foreign
Assistance
Act
(FAA);
and
fast-tracking the
approval
of
Congressional
Notifications
(CNs)
and other
pre-obligation requirements.
Management Bureau.
As
indicated
previously, the
next conservative
Admin- istration should
name a political appointee as USAID’s Senior Procurement
Executive and
Director of
the agency’s
Office of
Acquisition and Assistance
(M/ OAA). Political
appointees with the appropriate credentials (including warrants)
should
be
placed
within
M/OAA,
and
the
agency
should
exercise
its authority
to
engage qualified experts from
other federal departments and agencies and outside of
government (if
they are
free of
conflicts of interest)
on the
Technical Commit- tees that
review
applications for
USAID’s
contract and
grant
competitions. The
Administration should change
the designation of USAID’s Competition Advocate
to an individual favorable to
innovative types of contracts that can reduce the aid
oligopoly’s grip
on the
agency.
Office of Human Capital and Talent Management.
As soon as possible after
Inauguration
Day,
the
next
conservative Administration
should
name
a
political appointee
as
USAID’s
Chief Human
Capital
Officer
(CHCO)
and
Director
of
the
Office
of
Human
Capital
and Talent
Management.
USAID’s
White
House
Liaison must be
an individual with substantial experience with federal personnel
sys- tems. The
White
House
Office
of
Presidential
Personnel
should
allow
the
USAID
Administrator to
explore
with
counterparts
at
the
Office
of
Personnel
Management
whether the
agency
could
hire
personnel
under
both
the
Administratively
Deter-
mined
authority
and Schedule
C
of
the
Excepted
Service
of
the
Federal
Civil
Service. USAID
should be
one of
the agencies
to pilot-test
a reinstated
Executive Order 13957,16 which
created
a
Schedule
F
within
the
Excepted
Service, and
should aggres-
sively
recruit
and
place
candidates into
term-limited positions
under Schedule
A
of
the
Excepted
Service (especially
veterans). The
new
CHCO
should examine
how the
existing
members of
the Senior
Executive
Service (SES)
at USAID
should be
reworked throughout
the
agency
and
should
institute
an
SES
Mobility
Program
to
encourage
the regular
rotation
of
senior
career
leaders,
including
through
details
to
other
departments
and
agencies.
Bureau for
Policy, Planning, and Learning.
The next conservative Admin-
istration
should
shift
the
policy
functions
of
the
Bureau
for
Policy,
Planning,
and
Learning
(PPL) to
the
Office
of
Budget
and
Resource
Management
(BRM),
located in
the Office of
the
Administrator. It
should rename
BRM the
Office of
Budget, Policy, and
Resource Management (BPRM) and staff the policy team with
political appointees.
The
Administration
should
also
move
the
responsibility
for
reviewing
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
and processing
proposed changes in USAID’s policy bible, the Automated Direc-
tives
System (ADS),
from the
Management Bureau to
the new
BPRM.
Even before
these changes, the Assistant Administrator for PPL should decree
an
immediate freeze
on
changes
in
the
ADS
and
agencywide policy
documents to
allow
for
the
priority
publication of
amendments to
reflect the
new
Administra- tion’s
viewpoint. All
major agency
policies should
be
reviewed
and
amended
or withdrawn within
the
new
Administration’s
first
calendar year
in
office.
Bureau for
Legislative and Public
Affairs. The next
conservative Admin- istration
should invest
no more
than 10
percent of
USAID’s
allocation of Administratively
Determined politically appointed positions
in the
Bureau for
Legislative and
Public
Affairs.
A
priority
for
these
positions
(combined
with
hires
under
Schedule
A) should
be
the
review
and
editing
of
the
agency’s
public-facing web
pages
and
social
media accounts
to
eliminate
material
that
does
not
conform
to the
new
Administration’s policies.
The
agency
should
accelerate
the
review
of
Con- gressional
Notifications within
LPA
and
publish
all
CNs
and
congressional
reports.
To ensure
consistency
and
clarity
of
public
messaging,
LPA
should
gain
direct
authority over the communications staff scattered through
USAID’s various Bureaus
and
Offices.
LPA
should
expand
its
public-facing
efforts
to
include
con-
servative allies that are
active in global development and humanitarian aid work,
including industry
groups,
nonprofits,
trade
associations,
foundations,
and
advo- cacy
organizations, and correspondingly reduce the aid industrial
complex’s grip
on
USAID’s
corporate relationships.
Office of
General Counsel. Along
with the Director of M/OAA, the General
Counsel
is
one
of
the
two
or
three
most
important
positions
at
USAID
and
should be a
priority for immediate appointments. Because proper legal
interpretation of
executive orders
and internal
USAID policy
is crucial,
the next
conservative Administration
should recruit
and appoint
a commanding
team of
Schedule C
attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel (OGC). Within
weeks of Inau- guration
Day, OGC
should issue
clear guidance
on the
eligibility of faith-based
organizations for USAID funding.
Office of Budget Resources and Management.
The Director of Budget
Resources and Management
should be a political appointee empowered as part of
the
Administrator’s senior
management
team.
BRM’s
highest
priorities
should
be
to
prepare
the report
required
by
Section
653(a)
according
to
the
Administrator’s
guidance,
institute
a
fast-track
process for
the
submission
of
Congressional
Notifica-
tions, and
identify
already
appropriated
resources to
reprogram
immediately
to
fund
the new
Administration’s
priorities.
The
next
conservative
Administration
should consider
prioritizing the
placing
of
young
political
appointees
in
BRM
over
LPA.
Bureau
for Democracy, Development, and
Innovation.
A key outcome of the
transformation of USAID undertaken during the Trump
Administration, the Bureau
for
Democracy,
Development,
and
Innovation
(DDI)
is
the
home
for
most
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
of the agency’s
non-health, nonhumanitarian
funding as
well as
almost all
of its
sectoral
appropriations
directives,
including
those
that
reflect
the
pet
projects
of individual
Members
of Congress.
The
Bureau
is
the
policy
and
financial
nexus
at USAID
for
most
of
the
Biden
Administration’s radical
priorities
in
foreign
assis- tance,
including gender, climate change, and the promotion of
identity-based politics.
On the
positive side,
DDI is
also the
Bureau in
charge of
areas that
will be
crucial to a
reorientation of USAID,
including trade, economic
growth, inno-
vation, partnerships
with the
private
sector, and
the agency’s
relationship with communities of faith.
The
next conservative
Administration
should
make the
rapid staffing
of
key
DDI
positions
a
high
priority. Besides
the
Senate-confirmed
Assistant Administrator,
the
Directors of
each of
the Centers
and Hubs
in the
Bureau will
need political
leadership. Almost
every
one
of
the
agencywide
policies
that
cover
DDI’s
areas
of responsibility will
need to be edited or rewritten entirely as soon as possible. The
next conservative Administration should harvest DDI’s central
appropriations to fund
new
priorities,
especially
working
with
ethnic
and
religious
minorities
and faith-based
organizations and
joint
ventures
with
the
private
sector
in
education and
energy. All
DDI programs
should issue
funding
opportunities
restricted to new
and
underutilized
partners modeled
on the
NPI.
REGIONS
Asia.
Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the
battle against Communist China’s efforts to exploit the
development needs of poor countries for
geopolitical
gain. America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should guide USAID’s
approaches to
disbursing
foreign aid
in the region.
USAID should
intensify its bilateral relationships with pro–free market
Japan,
Australia,
South Korea,
and
India
so
that
they can
jointly advance
private-sector
solutions to secure financing for power generation,
infrastructure, digital con-
nectivity,
investment
and
trade
expansion,
and
other
economic
activities.
USAID enjoys
a strong
in-country presence in
India,
buttressed by
recent
coordination on
the
global
response
to
COVID-19
as
India
is
a
global
leader
in
vaccine
produc-
tion. Those
ties
should
be
expanded.
So
too
should
development
cooperation
with Taiwan,
which
boasts
effective
pandemic
response
capacity
that
should
be
shared with
developing countries.
China’s
island-hopping efforts to
capture
vulnerable Pacific
states is
a direct strategic
threat
to
U.S.
maritime
supremacy
and
homeland
security,
and
USAID and
its allied
donors should
neutralize
these efforts
through the
deployment of
targeted assistance such
as helping
countries combat the
effects of
China’s ille-
gal
fishing.
While
China
outpaces
the
ability
of
the
democratic
alliance
to
deploy state-backed
financing
to developing
countries,
it
is
unable
to
compete
with
our collective
private-sector capacity to
deploy
trillions of
dollars of
capital.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
Pakistan is a prime example of
foreign aid policies disconnected from U.S.
national
interests.
The country
has
been
the
recipient
of
more
than
$12
billion
in
U.S.
foreign aid
since 2010,
yet
it
remains intensely
anti-American
and
corrupt, has
backed the
Taliban continuously since 2001, jump-started North Korea’s
nuclear bomb
program, brutalizes
its
religious
minorities, and
is
a
willing client
of
China
while
taking
on
unrepayable
loans from
the
U.S.
taxpayer-funded
International Monetary Fund
and World Bank.
Middle
East.
The
Middle
East is
far
more
vulnerable today
than it
was
in
2020 because
the Biden
Administration’s strategy for
the region
is adrift.
Tunisia has
slid
into
autocracy,
Iraq
is
plummeting
further
into
Iran’s
orbit,
and
U.S.
soldiers
continue to
risk their
lives for
unclear ends
amid the
ruins of
Syria.
Meanwhile, billions
of
dollars
in U.S.
foreign
aid
props
up
regimes
allied
with
Iran.
President
Trump’s Abraham
Accords signaled
the
end
of
the
centrality of
the
Arab–Israeli
conflict,
which paralyzed
U.S. approaches
to
the
region, and
focused instead
on Iran
as the
principal threat to
America from
this region.
During the
Trump Administration, USAID’s allocations reflected the new
opportunities created
by the
Accords and
sought to
strengthen
regional alliances
against Iran
through
expanded
regional
trade
and
investment
and
to
promote
genuine
polit- ical
stability
tethered
to strong
American
leadership.
USAID
formally
partnered with
the United
Arab Emirates,
Israel,
Morocco, Qatar,
and Kuwait
to catalyze
regional partnerships in
Africa. Under the Biden Administration, however, USAID
has returned
to a model that
deepens the
region’s
dependence on aid.
A
new
conservative
President should
reset USAID’s
programming in
the
Middle
East
in
line
with
our
national
security
interests and
committed
to
the
goal
of
ending the
need for
foreign aid
through
development that is
led by
the private
sector. Specifically:
•
Foreign
aid must
advance the
Abraham
Accords. Increased
trade and
investment between Israel
and its
Arab neighbors
represent the
most effective
path toward
reducing
poverty,
fostering
the
emergence
of
a
middle
class, and
solidifying
peace.
USAID
should
therefore
focus
its
development
assistance on
countries such
as Morocco and
Sudan through
joint investment
collaboration
with
the
more
economically
advanced
economies such
as the UAE and Israel.
•
USAID
should
consider cutting
aid to states allied
to Iran,
limiting assistance
in these
countries to the
advancement of narrow
strategic priorities
and
support
for
basic
American
values, such
as
aid
to
persecuted
religious
minorities.
USAID
continues
to
expend
hundreds
of
millions
of dollars
in
nonhumanitarian aid
to antagonistic regimes in
Iraq, Lebanon,
and the Palestinian
territories. After
billions of
dollars of
aid and many
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
years
of effort,
these
countries remain
hopelessly
dysfunctional—a fact
that exposes the
failure of
a foreign aid
model that
is disconnected
to our national
security and
without exit
strategies to
promote
self-reliance. We must
admit
that
USAID’s
investments
in
the
education
sector,
for
example, serve
no other
purpose than
to subsidize
corrupt,
incompetent, and
hostile
regimes.
•
USAID
should
undergo
operational
changes
to
secure
better
development outcomes
by
reducing
its
missions’
footprints
in
the
Middle
East
given
that most
personnel
in
the
region
are
unable
to
leave
their
highly
protected
and
expensive compounds and carry
out their
oversight functions. It
should redirect
program
funding
away
from
expensive
and
poorly
performing
international partners to more cost-effective local entities
that require a minimal USAID field presence.
Africa.
Since its
inception, USAID
has
had
a
strong
presence in
Africa, saving
millions of
lives through its pandemic and infectious disease responses,
especially
for
malaria
and
HIV-AIDS.
It
has
led
global
efforts to
provide lifesaving
emergency
assistance to those who are fleeing conflict and suffering from
devastating natural
disasters. American
generosity
knows no
equal.
Yet
the
agency’s
efforts to
reduce poverty
and
hunger
have failed
as
it
spends ever-higher
amounts of
aid partnering with
a costly
and ineffective
aid indus-
trial complex that has
little interest
in “working
itself out
of a
job.”
Long-term, multibillion-dollar humanitarian responses lack exit
strategies, while numer- ous
development
projects lead
neither to
measurable
results nor
to government reforms.
Despite
the
tens
of
billions
of
dollars
spent,
the
continent
remains
poor,
unstable,
and riven
with
conflict,
corruption,
and
Islamic
terrorism.
This
situation has
also resulted
in vast
illegal
migration from
the continent.
Failure
to
generate
wealth has
provided opportunities
for
China
to
step
in
and
become the continent’s leader in trade, loans, and investment.
As a result, Beijing controls
most of
the
continent’s strategic minerals
that are
critical to
advanced technology.
Moreover, USAID
is
criticized
by
Africans
for
exporting
cultural
values that are
anathema to
their
traditional norms, further
abetting
Chinese continen- tal
supremacy.
The Biden
Administration’s radical global climate policies have cut off
billions in
investment to
develop clean
fossil fuels,
denying
Africa’s billion-plus
people access
to cheap
energy to
further their
own development and finance
their own
social services
in health,
water,
education, and
agriculture, while increasing
its dependence on
China’s renewables industry. It has exacerbated hunger by
increas- ing
the
costs
of
fertilizers to
levels
that
many
African
farmers
can
no
longer
afford.
Poverty-inducing
dependence
on
aid
grows
daily.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
USAID
efforts in
Africa require
a
rethink.
In
2025,
USAID will
update its
five- year
Country
Development and
Cooperation Strategies. This
will give
the next
Administration an
opportunity to pursue
a new
development course for
Africa that promotes economic
self-reliance, catalyzes
private-sector
solutions for
job creation
through increased
trade
and
investment,
terminates
legacy
and
nonper-
forming programs,
and
supports
diversified
energy
approaches.
Critically,
it
must hold
China
accountable for
its extractive
investments that violate
international labor,
environmental, and
anticorruption
norms
and
practices;
undercut
business opportunities
for
U.S.
companies;
and sabotage
Africa’s
development.
•
USAID,
in
collaboration
with
the
U.S.
International
Development
Finance
Corporation, U.S.
Department of
State, U.S.
Department of
the Treasury,
and U.S. Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service, should
use
its
convening
power, diplomatic
heft,
and
risk-reducing
instruments
to facilitate
U.S.–African business relationships and expand Prosper Africa,
launched
by
the
Trump Administration
to
“bring[]
together services
from
across
the
U.S.
Government to
help companies
and
investors
do
business
in
U.S.
and
African
markets.”17
•
The
Africa
Growth
and
Opportunity
Act
(AGOA)18 provides
Africa
duty-
free
access
to
U.S.
markets.
The
next
Administration
should extend
AGOA
beyond
its
2025
term
but
within
a
strategic
framework
that
rewards
good
governance and pro–free
market
economic policies.
There is
no point in
wasting
massive
sums
of
aid
to
countries
whose governments
fail
to
keep their
promises to reform.
•
USAID
should build
on, not
compete with,
private-sector
initiatives launched
by
global
churches,
corporate
philanthropists,
and
diaspora
groups that
have
already
invested
billions
of
dollars
in
self-reliance–
based projects.
Japan
has
committed
$30
billion
in
aid
to
Africa
over three
years to
stem China’s
economic
and
political
grip on
the
continent.
Gulf-based sovereign
funds also
are
investing
billions in
African
energy,
infrastructure,
mining,
water,
food
production, information and
communications technology, and other strategic industries. Other
allied
donors
are
promoting
investment-based
aid.
There
is
no
lack
of
funding
to support
Africa’s
economic
rise.
What
is
lacking
is
strategic
direction
among
U.S. government
foreign aid agencies.
PEPFAR
has
saved
countless lives
over the
years and
constitutes America’s
most
successful
aid
program.
During the
Trump Administration,
PEPFAR increased
the
share
of
funding
to
local
entities from
about 20
percent to
nearly 70
percent with
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
commensurate
improvements that
have had
lasting impact.
The
next
Administra-
tion
should
extend
that
localization
model to
all
global
health and
humanitarian
assistance in
view of
how
local
African entities
have strengthened
their capacity
for
direct
management
of
U.S.
programs. Correspondingly,
USAID should
aggressively
ramp down
its
partnerships
with wasteful,
costly, and
politicized U.N.
agencies,
international
NGOs,
and
Beltway contractors.
All
new
programs in
Africa should
build
on existing
local
initiatives that
enjoy the
support of
the African
people.
Latin America.
U.S.
foreign
assistance throughout
the Western
Hemisphere is
designed
to respond
to
national
security
threats
that
emanate
from
the
region, such as
illicit drug and arms trafficking; illegal immigration flows;
terrorism; pandemics; and strategic threats from China, Russia,
and Iran. Over the past decade,
the United
States has
provided
billions of
dollars in
security,
humani- tarian,
and
development
assistance
in
Central
America
and
the
Andes,
including
$1 billion in
food and
non-food
emergency aid
to millions
of Venezuelan
refu- gees
who
have
fled
the
Maduro
dictatorship.
USAID
is
always
first
to
respond
to natural
disasters in
Central
America and
the Caribbean and employs
a network of
dedicated experts in
the region
to deliver
this
assistance. During
the COVID
pandemic, the United States provided millions of doses of
vaccines and other emergency health support.
Yet
years of
foreign aid
have failed
to
bring
peace, prosperity,
and
stability
to
the
hemisphere. Poverty,
joblessness, and
social unrest
have led
to
leftist
electoral
victories from Mexico to Chile. These regimes are hostile to American
interests and
private
enterprise, breed
corruption, implement
radical policies
that will
further impoverish
their people
and threaten
their
democracies, and
are more
open to
striking partnerships with
Communist China. Left-wing authoritarian kleptocra-
cies
in
Cuba,
Nicaragua, and
Venezuela
deny
their
people basic
freedoms,
violently
and ruthlessly
suppress
any
dissent,
repress
communities
of
faith,
and
generate such
misery
that
hundreds
of thousands
of
their
citizens
have
attempted
to
cross
our
southern
border over
the
past
two
years.
No
recent
Administration
has
made any
progress in
reducing the
chaos and
desperation in
Haiti.
Conversely,
Latin America
is
a
major global
source of
energy and
food, which
generates
substantial income that can finance internal social and economic
devel- opment.
The nations
of the
hemisphere share a
natural and
massive
geographic trade and investment advantage through their
proximity to the United States,
supplemented
by
free-trade
agreements.
The
United
States
remains
the
favored
destination for higher
education and business opportunities for Latin Americans.
Successful diasporas
in the United States
serve as
powerful
economic, cultural,
and political bridges to
every country
in the
region.
The Trump Administration focused on
promoting trade and investment, especially in infrastructure,
through an
interagency
effort called
América
Crece (America Grows), by which USAID played a key
role in providing technical
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
assistance
to create
a more
enabling
environment to
attract private
investment. The Biden Administration canceled the
program.
The
next conservative
Administration
should
reassess all
programs of
U.S. for-
eign
aid
to
Latin
America and
terminate those
that have
failed to
achieve results
after
years of
effort.
Instead, USAID
should:
•
Focus
its
resources
on
strengthening
the
fundamentals
of
free
markets,
such as
clear
property
rights
and
a
functioning
judiciary,
and
on
promoting
labor
and pension
reforms, lower
taxes, and
deregulation in order
to increase
trade and investment within
the region
and with
the United
States as
the genuine
path to
economic and
political
stability.
•
Challenge
the
socialist
ideas
that
have
captured
too
many
of
the
region’s
governments and their nations’ youth.
•
Fund
partnerships
with
the
private
sector
and
support
civil-society
groups,
including university centers and
think tanks
that advocate
for pro–free
market and democratic ideas.
Finally, Latin
America is the perfect proving ground for reducing USAID’s reli-
ance
on
large U.S.-based
implementers,
and
the
agency
should commit
to
shifting
all
of its
portfolio in
the region
to local
organizations
by 2030.
PERSONNEL
The Trump Administration
agenda for
USAID was
undercut from
the outset
both by recalcitrant
career
personnel and
by
inexperienced
political personnel. The next
conservative Administration should implement personnel policies
from the
beginning
so
that
the
agency
can
be
effectively
managed according
to
high
stan-
dards.
The
rapid
deployment
of reforms
will
require
key
experienced
personnel installed
quickly
at USAID’s
headquarters
and
missions.
Delay
will
only
impede progress.
In
general,
areas of
focus
should
be
appointing
effective
lawyers
in
key positions,
reforming
career hiring/firing
mechanisms, and getting
a grip
on the
grantmaking process.
The
Administration should staff the Office of the General Counsel
with at least
four
politically
appointed attorneys
(besides the
General Counsel).
The
General
Counsel
should have
two
political
deputies, one
of
whom
should cover
Human
Capital and Talent Management (HCTM) and the other the Office of
Acquisition and Assistance
(OAA).
The
Administration
should
name a
political appointee
with long
experience in federal
personnel systems as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer and
Director of
HCTM. This
appointee would
help to
scope and
shepherd position
descriptions,
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
clearances, and other components of
the hiring process that are necessary for
immediate
onboarding
while coordinating
with
the
White
House
to
bring
in
new appointees
and make
internal
career employee
changes. On
Day One, USAID
should halt all agencywide
training and replace it with training modules to advance
the President’s agenda.
The Administration should appoint a
Senior Accountable Official (SAO) to
report
on
the
agency’s
adherence
to
Administration
policy
priorities,
including
on Protecting Life in
Foreign Assistance, critical race theory, climate change,
gender, and
diversity and
inclusion. It
should also
create a
program to
staff
hard-to-fill positions
overseas.
Finally,
the
Administration should
create a
recruiting
program for
veterans and
other
groups
to
participate in
career
job
opportunities
at
USAID.
Former
mis-
sionaries, veterans, members
of diasporas, and faith community stakeholders with overseas
experience should be recruited to work at USAID on Schedule A
appoint- ments,
as
Institutional
Services
Contractors,
as
Personal
Services
Contractors,
and as Foreign
Service Officers.
CONCLUSION
The
next
conservative
Administration
will
have a
unique opportunity
to
realign
U.S. foreign
assistance with American national interests and the principles
of good governance
and more
accurately
reflect the
U.S.
taxpayer’s unmatched charita-
ble desire to help
those in
need. It
can build
on a
strong
baseline of
conservative reforms
undertaken
by the
Trump
Administration
to
counter
Communist
China’s strategy
of
world
domination. However,
this
will
require
that
bold
steps
are
taken
on Day One to undo the gross
misuse of foreign aid by the current Administration to
promote a
radical
ideology that
is politically divisive
at home
and harms
our global standing.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The
preparation of
this chapter
was a
collective enterprise of
individuals involved in
the
2025
Presidential Transition
Project.
All
contributors
to
this
chapter
are
listed
at
the
front
of
this
volume,
but
Dr. William
Steiger,
Bethany
Kozma,
and
Dr.
Alma
Golden
deserve
special
mention.
The
author
assumes
full
responsibility
for
the
content
of
this
chapter,
and
no
views
expressed
therein
should
be
attributed
to
any other
individual.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
S.
1983, Foreign
Assistance Act
of 1961,
Public Law
No. 87-195,
87th Congress,
September 4,
1961,
https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg424-2.pdf
(accessed
January
19,
2023).
2.
U.S.
Agency
or
International
Development,
“Journey
to
Self-Reliance
Fact
Sheet,”
June
3,
2020,
https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1870/journey-self-reliance-fact-sheet#:~:text=WHAT%20
IS%20THE%20JOURNEY%20TO%20SELF-RELIANCE%3F%20USAID%20is,greater%20
developmentoutcomesandworktowardatimewhenforeignassistanceisnolongernecessary.%20
It%E2%80%99s%20called%20the%20Journey%20to%20Self-Reliance (accessed March 17, 2023).
3.
News
release,
“U.S.
Agency
for
International
Development
Administrator
Mark
Green’s
Interview
with
C-Span’s ‘Newsmakers’ Host Susan
Swain
and Washington Post’s Carl
Morello and Wall Street Journal’s Ben
Kesling,”
U.S. Agency
for
International
Development,
November
26,
2018,
https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/news-
information/press-releases/nov-26-2018-administrator-mark-green-interview-cspan-newsmakers
(accessed March 17, 2023).
4.
U.S.
Agency
for
International
Development,
Digital
Strategy
2020–2024,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
files/2022-05/USAID_Digital_Strategy.pdf.pdf://www.usaid.gov/digital-development/usaid-digital-strategy (accessed March 17,
2023).
5.
“U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,”
declassified in part by Assistant to the President for
National
Security
Affairs
Robert
C.
O’Brien,
January
5,
2021,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf
(accessed
March
18,
2023),
and Robert
C.
O’Brien,
Assistant to
the
President
for
National
Security
Affairs,
“A
Free
and
Open
Indo-Pacific,”
January
5,
2021,
https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf
(accessed March 18, 2023).
6.
News
Release,
“Fact
Sheet:
Prioritizing
Climate
in
Foreign
Policy
and
National
Security,”
The
White
House, October 21, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/21/fact-sheet-
prioritizing-climate-in-foreign-policy-and-national-security/
(accessed
January
28,
2023).
7.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Climate Strategy
2020–2030, April
2022,
https://www.usaid.gov/
sites/default/files/2022-11/USAID-Climate-Strategy-2022-2030.pdf
(accessed
March
18,
2023).
8.
Adva Saldinger, “USAID Steps
Up
‘Languishing’ Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion Effort,”
Devex.com, December 15, 2021,
http://www.devex.com/news/usaid-steps-up-languishing-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-
effort-102316
(accessed
January
28,
2021).
9.
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Gender Equity
and Women Empowerment,”
https://www.usaid.
gov/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment
(accessed January 30,
2023).
10.
U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrating
Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle,” ADS
Chapter
25, partial revision date January 22, 2021,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/2022-12/205.pdf
(accessed March
18, 2023).
11.
S.
137,
Protecting
Life in
Foreign
Assistance
Act,
117th
Congress,
introduced
January
28,
2021,
https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/137#:~:text=Protecting%20Life%20in%20Foreign%20
Assistance%20Act.%20This%20bill,support%20for%20an%20entity%20that%20conducts%20
such%20activities (accessed January 20, 2023), and H.R. 534, Protecting
Life in Foreign Assistance
Act, 117th Congress, introduced
January
28, 2021,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-
bill/534?s=1&r=450
(accessed
January 20,
2023).
12.
President
Joseph
R.
Biden
Jr.,
“Memorandum
on
Protecting
Women’s
Health
at
Home
and
Abroad,”
Memorandum for
the
Secretary
of
State,
the
Secretary
of
Defense,
the
Secretary
of
Health
and
Human
Services, and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, The White House,
January
28, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandum-
on-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/
(accessed
March
18,
2023).
13.
President Donald J. Trump, Executive
Order 13926, “Advancing
International Religious Freedom,” June 2, 2020,
in
Federal
Register,
Vol.
85, No. 109 (June 5, 2020),
pp. 34951–34953,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2020-06-05/pdf/2020-12430.pdf
(accessed
January
20,
2023).
14.
22 Code of Federal Regulations § 205.1,
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-II/part-205
(accessed March 18, 2023).
15.
Contributor’s
notes
from
internal
USAID
meetings.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
16.
President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating
Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21, 2020, in
Federal
Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26,
2020), pp. 67631–67635,
https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf
(accessed
March
18,
2023).
17.
Prosper Africa, “Increasing Trade & Investment Between the
U.S. and African Countries,”
https://www.
prosperafrica.gov/
(accessed March 18, 2023).
18.
H.R. 434,
Trade and
Development
Act of 2000,
Public Law 106-200, 106th Congress, May 18, 2000, Title I,
Subtitle
A,
https://agoa.info/images/documents/2385/AGOA_legal_text.pdf
(accessed
March
18,
2023).
W
hen
our
Founders
wrote in
the
Constitution
that the
federal government
would
“promote
the
general
Welfare,” they
could not
have fathomed
a
massive
bureaucracy that
would someday
spend $3
trillion in
a
single
year—roughly the
sum, combined, spent by the departments covered in this section
in
2022.
Approximately
half
of
that
colossal sum
was
spent
by
the
Department of
Health and
Human Services (HHS) alone—the belly of the massive behemoth
that is the modern
administrative state.
HHS is home to
Medicare and Medicaid, the principal drivers of our $31 trillion
national
debt. When
Congress passed
and President
Lyndon B.
Johnson signed
into law
these
programs, they
were set
on autopilot
with no
plan for
how to
pay for them. The
first year that Medicare spending was visible on the books was
1967. From
that
point
on
through
2020—according to
the
American
Main
Street
Initia-
tive’s analysis of official
federal tallies—Medicare and Medicaid combined cost $17.8
trillion, while our combined
federal deficits over that same span were $17.9 trillion.
In essence,
our deficit
problem is
a Medicare
and Medicaid
problem.
HHS is also
home to
the Centers
for Disease
Control and
Prevention
(CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the duo most
responsible—along with
President
Joe
Biden—for
the
irrational,
destructive,
un-American
mask
and vaccine
mandates that
were imposed
upon an
ostensibly free people
during the
COVID-19
pandemic.
All
along,
it
was
clear
from
randomized
controlled
trials— the
gold
standard
of medical
research—that
masks
provide
little
to
no
benefit
in preventing
the spread
of viruses
and might
even be
counterproductive. Yet the
CDC ignored these
high-quality RCTs, cherry-picked from politically malleable
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
“observational
studies,” and declared
that everyone
except
children and
infants below
the
age
of
two
should
don
masks.
Under
COVID,
as
former
director
of
HHS’s
Office
of
Civil
Rights
Roger
Severino
writes in
Chapter
14,
the
CDC
exposed
itself
as
“perhaps
the most
incompetent
and
arrogant
agency
in
the
federal
government.”
Nor is the CDC the only villain in this play. Severino writes of
the National Institutes
of
Health,
“Despite
its
popular
image
as
a
benign
science
agency,
NIH
was
responsible for
paying
for
research
in
aborted
baby
body
parts,
human
animal
chimera
experiments”—in
which
the
genes
of
humans
and
animals
are
mixed,
“and
gain-of-function viral
research that
may have
been
responsible for COVID-19.”
Severino
writes that
“Anthony
Fauci’s
division
of
the
NIH”—the
National
Institute
of Allergy
and
Infectious
Diseases—“owns
half
the
patent
for
the
Moderna
COVID-
19 vaccine,”
and
“several
NIH
employees”
receive
“up
to
$150,000
annually
from Moderna
vaccine
sales.” That
would
be
the
same
experimental
mRNA
vaccine
that the
CDC
now
wants
to
force
on
children,
who are
at
little
to
no
risk
from
COVID-19
but
at
great
risk from
public health
officials.
The incestuous
relationship between the NIH, CDC, and vaccine makers—with
all of the conflict of
interest it entails—cannot be allowed to continue, and the
revolving door
between them
must be
locked. As
Severino
writes, “Funding
for scientific
research should
not be
controlled by
a small
group of
highly paid
and unaccountable insiders
at
the
NIH,
many
of
whom
stay
in
power
for
decades.
The
NIH
monopoly
on directing
research
should
be
broken.”
What’s
more,
NIH
has
long “been
at the
forefront in
pushing junk
gender
science.” The
next HHS
secretary should immediately put an end to the
department’s foray into woke transgen- der
activism.
HHS also pushes
abortion as
a form of
“health care,”
skirting and
sometimes blatantly
defying the
Hyde Amendment in the
process.
Severino writes
that the
“FDA
should…reverse
its
approval
of
chemical
abortion
drugs
because
the
polit- icized
approval
process was
illegal from
the start.”
In addition,
HHS programs
often violate the spirit,
and sometimes
the letter,
of
conscience-protection
laws. Severino writes that
the HHS
“Secretary should pursue
a robust
agenda to
pro- tect the fundamental right to life, protect
conscience rights, and uphold bodily integrity
rooted in
biological realities, not
ideology.” The next
secretary
should also reverse
the Biden
Administration’s focus on
“‘LGBTQ+
equity,’ subsidizing
single-motherhood,
disincentivizing
work, and
penalizing
marriage,” replacing such
policies with
those
encouraging marriage, work,
motherhood, fatherhood, and nuclear families.
If there is
another
department that
has gone
off the
rails like
HHS during
the Obama and Biden Administrations, it is the once proud
Department of Justice (DOJ).
As former counselor to the attorney general Gene Hamilton writes
in Chap- ter
17, the
department “has a
long and
noble
history”—Edmund
Randolph, the
first
attorney
general,
took
office
the
same
year
as
President
Washington—yet
its
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
longstanding
reputation has
been marred
by
the
Biden
Administration’s
abuse of
the
department’s
powers for
its
own
ends. Hamilton
writes that
the
department’s “unprecedented
politicization and weaponization” under Biden and Attorney
General
Merrick
Garland,
resulting
in
“politically
motivated
and
viewpoint-based
prosecutions” of political enemies and indifference to the
crimes of political allies, has
made
the
department
“a threat
to
the
Republic.”
The
most
important
thing
for the
next
attorney
general to
do
is
to
refocus
the
department
on
its
core
functions
of
“protecting public safety and
defending the rule of law,” while restoring its “values
of independence,
impartiality,
honesty, integrity,
respect, and
excellence.”
This
is
especially
true of
the
Federal
Bureau of
Investigations
(FBI).
A
bloated,
arrogant,
increasingly lawless
organization,
especially
at
the
top, “the
FBI
views
itself
as an independent agency” that is “on par with the Attorney
General,” rather than as an agency that is under the AG and
fully accountable to him or her. To rein in this “completely out
of control” bureau and remind it of its place within—rather
than at the top of—the DOJ
hierarchy, Hamilton writes that the FBI’s separate
Office
of
General
Counsel
(with
“approximately
300
attorneys”),
separate
Office
of Legislative Affairs, and
separate Office of Public Affairs should all be abolished.
Requiring
the
FBI
to
get
its
legal
advice
from
the
wider
department
“would serve as
a
crucial
check
on
an
agency
that
has
recently
pushed
past
legal
boundary
after
legal
boundary.”
Indeed, Hamilton
writes,
“[t]he
next
conservative
Administra- tion
should
eliminate
any offices
within
the
FBI
that
it
has
the
power
to
eliminate
without any
action from
Congress.”
Elsewhere,
DOJ
should
target violent
and
career
criminals, not
parents; work
to
dismantle
criminal
organizations, partly
by rigorously
prosecuting interstate drug
activity;
and
restart
the Trump
Administration’s
“China Initiative”
(to
address
Chinese espionage
and
theft
of
trade
secrets),
which
the
Biden
Administration
“ter- minated…largely
out of a concern for poor ‘optics.’” It should also enforce
existing federal
law that
prohibits
mailing
abortifacients,
rather than
harassing
pro-life demonstrators; respect the constitutional guarantee of
the freedom of speech, rather
than
trying
to
police
speech
on
the
internet;
and enforce
federal
immigra- tion
laws, rather
than pretending there is
no border.
In contrast to
DOJ’s long
history, the
Department of
Education (the
depart- ment, or ED),
discussed by Lindsey Burke in Chapter 11, is a creation of the
Jimmy Carter Administration. The department is a convenient
one-stop shop for the woke education cartel, which—as the COVID
era showed—is not particularly concerned
with
children’s
education.
Schools
should
be
responsive
to
parents,
rather
than
to
leftist
advocates
intent
on
indoctrination—and
the
more
the
federal
government is
involved
in
education,
the less
responsive
to
parents
the
public
schools
will
be. This
department is an
example of
federal
intrusion into a
traditionally state and local
realm. For
the sake
of American
children,
Congress should
shutter it
and return control of education to the states.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
Short of this, the Secretary of
Education should insist that the department
serve
parents
and
American
ideals, not
advocates
whose
message
is
that
children can
choose their
own sex,
that America
is
“systemically
racist,” that
math itself is racist, and
that Martin
Luther King,
Jr.’s ideal
of a
colorblind society should be
rejected in favor of reinstating a color-conscious society. The
next head of this
department
will have
a
lot
to
do—hopefully
culminating
in
the
department’s
closure and the salutary restoration of educational control to
states, localities, and
parents.
The
next Secretary
of
Energy
will similarly
have much
work to
do.
Under
the
next
President,
the
Department
of
Energy
should end
the
Biden
Administration’s unprovoked war on fossil fuels, restore
America’s energy independence, oppose
eyesore windmills
built at
taxpayer expense,
and
respect
the
right
of
Americans to buy and drive
cars of their own choosing, rather than trying to force them
into
electric
vehicles
and
eventually
out
of
the
driver’s
seat
altogether
in
favor
of self-driving
robots. As
former
commissioner of the
Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
Bernard L.
McNamee
says
in
Chapter
12,
“A
conservative
President
must be
committed
to
unleashing
all
of
America’s
energy
resources
and
making the
energy economy
serve the
American
people, not
special
interests.”
In
Chapter 10,
Daren Bakst
writes that
the
Biden
Administration’s
Department of
Agriculture
claims to
be
“transforming
the
food
system as
we
know
it.” But
the government
“does not
need to
transform the
food system”;
instead, “it
should respect
American
farmers,
truckers,”
and
families.
In
Chapter
13,
former
chief
of staff
at
the
Environmental Protection
Agency
Mandy
Gunasekara
writes
that
the
EPA’s
“current
activities
and
staffing
levels
far
exceed
its
congressional
mandates and
purpose,”
whereas its
“initial
success” in
its “infancy” (in
the 1970s)
was a
product of “clear mandates, a
streamlined structure, [and] recognition of the states’
prominent role.”
Having
since
become
a “coercive”
agency,
full
of
embedded
activ- ists, its “structure
and mission
should be
greatly
circumscribed.”
Former
secretary of
the
Department
of
Housing
and
Urban
Development Dr. Benjamin
S.
Carson
writes in
Chapter 15
that HUD
is
beset
with “mission
creep” and regularly
crosses the
line into
exercising
quasi-legislative
powers. In
the
next
Administration, it should refocus on its core duties and keep
“noncitizens…from
living in federally assisted housing,” provide enhanced
“oversight of foreign own- ership of [U.S.] real estate,” and
“reinvigorate paths to upward economic mobility”
and
economic
“self-sufficiency.”
In
Chapter 18,
former acting
assistant secretary
of
policy at
the Department of Labor
Jonathan Berry
writes that
the department
and related
agencies
should
pursue
pro-family, pro-worker
policies
to
help
“restore the
family-supporting
job
as
the
centerpiece
of
the
American
economy,”
in
lieu
of
the current Administration’s
“left-wing social-engineering agenda”—“the most
assertive”
in
history—which
empowers
race,
gender,
and
climate-change
activists at
the expense of American workers.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
In
Chapter 19,
on
the
Department of
Transportation
(DOT),
former DOT
deputy
assistant
director
for
research
and
technology
Diana Furchtgott-Roth
writes, “In
pursuit
of
an
anti-fossil-fuel
climate
agenda never
approved
by
Congress,
the Biden
Administration has
raised
fuel
economy
requirements
to
levels
that
cannot
real-
istically be met” by most
gas-powered cars, thereby reducing Americans’ freedom
while increasing costs.
Lastly, former
acting chief
of staff
at the
Department of
Veterans Affairs Brooks D.
Tucker, echoing concerns expressed in other chapters,
writes in
Chapter 20
that the
Veterans
Affairs (VA)
must be
“accountable to
the needs and problems of
veterans, not
subservient to
the parochial
preferences of
the bureaucracy.”
merican
farmers
efficiently and
safely produce
food to
meet the
needs of
individuals around the globe. Because of the innovation and
resilience of the
nation’s
farmers, American
agriculture is
a model
for the
world. If
farmers
are allowed
to operate
without
unnecessary government
intervention, American
agriculture will
continue
to
flourish,
producing
plentiful,
safe,
nutritious, and
affordable food.
The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) can and should play a limited
role,
with
much
of
its
focus on
removing governmental
barriers that
hinder food
pro- duction
or otherwise
undermine efforts to
meet consumer
demand. The
USDA should recognize
what should be self-evident: Agricultural production should
first and foremost be
focused on
efficiently
producing safe
food.
This
chapter provides
important background
on
the
USDA and
identifies many
of
the
USDA-specific
issues
that will
be
faced
by
an
incoming Administration.
It provides
specific
recommendations for
the next
Administration about how
to address these
issues and lays out a conservative vision for what the USDA
should look like in the future.
MISSION
STATEMENT
The
current mission
statement as
stated by
the
Biden
Administration
highlights the broad scope of
the USDA:
To
serve all
Americans
by
providing
effective,
innovative,
science-based public
policy
leadership
in
agriculture,
food
and
nutrition,
natural
resource
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
protection and
management,
rural
development,
and
related
issues
with
a
commitment
to
delivering
equitable
and
climate
smart
opportunities
that
inspire and help America thrive.1
The
first part
of
the
mission statement
regarding the
issues covered
is
not
new
to
the
Biden
Administration;
it
reflects the
overly broad
nature of
the
USDA’s
work.
However,
the
language
bringing in
equity and
climate change
is
new
to
the
Biden Administration
and part
of the
USDA’s express
effort to
transform
agricultural production.2
The
USDA’s
new
vision
statement
illuminates
the
focus
of
this
effort:
An equitable and climate
smart food and agriculture economy that protects and improves
the health,
nutrition and
quality of
life of
all Americans,
yields healthy
land,
forests
and
clean
water,
helps
rural
America
thrive,
and
feeds
the
world.3
This effort is one of a federal
central plan to put climate change and envi- ronmental
issues ahead
of the
most important requirements of
agriculture—to efficiently
produce
safe food.
The
USDA
would
apparently
use
its
power
to
change the
very
nature
of
the
food
and
agriculture economy
into
one
that
is
“equitable
and
climate
smart.”
As an
initial
matter,
the
USDA
should
not
try
to
control
and
shape
the
economy,
but should
instead
remove
obstacles
that
hinder
food
production. Further,
it
should
not
place
ancillary
issues, such
as
environmental
issues,
ahead of
agricultural production itself.
A Proper Mission Statement.
Even before the Biden
Administration’s rad- ical
effort
to
reshape
the
USDA’s
work,
the
USDA’s
mission
was
and
is
too
broad,
including serving as a major
welfare agency through implementation of programs
such
as
food
stamps.
This
far-reaching
mission
is
not
the
fault
of
the
USDA,
but
of Congress,
which has
given the
department its extensive
power.
Congress
must limit
the
USDA’s
role. A
proper mission
would clarify
that the
department’s
primary focus
is
on
agriculture and
that the
USDA serves
all
Amer-
icans. The USDA’s “client” is
the American people in general, not a subset of interests,
such as
farmers,
meatpackers, environmental groups,
etc.
Within this agricultural focus, the
USDA should develop and disseminate
information
and
research
(the historical
role
of
the
USDA);
identify
and
address
concrete threats
to public
health and
safety arising
directly from
food and
agri- culture; remove unjustified foreign trade barriers
blocking market access for American agricultural goods; and
generally remove government barriers that undermine
access to
safe and
affordable food
across the
food supply
chain.
Core
principles should
be
included
within any
mission statement,
including a
recognition that farmers,
and the
food system
in general,
should be
free from
unnecessary
government
intervention.
Further, there should
be clear statements
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
about the
importance of sound science to inform the USDA’s work and
respect for
personal
freedom and
individual dietary
choices, private
property rights,
and
the
rule of law.
Taking
these
factors
into account,
below is
a
model
USDA mission
statement:
To
develop and
disseminate
agricultural
information
and
research,
identify
and address
concrete
public
health
and
safety
threats
directly
connected
to
food
and
agriculture,
and
remove both
unjustified
foreign
trade
barriers
for
U.S.
goods
and
domestic
government
barriers that
undermine
access
to
safe
and
affordable
food
absent
a
compelling
need—all based
on
the
importance
of
sound
science,
personal
freedom,
private
property,
the
rule
of
law,
and
service
to
all
Americans.
OVERVIEW
In
1862, President
Abraham Lincoln
signed into
law
the
legislation that
created the
USDA.4
The
department had
a very
narrow mission
focused on
the dissemi-
nation of information connected
to agriculture
and “to
procure,
propagate and
distribute
among the
people
new
valuable
seeds
and
plants.”5 During
the
last
160 years, the
scope of
the
USDA’s
work has
expanded well
beyond that
narrow mis- sion—and
well beyond
agriculture itself.
In
addition
to
being
a
distributor
of
farm
subsidies,
the USDA
runs the
food stamp
program and
other
food-related wel-
fare programs
and covers
issues
including
conservation,
biofuels, forestry, and rural
programs.
Based
on the
USDA’s fiscal
year (FY)
2023 budget
summary,
outlays are
esti- mated at $261 billion: $221 billion for mandatory
programs and $39 billion for
discretionary programs.6
These
outlays
are
broken
down as
follows: nutrition
assis- tance (70
percent); farm,
conservation,
and
commodity programs
(14
percent);
“all
other,”
which
includes
rural development,
research, food
safety, marketing
and regulatory,
and
departmental management
(11
percent);
and
forestry
(5
percent).7 The
USDA
has
provided a
summary of
its
size,
explaining, “Today,
USDA is
com- prised
of 29
agencies
organized under
eight Mission
Areas and
16 Staff
Offices, with
nearly
100,000
employees
serving
the
American
people
at
more
than
6,000
locations
across
the
country
and
abroad.”8
MAJOR
PRIORITY ISSUES
AND SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS
For an incoming
Administration, there are
numerous issues
that should
be addressed at the USDA.
This chapter
identifies and discusses
many of
the most
important issues. The initial
issues discussed should be priority issues for the next
Administration:
Defend
American Agriculture. It
is deeply unfortunate that the first issue
identified
must
be
a
willingness
of
the
incoming
Administration
to
defend
Amer-
ican
agriculture, but
this
is
precisely
what
the
top
priority
for
that
Administration
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
should be. As
previously discussed, the
Biden
Administration is
seeking to
use the
federal
government
to transform
the
American
food
system.9 The
USDA
web site
explains:
The U.S.
Department of
Agriculture
(USDA), alongside
Biden–Harris
Administration leadership
and
the
people
of
this
great
country,
has
embarked on
another
historic journey:
transforming
the food
system as
we know
it— from farm
to fork,
and at every stage
along the
supply chain.10
The federal
government does not need to transform the food system or develop
a national plan to intervene
across the supply chain. Instead, it should respect American
farmers,
truckers, and everyone
who makes
the food
supply chain
so resilient and
successful. One of the important lessons learned during the
COVID- 19
pandemic
was how
critical
it
is
to
remove
barriers
in the
food
supply
chain—not to
increase them.
The Biden
Administration’s
centrally planned
transformational
effort mini-
mizes the importance of
efficient agricultural production and instead places issues
such as
climate change
and equity
front and
center. The
USDA’s Strategic Plan Fiscal Years
2022–2026 identifies six
strategic goals, the
first three
of which
focus on issues
such as
climate
change, renewable
energy, and
systemic
racism. In
the Secretary
of Agriculture’s
message,
there
is
only
one
mention
of
affordable
food— and nothing
about efficient production and the incredible innovation and
respect for the
environment that already
exists within
the
agricultural
community.11
The Biden Administration’s USDA
strongly supported12
the recent United
Nations
(U.N.)
Food
Systems
Summit.
According
to
the
USDA:
The stated
goal of
the Food
Systems Summit
was to
transform the
way the
world
produces,
consumes
and
thinks
about
foods
within
the
context
of
the 2030
Agenda for
Sustainable Development and
to meet
the challenges
of poverty,
food
security,
malnutrition,
population
growth,
climate
change,
and natural
resource degradation.13
Not
unlike those
who
oppose
reliable and
affordable energy
production, there
is a disdain,
especially by some on the Left, for American agriculture and the
food system.14 The
Biden Administration’s vision of a federal government developing
a plan that “fixes” agriculture and focuses on issues secondary to food
production is very
disturbing.
A recent USDA-created
program
captures both
the disrespect
for American
farmers and the Biden
Administration’s effort to
dictate
agricultural
practices. The USDA explained that it was concerned with farmers
not transitioning to organic
farming, and
therefore
announced that
it will dedicate
$300 million
to
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
induce
farmers to
adopt organic
farming.15 There
was
no
recognition
that farmers
know
how
to
farm
better than
D.C. politicians16 or
a
that
organic food
is
expensive17 and
land-intensive.18 The Biden Administration
has also
been pushing
so-called “climate-smart”19 agricultural
practices which
received additional
support in
the partisan Inflation
Reduction Act.20
American
agriculture should not need defending. According to the USDA’s
latest
data,
farm
output nearly
tripled (a
175
percent
increase) from
1948 to
2019, while
the
amount of
land farmed
decreased. In
fact, as
farm output
increased by
175 percent,
all agricultural
inputs
increased by
only 4
percent.21
In 2021, despite
high food
prices—a major
problem and
regressive—Ameri- can
consumers
spent
an
average
of
about
10
percent
of
their
personal
disposable
income on
food,
which
is
close
to
historic
lows.
For
decades,
this
share
has
been
in
decline.22 America’s
farmers efficiently
produce
food
using
fewer resources,
making
it
possible
for
food
to
be
affordable.
This
reality
is
not
only
something
that
should be
defended
but
also
touted
as
a
prime
example
of
what
makes
American
agricul- ture
so
successful.
The
connection
between
efficiency
and
affordability
seems
lost in
the Biden
Administration’s effort to
transform the
food system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Proactively
Defend Agriculture. From
the outset, the next Administration should:
Denounce
efforts to
place
ancillary issues like
climate change
ahead of food
productivity
and affordability when it
comes to
agriculture.
•
Remove
the
U.S.
from
any
association
with
U.N.
and
other
efforts
to
push
sustainable-development
schemes
connected to
food
production.
•
Defend
American
agriculture and
advance the
critical
importance of efficient
and
innovative
food
production,
especially
to
advance
safe
and affordable
food.
•
Stress
that ideal
policy should
remove
obstacles imposed on
American farmers
and
individuals across
the
food
supply
chain
so
that
they
can
meet the food
needs of Americans.
•
Clarify
the
critical
importance
of
efficiency
to
food
affordability,
and
why
a
failure
to
recognize
this
fact
especially
hurts
low-income
households
who
spend
a
disproportionate share of
after-tax
income on
food compared
to higher-income households.23
To accomplish these
objectives, a new
Administration should announce
its principles
through
an
executive
order,
the
USDA
should
remove
all
references
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
to transforming the food system on
its web site and other department-dis- seminated material, and
it should expressly and regularly communicate the principles
informing the objectives
listed above,
as well
as promote
these prin-
ciples
through
legislative efforts.
The
USDA
should
also
carefully
review
existing
efforts that
involve
inappropriately
imposing
its
preferred
agricultural
practices onto
farmers.
Address the Abuse of CCC Discretionary Authority.
With the exception of
federal
crop
insurance,
the
Commodity
Credit
Corporation
(CCC)
is
generally
the
means
by
which
agricultural-related farm
bill
programs
are
funded.
The
CCC
is
a funding
mechanism,
which, in
simple
terms,
has
$30
billion
a
year
at
its
disposal.24 Section
5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (Charter Act)25 gives
the
Secretary
of
Agriculture
broad discretionary
authority to
spend “unused” CCC
money. However,
in
general,
past Agriculture
Secretaries have
not
used
this power
to any
meaningful extent. This
changed
dramatically during
the Trump
Administration, when
this
discretionary
authority was used
to fund
$28 billion
in
“trade aid”
to
farmers,
consisting
primarily
of
the
Market
Facilitation
Program.
In 2020, this
authority was
used for
$20.5 billion
in food purchases and
income subsidies in response
to the
COVID-19
pandemic.26
At the time,
critics warned
that this
use of
the CCC,
which in
effect created
a USDA slush
fund,
would
lead
future
Administrations
to
abuse
the
CCC,
such
as
by
pushing
climate-change
policies.27 Predictably,
this
is
precisely what
the
Biden
Administration
has done,
using the
discretionary
authority to
create programs
out
of
whole
cloth,
arguably
without
statutory
authority,28 for
what
it
refers to
as climate-smart
agricultural practices.29
The merits of the various programs
funded through the CCC discretionary
authority
is
not
the
focus
of
this
discussion.
The
major
problem
is
that
the
Secre-
tary of
Agriculture
is
empowered
to
use
a
slush
fund.
Billions
of
dollars
are
being used
for programs
that Congress
never
envisioned or
intended.
Concern
about this
type of
abuse is
not
new.
In
fact,
from 2012
to
2017,
Congress expressly
limited the
Agriculture
Secretary’s discretionary
spending authority
under the Charter Act.30 And this was before the recent
massive discretionary CCC
spending occurred.
The use of
the
discretionary power
is a separation of
powers
problem, with
Congress
abrogating
its
spending
power.
This
power
is
ripe
for
abuse—as
could
be
expected with any slush
fund—and it is a possible way to get around the farm bill
process to
achieve policy
goals not
secured during
the legislative process.
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Refrain from
using section
5
discretionary
authority.
The
USDA can
address
this
abuse
on
its
own
by
following
the
lead
of
most
Administrations
and not using this discretionary authority.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
•
Promote legislative fixes to
address abuse.
Ideally, Congress
would repeal
the
Secretary’s
discretionary
authority
under
section
5
of
the
Charter Act.
There is
no reason
to maintain
such authority.
If Congress
needs to
spend money
to
assist
farmers,
it
has
legislative
tools,
including
the
farm
bill and
the annual
appropriations process, to
do so
in a
timely
fashion. While
not
an
ideal
solution,
Congress
could
also
amend
the
Charter
Act
to
require prior
congressional
approval through
duly enacted
legislation
before any money is
spent.
At
a
minimum, Congress
should amend
the
Charter
Act
to:
•
Limit
spending
to
directly
help
farmers
and
ranchers
address
issues
due to
unforeseen
events
not
already
covered
by
existing
programs
and
that
constitute genuine
emergencies
that must
be addressed immediately.
•
Prohibit the
CCC
from being
used
to assist
parties
beyond farmers
and
ranchers.
•
Clarify
that
spending
is
only
to
address
problems
that
are
temporary
in
nature and
ensure that
funding is
targeted to
address such
problems.
•
Tighten
the
discretion
within
section
5
and
identify
ways
for
improper
application of
the Charter
Act to be challenged
in court.
Reform
Farm
Subsidies.
Too
often,
agricultural policy
becomes
synonymous with farm subsidy policy. This is unfortunate,
because making them synony- mous fails to recognize that
agricultural policy covers a wide range of issues,
including
issues
that
are
outside
the
proper
scope
of
the
USDA,
such
as
environ- mental
regulation.
However, there is no question that
farm subsidies are an important issue within
agricultural policy that
should be
addressed by
any incoming Adminis-
tration. There are several
principles that even
subsidy
supporters would
likely agree
upon,
including
the
need
to
reduce
market
distortions.
Subsidies
should
not
influence planting decisions,
discourage proper risk management and innovation,
incentivize planting on
environmentally sensitive land, or create barriers to entry
for new
farmers. Farm
subsidies can
lead to
these market
distortions and
there- fore, it
would
hardly
be
controversial
to
ensure
that
any
subsidy
scheme
should be
designed to
avoid such
problems.
The overall goal should be to
eliminate subsidy dependence. Despite what
might
be
conventional
wisdom,
many
farmers
receive
few
to
no
subsidies,31 with most
subsidies going to only a handful of commodities. According to
the Congres- sional Research
Service (CRS), from 2014 to 2016, 94 percent of farm program
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
support
went to
just six
commodities—corn,
cotton,
peanuts, rice,
soybeans, and
wheat—that
together account
for
only
28
percent
of
farm
receipts.32 Although
many
farmers
do
not
receive much
in
the
way
of
subsidies, especially
those in
the
areas
of
livestock and
specialty
crops (fruit,
vegetable, and
nuts),33 there are still
a sig-
nificant number of farmers
growing row crops like corn and cotton that do receive
significant farm subsidies.
The
primary subsidy
programs include
the
Agriculture
Risk Coverage
(ARC) program,34 the Price Loss
Coverage (PLC)
program,35 and the federal
crop insur-
ance program.36
Farmers can
participate on a crop-by-crop basis in the ARC
program
or
the
PLC
program.
These programs
cover
about
20
different
crops.37 The ARC
program protects
farmers from
what are
referred to
as
“shallow”
losses, pro- viding
payments when
their actual
revenues fall
below 86
percent of
the
expected
revenues
for
their
crops.38 The
PLC
program provides
payments to
farmers when
commodity
prices fall
below a
fixed,
statutorily established reference
price.39
The federal crop
insurance program is
broader in
scope than
ARC and
PLC, and in crop year 2019 covered 124 commodities.40
Farmers pay a portion of a
premium
to
participate in
the
program.
Taxpayers
on
average
pay
about
60
per- cent41 of the premium.
As explained
by CRS,
“Revenue
Protection was
the most
frequently purchased
policy type
in 2019,
accounting for
almost 70
[percent] of
policies purchased.”42
While
there are
certainly other
subsidy programs
besides ARC,
PLC, and
federal crop
insurance, one program
that deserves
special
mention is
the federal
sugar program.
This
program,
unlike
most
other
subsidy
programs,
intentionally
tries
to
restrict
supply43 and
thereby
drives up
prices. The
program costs
consumers as
much as $3.7 billion a year.44
When
it
comes
to
reforming
subsidy programs,
the
next
Administration
will primarily
have to
look to
legislative solutions. The
next
Administration should
champion legislation that would:
•
Repeal the
federal sugar
program.
The federal government should
not
be
in
the
central
planning
business,
and
the
sugar
program
is
a
prime
example
of harmful
central
planning. Its
very purpose
is to limit the
sugar supply
in
order
to
increase
prices.
The
program
has
a
regressive
effect,
since
lower-income
households spend more
of their
money to
meet food
needs compared to higher income households.45
•
Ideally, repeal the ARC and PLC programs.
Farmers eligible to
participate in
ARC or
PLC are
generally already able
to purchase
federal crop
insurance,
policies
that
protect
against
shortfalls
in
expected
revenue whether
caused by
lower prices
or smaller
harvests. The
ARC program
is especially egregious because
farmers are
being protected
from shallow
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
losses,
which is
another way
of
saying
minor dips
in
expected
revenue. This
is
hardly consistent
with the
concept of
providing a
safety net
to
help
farmers
when they
fall on
hard times.
The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
in one
of its
options to
reduce the
federal
deficit, has
once again
identified
repealing
all
Title
I
farm
programs,
including
ARC,
PLC,
and
the federal
sugar program.46
•
Stop
paying farmers
twice for
price and
revenue losses
during the same year.
Farmers can
receive
support from
the ARC
or PLC
programs
and
the
federal
crop
insurance
program
to
cover
price
declines
and
revenue shortfalls
during
the
same
year.
Congress
should prohibit
this
duplication
by prohibiting
farmers from
receiving an
ARC or
PLC payment
the same
year they receive a crop insurance indemnity.
•
Reduce the
premium
subsidy rate
for crop
insurance.
On
average, taxpayers cover about
60 percent47
of the
premium cost
for policies
purchased in the
federal crop
insurance
program. One
of the most
widely supported
and
bipartisan
policy
reforms
is
to
reduce
the
premium
subsidy
that taxpayers
are
forced
to
pay.48 At
a
minimum,
taxpayers
should
not
pay
more
than
50
percent
of
the
premium.
After
all,
taxpayers
should
not
have to
pay
more
than
the
farmers
who
benefit
from
the
crop
insurance
policies.
CBO
has found
that reducing
the premium
subsidy to
47 percent would save
$8.1 billion
over 10
years and
have little
impact on
crop insurance
participation or
on the
number of
covered acres.49
In
that analysis, there would be
a reduction
in insured
acres of
just one-half
of 1
percent, and
only
1.5
percent
of
acres
would
have
lower
coverage
levels.
50 This
reform
is
basically all
benefit with
little to
no cost.
In its
recently
released report
identifying
options
to
reduce
the
federal
deficit,
CBO
found
that
reducing
the
premium subsidy
to
40
percent would
save $20.9
billion over
10
years.51 Beyond
these
legislative reforms,
the next
Administration should:
•
Communicate to
Congress the
necessity of
transparency
and a
genuine reform
process.
The
White House
and the
USDA should
make it
very clear
that
the farm
bill
process,
including
reform
of
farm
subsidies,
must
be
con- ducted
through
an open
process
with
time
for
mark-up
and
the
opportunity for
changes
to
be
made
outside
the
Agriculture Committee
process.
The
farm bill
too often
is developed
behind closed
doors and
without any
chance
for
real
reform.
The
White
House,
given
the
power
of
the
bully
pulpit,
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
must
demand a
genuine reform
process and
express unwavering
support for a
USDA that
shapes a
safety net
that considers
the
interests
of
farmers,
while
also
remembering the interests
of taxpayers
and consumers.
Any safety net for
farmers should
be a
true safety
net—one that
helps farmers
when they have
experienced serious unforeseen
losses
(preferably when
there
has
been
a
disaster
or
unforeseen
natural
event
causing
damage)
and that exists
to help them in unusual situations.
•
Separate
the
agricultural
provisions of the
farm bill
from the
nutrition provisions.
To have genuine reform and proper consideration
of the
issues,
agricultural programs should
be considered
in separate
legislation distinct
from
food
stamps
and
the
nutrition
part
of
the
farm
bill,
and
reauthorization of
such
programs
should
be
fixed
on
different
timelines
to ensure
this
separation.
Agricultural
and
nutritional
programs,
which
are distinct
from
each
other,
have
been
combined
together
for
political
reasons,
something
which
is
readily
admitted
by
proponents
of
this
logrolling.
When it
comes
to
American
agriculture
and
welfare
programs,
they
deserve
sound policy
debates, not
political
tactics at
the expense of
thoughtful discourse.
Move the Work of the Food and Nutrition Service.
The USDA implements many
means-tested
federal support
programs,
including the
largest food
assis- tance program,
Supplemental
Nutrition
Assistance
Program
(SNAP,
also
known as
food stamps),
and the
Special
Supplemental Nutrition
Program for
Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) Food Program. The Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) oversees
these programs
and other
food and
nutrition programs, including
the Center
for
Nutrition
Policy
and
Promotion,52 which
handles
the
USDA’s
work on
the
“Dietary
Guidelines for Americans”
(Dietary
Guidelines).53
Food
nutrition programs
include:
SNAP; WIC;
the
National
School
Lunch
Program
(NSLP);
the School
Breakfast Program (SBP); the Child and Adult Care Food Program;
the Nutrition
Program for
the
Elderly;
Nutrition
Service
Incentives;
the
Summer
Food Service
Program; the
Commodity
Supplemental Food Program;
the Temporary
Emergency Food Program; the
Farmer’s Market Nutrition Program; and the Spe- cial Milk
Program.
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Move
the USDA
food and
nutrition
programs to
the Department
of Health and Human Services.
There are more than 89 current means- tested
welfare
programs, and
total
means-tested spending has
been estimated to surpass
$1.2 trillion
between federal
and state
resources.54
Because means-tested federal programs
are siloed
and
administered in
separate
agencies,
the
effectiveness
and
size
of
the
welfare
state
remains
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
largely
hidden. There
are
means-tested food-support programs
in the USDA
(specially
FNS), whereas
most
means-tested programs are
at the
Department of Health and
Human Services
(HHS). All
means-tested
anti- poverty programs should
be overseen by one department—specifically HHS, which
handles most
welfare
programs.
Reform SNAP. Ostensibly,
SNAP sends money through electronic-bene-
fit-transfer (EBT)
cards to help “low-income” individuals buy food. It is the
largest of
the
federal
nutrition
programs.
Food
stamps
are
designed
to
be
supplemented
by
other
forms
of
income—whether through
paid
employment
or
nonprofit
support.
SNAP serves 41.1 million
individuals—an increase of 4.3 million people during the
Biden years.55
In
2020, the
food stamp
program cost
$79.1 billion.
That number
continued to
rise—by 2022,
outlays hit
$119.5 billion.56
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Re-implement work requirements.
The statutory language covering
food stamps
allows states
to waive
work
requirements that
otherwise apply to
work-capable
individuals—that
is,
adult
beneficiaries
between
the
ages
18
and
50
who
are
not
disabled
and do
not
have
any
children
or
other
dependents in the home.57
Even
in
a
strong
economy, work
expectations are
fairly limited:
Individuals who
are
work-capable and
without
dependents are required
to work
or prepare
for
work
for
20
hours
per
week.58 The
work
requirements
are
then
implemented
unless the
state requests
a
waiver
from the
USDA’s Food
and Nutrition
Services.59
Waivers
from statutory
work
requirements can
be approved in
two
instances:
an
unemployment
rate
of
more
than
10
percent or a
lack of sufficient jobs.60
The
Trump
Administration bolstered USDA
work
expectations in
the food stamp program. In
February 2019,
FNS issued
a modest
regulatory change that
applied
only
to
able-bodied
individuals
without
dependents—
beneficiaries
aged 18
to
49,
not
elderly
or
disabled,
who
did
not
have
children or
other
dependents in
the home
(ABAWD).61 The FNS rule
changed
when
a
state
could receive
a
waiver
from implementing
the
ABAWD
work
requirement.
Under
the new
rule, in
order to
waive the
work
requirement, the state’s
unemployment rate
had to
be above
6 percent
for more
than 24
months. The rule also
defined “area”
in such
a way
that states
would be
unable to
combine
non-contiguous
counties
in
order
to
maximize
their
waivers.62 Of
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
the
more
than 40
million food
stamp beneficiaries,
the
Trump
rule would
have
applied only
to 688,000
individuals in
fiscal year
2021.63
The
Trump reform
was scheduled
to go into effect,
but a
D.C. district
court federal
judge
enjoined
the
rule.64 The
USDA
filed
an
appeal
in
late
December 2020,65 but the Biden
Administration withdrew from
defending the
challenge, and
the rule
was never
implemented.66
Beyond
the
able-bodied
work requirement,
FNS
should
implement better
regulation
to clarify
options for
states to
implement the
general work
requirement. This requirement
is an
option states
can apply
to work-
capable beneficiaries
aged
16
to
59.
If
beneficiaries’
work
hours
are
below 30
hours a
week, states
can implement
the general
work
requirements to
oblige
beneficiaries
to
register
for
work
or
participate
in
SNAP
Employment and
Training or
workfare
assigned by
the state SNAP
agency.67
Increased clarity
for states
would include
items like
states being
required to
offer employment
and training
spots for
those that
request
them—not simply
budgeting for
every
currently enrolled
able-bodied adult.
•
Reform broad-based categorical
eligibility.
Federal
law permits
states to enroll
individuals in food
stamps if
they receive
a benefit
from another
program, such as the
Temporary
Assistance for
Needy Families
(TANF) program.
However,
under
an
administrative
option
in
TANF
called
broad- based
categorical eligibility (BBCE),
”benefit” is
defined so
broadly that
it includes simply
receiving
distributed
pamphlets
and
1–800
numbers.68 This
definition,
with
its
low
threshold
to
trigger
a
“benefit,”
allows
individuals
to
bypass
eligibility
limits—particularly
the
asset
requirement
(how
much
the
applicant has in
resources, such as
bank accounts
or property).69
Adopting the
BBCE option
has even
allowed
millionaires to enroll
in the
food
stamp
program.70
The
Trump Administration
proposed to
close the
loophole with
a
rule
to
“increase program
integrity and
reduce fraud,
waste, and
abuse.”71 The
regulation
was
not
finalized before
the
end
of
the
Trump Administration.
•
Re-evaluate the Thrifty Food Plan.
In a dramatic overreach, the Biden
Administration
unilaterally
increased food stamp
benefits by
at least 23 percent
in October
2021.72
Through an
update to
the Thrifty
Food Plan,
in which
the
USDA
analyzes
a
basket
of
foods
intended
to
provide
a
nutritious
diet, the
USDA increased
food stamp
outlays by
between $250
billion and
$300
billion over
10
years.73
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Although
the
2018
farm bill
instructed FNS
to
update
the
Thrifty
Food Plan
by
2023 and
every five
years
thereafter, every previous
Thrifty Food
Plan has
been
always
cost-neutral (
just
an
inflation
update)—exactly
what
CBO estimated
as cost of the 2018 farm bill.74
The
Biden Administration
may
have
skirted regulations
and
congressional authority
to increase
the overall
cost of
the program.
In fact,
Senate and
House Republicans
requested
that
the
Government
Accountability
Office
investigate the
legal
authorities and process
that the
USDA undertook
to arrive at such an unprecedented increase.75
•
Eliminate the heat-and-eat loophole.
States can artificially boost a
household’s food stamp
benefit by
using the
heat-and-eat
loophole. The amount
of food
stamps a
household
receives is
based on
its “countable”
income (income minus
certain
deductions).
Households that
receive benefits
from the Low-Income
Heat and
Energy
Assistance Program
(LIHEAP) are
eligible for
a larger
utility
deduction. In order
to make
households eligible
for the
higher
deduction, and
thus for
greater food
stamp
benefits,
states
have
distributed
LIHEAP
checks
for
amounts
as
small as $1 to
food stamp recipients.
The
2014 farm
bill tightened
this loophole
by
requiring
that a
household must receive
more than
$20
annually
in
LIHEAP
payments to
be
eligible
for
the
larger utility
deduction and
subsequently
higher food
stamp benefits.76 Nonetheless, states continue
to inflate their standard utility allowances. Under the Trump
Administration, the
USDA
proposed
a
rule,
which
was
not
finalized,
that
would have
standardized the utility
allowance.77
Reform
WIC.
Turning
to WIC,
this program
distributes
money through
EBT cards to help
low-income women, infants, and children under six purchase
nutri- tion-rich
foods
and
nutrition
education
(including
breastfeeding
support).
As
of August
2022,
approximately 6.3
million people
participated
in WIC
each month to
purchase food.78 In 2021, WIC
federal
outlays were
$5 billion.79
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Reform the state voucher system.
State agencies control WIC costs
by approving
only one
brand of
infant formula
through
competitive bidding
for
infant
formula
rebate
contracts.
Because
50
percent
of baby formula
is
purchased
through
the
federal
WIC
program,
it
is
vital
that
regulation
for
these
competitive bidding
contracts does
not
unintentionally create
monopolies.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
•
Re-evaluate excessive regulation.
As for baby formula regulations
generally,
labeling
regulations
and
regulations
that
unnecessarily
delay
the manufacture
and
sale
of
baby
formula
should
be
re-evaluated.80 During
the
Biden
Administration,
there
have
been
devastating
baby
formula
shortages.
Return to the Original Purpose of School Meals.
Federal meal programs for
K–12
students
were created
to
provide
food
to
children
from
low-income
families
while at school.81 Today, however, federal school meals increasingly resemble enti-
tlement
programs that
have strayed
far
from
their original
objective and
represent an
example of
the ever-expanding federal
footprint in
local school
operations.
The
NSLP and
SBP
are
the
two
largest K–12
meal programs
provided by
federal
taxpayer
money.
The
NSLP
launched
in
1946
and
the
SBP
in
1966, both
as
options
specifically for children in
poverty.82 During the COVID-19 pandemic,
federal policymakers
temporarily expanded
access to
school meal
programs, but
some lawmakers and
federal
officials
have
now
proposed
making
this
expansion
per- manent.83 Yet
even
before the
pandemic, research
found that
federal officials
had already
expanded these
programs to
serve children
from
upper-income homes,
and these programs
are rife
with improper
payments and
inefficiencies.
Heritage Foundation research from
2019 found that after the enactment of the Community Eligibility
Provision (CEP)
in 2010,
the share
of students
from middle-
and
upper-income
homes
receiving free
meals
in
states
that participated
in
CEP doubled, and in some
cases tripled—all in a
program meant for children from families with incomes at or
below 185 percent of the federal poverty line (Children
from
homes
at
or
below
130
percent
of the
federal
poverty
line
are
eligible
for
free
lunches,
while students
from
families
at
or
below
185
percent
of
poverty
are
eligible for
reduced-priced lunches).84
Under CEP, if
40 percent of students in a school or school district are
eligible for federal
meals,
all
students
in
that
school or
district can
receive free
meals. However,
the
USDA has
taken it
even further,
improperly
interpreting the
law85 to allow a subset
of schools
within a
district to
be grouped
together to
reach the
40 percent threshold,
As
a
result,
a
school
with
zero
low-income
students
could
be
grouped together
with
schools
with high
levels
of
low-income
students,
and
as
a
result
all
the
students
in the
schools
within
that
group
(even
schools
without
a
single
low-in-
come student)
can
receive
free
federal
meals.86 Schools
can
direct
resources meant
for
students in
poverty to
children from
wealthier
families.
Furthermore, the NSLP and SBP are
among the most inaccurate federal
programs
according
to
PaymentAccuracy.gov, a
project of
the
U.S.
Office of
Man- agement and Budget
and the Office of the Inspector General.87
Before federal auditors
reduced the
rigor of
annual
reporting requirements in 2018,
the NSLP
had
wasted nearly
$2
billion
in
taxpayer
resources
through
payments
provided
to ineligible
recipients.88 Even
after
the
auditing changes,
which the
U.S. Government
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Accountability
Office said results in the USDA not “regularly assess[ing] the
pro- grams’
fraud risks,”
the NSLP
wasted nearly
$500 million
in FY 2021.89
The
SBP now wastes nearly $200 million annually.90
Despite
the
ongoing
effort to
expand school
meals under
CEP
and
the
evidence
of
waste and
inefficiency,
left-of-center
Members of
Congress and
President Biden’s
Administration
have nonetheless
proposed further
expansions to
extend federal
school meals to
include every K–12 student—regardless of need.91 The
Administra-
tion
recently
proposed expanding
federal school
meal programs
offered during
the
school
year
to
be
offered
during the
summer as
part of
the
“American
Families Plan,”
and
also
proposed expanding
CEP. Other
federal officials,
including Senator
Bernie
Sanders
(I–VT),
have, in
recent years,
proposed expanding
the
NSLP
to
all
students.92 To
serve students
in need and prevent
the misuse
of taxpayer
money, the
next Administration should focus
on students
in need
and reject
efforts to
transform
federal school
meals into
an
entitlement
program.
Specifically,
the next Administration
should:
•
Promulgate a
rule properly
interpreting
CEP.
The USDA should issue a
rule that
clarifies that
only an
individual
school or
a school
district as
a whole, not
a subset
of schools
within a
district, must
meet the
40-percent
criteria
to
be
eligible for
CEP. Education
officials should
be
prohibited
from grouping schools
together.
•
Work with lawmakers to eliminate CEP.
The NSLP and SBP should
be directed to
serve children
in need,
not become
an entitlement
for students
from middle- and upper-income
homes. Congress
should
eliminate CEP.
Further,
the
USDA
should
not
provide
meals
to
students
during
the
summer unless
students are
taking
summer-school classes. Currently,
students can
get meals
from
schools
even
if
they
are
not
in
summer
school,
which
has,
in effect,
turned school
meals into
a federal
catering
program.93
•
Restore programs to their original intent and reject
efforts to create
universal free
school meals.
The USDA should
work with
lawmakers
to
restore NSLP
and
SBP
to
their
original goal
of
providing
food to
K–12
students who
otherwise would
not have
food
to eat
while at
school.
Federal
school meals
should be
focused on
children in
need, and
any efforts
to
expand
student
eligibility
for
federal
school
meals
to
include
all
K–12
students should be
soundly rejected. Such expansion would allow an inefficient,
wasteful program to
grow,
magnifying
the
amount
of
wasted
taxpayer
resources.
Reform
Conservation Programs.
Farmers,
in general,
are excellent
stewards of
the
land,
if
not
for
moral
or
ethical
considerations,
then
out
of
self-interest
to
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
make
sure their
land and—by
extension, their
livelihoods—remain
intact.
Farmers are often
called the original conservationists.94
When evaluating
federal conservation programs, it is important to remember
the
importance of
the land
to farmers.
In terms
of USDA
federal
conservation programs,
both
the
USDA’s
Farm
Service
Agency
(FSA)
and
Natural
Resources
Conservation Service
(NRCS) oversee
numerous
programs.95
As
a
general
matter,
the
next
Administration
should
ensure
that
these programs
address
genuine
and
specific
environmental
concerns
with
a
focus
on
currently existing
environmental problems,
not
those
that
are
speculative
in
nature.
These
conservation programs
should
have
clearly
identifiable
goals,
with
the
success
or failure
of
these
programs
being directly
measurable.
Any
assistance
to
farmers
to
take specific actions should
not be provided unless the assistance will directly and
clearly
help
to
address
a specific
environmental
problem.
Further,
any
assistance to
encourage
farmers to
engage in
certain
practices should only
be provided
if farmers would not
have adopted
the practices
in the
first place.
There are specific issues that the
next Administration should address. The
Conservation
Reserve
Program,96 which
is
run
by
FSA,
pays farmers
to
not
farm
some
of
their
land. This
program has
recently received
attention, as
agricultural groups
rightfully
seek to
farm without
penalty voluntarily
idled land,
in
light
of the
consequences to food
prices of
Russia
invading Ukraine.97
There
is
also
a
need
to reform
USDA’s
conservation
easements.
These easements
are
a
powerful
tool to
incentivize
long-term
preservation
of
ecosystems
while
still
allowing
farmers to
benefit
economically.
However,
when
farmers
and
ranchers sign
conservation
easements
with the
USDA,
they
can
be
enforced
in
perpetuity.
Future generations,
be they
the
descendants of
the landowner or new
residents, are bound by those conditions.
Ecosystems
and
topography
naturally change
over time,
but
without
legislative change,
easement requirements will not.
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Champion
the
elimination of
the
Conservation Reserve Program.
Farmers
should not
be
paid in
such
a sweeping
way
not
to
farm
their land.
If
there is
a desire
to ensure
that extremely
sensitive land is
not farmed,
this should
be
addressed
through
targeted
efforts
that
are
clearly
connected
to addressing
a
specific
and concrete
environmental
harm.
The
USDA
should work
with Congress
to eliminate
this overbroad
program.
•
Reform NRCS
wetlands and
erodible land
compliance and
appeals.
Problematic
NRCS overreach
could be
avoided
entirely by
removing its
authority to
prescribe specific practices
on a
particular farm operation
in order
to
ensure
continued
eligibility
to
participate
in
USDA
farm
programs,
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
and
to
require instead
that each
farm (as
a
function
of
eligibility)
must have
created
a general
best practices
plan. Such
a plan
could be
approved by
the local
county
Soil
and
Water
Conservation District
(SWCD).
The
local
SWCD
commissioners are
elected by
their peers
in each
respective
county and
are better suited than
the NRCS
to provide
guidance for
farm
operations in their respective jurisdictions.
At
a
minimum,
a
new
Administration
should
support legislation
to
divest
more
power
to
the
states (and
possibly local
SWCDs) regarding
erodible land and
wetlands conservation.98
•
Reform easements.
The new Administration should, to the extent
authorized by law, limit
the use
of permanent
easements and
collaborate
with
lawmakers
to
prohibit
the
USDA
from
creating
new permanent
easements.99
Other Major Issues and Specific Recommendations.
Although
the following
issues have not been listed
as “priority,” these issues are still extremely important,
and the next
Administration should address
them.
Only
meat and
poultry from
federally inspected
facilities can
be
sold
in
inter-
state
commerce.100 Even
meat
and
poultry
from USDA-approved
state-inspected
facilities may only be sold in intrastate commerce, with limited
exceptions.101 This is despite the fact that
states with USDA-approved inspection programs must meet and
enforce
requirements that
are “at
least equal
to” those
imposed under the Federal
Meat and
Poultry
Products Inspection
Acts and
the Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978.102
This is an unnecessary
regulatory barrier that
makes it
difficult to get
meat and
poultry into
interstate
commerce to
create more options for consumers and farmers.
Legislation entitled the New Mar- kets for State-Inspected Meat
and Poultry Act of 2021 would help to remove this
obstacle.103
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Promote
legislation that
would allow
state-inspected
meat to
be sold in
interstate
commerce.
These barriers
to the sale of
meat and
poultry
from
USDA-approved state-inspected
facilities should
be removed.
Eliminate or
Reform Marketing Orders and Checkoff Programs.
Mar-
keting
orders
and
checkoff
programs
for
agricultural
commodities
are
similar
in
many
ways.
They
both
allow
private
actors within
an
industry
to
collaborate
with
the
federal
government
to
compel
other
competitors
within
an
industry
to
fund
the
respective
marketing
order
or
checkoff
program.
There
are
currently
22
checkoff
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
programs,104 and
they
focus
on
research
and
promotion
of
commodities
such as
beef
and
eggs.
Marketing
orders cover
research and
promotion, but
also cover
issues
such as quality regulations and volume controls. The latter issue, volume
controls,
is
a
means
to
restrict
supply, which
drives up
prices for
consumers. Fortunately,
there are few active volume
controls.105
Marketing
orders and
checkoff programs
are
some
of
the
most egregious
pro-
grams
run
by
the
USDA.
They are,
in
effect,
a
tax—a
means to
compel speech—and
government-blessed cartels. Instead of getting private
cooperation, they are tools
for industry
actors to
work with
government to force
cooperation.
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Reduce
the number
and scope
of marketing
orders and
checkoff programs.
The USDA
should
reject any
new
requests for
marketing
orders
and checkoff
programs to
the extent
authorized by law
and eliminate
existing programs
when
possible.
While
the
programs
work
differently,
there are
often petition
processes and
other ways
that make
it difficult for affected
parties
to
get
rid
of
the
marketing
orders
and
checkoff
programs,106 and
the USDA
itself may
not even
be required
to honor
requests to
terminate
a
program.107 The USDA
should
make the
process
easier. Further,
the USDA should
reject any
effort to
bring back
volume
controls to
limit supplies of commodities.
•
Work with Congress to eliminate marketing orders and
checkoff
programs.
These
programs should
be eliminated, and if
industry actors
want
to
collaborate,
they
should
do
so
through
private
means,
not
using
the government
to compel cooperation.
•
Promote legislation that would
require
regular votes.
There
should
be
regular
voting
for
parties
subject
to
checkoff
programs
and
marketing
orders. For
example,
the
voting
should
occur
at
least
every
five
years,
to
determine
whether a
marketing order
or
checkoff
program should
continue. The
USDA should
be required
to honor
the results
of such
a vote.
Through regular
voting,
parties
can
demonstrate
their
support
for
a
marketing
order or
checkoff
program
and
ensure
that
those
administering them
will
be
held accountable.
Focus on Trade Policy, Not Trade Promotion.
The USDA’s Foreign Agri- cultural Service (FAS)
covers
numerous issues,
including “trade policy,”
which is a
reference to
removing trade
barriers,
among other
things, to
ensure an
envi- ronment conducive to trade.108
It also covers trade promotion.109 This includes programs
like the
Market Access
Program110
that
subsidizes
trade associations,
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
businesses, and other private
entities to market and promote their products overseas. FAS should
play a
proactive and leading
role to
help open
upmarkets for American farmers
and ranchers.
There are
numerous
barriers, such
as sani-
tary and phytosanitary
measures, blocking American agricultural products from
gaining access to foreign
markets.111 However, FAS should not help businesses and
industries
promote their
exports, something
these businesses
and
industries
can and
should do
on their own.
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Push legislation to repeal
export
promotion programs.
The
USDA
should
work
with
Congress
to repeal
market
development
programs
like
the Market
Access Program
and similar
programs.
Remove Obstacles for Agricultural Biotechnology.
Innovation is critical to
agricultural
production
and the
ability
to
meet
future
food
needs.
The
next
Admin- istration
should
embrace
innovation
and
technology,
not
hinder
its
use—especially
because of
scare tactics
that ignore
sound science.
One of
the key
innovations in agriculture
is
genetic
engineering.
According
to
the
USDA,
“[C]urrently,
over
90
percent of U.S. corn, upland
cotton, and soybeans are produced using GE [genet- ically
engineered] varieties.”112
Despite the
importance of agricultural biotechnology, in 2016, Congress
passed
a federal mandate to label genetically engineered food.113 This legislation was argu- ably
just a
means to
try to
provide a
negative
connotation to GE
food. There
are other challenges
as well for agricultural biotechnology. For example, Mexico
plans to ban
the importation of U.S.
genetically modified yellow
corn.114
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Counter scare tactics and remove obstacles.
The USDA should
strongly counter
scare tactics
regarding
agricultural biotechnology and
adopt policies to remove
unnecessary barriers to
approvals and the
adoption of
biotechnology.
•
Repeal the federal labeling mandate.
The USDA should work with
Congress
to
repeal
the
federal
labeling
law,
while
maintaining
federal
preemption, and
stress that
voluntary
labeling is
allowed.
•
Use all tools available to remove improper trade barriers
against
agricultural biotechnology.
The USDA
should work
closely with
the Office of the United
States Trade
Representative to remove
improper
barriers imposed by
other countries
to block
U.S.
agricultural goods.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
Reform Forest Service Wildfire Management.
The United States Forest
Service
is
one
of
four
federal
government
land
management
agencies
that
admin- ister
606 million
acres, or
95 percent
of the
640 million
acres of
surface land
area managed by
the
federal
government.115 Located
within
the
USDA,
the
Forest Service
manages
the National
Forest System,
which is
comprised of
193 million
acres.116
As
explained
by
the
USDA, “The
USDA Forest
Service’s mission
is
to
sustain the health,
diversity, and
productivity of
the
nation’s
forests and
grasslands to
meet the
needs of
present and
future
generations.”117
The Forest Service
should focus
on proactive management of
the forests
and grasslands that does not depend heavily on burning.
There should be resilient
forests
and
grasslands
in
the
wake
of
management
actions.
Wildfires
have
become a
primary
vegetation management regime
for national
forests and
grasslands.118
Recognizing the need for vegetation management, the Forest
Service has adopted
“pyro-silviculture” using “unplanned” fire,119 such
as unplanned human-caused fires,
to otherwise accomplish vegetation
management.120
The Forest Service
should instead
be focusing
on addressing
the
precipitous annual amassing of biomass in the national forests
that drive the behavior of
wildfires.
By thinning
trees,
removing
live
fuels
and
deadwood,
and
taking
other
preventive steps, the Forest Service can help to minimize the
consequences of
wildfires.
Increasing
timber sales could also play an important role in the effort to
change the
behavior of
wildfire
because there
would be
less biomass.
Timber sales
and timber harvested in
public forests
dropped
precipitously in the
early 1990s
and still remain very
low. For example, in 1988, the volume of timber sold and
harvested by volume
was about 11 billion and 12.6 billion board feet (BBF),
respectively.121 In 2021, timber sold
was 2.8
BBF and
timber
harvested was
2.4 BBF.
In 2018, President Donald Trump
issued Executive Order 13855 to, among
other
things,
promote
active
management
of
forests
and
reduce
wildfire
risks.122 The
executive
order stated,
“Active management
of
vegetation
is
needed
to
treat
these
dangerous
conditions on
Federal lands
but
is
often delayed
due
to
challenges
associated
with
regulatory
analysis and
current consultation
requirements.”123 It further explained the need to
reduce regulatory obstacles to fuel reduction in forests created by
the National
Environmental Policy Act
and the
Endangered Species Act.124
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Champion executive action, consistent with law, and
proactive
legislation to reduce wildfires.
This would involve embracing Executive
Order
13855,
building
upon
it,
and
working
with
lawmakers
to
promote active
management
of
vegetation, reduce
regulatory
obstacles
to
reducing fuel
buildup, and
increase
timber sales.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Eliminate or
Reform the Dietary Guidelines.
The USDA, in collaboration
with
HHS,
publishes
the
Dietary
Guidelines
every
five
years.125 For
more
than
40
years, the
federal government has been releasing Dietary Guidelines,126 and during this
time, there
has
been
constant controversy
due
to
questionable recommenda-
tions
and claims
regarding the
politicization
of the
process.
In
the
2015
Dietary Guidelines
process, the
influential Dietary
Guidelines Advi- sory
Committee veered
off
mission
and
attempted
to
persuade
the
USDA
and
HHS
to
adopt
nutritional advice
that focused
not
just
on
human
health, but
the
health
of
the planet.127
Issues
such as
climate change
and
sustainability infiltrated the
process.
Fortunately,
the
2020
process
did
not
get
diverted
in
this
manner.
How- ever,
the
Dietary
Guidelines
remain
a
potential
tool
to
influence
dietary
choices
to
achieve
objectives
unrelated
to
the
nutritional
and
dietary
well-being
of
Americans.
There is
no
shortage
of
private
sector
dietary
advice
for
the
public,
and
nutrition
and dietary
choices
are
best
left
to
individuals
to
address
their
personal
needs.
This
includes
working with
their
own
health
professionals.
As
it
is,
there
is
constantly changing
advice
provided
by the
government,
with
insufficient
qualifications
on
the
advice,
oversimplification
to
the
point
of
miscommunicating
important
points,
questionable
use
of
science, and
potential political
influence.
The
Dietary Guidelines
have a
major impact
because they
not
only
can
influence
how private
health providers offer nutritional advice, but they also inform
federal programs. School
meals are
required to
be consistent with the
guidelines.128
The
next
Administration
should:
•
Work with lawmakers to repeal the Dietary Guidelines.
The
USDA
should
help lead
an effort
to repeal
the Dietary
Guidelines.
•
Minimally, the
next
Administration should
reform the
Dietary
Guidelines.
The
USDA, with
HHS, should
develop a
more transparent process
that properly
considers the
underlying science and
does not
overstate its findings. It
should also
ensure that
the Dietary
Guidelines focus on nutritional
issues and
do not veer
off-mission by focusing
on unrelated
issues,
such
as
the
environment,
that
have
nothing
to
do
with nutritional
advice.
In fact,
if
environmental
concerns
supersede
or
water down
recommendations
for
human
nutritional advice,
the
public
would be
receiving
misleading health
information. The USDA,
working with
lawmakers, should
codify these
reforms into
law.
ORGANIZATIONAL
ISSUES
Based
on the
recommended reforms identified
as ideal
solutions, the USDA
would look different in many
respects. One of the biggest changes would be a USDA
that
is
not
focused
on
welfare,
given
that
means-tested
welfare
programs
would
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
be
moved to
HHS. The
Food and
Nutrition Service
that administers
the
food
and nutrition programs
would be eliminated.
The Farm Service
Agency, which
administers
many of
the farm
subsidy pro-
grams, would
be
significantly smaller
in size if the
ideal farm
subsidy reforms
were adopted.
Most
important, a
conservative USDA,
as
envisioned,
would not
be
used
as
a
governmental
tool to
transform the
nation’s food
system, but
instead would
respect the
importance
of efficient
agricultural
production and
ensure
that
the
government
does not hinder farmers and
ranchers from producing an abundant supply of safe and
affordable food.
For
a
conservative
USDA to
become a
reality, and
for
it
to
stay
on
course
with
the
mission
as
outlined,
the
White
House must
strongly support
these reforms
and install strong USDA leaders. These individuals almost
certainly will be faced with
opposition
from
some
in
the
agricultural community
who
would
fight changing
subsidies in
any fashion, although many of the reforms would likely be
embraced by those in
agriculture.
There
would be
strong opposition
from environmental
groups and
others who
want
the
federal government
to
transform
American agriculture
to
meet
their ideo-
logical
objectives.
Finally, there
would be
opposition
from left-of-center
groups who do not want
to reform SNAP and would expand welfare and dependency—such
as
through
universal
free
school
meals—as
opposed
to
reducing
dependency.
Reducing the
scope of government and promoting individual freedom may not
always
be
easy,
but
it
is
something that
conservatives
regularly
should strive
for. The
listed reforms
to the
U.S.
Department of Agriculture
would help
to accom-
plish
these
objectives
and
are
well
worth
fighting
for
to
achieve
a
freer
and
more prosperous
nation.
CONCLUSION
This chapter started
with a
discussion of the
incredible success of
American farmers
and
American
agriculture
in
general.
This
is
how
the
chapter
should
close as
well. Americans
are blessed
with an
agricultural sector, and
a food
system in
general, which are worthy of incredible respect. A conservative
USDA should appreciate
this while
recognizing
that
its
role
is
to
serve
the
interests
of
all
Amer- icans,
not special
interests. By being
a champion
of unleashing
the potential
of American agriculture, a
conservative USDA would
help to
ensure a
future with
an
abundant
supply
of
safe
and
affordable
food
for
individuals
and
families
in
the United
States and across the globe.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The
author would
like to
thank all
the
contributors for their
assistance, expertise, and
insight into
the
development
of
this
chapter.
In
addition,
special
thanks
are
due
to
Rachael
Wilfong,
who
was
instrumental in
getting the chapter ready for submission.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
ENDNOTES
1.
U.S.
Department of Agriculture,
Fiscal Year
2023 Budget
Summary,
p.1,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
2.
See,
for
example,
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
“Transforming
the
U.S.
Food
System,”
https://www.usda.
gov/fst
(accessed December
14, 2022).
3.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Fiscal
Year 2023
Budget Summary,
p.1.
4.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150
Years,”
https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/
history
(accessed December
16, 2022).
5.
The
law
stated,
“[T]here
is
hereby
established
at
the
seat
of
government
of
the
United
States
a
Department of
Agriculture,
the
general
designs
and
duties
of
which
shall
be
to
acquire
and
to
diffuse
among
the
people of
the United States
useful
information on
subjects
connected with
agriculture in the
most general
and comprehensive sense of
that word,
and to
procure,
propagate, and
distribute among the
people new
and valuable
seeds
and
plants.”
Gladys L.
Baker
et
al.,
Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States
Department of
Agriculture,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13,
https://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
6.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Fiscal
Year 2023
Budget Summary,
p.
2.
7.
Ibid.,
p.
2.
8.
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Strategic
Plan: Fiscal
Years 2022–2026, p. 3,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf
(accessed December 14, 2022).
9.
News
release,
“USDA
Announces
Framework
for
Shoring
Up
the
Food
Supply
Chain
and
Transforming
the Food System to Be Fairer,
More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of
Agriculture, June 1, 2022,
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supply-
chain-and-transforming
(accessed December
14, 2022).
10.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
“Transforming
the
U.S.
Food
System.”
11.
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Strategic
Plan: Fiscal
Years
2022–2026,
pp.
1–2.
12.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
“Background
on
the
U.S.
Approach
to
the
2021
UN
Food
Systems
Summit,”
August 4, 2021,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UN-
Food-Systems-Summit.pdf
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
13.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,”
https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/un-
summit
(accessed December
14, 2022).
14.
Mark Bittman et al., “How a
National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,”
The Washington
Post, November 7, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could-
save-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html
(accessed
December
14,
2022);
Daren
Bakst
and
Gabriella
Beaumont-Smith,
“No,
We
Don’t
Need
to
Transform
the
American Food System,” The
Daily Signal, February 26, 2021,
https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/
no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/
(accessed December 14,
2022); and
Daren Bakst,
“Biden’s
Food Conference
Should
Put
People
First,
Not
Environmental
Extremism,”
The
Daily
Signal,
September
22,
2022,
https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-people-
first-not-environmental-extremism/
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
15.
News
release,
“USDA
to
Invest
Up
to
$300
Million
in
New
Organic
Transition
Initiative,”
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture, August
22,
2022,
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300-
million-new-organic-transition-initiative
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
16.
Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s
Green
New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures,
November 14, 2022,
https://www.
farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster
(accessed December 16, 2022).
17.
See,
for
example,
Catherine
Greene
et
al.,
“Growing
Organic
Demand
Provides
High-Value
Opportunities
for
Many Types of Producers,” Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6,
2017,
https://www.
ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunities-
for-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20
by%20the%20consumer
(accessed
December 14,
2022), and
Andrea Carlson,
“Investigating
Retail Price
Premiums
for Organic Foods,” Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016,
https://www.ers.
usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/
(accessed December
16, 2022). Further, there are
many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit
of organic food. One
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
meta
study
found
that
“[t]he
published
literature
lacks
strong
evidence
that
organic
foods
are
significantly
more
nutritious
than
conventional
foods.”
Crystal
Smith-Spangler
et
al.,
“Are
Organic
Foods
Safer
or
Healthier
Than
Conventional
Alternatives,”
Annals of
Internal
Medicine, Vol.
157, No.
5 (September
4, 2012),
pp. 348–366,
https://
www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
18.
Steve
Savage,
“USDA
Data
Confirm
Organic
Yields
Significantly
Lower
Than
With
Conventional
Farming,” Genetic Literacy Project,
February 16, 2018,
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirm-
organic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/
(accessed December 16, 2022).
19.
See, for example,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice:
Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request
for Comments,”
USDA–2021–0010, October 21,
2021,
https://www.regulations.
gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
20.
Inflation
Reduction
Act
of
2022,
Public
Law
117–169.
21.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Economic
Research
Service,
“Productivity
Growth
in
U.S.
Agriculture (1948–2019),”
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivity-
growth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
22.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,
“Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4
Percent
of
Disposable
Income
to
10.3
Percent
in
2021,”
July
15,
2022,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
23.
U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes:
Annual Expenditure
Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of
Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021,
Table 1101,
https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu-
income-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf
(accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick
Tyrrell,
“Big Government Policies That
Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation
Special
Report
No.176,
April
5,
2017,
p.
7,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf.
24.
Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell,
“Congress Should Stop
Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA
Slush
Fund,”
Heritage
Foundation
Issue
Brief
No.
6052,
February
19,
2021,
p.
2,
https://www.heritage.org/
budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda.
25.
Commodity
Credit
Corporation
Charter
Act
of
1948,
Public
Law
80–806.
26.
Bakst
and
Sewall,
“Congress
Should
Stop
Abrogating
Its
Spending
Power.”
27.
Ibid.,
p.
3.
28.
Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice:
Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership
Program,
Request
for
Comments,”
USDA–2021–0010,
October
21,
2021,”
November
1,
2021,
https://www.
regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
29.
U.S. Department
of
Agriculture, “Notice:
Climate-Smart Agriculture
and
Forestry
Partnership
Program.”
30.
Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),”
Congressional Research Service
Report
for
Congress,
updated
January
14, 2021,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606
(accessed December 16,
2022).
31.
“Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some
type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall,
14
percent
of
U.S.
farms
participated
in
Federal
crop
insurance
programs.”
Christine
Whitt,
Noah
Miller,
and
Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms
and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, pp. 24 and 26,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247.
pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which
apparently does not cover crop insurance, included payments beyond just
commodity
payments, such
as conservation
payments.
32.
Randy
Schnepf,
“Farm
Safety-Net
Payments
Under
the
2014
Farm
Bill:
Comparison
by
Program
Crop,”
Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress, August 11, 2017,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf (accessed December 14,
2022).
33.
Although
livestock
and
specialty
crop
producers
do
receive
some
subsidies,
former
American
Farm
Bureau
Federation President
Bob Stallman
captured the
subsidy issue
well. He
“dismisse[d]
outright the
claim that
farmers
couldn’t
survive
without
subsidy
money.
‘Why
does
the
livestock
industry
survive
without
subsidies?’ he
ask[ed]. ‘Why does
the specialty
crop [fruit
and vegetable]
industry
survive?’” Tamar
Haspel, “Why
Do Taxpayers Subsidize
Rich Farmers?”
The Washington
Post, March 15, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d-
f3d931db7f68_story.html
(accessed March 18, 2023).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
34.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Farm
Service
Agency,
“ARC/PLC
Program,”
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/
programs-and-services/arcplc_program/index
(accessed December 16, 2022).
35.
Ibid.
36.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Economic
Research
Service,
“Crop
Insurance
at
a
Glance,”
May
31,
2022,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/risk-management/crop-insurance-at-a-glance/ (accessed December 16,
2022).
37.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Agriculture Risk Coverage
(ALC) & Price Loss Coverage (PLC),” Farm
Service
Agency
Fact
Sheet,
August
2019,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/
FactSheets/2019/arc-plc_overview_fact_sheet-aug_2019.pdf
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
38.
See, for example, U.S Department of Agriculture, Farm
Service Agency,
Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price
Loss
Coverage Handbook, last
amended October 5, 2020,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/1-
arcplc_r01_a10.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023); Mesbah Motamed,
“Federal Commodity Programs Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk
Coverage Address Price Yield Risks Faced by Producers,” U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Economic
Research
Service,
August
6,
2018,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/
august/federal-commodity-programs-price-loss-coverage-and-agriculture-risk-coverage-address-price-
and-yield-risks-faced-by-producers/
(accessed
March
18,
2023);
and
Taxpayers
for
Common
Sense,
“Shallow
Loss Agriculture Programs 101,”
https://www.taxpayer.net/agriculture/shallow-loss-agriculture-programs-101/ (accessed March 18,
2023).
39.
Ibid.
40.
Stephanie Rosch, “Federal Crop
Insurance: A Primer,” Congressional Research Service
Report
for Congress,
February 18, 2021, p. 1,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46686
(December 14, 2021).
41.
Congressional
Budget
Office,
Options for
Reducing the
Deficit, 2023
to 2032:
Volume II;
Smaller
Reductions,
December 2022, p. 6,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-12/58163-budget-options-small-effects.pdf
(accessed
December 14,
2022).
42.
Rosch,
“Federal
Crop
Insurance:
A
Primer,”
p.
17.
43.
“Farm Bill Primer: Sugar Program,” Congressional Research
Service
In
Focus, updated
May 15, 2018,
https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/2018-05-15_IF10689_42900e56be67f5cfa17e40953ad9acb54561d3db.pdf (accessed December 16,
2022).
44.
See, for example, Agralytica, “Economic Effects of the
Sugar Program Since the 2008 Farm Bill & Policy
Implications for the 2013
Farm Bill,” June 3, 2013, p. 1,
https://fairsugarpolicy.org/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/AgralyticaEconomicEffectsPaperJune2013.pdf
(accessed
December
16, 2022).
45.
U.S. Department of Labor,
“Quintiles
of Income Before Taxes,” and
Bakst and Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That
Hurt the
Poor and
How to
Address Them.”
46.
Congressional Budget Office,
Options for
Reducing the
Deficit, 2023
to 2032, p. 3. See also Congressional
Budget
Office,
“Reduce
Subsidies
in
the
Crop
Insurance
Program,”
in
Congressional
Budget
Office,
“Options for
Reducing the Deficit:
2021 to
2030,” December
9, 2020,
https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/56815
(accessed
December 14,
2022).
47.
Congressional
Budget
Office,
Options
for
Reducing
the
Deficit,
2023
to
2032,
p.
6.
48.
“Reduce Premium Subsidies in the Federal Crop Insurance
Program,”
Budget
Blueprint for
Fiscal Year
2023,
https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/2.350.171.html.
49.
Congressional
Budget
Office,
“Reduce
Subsidies
in
the
Crop
Insurance
Program.”
50.
Ibid.
51.
Congressional
Budget
Office,
Options
for
Reducing
the
Deficit,
2023
to
2032,
p.
6.
52.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Food
and
Nutrition
Service,
“Center
for
Nutrition
Policy
and
Promotion
(CNPP),”
https://www.fns.usda.gov/cnpp
(accessed
December
16,
2022),
and
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture, “About CNPP,”
Food and Nutrition Service,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/about-cnpp
(accessed December 16, 2022).
53.
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “Purpose of the
Dietary Guidelines,”
https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/
about-dietary-guidelines/purpose-dietary-guidelines
(accessed December 16, 2022).
54.
Robert Rector and Vijay Menon,
“Understanding the Hidden
$1.1 Trillion Welfare System and How to Reform
It,” Heritage
Foundation
Backgrounder
No. 3294, April 5, 2018,
https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/
understanding-the-hidden-11-trillion-welfare-system-and-how-reform-it.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
55.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
“SNAP
Data
Tables,”
Food
and
Nutrition
Service,
December
9,
2022,
https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap
(accessed December 16, 2022).
56.
Ibid.
57.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Service, “SNAP Work Requirements,” May 2019,
https://
www.fns.usda.gov/snap/work-requirements#:~:text=Work%20at%20least%2080%20hours,least%2080%20
hours%20a%20month
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
58.
7
U.S.
Code
§
2015,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2015
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
59.
Ibid.
60.
7
U.S.
Code
§
2015(o)(4).
The
USDA
has
approved
nearly
all
waivers
under
the
“lack
of
sufficient
jobs”
option.
61.
Federal
Register,
Vol.
84,
No.
234
(December
5,
2019)
p.
66782,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2019-12-05/pdf/2019-26044.pdf
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
62.
Ibid.,
p.
66795.
63.
Ibid.,
pp.
66807–66810.
64.
District of
Columbia, et
al. v. U.S.
Department of Agriculture,
496 F.
Supp.
3d
213
(2020),
https://oag.dc.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-10/SNAP-ABAWD-Opinion.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
65.
Ibid. On December 16, 2020, the Trump Administration
appealed the
District
Court
decision.
See, for example,
News release “Fudge Slams
Administration for Appealing ABAWD Ruling,” House Committee on
Agriculture, December
16, 2020,
https://agriculture.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2069
(accessed
December 16,
2022).
66.
News release,
“Statement
by
Agriculture Secretary
Tom
Vilsack
on
D.C.
Circuit
Court’s
Decision
Regarding
ABAWDs
Rule,”
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
March
24,
2021,
https://www.usda.gov/media/
press-releases/2021/03/24/statement-agriculture-secretary-tom-vilsack-dc-circuit-courts
(accessed December 16, 2022).
67.
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
“SNAP
Employment and Training
Screening and Referral Guidance,” July 13,
2022,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/et-screening-and-referral-guidance
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
68.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Food
and
Nutrition
Service,
“Regulatory
Reform
at
a
Glance:
Proposed
Rule; Revision of SNAP Categorical
Eligibility,” July 2019,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
BBCE_Fact_Sheet_%28FINAL%29_72219-PR.pdf
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
69.
7
Code of Federal Regulations §
273.8 (1978),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/7/273.8 (accessed
December
16, 2022).
70.
Kristina
Rasmussen, “How
Millionaires
Collect Food
Stamps,”
Wall Street
Journal, January
15, 2018,
https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-millionaires-collect-food-stamps-1516044026
(accessed December 14, 2022).
71.
Federal
Register, Vol. 84,
No. 142 (July 24, 2019), pp. 35570–55581,
https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2019/07/24/2019-15670/revision-of-categorical-eligibility-in-the-supplemental-nutrition-
assistance-program-snap
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
72.
News release, “USDA
Modernizes the Thrifty Food Plan, Updates SNAP Benefits,” U.S.
Department of
Agriculture, August 16, 2021,
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2021/08/16/usda-modernizes-
thrifty-food-plan-updates-snap-
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
73.
Phillip L.
Swagel, Director,
Congressional Budget
Office, letter to Congressman Jason Smith, June 23, 2022, p.
2,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-06/58231-Smith.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).
74.
Congressional Budget Office,
“H.R. 2, as Passed by the House of Representatives and as Passed
by the Senate,” July
24,
2018,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54284
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
75.
News
release,
“Republican
AG
Committee
Leadership
Urge
GAO
Review
of
USDA
Thrifty
Food
Plan
Scheme,”
U.S.
House
Committee
on
Agriculture,
August
13,
2021,
https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=7013 (accessed December 14, 2022).
76.
“The
2014
Farm
Bill:
Changing
the
Tradition
of
LIHEAP
Receipt
in
the
Calculation
of
SNAP
Benefits,”
updated February
12, 2014,
Congressional Research Service
Report for
Congress
R42591,
https://crsreports.congress.
gov/product/pdf/R/R42591/24
(accessed March
18, 2023).
77.
Federal
Register,
Vol.
84,
No.
192
(October
3,
2019),
pp.
52809–52815,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2019-10-03/pdf/2019-21287.pdf
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
78.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
“Special
Supplemental
Nutrition
Program
for
Women,
Infants,
and
Children (WIC)
Data
Series,
2018
to
2022,”
https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
79.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Food
and
Nutrition
Service,
“WIC
Data
Tables,”
December
9,
2022,
https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program
(accessed December 16, 2022).
80.
U.S.
Food
and
Drug
Administration,
“Regulations
and
Information
on
the
Manufacture
and
Distribution
of Infant
Formula,”
May
16,
2022,
https://www.fda.gov/food/infant-formula-guidance-documents-regulatory-
information/regulations-and-information-manufacture-and-distribution-infant-formula
(accessed December 14, 2022).
81.
U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the
National School Lunch Program,”
January
17,
2008,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/program-history
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
82.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Food
and
Nutrition
Service,
“School
Breakfast
Program
History,”
July
24,
2013,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sbp/program-history
(accessed
December
14,
2022),
and
U.S.
Department
of Agriculture, Food and
Nutrition
Service, “History
of the
National School
Lunch Program.”
83.
Crystal FitzSimons, “Free
School Meals for All Is the Key to Supporting Education and
Health Outcomes,”
Journal
of Policy
Analysis and
Management, Vol 41,
No. 1 (2022), pp. 358–364,
https://econpapers.repec.org/
article/wlyjpamgt/v_3a41_3ay_3a2022_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a358-364.htm (accessed
December 14, 2022).
84.
Jonathan Butcher and Vijay Menon, “Returning to the Intent
of Government School Meals: Helping Students
in Need,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder
No. 3399, March 22, 2019,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/
default/files/2019-03/BG3399.pdf.
85.
Daren
Bakst
and
Jonathan
Butcher,
“A
Critical
Fix
to
the
Federal
Overreach
on
School
Meals,”
Heritage
Foundation
Issue Brief
No.
4976, July 11, 2019,
https://www.heritage.org/hunger-and-food-programs/report/
critical-fix-the-federal-overreach-school-meals.
86.
Ibid., and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and
Nutrition Service, “Community Eligibility Provision,” April
19,
2019,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/cn/community-eligibility-provision
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
87.
See
Payment
Accuracy,
https://www.paymentaccuracy.gov/
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
88.
Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity
Scorecard,”
https://www.cfo.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/Q3/
FNS%20National%20School%20Lunch%20Program%20(NSLP)%20Payments%20Integrity%20Scorecard%20
FY%202022%20Q3.pdf
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
89.
U.S.
Government
Accountability
Office,
“School
Meals
Programs:
USDA
Has
Reported
Taking
Some
Steps
to Reduce Improper Payments But
Should Comprehensively Assess Fraud Risks,” GAO–19–389, May 21,
2022,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-389
(accessed December 14, 2022).
90.
Payment
Accuracy,
“Payment
Integrity
Scorecard.”
91.
White
House,
“Fact
Sheet:
The
American
Families
Plan,”
April
28,
2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-american-families-plan/
(accessed December 14, 2022).
92.
Universal School
Meals Program Act of 2021, S. 1530, 117th Cong., 1st Sess.,
https://www.congress.gov/
bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1530
(accessed
December
14,
2022).
93.
See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Find
Meals for Kids When Schools Are Closed,” Food and Nutrition Service, September
22, 2022,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/meals4kids
(accessed December 16, 2022),
and
U.S.
Department
of Agriculture,
Food
and
Nutrition
Service,
“Seamless
Summer
and
Other
Options
for
School,” July
16,
2013,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sfsp/seamless-summer-and-other-options-schools
(accessed
December 16,
2022).
94.
Tom
Driscoll,
“From
the
Field:
Farmers
Are
the
Original
Conservationists,”
National
Farmers
Union,
August
30,
2017,
https://nfu.org/2017/08/30/from-the-field-farmers-are-the-original-conservationists/
(accessed
December 16,
2022).
95.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Farm
Service
Agency,
“Conservation
Programs,”
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/
programs-and-services/conservation-programs/index
(accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Natural
Resources
Conservation
Service,
“Programs
and
Initiatives,”
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
programs-initiatives
(accessed December 16,
2022).
96.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Farm
Service
Agency,
“Conservation
Reserve
Program:
About
the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP),”
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-
programs/conservation-reserve-program/
(accessed December 16, 2022).
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
97.
American Bakers Association et al., letter to U.S. Department of
Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, March 23,
2022,
https://www.dropbox.com/s/yfyv04ilkom11zd/USDA%20Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Vilsack%20on%20
Tools%20to%20Address%20Global%20Commodity%20Supply%20Challenges%203.23.22_.pdf?dl=0
(accessed
December 15, 2022). It is also necessary to increase food
production to mitigate high food inflation. Approximately
25 percent of idled land is
considered prime farmland. Therefore, one-quarter of idled land
is merely idling,
not
producing food—and this does not include other land that may
viably be used for food production. The
Conservation Reserve Program
should be eliminated. There are also two issues connected to
property rights and
fairness that should be addressed: challenging NRCS
determinations and problems with USDA easements. To be
eligible
for many
USDA
programs,
farmers
must
comply
with
certain
conservation
provisions
enforced
by
NRCS.
Conservation compliance of
wetlands and highly erodible lands consist of federal
restrictions that prevent farmers
from using parts of their
property. If farmers plant crops or modify the areas federal
officials deem protected,
farmers can lose all access
to USDA programs and support. For farmers, there are real,
practical concerns to
challenging NRCS determinations, including the time and costs of
challenging the federal bureaucracy. NRCS is
empowered to declare areas
wetlands and highly erodible areas, which are therefore off
limits for farming. If these
wetland-or-erodible-declared
areas
are
used
in
a
manner
deemed
unacceptable
by
federal
officials,
NRCS
may
revoke access
to
federal
resources
and
subsidies
by
making
technical
determinations
that
carry
potential
penalties.
There must be a fair and
reasonable process for farmers to challenge such actions. See
Daren Bakst, “Food Price
Inflation
Continues
to
Worsen.
Here’s
What
Should
Be
Done
About
It,”
The
Daily
Signal,
April
25,
2022,
https://
www.dailysignal.com/2022/04/25/food-price-inflation-continuing-to-worsen-heres-what-should-be-done-
about-it/
(accessed
December 15,
2022);
American Bakers
Association
et.al.,
letter to
Vilsack; U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service,
“Conservation Compliance Appeals
Process,”
https://www.
nrcs.usda.gov/getting-assistance/compliance/conservation-compliance-appeals-process
(accessed December 15,
2022);
and
Chris
Bennett,
“Regulatory
Hell:
Farmer
and
Veteran
Wins
10-Year
Wetlands
Fight
With
Government,”
AG Web, August 30, 2021,
https://www.agweb.com/news/crops/crop-production/regulatory-hell-farmer-and-
veteran-wins-10-year-wetlands-fight
(accessed
December 15,
2022).
98.
Fortunately,
there
are
already
resources
available
to
help
states
establish
their
own
wetlands
conservation programs. One particular
example, the American Legislative Exchange Council’s Wetlands
Mapping and Protection Act
model
policy,
is
available
for
states
to
define
the
procedures,
guidelines,
and
administration
of
wetlands programs. American
Legislative Exchange Council, “Wetlands Mapping and Protection
Act,” November 16,
2017,
https://alec.org/model-policy/wetlands-mapping-and-protection-act/
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
The
new
Administration
should
focus
on
best
practices
instead
of
imposing
prescriptive
federal
practices.
It
should
support the
policies
contained
within
the
“NRCS
Wetland
Compliance
and
Appeals
Reform
Act”
and
modify
NRCS
compliance rules
to
protect
farmers
and
ranchers
by
adding
protections
against
regulatory
overreach—such
as
banning the
practice
of
re-engaging
farmers
in
new
technical
determinations
appeals
processes
for
the
same
areas
of their
farms. See
NRCS Wetland
Compliance and Appeals
Reform Act,
S. 4931,
117th Cong.,
2nd Sess.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4931?s=1&r=8
(accessed December 15, 2022).
99.
Ibid
100.
See,
for
example,
Daren
Bakst
and
Jeremy
Dalrymple,
“Reducing
Federal
Barriers
for
the
Sale
of
Meat,”
Heritage
Foundation
Issue
Brief
No.
5078,
June
1,
2020,
https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/
reducing-federal-barriers-the-sale-meat, and
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection
Service, “State Inspection
Programs,” updated January 12, 2023,
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state-
inspection-programs (accessed December 15, 2022).
101.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Food
Safety
and
Inspection
Service,
“Cooperative
Interstate
Shipping
Program,” September 7, 2022,
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state-inspection-programs/cooperative-
interstate-shipping-program
(accessed
December
15,
2022).
102.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
“State
Inspection
Programs.”
103.
The
Senate
bill
removes
obstacles
for
both
meat
and
poultry.
The
House
version
does
not
appear
to
cover
poultry.
New
Markets
for
State-Inspected
Meat
and
Poultry
Act
of
2021,
S.
107,
117th
Cong.,
1st
Sess.,
https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/107#:~:text=This%20bill%20allows%20meat%20and,be%20
sold%20in%20interstate%20commerce (accessed December 15, 2022), and Expanding Markets for
State- Inspected Meat Processors Act
of
2021, H.R. 1998, 117th Cong., 1st Sess.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-
congress/house-bill/1998 (accessed December 15, 2022).
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
104.
U.S.
Department
of Agriculture,
Agricultural
Marketing
Service,
“Specialty
Crops
Marketing
Orders
&
Agreements,”
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/fv
(accessed December 15, 2022).
105.
See,
for
example,
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Agricultural
Marketing
Service,
“Commodities
Covered
by Marketing Orders,”
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/commodities
(accessed March
18, 2023), and Elayne
Allen
and Darren Bakst, “How the
Government Is Mandating Food Waste,” August 19,
2016,
https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/08/19/how-the-government-is-mandating-food-waste/
(accessed
March
18,
2023).
106.
U.S.
Department
of Agriculture,
Agricultural
Marketing
Service,
“Frequently
Asked
Questions
Regarding
the
Beef Checkoff Program
Petition Process,”
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/research-promotion/
beef/petition (accessed December 16, 2022); “Beef
Producers: Do You Want to Vote on the Checkoff?”
Beef
Magazine, July 28, 2020,
https://www.beefmagazine.com/marketing/beef-producers-do-you-want-vote-
checkoff
(accessed
December
16,
2022);
and
Steve
White,
“Group
Seeking
Beef
Checkoff
Referendum
Asks
for Access to Producer Database,”
Nebraska TV, May 4, 2021,
https://nebraska.tv/news/ntvs-grow/group-seeking-
beef-checkoff-referendum-asks-for-access-to-producer-database
(accessed December 16, 2022). As reported,
“There
has
not
been
a
referendum
of the
mandatory
National
Beef
Checkoff
Program
in
35
years.”
107.
See,
for
example,
Federal
Register,
Vol.
86,
No.
213
(November
8,
2021),
p.
61718,
https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2021-11-08/pdf/2021-24301.pdf
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
108.
U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service,
“Topics,”
https://www.fas.usda.gov/topics (accessed December 15,
2022).
109.
Ibid.
110.
U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Market
Access Program (MAP),”
https://www.fas.
usda.gov/programs/market-access-program-map
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
111.
To
learn
about
trade
barriers
for
food
and
agricultural
products,
see,
for
example,
News
release,
“USTR
Releases 2022 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative,
March 31, 2022,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/
march/ustr-releases-2022-national-trade-estimate-report-foreign-trade-barriers
(accessed
December 16,
2022).
112.
U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture,
Economic
Research
Service,
“Recent
Trends
in
GE
Adoption,”
September
14,
2022,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-u-s/recent-
trends-in-ge-adoption/
(accessed
December
15,
2022).
113.
National
Bioengineered
Food
Disclosure
Standard,
Public
Law
114–216.
114.
Noi
Mahoney,
“Trade
Dispute
Arising
Over
Mexico’s
Plan
to
Block
Imports
of
Genetically
Modified
Corn,”
Freight Waves, November 22,
2022,
https://www.freightwaves.com/news/trade-dispute-arising-over-
mexicos-plan-to-block-imports-of-gm-corn
(accessed
December
15,
2022),
and
News
release,
“Grassley,
Ernst,
Urge
USTR
to
Intervene
In
Mexico’s
Ban
on
American
Corn,”
Office
of
Chuck
Grassley,
November
14,
2022,
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-ernst-urge-ustr-to-intervene-in-mexicos-ban-
on-american-corn
(accessed December
15, 2022).
115.
“The
Federal Land Management Agencies,” Congressional Research
Service
In Focus, updated
February 16,
2021,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10585.pdf
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
116.
Ibid.
117.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service,
Fiscal
Year 2023:
Budget
Justification, March 2022, p.
1,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/30a-2023-FS.pdf (accessed December 16,
2022).
118.
Forests
and Rangelands,
The National Strategy: The Final Phase in the
Development of the National Cohesive
Wildland Fire Management
Strategy,
April
2014,
https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/strategy/
strategy/CSPhaseIIINationalStrategyApr2014.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).
119.
U.S.
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “Unplanned
Fires,”
https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/
landmanagement/resourcemanagement/?cid=stelprd3804071
(accessed
December
16,
2022).
120.
See,
for
example,
Sherry
Devlin,
“A
Conversation
with
Jim
Hubbard:
Unplanned
Wildfires
Rule
West’s
Forests,”
TreeSource,
March
28,
2017,
https://treesource.org/news/lands/jim-hubbard-forest-service-wildfires/
(accessed December
16, 2022).
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
121.
U.S.
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “FY 1905–2021
National Summary Cut and Sold Data
Graphs,”
https://www.fs.usda.gov/forestmanagement/documents/sold-harvest/documents/1905-2021_Natl_
Summary_Graph_wHarvestAcres.pdf
(accessed December 16,
2022),
and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, U.S.
Forest
Service,
“Forest
Products
Cut
and
Sold
from
the
National
Forests
and
Grasslands,”
https://www.fs.usda.
gov/forestmanagement/products/cut-sold/index.shtml
(accessed December 16, 2022).
122.
Donald
J. Trump, “Promoting
Active
Management of America’s
Forests, Rangelands, and Other Federal Lands
to Improve Conditions
and Reduce Wildfire Risk,” Executive Order 13855, December 21,
2018,
https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800866/pdf/DCPD-201800866.pdf
(accessed December 16, 2022).
123.
Ibid.
124.
Ibid.
125.
Dietary Guidelines for Americans,
https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/
(accessed December
16, 2022).
126.
Dietary
Guidelines for Americans, “History of the
Dietary
Guidelines,”
https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/
about-dietary-guidelines/history-dietary-guidelines
(accessed December 16,
2022).
127.
Daren
Bakst,
“Extreme
Environmental
Agenda
Hijacks
Dietary
Guidelines:
Comment
to
the
Advisory
Committee,”
The
Daily
Signal,
July
17,
2014,
https://www.dailysignal.com/2014/07/17/extreme-environmental-
agenda-hijacks-dietary-guidelines-comment-advisory-committee/
(accessed December 16, 2022).
128.
Healthy,
Hunger-Free Kids Act
of
2010, S. 3307, 111th Cong.,
2nd Sess.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-
congress/senate-bill/3307/text
(accessed
December
16,
2022),
and
Dietary
Guidelines
for
Americans,
“Current
Dietary
Guidelines,”
https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/usda-hhs-development-dietary-guidelines
(accessed December 16, 2022).
MISSION
Federal
education policy
should be
limited and,
ultimately, the
federal Depart-
ment of Education should be
eliminated. When power is exercised, it should
empower
students
and
families,
not
government.
In
our
pluralistic
society,
fami-
lies
and
students
should be
free
to
choose
from
a
diverse
set
of
school
options
and learning
environments that best
fit their
needs. Our
postsecondary institutions should
also
reflect
such
diversity,
with
room
for
not
only
“traditional”
liberal
arts colleges and
research universities but also faith-based institutions, career
schools, military
academies, and
lifelong
learning programs.
Elementary
and secondary
education policy should
follow the
path outlined
by
Milton
Friedman
in
1955,
wherein
education
is
publicly
funded
but
education decisions
are
made
by
families.
Ultimately,
every
parent
should
have
the
option to
direct
his
or
her
child’s
share
of
education
funding through
an
education
sav- ings
account
(ESA),
funded
overwhelmingly by
state
and
local
taxpayers,
which
would empower parents to
choose a set of education options that meet their child's
unique needs.
States
are
eager
to
lead
in
K–12
education. For
decades, they
have acted
inde- pendently
of
the
federal
government to
pioneer a
variety of
constructive reforms
and
school
choice programs.
For
example,
in
2011,
Arizona first
piloted ESAs,
which provide
families
roughly 90
percent of
what the state
would have
spent on
that child
in
public
school
to
be
used
instead
on
education
options
such
as
private
school tuition,
online
courses, and
tutoring. In
2022, Arizona
expanded the
program to be
available to all families.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
The future of education freedom and
reform in the states is bright and will shine
brighter when
regulations and
red tape
from Washington are eliminated.
Federal
money is
inevitably
accompanied
by
rules
and
regulations
that
keep
the
influx of funds from having
much, if any, impact on student outcomes. It raises the
cost
of
education
without
raising
student
achievement.
To
the
extent
that
federal
taxpayer
dollars
are
used
to
fund
education
programs,
those
funds
should
be
block-
granted to
states
without
strings,
eliminating
the
need
for
many
federal
and
state
bureaucrats. Eventually,
policymaking and funding should take place at the state
and local
level, closest
to the
affected
families.
Although
student loans
and
grants
should ultimately
be
restored
to
the
private
sector (or,
at the
very least,
the federal
government should revisit
its role
as a
guarantor, rather than direct lender) federal
postsecondary education investments should bolster
economic
growth, and recipient institutions should nourish academic
freedom and
embrace
intellectual
diversity. That
has
not,
however,
been the
track
record
of
federal
higher
education
policy or
of the
many
institutions of higher
education that are
hostile to free expression,
open academic
inquiry, and
American
exceptionalism. Federal post-
secondary policy should be more than massive, inefficient, and
open-ended subsidies to “traditional” colleges and universities.
It should be rebalanced to focus far more on
bolstering
the
workforce
skills
of Americans
who
have
no
interest
in
pursuing
a
four-
year academic degree. It
should reflect a fuller picture of learning after high school,
placing apprenticeship
programs of all types and career and technical education on an
even playing
field with
degrees from
colleges and
universities.
Rather than
continuing to
buttress
a higher
education
establishment
captured
by
woke
“diversicrats”
and
a
de
facto
monopoly
enforced
by
the
federal
accreditation
cartel,
federal
postsecondary
education policy
should
prepare
students
for jobs
in
the
dynamic
economy, nurture
institutional diversity,
and
expose
schools
to
greater
market
forces.1
OVERVIEW
For most of our
history, the federal government played a minor role in
education.
Then,
over
a
14-month
period beginning
in
1964,
Congress planted
the
seeds
for what
would become
the U.S.
Department of Education
(ED or
the
department). In
July of
that
year,
President
Lyndon
B.
Johnson
signed
into
law
the
Civil
Rights Act
of 1964, after
Congress
reached a
consensus that the
mistreatment of black Americans
was no
longer
tolerable and
merited a
federal
response. In the
case of
the
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Act
of
1965
(ESEA)2 and
the
Higher
Education
Act
of
1965 (HEA),3 Congress
sought
to
improve
educational outcomes
for
disadvantaged
students by
providing
additional compensatory funding
for low-income children and
lower-income college students.
Spending
on
ESEA
and
the
HEA—part of
Johnson’s “War
on
Poverty”—grew exponentially
in the
years that
followed. By
Fiscal Year
2022, ESEA
programs received $27.7 billion in appropriations, in
addition to $190 billion that came
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
through
the pandemic’s
Elementary and Secondary
Schools
Emergency Relief
(ESSER)
Funds,4 which
relied
on
ESEA
formulas.
The
same
year, the
department
spent more than $2 billion just to administer Title IV of the HEA, which
authorizes
federal
student loans
and
Pell
grants. It
provided $22.5
billion in
Pell grants,
and it
oversaw outlays
of close
to $100
billion in
direct student
loans.
Since
1965, Congress
has continued
to layer
on dozens
of new
laws and
pro- grams as federal
“solutions” to myriad education problems. In 1973, it passed the
Rehabilitation Act,5 and,
in
1975,
the
Individuals
with Disabilities
Education Act
(IDEA)6 to
address
educational neglect
of
students
with disabilities.
In
2002,
it
cre-
ated
the
Institute for
Education Sciences
to
consolidate
education data
collection
and
fund
research.
Congress has
also enacted
a
series
of
Carl
D.
Perkins
Career and
Technical
Education
Acts, including
Perkins V
in 2018.7
Congress
could have,
and
once
did, distribute
management of
federal education
programs
outside of
a single
department.
But for
those
interested in expanding
federal funding and influence
in education, this unconsolidated approach was less than
ideal, because
a single,
captive agency
would allow
them to
promote their
agenda more effectively
across Administrations. Eventually, the National Educa-
tion Association made a deal and backed the right presidential candidate—
Jimmy Carter—who
successfully
lobbied
for
and
delivered
the
Cabinet-level
agency.
When
it
was
established in
1979—becoming
operational
in
1980—the
agency was supposed
to
act
as
a
“corralling” mechanism.
Carter signed
the
Department of
Education
Organization Act8
into
law in
1979,
believing in
part that
it would
reduce administrative costs
and improve efficiency by housing most of the federal
education programs
that
had
proliferated
in the
wake
of
Johnson’s
War on
Poverty under one
roof.
It
has
had
the
opposite
effect. Instead,
special interest
groups like
the
National
Education
Association (NEA),
American Federation
of
Teachers
(AFT), and
the
higher education lobby have leveraged the agency to continuously expand
federal
expenditures—a
desirable
funding
stream
from
their vantage
point
because
federal budgets
are
not
constrained
like state
and
local
budgets
that must
be
balanced
each
year.
By
FY
2022,
the
department’s discretionary
and
mandatory
appropriation topped
$80
billion,
not including
student
loan
outlays.
Each
of
its
programs
has attendant
federal strings and red tape.
One recent
example is the Biden Administration’s requirement that state
educa- tion agencies and school districts submit “equity” plans
as a condition of receiving
COVID recovery
ESSER funds in the American Rescue Plan (ARP).9 This exercise led
to
the
hiring of
numerous new
government employees
as
the
rules were
pro- mulgated,
plans were
created after
collecting
public feedback,
and those
plans were eventually deemed satisfactory.
The
next Administration
will need
a
plan
to
redistribute
the
various
congres- sionally
approved
federal education
programs across
the
government,
eliminate
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
those
that are
ineffective or
duplicative, and
then eliminate
the
unproductive
red
tape
and
rules
by
entrusting
states and
districts with
flexible, formula-driven
block grants. This
chapter details that plan.
As
the
next
Administration
executes
its
work,
it
should
be
guided
by
a
few
core
principles,
including:
•
Advancing
education
freedom.
Empowering families
to choose
among
a
diverse
set
of
education options
is
key
to
reform
and
improved
outcomes, and
it can
be achieved
without
establishing a
new federal
program. For
example,
portability
of
existing
federal
education
spending
to
fund
families
directly or allowing federal
tax credits to encourage voluntary contributions to K–12
education
savings
accounts
managed
by
charitable
nonprofits,
could
significantly advance education choice.
•
Providing education choice for
“federal” children.
Congress has
a special
responsibility
to children
who are
connected to military
families, who
live
in
the
District
of Columbia,
or
who
are
members
of
sovereign
tribes.
Responsibility for
serving these
students should
be housed
in agencies
that are already serving these families.
•
Restoring state
and local
control over
education
funding.
As
Washington begins
to downsize
its
intervention in
education,
existing funding
should
be
sent
to
states
as
grants
over
which
they
have
full
control, enabling
states
to
put
federal
funding toward
any
lawful
education
purpose under
state law.
•
Treating taxpayers like investors
in federal
student aid.
Taxpayers should
expect their
investments in
higher
education to
generate
economic productivity.
When
the
federal
government
lends
money
to
individuals
for
a postsecondary
education,
taxpayers
should
expect
those
borrowers
to
repay.
•
Protecting the
federal student
loan portfolio
from predatory
politicians.
The
new
Administration must
end the
practice of
acting like
the federal
student loan
portfolio is
a campaign
fund to
curry
political support
and
votes.
The
new
Administration
must
end
abuses
in
the
loan
forgiveness programs.
Borrowers
should
be
expected
to
repay
their
loans.
•
Safeguarding civil rights.
Enforcement of civil rights should be based on
a
proper
understanding of
those
laws,
rejecting
gender
ideology
and
critical race
theory.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
•
Stopping executive overreach.
Congress should set policy—not
Presidents through pen-and-phone
executive
orders, and
not agencies
through regulations
and
guidance.
National
emergency
declarations
should expire
absent express
congressional
authorization within
60 days
after the date
of the declaration.
Bolstered
by an
ever-growing cabal of
special
interests that
thrive off
federal largesse,
the
infrastructure that
supports
America’s costly federal
intervention in
education
from early
childhood
through
graduate
school
has
entrenched
itself.
But, unlike
the
public
sector
bureaucracies,
public
employee
unions,
and
the
higher
education lobby,
families and
students do
not need
a Department of Education
to
learn,
grow,
and
improve
their lives.
It
is
critical
that
the
next
Administration
tackle this entrenched infrastructure.
NEEDED
REFORMS
Federal
intervention in
education has
failed to
promote student
achievement. After
trillions spent since 1965 on the collective programs now housed
within the walls of the department, student academic outcomes
remain stagnant. On the main National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), reading out- comes on the 2022 administration
have remained unchanged over the past 30 years.
Declines in math
performance are even more concerning than students’ lack of
progress on reading outcomes. Fourth- and eighth-grade math
scores saw the largest decline since the assessments were first
administered in 1990. Average
fourth-grade
math
scores
declined
five
points,
and
average
eighth-grade
math scores declined eight points. Just one-third of eighth
graders nationally are
proficient in
reading and
math. Just
27 percent
of eighth
graders were
pro- ficient in math in 2022, and just 31 percent of
eighth graders scored proficient in reading in 2022.
The NAEP
Long-term Trend Assessment shows academic stagnation since the
1970s,
with particular
stagnation in
the
reading
scores of
13-year-old students
since
1971,
when
the
assessment was
first administered.
Math scores,
though modestly
improved, are still lackluster.
Additionally,
the
department
has
created
a
“shadow”
department of
education
operating in states across the country. Federal mandates, programs, and
proclama-
tions
have spurred
a
hiring
spree among
state education
agencies, with
more than
48,000
employees
currently on
staff in
state agencies
across the
country. Those
employees
are
more
than
10
times
the
number
of
employees
(4,400)10 at
the
federal Department
of
Education,
and
their
jobs largely
entail reporting
back to
Washing- ton.
Research
conducted by
The Heritage
Foundation’s Jonathan Butcher
finds that the federal
government funds 41
percent of
the salary costs
of state
educa- tion agencies.11
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
CHART
1
EIGHTH-GRADE
READING,
AVERAGE
SCORES
270
265
260
255
1992
1994
1998
’02
’03
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2022
FOURTH-GRADE
READING,
AVERAGE
SCORES
225
220
215
210
1992
1994
1998
2000
’02
’03
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2022
SOURCES:
The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average Scores,” Grade 4,
https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/
reading/nation/scores/?grade=4
(accessed
March 17,
2023), and
The Nation’s
Report Card,
“National Average
Scores,” Grade
8, https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/reading/nation/scores/?grade=4
(accessed March
17, 2023).
A
heritage.org
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
This bloat has persisted for
decades. In 1998, a commission led by Repre- sentative
Pete Hoekstra
released a
critical report
based on
extensive
fieldwork, interviews,
and analysis
of the
Department of Education.
The report,
Education at a
Crossroads: What Works and What’s Wasted in Education Today,
detailed the suffocating
bureaucratic
red
tape
Carter’s
agency
had
wrapped
around
states.12 The commission estimated that states completed nearly 50 million hours of
paperwork just to get
their federal
education
spending, which
at that
time, they
estimated, resulted
in
just
65
cents
to
70
cents
of
each
federal
taxpayer
dollar
making
its
way
to the classroom. The
situation has only worsened since the Hoekstra report. More
recent evidence
of Washington’s bureaucratic paperwork
burden can
be found
in
the growing
number
of
non-teaching staff
in
public
schools
across
the
country, which
doubled
relative to
growth in
student
enrollment from 1992
to 2015.
The
labyrinthian nature
of
federal
education
programs—convoluted
funding
formulas,
competitive
grant applications,
reporting requirements,
etc.—has likely
contributed to
the considerable bureaucratic bloat in state and local school
districts across the country and is one of the key areas of
needed reform. Streamlining exist- ing
programs and
funding so
that dollars
are
sent
to
states
through straightforward
per-pupil
allocations or in
the form
of grants
that states
can put
toward any
lawful edu-
cation purpose under
state law
would bring
a needed
easing of
the federal compliance
burden.
The
federal
government should
confine its
involvement in
education policy
to
that
of
a
statistics-gathering
agency
that disseminates
information to
the
states.
To improve
educational opportunities for all Americans, the next
Administra-
tion
should
work with
Congress to
pass a
Department of
Education Reorganization
Act to reform, eliminate, or move the department’s programs and
offices to appro-
priate
agencies. The
following is
an
overview
of
what
should happen
within each
of
the
offices and
to
each
of
the
programs currently
operated by
the
department.
PROGRAM
AND OFFICE
PRIORITIZATION
WITHIN THE
DEPARTMENT
Office
of Elementary and Secondary
Education
(OESE)
The OESE is
comprised of 36
programs, ranging from
Title I,
Part A,
of the
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Act
and
Impact
Aid,
to
programs
for
Native
American
students
and
the
D.C.
Opportunity
Scholarship
Program.
•
Reduce the
number of
programs
managed by
OESE, and
transfer some remaining
programs to other federal agencies.
•
Transfer Title I, Part A, which provides federal funding
for lower- income school districts, to the Department of Health
and Human Services,
specifically the
Administration
for Children
and Families.
It should be
administered as
a
no-strings-attached formula block
grant.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
Restore revenue
responsibility for Title
I funding
to the
states over
a
10-year
period.
OESE also currently manages the federal Impact Aid program,
which provides fund-
ing
to
school
districts to
compensate for
reductions in
property tax
revenue due
to
the
presence
of
federal
property (such
as
that
associated with
a
military
base or
tribal lands).
•
Eliminate Impact
Aid not
tied to
students.
•
Move student-driven Impact Aid programs to the Department
of Defense Education Authority
(DoDEA) or
the Department of
Interior’s Bureau of Indian Education.
•
Transfer all
Indian
education programs
to the
Bureau of
Indian Education.
•
The
D.C.
Opportunity
Scholarship
Program,
which
provides
vouchers
to low-income children living
in the
nation’s
capital—appropriate
as
D.C. is
under the
jurisdiction
of Congress—should
be expanded
into a
universal program,
formula-funded, and moved
to the
Department of Health and Human Services.
•
All
other programs
at OESE
should be
block-granted or
eliminated.
Office
of Career,
Technical, and
Adult
Education
•
Transfer
the
Office
of
Career,
Technical,
and
Adult
Education’s
few
programs to the Department of Labor, but
•
Move
the
Tribally
Controlled
Postsecondary
Career
and
Technical
Education Program to the Bureau of Indian Education.
Office of
Special
Education and
Rehabilitative Services
(OSERS)
The Office of
Special
Education and
Rehabilitative Services (OSERS)
houses nearly
two
dozen
programs,
ranging
from
funding
for
the
Individuals
with
Dis- abilities
Education Act
(IDEA) and
the National
Technical
Institute for
the Deaf to
Special
Olympics Funding
and the American Printing
House for
the Blind.
•
Most IDEA
funding should
be converted into a
no-strings formula block grant targeted at students with disabilities and
distributed directly
to local
education
agencies by
Health and
Human Service’s
Administration for Community Living.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
•
Transfer the
Vocational Rehabilitation Grants
for Native
American students to the Bureau of Indian Education.
•
Phase out
earmarks for
a variety of
special
institutions, as
originally
envisioned.
•
To the
extent that
OSERS supports
federal efforts
to enforce
our laws
against discrimination of individuals with disabilities, those
assets should be moved to the Department of Justice (DOJ) along
with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).
Office
for
Postsecondary Education
(OPE)
•
The next
Administration should work
with Congress
to eliminate
or move OPE
programs to
ETA at
the Department of Labor.
•
Funding to institutions should be block-granted and
narrowed to Historically
Black Colleges
and
Universities (HBCUs)
and tribally
controlled colleges.
•
Move programs
deemed
important to
our national
security
interests to the Department of State.
Institute of
Education
Sciences
(IES)
•
Move ED’s statistical office, the National Commission for
Education Statistics
(NCES), to
the Department of
Commerce’s Census
Bureau.
If Congress
believes the
federal
government can
play a
valuable research
role,
those
research
centers
can
be
moved
to
the
National
Science
Foundation.
If
Congress
decides to
maintain IES
as
an
independent agency,
it
needs to
address major
governance and
management issues
that keep
it
from
being a
productive contributor
to
the
knowledge base
related to
teaching and learning.
Office
of
Federal
Student
Aid
(FSA)
•
The next
Administration should completely
reverse the
student loan
federalization of 2010 and work with Congress to spin off FSA
and its student loan obligations to a new government corporation
with professional governance and management.
With
a statutory
charge that
it preserve
the federal
student loan
portfolio for
the
benefit
of
the
taxpayers
and
students,
this
new
entity
would
be
(1)
profession- ally
governed
by
an
agency
head
and
board
of
trustees
appointed
by
the
President
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
CHART
2
EIGHTH-GRADE
MATH, AVERAGE
SCORES
300
290
280
270
260
1990
1992
1996
2000
2003
2005 2007
2009 2011
2013 2015
2017
2019
2022
FOURTH-GRADE
MATH,
AVERAGE
SCORES
250
240
230
220
210
1990
1992
1996
2000
2003
2005 2007
2009 2011
2013 2015
2017
2019
2022
SOURCES:
The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average Scores,” Grade 4,
https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/
mathematics/nation/scores/?grade=4 (accessed March 17, 2023),
and The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average
Scores,”
Grade
8,
https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/mathematics/nation/scores/?grade=4
(accessed
March
17,
2023).
A
heritage.org
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
CHART
3
READING,
AVERAGE
SCORES
300
280
260
240
220
200
1971
1975
1980
1984
’88
’90 ’92
’94
’96
1999
2004
2008
2012
2020
MATH,
AVERAGE
SCORES
13–YEAR-OLDS
285
280
NINE–YEAR-OLDS
244
241
300
280
260
240
220
200
1978
1982
1986
’90
’92
’94
’96
1999
2004
2008
2012
2020
SOURCE:
The Nation’s
Report Card,
“NAEP Data
Explorer,” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?
n=PET&s=WCSSTUS1&f=W (accessed March 17, 2023).
A
heritage.org
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
with the advice
and consent of the Senate; (2) funded with annual appropriations
from
Congress;
and
(3)
operated by
professional managers.
Federal loans
would
be assigned directly to the Treasury Department, which would manage
collections and defaults. The new federal student loan authority
would manage the loan port-
folio,
handle borrower
relations, administer
loan applications
and
disbursements, monitor
institutional
participation
and
accountability
issues, and
issue regulations.
Office
for Civil
Rights
(OCR)
•
OCR should move to the Department of Justice.
The federal
government has an
essential
responsibility
to
enforce
civil
rights
protections,
but Washington
should
do
so
through
the Department
of
Justice
and
federal courts.
The
OCR
at
DOJ
should
be
able
to
enforce
only
through
litigation.
Additional Bureaus
and
Offices
For those attorneys,
accountants, experts, and
specialists in the
department's remaining
offices
subject to
closure
whose
positions
might
nevertheless
be
a
key
component of serving the
mission—positions that might include the Office of the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary, Office
of the
Undersecretary, Office of
the General
Counsel,
Office of
the
Inspector
General,
Office of
Finance
and
Operations,
Office of
the Chief Information
Officer, Office of Communications and Outreach, and Office
of
Legislative and
Congressional
Affairs—the
opportunity
to
join
other
agencies
based on their expertise and
the needs of other agencies should be made available.
For
example,
OGC higher
education
lawyers
would
join
the
newly
independent
Federal Student Aid Office or
the Department of Labor, and OGC civil rights attor-
neys
would
join
DOJ.
These positions
must
first
be
determined
to
serve
a continued mission need
prior to being transferred.
•
Attorneys, accountants, experts, and specialists in the
department’s remaining offices subject to closure, and whose
positions are indispensable
to serving
the mission,
should have
the opportunity
to join other agencies.
Current
Laws
Relating
to
the
Department
of
Education That
Require Repeal
In
order
to
fully wind
down the
Department of
Education, Congress
must pass
and the
President must sign into law a Department of Education
Reorganization
Act (or
Liquidating Authority Act) to direct the executive branch on how
to devolve the
agency as
a stand-alone
Cabinet-level department.
•
Congress should
pass and
the next
President
should sign
a Department of Education Reorganization Act.
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
Current
Regulations
Promulgated by or
Relevant to
the Agency That Should Be Rolled Back or Eliminated
While
the next
Administration works to
distribute
department
programs
across
the
federal
government, it
will need
to
thoroughly
review the
many educa-
tion-related regulations promulgated by the Biden
Administration. There are five
primary
regulatory targets
(as
of
December 2022)
that require
the
next
Adminis-
tration’s attention: regulations on (1) Charter School Grant Program
Priorities; (2) Civil Rights Data
Collection; (3) Student
Assistance General Provisions,
Federal Perkins Loan Program,
and William
D. Ford
Federal Direct
Loan Program
Final Regulations;
(4)
Nondiscrimination
on
the
Basis
of
Sex
in
Education
Programs
or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance (Title IX); and (5)
Assistance to States for the Education of Children with
Disabilities, Preschool Grants for
Children with Disabilities
(Equity in IDEA). The next Administration should also review
regulatory
changes
to
the
school
meals
program
(under
the
Department
of Agriculture)
and
changes
to the
Income-Driven
student
loan
program.
Additional
Biden Administration
regulations on (1) gainful employment, administrative capa-
bility, and
financial
responsibility for institutions
that
participate in
the federal
student
loans
and
grant
programs;
(2)
Title
VI,
(3)
accreditation
of
postsecondary
institutions, and
(4) female
athletics are expected
in to
be released
in 2023.
•
Thoroughly review the many education-related regulations
promulgated by
the Biden
Administration, as well
as the
school meals
program and the Income-Driven student loan program.
Charter
School Grant
Programs
Congress
first
authorized the
Charter School
Program (CSP)
in 1994
[Title X,
Part
C
of
the
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Act
of
1965
(ESEA),
as
amended,
20 U.S.C.
§
8061
et
seq.
(1994)].
It
most
recently
reauthorized
the
program
in
2015 as
part of
the Every
Student
Succeeds Act.13 On March 14,
2022, the
department published a
notice concerning proposed priorities, requirements,
definitions, and grant
selection
criteria
relating
to
the
award
of
federal
grants
to
applicants
in
CSP. This proposal
increases the federal footprint in the charter school sector by
ignor- ing
statute and
adding to
the list
of
requirements imposed on
charter
schools.
•
The new
Administration must take
immediate steps
to rescind the
new requirements and lessen the federal restrictions on charter
schools.
Civil
Rights Data
Collection
On December 13,
2021, OCR published a notice concerning proposed revisions
to
OCR’s
Mandatory Civil
Rights Data
Collection (CRDC)
in
which
it
proposed
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
to create and
collect data
on a
new
“nonbinary” sex category
(in addition
to the
current “male”
or
“female”
sex
categories)
and
to
retire
data
collection
that
indi- cates
the
number
of
(1)
high
school–level interscholastic
athletics
sports
in
which only
male and
female
students participate,
(2) high
school–level athletics teams in
which only
male or
female
students participate,
and (3)
participants
on high school–level
interscholastic athletics sports teams in which only male or
only female
students
participate.
These
poorly
conceived
changes
are
contrary
to
law,
fail
to
take
account
of student
privacy
interests
and
statutory
protections
favoring
parental rights
under the
Protection of
Pupils Rights
Amendment, and
jettison longstanding
data
collections that
assist in
the
enforcement of Title
IX.
•
The new
Administration must quickly
move to
rescind these
changes, which
add a
new
“nonbinary” sex
category to
OCR’S data
collection and
issue a
new
CRDC
that
will
collect
data
directly
relevant
to
OCR’s statutory
enforcement authority.
Student
Assistance General Provisions,
Federal Perkins
Loan Program,
and William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program Final Regulations
Effective
July
1,
2023, the
department promulgated
final regulations
addressing
loan
forgiveness under
the
HEA’s
provisions for
borrower defense
to
repayment
(“BDR”), closed
school loan discharge (“CSLD”), and public service loan forgive-
ness (“PSLF”). The
regulations also included prohibitions against pre-dispute
arbitration
agreements
and
class
action
waivers
for
students
enrolling
in
institu- tions
participating
in
Title
IV
student
loan programs.
Acting
outside
of
statutory authority,
the
current
Administration has
drastically
expanded
BDR,
CSLD,
and
PSLF loan forgiveness without
clear congressional authorization at a tremendous cost
to the
taxpayers, with
estimates
ranging from
$85.1 to
$120 billion.
•
The new
Administration must quickly
commence
negotiated rulemaking
and propose
that the
department rescind these
regulations.
•
The next
Administration should also
rescind Dear
Colleague
Letter (DCL)
GEN
22-11
and
DCL
GEN
22-10
and
its
letters
to
accreditation agencies
dated
July
19,
2022,
which
are
attempts
to undercut
Florida’s SB
7044, providing universities more flexibility on accreditation.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance (Title IX)
With
its
Notice
of
Proposed
Rulemaking published
on
July
12,
2022,
the
Biden
Education Department seeks to gut
the hard-earned rights of women with its
changes
to
the
department’s
regulations implementing
Title
IX,
which
prohibits
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
discrimination
on
the
basis of
sex
in
educational programs
and
activities.
Instead,
the Biden Administration has sought to trample women’s and girls’
athletic oppor- tunities and due process on campus, threaten
free speech and religious liberty, and
erode parental
rights in elementary and secondary education regarding sensitive
issues
of sex.
The new
Administration
should take
the following
steps:
•
Work with
Congress to
use the earliest
available
legislative vehicle to
prohibit the
department
from using
any
appropriations or
from
otherwise
enforcing any
final
regulations under
Title IX
promulgated by the department during the prior
Administration.
•
Commence a new agency rulemaking process to rescind the
current Administration’s Title IX regulations; restore the Title
IX regulations
promulgated by then-Secretary
Betsy DeVos
on May
19, 2020; and define “sex” under Title IX to mean only
biological sex recognized at birth.
•
Work with Congress to amend Title IX to include due process
requirements; define “sex” under Title IX to mean only
biological sex
recognized at birth;
and strengthen
protections for faith-based
educational institutions, programs, and activities.
The Trump
Administration’s 2020
Title IX
regulation
protected the founda- tional
right to
due process
for those
who are
accused of
sexual
misconduct. The Biden
Administration’s
proposed
change
to
the
interpretation
of
Title
IX
disposes of
these rights.
•
The next Administration should move quickly to restore the
rights of women
and girls
and restore
due process
protections for accused
individuals.
At the same time, there is no
scientific or legal basis for redefining “sex” to
“sexual
orientation and
gender
identity”
in
Title
IX.
Such
a
change
misrepresents
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in
Bostock, threatens the
American system of federalism, removes important due process
protections for students in higher
education, and puts girls and
women in danger of physical harm. Facilitating social
gender
transition
without parental
consent
increases
the
likelihood
that
children will
seek
hormone
treatments, such
as
puberty
blockers,
which
are
experimental
medical interventions.
Research has
not
demonstrated positive effects
and long- term
outcomes of these
treatments, and the
unintended side effects
are still
not fully
understood.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
The next Administration should abandon this change
redefining “sex” to
mean “sexual
orientation and gender
identity” in
Title IX
immediately across all departments.
•
On its first day in office, the next Administration should
signal its intent
to enter
the rulemaking
process to
restore the
Trump
Administration’s
Title IX
regulation,
with the
additional insistence that “sex”
is properly
understood as a
fixed
biological fact.
Official notice-and-comment should be posted immediately.
•
At the same time, the political appointees in the Office
for Civil Rights should begin a full review of all Title IX
investigations that were
conducted on
the
understanding that “sex”
referred to
gender identity and/or sexual orientation.
•
All ongoing
investigations should be
dropped, and
all school
districts affected should be given notice that they are
free to drop any policy changes pursued under pressure from the
Biden Administration.
•
The
OCR
Assistant
Secretary
should
prepare
a
report
of
OCR’s
actions
for
the
new
Secretary
of
Education,
who
should—by
speech
or
letter—
publicize the
nature of
the overreach engaged in
by his
predecessor.
•
The Secretary
should make
it clear
that FERPA
allows parents
full access to their children’s educational records, so
any practice of paperwork obfuscation on this front violates
federal law.
Title
VI—School
Discipline and
Disparate
Impact
Assuring
a safe
and orderly
school
environment should
be a primary consid-
eration for school leaders and district administrators.
Unfortunately, federal
overreach
has pushed
many
school
leaders
to
prioritize
the
pursuit
of
racial
parity in
school
discipline
indicators—such
as
detentions,
suspensions,
and
expulsions—
over student
safety.
In
2014,
the
Obama
Administration
issued
a
Dear
Colleague
Letter that
muddied the
standard for
civil rights
enforcement
under Title
VI for
student discipline
cases.
Before
the
DCL,
a
school
would
be
in
violation
of
federal law
for
treating
black and
white
students
differently
for
the
same
offense
(dispa- rate
treatment);
under the
Obama
Administration schools were
at risk
of losing
federal funding
if
they
treated
black
and
white
students
equally
but
had
aggregate
differences in
the rates
of school
discipline by race
(disparate impact).
OCR
leveraged federal
civil rights
investigations
as
policy enforcement
tools;
these
investigations
could only
end
when
school districts
agreed to
adopt lenient
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
discipline
policies, commonly
known as
“restorative justice.”
Academic studies,
as
well
as
student
and
teacher
surveys, suggest
that academics
and
school
climate have
been harmed
substantially by this
push.
The
Trump Administration
rescinded the
Obama
Administration’s
guidance
on
school
discipline
and
corrected
the
Obama
Administration’s
overreach
in
Title
VI
enforcement.
•
The next Administration should continue the policy of the
Trump Administration in this area and direct the department to
conduct a comprehensive
review of
all Title
VI cases
to ascertain
to what
extent these cases include allegations of disparate
impact.
•
OCR should
also review
all resolution
agreements with school districts
to conform with this policy.
•
As part
of this
effort, the
new Administration should
also direct
the department and DOJ jointly to issue enforcement
guidance stating that the agencies will no longer investigate
Title VI cases that exclusively rest on allegations of disparate
impact.
•
To the extent that the Biden Administration publishes
guidance or promulgates a
regulation on this
topic, the
next
Administration should
rescind the
guidance and
commence
rulemaking to rescind the
regulation.
Getting
the
federal
government
out
of
the
business
of
dictating
school
discipline policy
is
a
good
start.
But
if
the
next
conservative
Department
of
Education
simply
rescinds
the
Biden-era
regulation,
it
could
very
easily
be
enforced
again
on
Day One
through a
Dear Colleague Letter
by another
leftist
Administration.
•
In addition
to rescinding
the policy
and any
related
guidance, the
next Secretary should work
with the
next Attorney
General on
a regulation that would clarify current regulations to state that
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act does not include a disparate
impact standard.
As law professor
Gail Heriot
has noted,
the alleged
existence of a
disparate impact
standard
under Title
VI
makes
everything
presumed
illegal
unless
given special
dispensation by the
federal
government.
•
Although it would require political capital from the White
House, given that
mainstream news outlets
are sure
to frame
it as
an attack
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
on civil rights, the next conservative
Administration should take sweeping action to assure that the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act is not
inverted
through a
disparate
impact standard
to provide
a pretext for
theoretically endless federal meddling.
Assistance to
States for
the Education of Children
with
Disabilities; Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities
(Equity in IDEA)
•
Effective
January 18,
2017, the
department
issued final
regulations under
Part
B
of
IDEA
that
require
states
to
consider
race and
ethnicity in
the identification, placement, and discipline of students with
disabilities. The new Administration should rescind this
regulation.
Students should
never be denied access to special education services because of
their
race
or
ethnicity,
but
this
is
happening
in
school
districts across
the
country
thanks
to the Obama Administration’s Equity in IDEA regulation. This
was not the intent of the regulation, but it is an inevitable
byproduct of its flawed assumptions.
The Obama Administration looked at
the racial statistics on special education
assignment and made two
assumptions: that African American students were dis-
proportionately
overrepresented, and that this overrepresentation constituted a
harm that required federal pressure to ameliorate.
School
districts deemed to overrepresent minority students in special
education assignment,
or in
discipline
amongst special
education
students, are
tagged by
their
state
education
agencies
as
engaging
in
“significant
disproportionality,”
and are
required
to
reallocate
15 percent
of
their
IDEA
Part
B
money
into
coordinated early
intervening services that are intended to address the “root
causes of dispro-
portionality.”
In
practice,
this
can
mean
raiding
special
education
funding
to
pay for
CRT-inspired “equity” consultants
and
professional
development.
This is
especially problematic given that both of the assumptions behind
Equity in
IDEA are
flawed. Special
education services
provide extra
assistance to
students;
they
do
not
harm them.
And
according
to
the
most rigorous
research on
the
subject,
conducted
by Penn
State’s Paul
Morgan, black
students are
actually
underrep- resented in special
education once
adequate
statistical controls are
made. That
means that
this
regulation
effectively
further
depresses
the
provision
of
valuable
services to
an already
underserved group.
•
The next
Administration should immediately
commence
rulemaking
to rescind
the Equity
in IDEA
regulation.
No replacement regulation
is
required.
•
The
Office
of
Special
Education
and
Rehabilitative
Services
(OSERS)
should prepare
a digest
of the
best research
on this
subject and
share
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
it directly with state superintendents and
state special education
leaders across the country, who have been led by this
regulation to
believe
a false
problem
diagnosis.
Every effort
should be
made to
dissuade states
from
continuing
to operate
on
the
assumption
that
overrepresentation
requires
state
intervention
after
the
federal
pressure
is
rescinded.
Provide School
Meals to Children in Need; Do Not Use Federal Meals to Support
Radical Ideology
In
May
2022, the
U.S. Department
of
Agriculture
(USDA) tried
to
advance
a
radical
political
agenda using
the
federal
school meal
program. Nearly
a
century
ago,
federal lawmakers adopted the National School Lunch Program
(NSLP) and School
Breakfast Program (SBP)
and other
services that
provide meals
for K–12
students
to give
children
from
low-income
families
access
to
food
while
at
school. Since
the
1940s,
federal
lawmakers
have
greatly
expanded
these
meal
programs, creating
an
entitlement for
nearly
all
students,
regardless
of
family
income
levels, and
have turned
the meal
programs into
some of
the most
wasteful
federal pro-
grams
in
Washington.
Now,
the
USDA
is
threatening
to
withhold
federal
taxpayer
spending for these meals from schools that do not implement
Title IX of the Education
Amendments of
1972 so
that the
term “sex”
is replaced
with “sexual
orientation
and
gender
identity” (SOGI).
•
The next
Administration should prohibit
the USDA
or any
other federal agency from
withholding services from
federal or
state
agencies—including but
not
limited
to
K–12
schools—that
choose
not
to replace
“sex” with
“SOGI” in
that agency’s
administration of Title
IX.
The
Administration will have significant support for this policy
change among state officials and Members of Congress. Twenty-two
state attorneys general filed
a
lawsuit
after
the
USDA’s
announcement
that
the
agency
intended
to
withhold spending
from
schools
that do
not
replace
sex
with
SOGI.
Members
of
Congress also
introduced
legislation in
2022
that
would
prohibit
the
agency
from
carrying out
its intentions regarding Title IX.
Phase
Out Existing Income-Driven
Repayment Plans
While
income-driven
repayment
(IDR) of
student loans
is
a
superior approach
relative to
fixed payment plans, the number of IDR plans has proliferated
beyond
reason. And
recent IDR
plans are
so
generous
that they
require no
or
only
token repayment from
many students.
•
The Secretary
should phase
out all
existing IDR
plans by
making new
loans (including
consolidation loans)
ineligible and
should
implement
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
a new IDR plan.
The
new plan
should have
an income
exemption
equal to the
poverty line
and require
payments of
10 percent of
income above
the exemption.
If new
legislation
is
possible,
there
should
be
no
loan
forgiveness,
but if
not,
existing
law
would
require
forgiving
any
remaining
balance
after
25
years.
President
Biden has
proposed a
new
income-driven
repayment program
that
would
be extremely
generous
to
borrowers,
requiring only
nominal
payments
from most students. It
would turn
every policy
lever to
the most
generous
setting on record
(e.g.,
lowering the
percentage of income
owed from
10 percent
to 25
per- cent
under
existing
plans
to
5
percent,
lowering
the
number
of
years
of
payment
required from
20 or
25 years
to 10
years, and
increasing
income exemption
from 150 percent to
225 percent of the poverty line). The median borrower who earns
an associate degree
would owe only $15 a month, regardless of how much he or she had
borrowed.
The median
bachelor’s
degree
borrower
would
owe
only
$68
a
month. This
plan
essentially converts
these student
loans into
delayed grant
programs.
OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS THAT
THE DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION
REQUIRES
Reform Federal
Education Data
Collection
The
National Assessment
of
Educational
Progress (NAEP)
and
other
data col-
lections
currently
release data
by race, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, English
language
proficiency,
disability,
and
sex.
However,
one
of
the
most
important—if not
the
most
important—factor influencing
student
educational
achievement
and
attainment
is family
structure.
As
education
scholar
Ian
Rowe
has
noted,
NAEP already
collects data on students’ family structure; it just does not
make those data publicly available.
•
The Department of Education (or whichever agency collects
such data long term) should make student data available by
family structure to
the public,
including as
part of
its Data
Explorer tool.
•
As discussed
above, data
collection efforts should
be consolidated
under the Census Bureau.
•
Data collection efforts in higher education should also be
improved by housing
higher education data at the Department of Labor.
This
would provide
more
transparency
in
evaluating
postsecondary
education
and workforce
training
program outcomes;
contextualize
those results based on trends
observed more
generally;
enable the
adjusting of
real
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
wages
to
account
for
regional
differences in
earnings and
cost of
living; and develop
a
reliable
methodology for
risk adjusting
institutional
and
program outcomes
to
more accurately
reflect the
value added
of
education
programs (as opposed to
their admissions selectivity).
Currently
the
Department
of
Education
relies on
graduation rates
and
average
earnings
as
proxies
for
educational
quality. Both
of
those
outcomes, however,
are
highly
dependent
upon a
student’s socioeconomic
background, sex,
family status, and
other factors.
Colleges and
universities with
selective admissions
policies post the
strongest outcomes, primarily because they admit mostly
low-risk, traditional students.
Open
enrollment
institutions post
the
weakest
outcomes, largely
because
life
is
challenging
and
complicated
for
low-income
and
non-traditional
students,
who
may
be
forced to
drop out
when a
work schedule
changes, a
child needs
more attention,
or an
unexpected repair or
medical bill
makes
continuing impossible. Such confounding
factors make it difficult to isolate the impact of educational
qual- ity
versus
socioeconomic factors
on
student
outcomes.
The
Department
of
Health
and Human Services faced
similar challenges in trying to evaluate healthcare out-
comes
since
social
determinants of
health
result
in
worse
health
outcomes
among
those
who
are
socioeconomically disadvantaged,
have
low
educational
attainment
levels,
have
struggled
with
addiction, or
have
poor
diet
and exercise
habits.
Without
risk adjustment of outcomes,
hospitals treating wealthy patients will always appear
to be delivering good care,
and hospitals treating low-income
patients will appear
to be
delivering poor
care. Higher
education
outcomes data
should be
similarly “risk adjusted”
to
more
carefully
isolate
the
impact
of
educational
quality
versus
socioeconomic status
and other
factors on
college
outcomes.
Reform
the Negotiated Rulemaking Process
at
ED
The U.S. Department
of Education
is required
by statute14 to engage in
nego- tiated
rulemaking
prior
to
promulgating
new
regulations
under
Subchapter
1
of the
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Act
as
well
as
Subchapters
II
(Teacher
Quality Enhancements) and IV of the Higher Education Act of 1964
(Student Assistance).
The purpose
of negotiated
rulemaking is to
engage a
committee of
stakeholders
early
in
the
drafting
of
proposed
regulations
to
ensure
that
the
reg- ulation
can
be
implemented as
written,
to
understand
any
potential
unintended
consequences,
and
to
seek
suggestions
from
stakeholders
on
alternative
solutions. The
goal is
for the
negotiators to
reach a
consensus, thus
smoothing the
way to
promulgate a new rule.
Although it is helpful for the
department to receive stakeholder input, the negotiated
rulemaking process has
become an
expensive and
time-consuming
undertaking. Consensus
is
only
rarely
reached,
enabling
the
department
to
pursue
its own
path.
The
department’s
master
calendar
(which
requires
final
rules
to
be
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
published by
October 1 if they are to be implemented by July 1st of the
subsequent
year)
compounds
the problem,
making
it
unduly
challenging to
update
regulations
as needed to keep pace with
changes in education, finance, accounting, pedagogy, and
student assessment.
In recent decades,
negotiated rulemaking has
become a
veritable
three-ring circus, replete with
negotiators who use
their Twitter
accounts and
other social
media feeds during
negotiations to denigrate
the process
and their
peer negoti-
ators in real time.
A few
Members of
Congress use
the public
comment process
to deliver political
speeches,
apparently to
raise their
own profiles
but without
adding any
new
information
to
the
process.
Some
advocacy
groups
have
latched
onto the process for
fundraising purposes, sometimes misrepresenting negotiation
language to
agitate
followers
and
supporters
and
encourage
them
to make
financial
contributions. At times, the
department itself has appeared to sabotage consensus,
which
enables
them to
write
the
regulation
as
they
wish
and
without
regard
to
the concerns
raised by negotiators.
•
The Department
of Education
should work
with Congress
to amend the
HEA to eliminate the negotiated rulemaking requirement. At
a
minimum, Congress
should allow
the department
to use
public hearings rather than negotiated rulemaking
sessions.
Reform
the Office
of Federal
Student
Aid
This proposal
urges the new Administration to end the abuse of FSA’s loan for-
giveness
programs, to manage the federal student loan portfolio in a
professional
way, and
to
work
with Congress
for
a
long-term overhaul
of
the
program for
the benefit of students
and taxpayers.
•
The new
Administration must end
the prior
Administration’s abuse of the
agency’s
payment pause
and HEA
loan
forgiveness programs,
including borrower defense to repayment, closed school
discharge, and Public Service Loan Forgiveness.
•
The new Administration should also take immediate steps to
commence the rulemaking process
to rescind
or
substantially modify
the prior Administration’s HEA regulations.
•
The federal government does not have the proper incentives
to make sound lending decisions,
so the
new
Administration should
consider returning to a system in which private lenders, backed
by government
guarantees, would compete
to offer
student loans,
including subsidized and unsubsidized,
loans.
This
would allow
for
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
market
prices and
signals to
influence educational
borrowing, introducing
consumer-driven
accountability
into
higher education.
Pell grants
should retain their
current voucher-like structure.
If
Congress is
unwilling to
reform federal
student aid,
then the
next Adminis-
tration should consider the
following reforms:
•
Switch
to
fair-value
accounting
from
FCRA
accounting,
and
•
Consolidate all
federal loan
programs into
one new
program
that
1.
Utilizes
income-driven
repayment,
2.
Includes
no interest rate subsidies or
loan forgiveness,
3.
Includes
annual
and
aggregate
limits
on
borrowing,
and
4.
Requires “skin
in the
game” from
colleges to
help hold them accountable
for loan repayment.
The
Biden Administration
has
mercilessly
pillaged the
student loan
portfolio for
crass
political purposes
without regard
to the
needs of
current
taxpayers or future students.
This must
never happen
again.
•
As detailed in Section III, the next Administration should
work with Congress
to spin
off federal
student aid
into a
new government
corporation with professional governance and management.
NEW POLICY
PRIORITIES FOR
2025 AND
BEYOND
New
Legislation
That Should
Be
Prioritized
For nearly 250
years, Congress has incorporated public and private
institutions,
including
banks, the District of Columbia’s city government, and other
organiza- tions
that federal
officials deem
to
be
conducting operations
in
the
public interest.
Such
charters offer
a certain
status to
organizations,
often viewed
as a
“seal of
approval” according to one
Congressional Research Service report, which can help
these organizations in their
fundraising and other
advocacy
efforts.
When
the
nation’s
largest teacher
association, the
National Education
Associ- ation
(NEA),
cites its
federal charter,
it
lends
the
NEA
a
level
of
significance
and suggests an
effectiveness
that
is
not
supported by
evidence. In
fact, the
NEA
and
the
nation’s
other large
teacher union,
the
American
Federation of
Teachers (AFT),
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
use litigation
and other efforts to block school choice and advocate for
additional taxpayer spending in education. They also lobbied to
keep schools closed during
the pandemic. All of these positions run contrary to robust
research evidence showing
positive
outcomes
for
students
from
education
choice
policies;
there
is
no conclusive evidence that
more taxpayer spending on schools improves student
outcomes; and
evidence finds
that keeping
schools closed
to in-person
learning resulted in
negative emotional and academic outcomes for students.
Furthermore, the
union promotes
radical racial
and gender
ideologies in schools
that parents
oppose according
to nationally
representative surveys.
•
Congress should rescind the National Education
Association’s congressional charter and remove the false
impression that federal taxpayers support the political
activities of this special interest
group.
This move would
not be unprecedented, as Congress has rescinded the federal
charters
of
other
organizations
over
the
past
century. The
NEA
is
a
demonstrably
radical special
interest group that overwhelmingly supports left-of-center
policies and
policymakers.
•
Members should conduct hearings to determine how much
federal taxpayer
money the
NEA has
used for
radical causes
favoring a
single political party.
Parental
Rights in
Education and
Safeguarding
Students
•
Federal officials should protect educators and students in jurisdictions under federal control from racial discrimination by
reinforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and prohibiting
compelled
speech.
Specifically, no teacher
or student
in Washington,
D.C., public
schools, Bureau
of Indian
Education schools, or
Department of Defense
schools
should
be
compelled
to believe,
profess,
or
adhere
to
any
idea,
but especially
ideas that
violate state
and federal
civil rights
laws.
By its very
design, critical race theory has an “applied” dimension, as its
found-
ers
state
in
their
essays that
define the
theory. Those
who
subscribe
to
the
theory believe
that
racism (in
this case,
treating individuals
differently based
on
race)
is appropriate—necessary,
even—making
the
theory
more than
merely an
analyti- cal tool
to
describe
race in
public and
private life.
The
theory
disrupts America’s
Founding
ideals of
freedom and
opportunity. So,
when critical
race theory
is
used
as part of school activities
such as mandatory affinity groups, teacher training programs in
which educators are required to confess their privilege, or
school
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
assignments
in which
students must
defend the
false idea
that America
is sys-
temically
racist, the
theory
is
actively
disrupting
the
values
that
hold
communities
together such
as equality
under the
law and
colorblindness.
•
As such,
lawmakers
should design
legislation that prevents
the theory from
spreading discrimination.
•
For K–12
systems under
their
jurisdiction, federal lawmakers
should adopt proposals that
say no
individual should receive
punishment or benefits based on the color of their skin.
•
Furthermore,
school officials should not
require
students or
teachers to believe that individuals are guilty or
responsible for the actions of others based on race or
ethnicity.
Educators
should not
be forced to
discuss
contemporary
political issues
but neither
should
they
refrain
from
discussing
certain
subjects
in
an
attempt
to
pro- tect
students
from
ideas
with
which
they
disagree.
Proposals
such
as
this
should result
in robust
classroom
discussions, not censorship.
At the
state level,
states should require schools
to post
classroom materials online
to provide
maximum transparency to parents.
•
Again, specifically for K–12 systems under federal
authority, Congress
and the
next
Administration should support
existing state
and federal civil rights laws and add to such laws a prohibition
on compelled speech.
Advancing Legal
Protections for Parental
Rights in
Education
While
the
U.S.
Supreme Court
and
other
federal courts
have consistently
rec- ognized that
parents have
the
right
and
duty
to
direct
the
care
and
upbringing
of their
children, they
have not
always treated
parental rights
as co-equal
to other
fundamental
rights—like free
speech or
the free
exercise of
religion. As
a result,
some
courts
treat
parental
rights
as
a
“second-tier”
right
and
do
not
properly
safe- guard
these
rights
against
government
infringement.
The
courts
vary
greatly
over
which
species
of constitutional
review
(rational
basis,
intermediate
scrutiny,
and strict
scrutiny) to apply to parental rights cases.
This
uncertainty has
emboldened federal
agencies to
promote rules
and
poli-
cies
that infringe
parental rights.
For
example,
under the
Biden
Administration’s proposed
Title IX
regulations,
schools could
be required
to assist
a child
with a
social or
medical
gender
transition
without
parental
consent
or
to
withhold
infor- mation
from
parents
about
a
child’s
social
transition
(e.g., changing
their
names
or
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
pronouns).
The
federal
government
could
demand that
schools
include
curriculum
or
lessons
regarding
critical
race
or
gender
theory
in
a
way
that
violates
parental
rights, especially
if
it
requires
minors
to
disclose
information
about
their
religious
beliefs, or beliefs about
race or gender in violation of the Protection of Pupil Rights
Amendment (20 USC Sec. 1232h).
To
remedy the
lack of
clear and
robust protection
for
parental
rights, the
next Administration
should:
•
Work
to pass
a federal
Parents’ Bill
of Rights that
restores
parental rights to a “top-tier” right.
Such legislation would give families a fair
hearing
in
court
when
the
federal
government
enforces
any
policy
against parents
in a
way that
undermines
their right
and
responsibility to raise,
educate,
and care
for
their
children.
The
law
would
require
the
government
to satisfy
“strict
scrutiny”—the
highest
standard
of
judicial
review—when the
government infringes parental rights.
•
Further ensure
that any
regulations that could
impact parental
rights contain
similar
protections and
require
federal agencies
to demonstrate that their action meets strict
scrutiny before a final rule
is promulgated.
At the same time, Congress should
also consider equipping parents with a private right of
action. Two
federal laws
provide
certain privacy
protections
for students
attending
educational
institutions
or
programs
funded
by
the
department.
The Family
Educational
Rights
and
Privacy
Act
(FERPA)
protects
the
privacy
of student
education
records and
allows parents
and students
over the
age of
18 to
inspect and review the
student’s education records maintained by the school and to
request corrections
to
those
records.
FERPA
also
authorizes
a
number
of
excep- tions
to
this
records
privacy protection
that
allow
schools
to
disclose
the
student’s education
records
without the
consent
or
knowledge
of
the
parent
or
student.
The
Protection
of Pupil
Rights
Amendment
(PPRA)
requires
schools
to
obtain
paren- tal
consent
before
asking
questions,
including
surveys,
about
political
affiliations or
beliefs; mental
or
psychological issues; sexual
behaviors or
attitudes;
critical appraisals of family
members; illegal or self-incriminating behavior; religious prac-
tices or
beliefs;
privileged relationships, as
with doctors
and clergy;
and family
income, unless for program eligibility.
The
difficulty for
parents is
that FERPA
and
PPRA
do
not
authorize a
private
right of action. If a school refuses to comply with either statute, the
only remedy is
for
the
parent
or
student
(if
over
the
age
of
18)
to
file
an
administrative
complaint with
the U.S.
Department of Education,
which must
then work
with the
school to
obtain compliance
before taking
any action
to suspend
or terminate
federal
2025 Presidential
Transition Project
financial
assistance. Investigations can take months if not years. The
department
has
never
suspended or
terminated the
funding for
an
educational
institution or agency
for
violating
FERPA or
PPRA. In
essence, Congress
has
granted
parents and
students
important statutory
rights without
an effective
remedy to
assert those rights.
•
The next
Administration
should work
with Congress
to amend FERPA
and PPRA to provide parents and students over the age of 18
years with a private right of action to seek injunctive and
declaratory relief,
together with attorneys’ fees and costs if a prevailing party,
against
educational institutions and
agencies that
violate rights
enshrined in these statutes.
This
will empower
parents and
students,
level
the playing
field
between families
and
education bureaucracies, and
encourage institutional compliance with
these statutory requirements.
Protect
Parental
Rights in
Policy
In addition to
strengthening legal protections
for parents,
the next
Adminis- tration should:
•
Prioritize legislation advancing such
rights.
Promising ideas
have appeared in
bills
introduced in
the 117th
Congress such
as H.R.8767,
the Empowering
Parents
Act,15 sponsored
by
Representative
Bob
Good
(R-VA);
H.R.
6056,
the
Parents’
Bill of
Rights Act,16 sponsored
by
Representative Julia
Letlow (R-LA);
and H.J.Res.
99,17
proposing
an amendment
to the
Constitution relating
to parental
rights,
sponsored by
Representative Debbie Lesko (R-AZ).
•
These congressional actions should be carefully reviewed to
make sure they complement state Parents' Bills of Rights, such
as those passed in Georgia (2022),
Florida
(2021), Montana
(2021),
Wyoming
(2017),
Idaho (2015),
Oklahoma (2014),
Virginia
(2013),
and
Arizona
(2010).
As documented by writers such as
Abigail Shrier and others, the American Society of Plastic
Surgeons documented a four-fold increase in the number of
biological
girls
seeking
gender
surgery
between
2016
and
2017.
Larger
increases were found in
the U.K.
from 2009
to 2019
and 2017
to 2018.
These
statistics and others point to
a social
contagion in which
minor
children, especially
girls, are
attempting
to
make
life-altering
decisions
using
puberty
blockers
and
other
hor-
mone treatments and even
surgeries to remove or alter vital body parts. Heritage
Foundation research finds
that providing
easier access
to such
treatments and
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
surgeries
without parental
involvement does
not
reduce
the
suicidality
of
these
young
people and
may even
increase
suicide rates.
•
The next Administration should take particular note of how
radical gender
ideology is
having a
devastating
effect on
school-aged children today—especially young girls.
School
officials in some states are requiring teachers and other school
employ- ees to accept a minor
child’s decision to assume a different “gender” while at
school—without
notifying
parents.
In
California,
New
Jersey,
and
certain
districts in Kansas
and elsewhere, educators are prohibited from informing parents
about children’s
confusion
over
their
sex
if
the
children
do
not
want
their
parents
to
know.
Such
policies
allow schools
to
drive
a
wedge
between
parents
and
children.
The next
Administration should work
with Congress
to provide
an example
to state
lawmakers by requiring K–12
districts under federal jurisdiction, including Wash-
ington,
D.C.,
public
schools,
Bureau
of
Indian
Education
schools,
and
Department of
Defense schools, with legislation stating that:
•
No public education employee or contractor shall use a name
to address a
student other
than the
name listed
on a student’s birth
certificate, without the written permission of a student’s
parents or guardians.
•
No public
education
employee or
contractor shall use
a pronoun in
addressing a student that is different from that student’s
biological sex
without the
written
permission of a
student’s parents or guardians.
•
No public institution may require an education employee or
contractor to use a pronoun that does not match a person’s
biological sex if contrary to the employee’s or contractor’s
religious or moral convictions.
State lawmakers
should use this model and adopt similar provisions for public
schools
within their
borders. Federal
lawmakers should
not
allow
public school
employees
to keep
secrets about
a child
from that
child’s
parents.
Advance School Choice
Policies
The D.C. Opportunity
Scholarship Program, a
voucher
program providing
scholarships to
children
from
low-income
families
living
in
the
nation’s
capital
to attend
a
private
school
of
choice,
is
capped
at
$20
million
annually
and limited
to
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
students
at
or
below 185
percent of
the
federal
poverty line.
The
maximum
schol- arship
amount is
$9,401 for
students in
kindergarten
through eighth
grade and
$14,102
for
students
in
grades
nine through
12.
The
average scholarship
amount is around
$10,000, or
less than
half of
the
current
per-student funding
amount in
D.C.
Public Schools.
•
Congress should expand eligibility to all students,
regardless of income
or background, and raise
the
scholarship amount
closer to the
funding students receive in D.C. Public Schools (spending per
student in 2020 was $22,856).
•
All families
should be
able to
take their
children’s
taxpayer-funded education dollars to the education providers of
their choosing— whether it be a public school or a private
school.
•
Congress should
additionally deregulate the
program by
removing the requirement of private schools to administer
the D.C. Public Schools assessment and allowing private schools
to control their admissions processes.
Provide Education Choice for
Populations Under the
Jurisdiction of Congress
The
federal
government oversees
three school
systems that
Washington should
transform
into examples
of
quality
learning environments
for
every
child in
those systems: students attending schools in Washington,
D.C.; students in active-duty
military
families, including
students
attending
schools
operated by
the
U.S.
Depart- ment of Defense;
and students
attending
schools on
tribal lands,
which include
schools under the Bureau
of Indian
Education. In each
of these
systems,
federal lawmakers
should
allow
every
student
the
option
of
using
an
education
savings account
so that
parents can
select
different education
products and
services to
meet their child’s needs.
Nearly
50,000 students
attended public
schools in
the
District
of
Columbia
in the 2021–2022
school year.
In
2022,
fourth grade
math students
scored 11
points lower
than fourth
graders in
2019, which
means District
children lost
an entire
year of learning over the
course of the pandemic. Eighth graders also lost an entire
year of learning in math.
•
Federal lawmakers should offer
District
students the
opportunity to
use education savings accounts.
A portion of a child’s
federal education spending
should
be
deposited
in
a
private
spending
account
that
parents
can use
to pay
for personal
tutors,
education therapists,
books and
curricular
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
materials,
private school
tuition,
transportation and more—accounts
modeled
after the
accounts
in
Arizona,
Florida,
West
Virginia,
and
seven other
states.
•
Members of Congress should design the same account system
for students in active-duty military families, including
students
attending
schools that
receive funding
under the
National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).18
Heritage
Foundation research found that if even 10 percent of the
students eli-
gible for
accounts under such a proposal transferred from an assigned
school to an education savings account, the change for the
sending district would be 0.1 percent
of
that
school district’s
K–12 budget.
Even in
heavily impacted
districts (districts
with a
large number of students receiving Impact Aid), the budgetary
effect would
be
less
than 2
percent. Yet
these children
would then
have the
chance to
receive a
customized
education that meets their unique needs. As with state ESA
programs,
families who
are
homeschooling
are
distinct
in
statute
from families
who
use
an ESA to customize an
education at home.
Furthermore, research from the
Claremont Institute used documents pro-
vided by a whistleblower
demonstrating how educators at Department of Defense
schools
around
the
world
are
using
radical
gender theory
and
critical
race
theory in
their lessons.
This
instructional
material discards
biology in
favor of
political indoctrination
and applies
critical race
theory’s core
tenets
advocating for more racial
discrimination. Such ideas
are highly
unpopular among
parents,
accord- ing to nationally representative surveys, and the course
material attempts to indoctrinate
students with
radical ideas
about race
and the
ambiguous concept of “gender.”
Finally,
schools on
tribal lands
and
under
the
auspices
of
the
Bureau of
Indian Education
(BIE) are
among the
worst-performing
public schools
in the
country. Research from
Rep.
Burgess
Owens’
office
reports
that
the
graduation
rate
for
BIE students
is 53
percent, lower
than the
average for
Native
American students
in public schools
around the country, and nearly 30 percentage points lower than
the national average for all students. In 2015, Arizona
lawmakers expanded the state’s
education
savings
account
program
to
include
children
living
on
tribal
lands,
and by
2021, nearly
400 Native
American
children were
using the
accounts.
•
Federal officials
should design
a federal
education
savings account option
for all children attending BIE schools.
The next Administration
should make
the K–12
systems under
federal juris-
diction examples of
quality
learning opportunities
and education
freedom.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
Washington
should convert some of the lowest-performing public school
systems in the country into areas defined by choices, creating
rigorous learning options for
all
children and
from all
backgrounds,
income levels,
and
ethnicities.
Expand Education
Choice Through
Portability of Existing
Federal
Funds
Setting
education
policy on
the
right
track long
term would
require sunsetting the
U.S. Department
of
Education
altogether. Doing
so
would
not
result
in
fewer
resources
and
less
assistance for
children with
special needs
or
from
low-income
families.
Rather,
closing the
federal behemoth
would better
target existing
taxpayer resources
already
set
aside
for
these
students by
shifting oversight
responsibilities to
federal
and
state
agencies that
have more
expertise in
helping these
populations. The
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)
is the
federal law
gov- erning
taxpayer
spending
on
K–12
students
with
special
needs.
The
law
stipulates
that students
have
a
right
to
a
“free
and
appropriate
education,”
and
95
percent
of children
with
special
needs
attend
assigned
public schools.
The
education
is
not
always
appropriate, however:
Special
education
is
fraught
with
legal
battles.
Some
argue
that
the
education
of children
with
special
needs
is
the
most
litigated
area
of
K–12
education.
Thus, despite
a
nearly
50-year-old
federal
law
that
sees
regular
revision
and
reauthorization
and
approximately
$13.5
billion
per
year
in
federal taxpayer
spending,
parents still
struggle
to
establish
intervention
plans
for
their
students
with public
school
district
officials
regarding
the
physical
and
educational
requirements
for
their
children with
special needs.
State-level
education options
often exclusively
serve children
with special
needs for these very reasons. Florida, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and
North
Carolina, to
name a
few
states,
all
have
education savings
accounts or
K–12
private school
scholarship
options for
children with
special needs.
•
Federal
lawmakers should
move IDEA
oversight and implementation to
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
•
Officials should then consider revising IDEA to require
that a child’s portion
of the
federal
taxpayer spending
under the
law be made
available to
families so
parents can
choose how
and where
a child
learns.
•
IDEA already allows families to choose a private school
under certain
conditions, but
federal
officials should update
the law
so that
families can use their
child’s IDEA
spending for
textbooks,
education therapies, personal tutors, and other learning
expenses, similar to the way in which parents use education
savings accounts in states
such as Arizona and Florida.
These micro-education savings accounts
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
would
give the
families of
children with
special needs
approximately
$1,800 per
child to
help meet
a child’s
unique
learning needs.
•
Members
of Congress
and the
White House
should consider
a similar
update to
Title I
of the
Elementary and Secondary
Education Act
(ESEA).
Title I
is the
largest
portion of
federal
taxpayer spending
under this
federal education
law, and
the section
provides
additional taxpayer
resources to schools
or groups
of schools
in lower
income areas.
Federal taxpayers committed $16.3
billion to
Title I
in FY
2019, spending
that is
dedicated to
students in
low-income
areas of
the U.S.
Per student,
this spending amounts to
more than
$1,400 for
a child
in a
large city
and approximately $1,300 for
a student
in a
remote, rural
area.19
Research
finds,
though,
that
this
enormous investment
has
not
produced
positive results for
children
in
need.
The achievement
gap
between
children
from the
highest
and
lowest income
deciles has
not improved over
the past
50 years.
And recent,
dismal outcomes
on
the
National
Assessment
of
Educational
Progress
showed
declines
for
all
students,
with math
scores
registering
declines
for
the
first
time
in
history.
•
Initially, the responsibilities for administering and
overseeing Title I should be moved to HHS, along with IDEA.
•
Students
attending schools
that receive
Title I
spending should
also have
access
to
micro-education savings
accounts
that
allow
families
to choose
how and
where their
children learn
according to
their needs.
•
Parents should be allowed to use their child’s Title I
resources to help pay
for private
learning
options including
tutoring
services and
curricular materials.
•
Over a
10-year
period, the
federal
spending should
be phased
out and states
should assume decision-making control over how to provide a
quality education to children from low-income families.
Additional
School Choice
Options
House Republicans included school
choice in their “Commitment to America”
agenda.
•
Though actions
by state
lawmakers are essential
and any
federal
policies
should be
strictly
designed so
they do
not conflict
with state
activities, Congress
could consider
school choice
legislation
such
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
as the
Educational Choice for Children Act.
This bill would create a
federal
scholarship tax
credit
that
would
incentivize
donors
to
contribute
to
nonprofit scholarship
granting organizations (SGOs). Eligible families could
then
use
that
funding
from
the
SGOs
for
their
children’s
education
expenses
including private
school
tuition, tutoring,
and
instructional
materials.
ADDITIONAL K–12
REFORMS
Allowing States
to Opt
Out of
Federal
Education Programs.
States should
be able
to
opt
out
of
federal
education
programs
such
as
the
Academic
Partnerships
Lead Us to Success (APLUS)
Act. Much of the red tape and regulations that hinder
local
school
districts
are handed
down
from
Washington.
This
regulatory
burden far exceeds the
federal government’s less than 10 percent financing share of
K–12 education.
In the
most recent
fiscal year
(FY 2022),
states and
localities
financed 93 percent of
K–12 education
costs, and
the federal
government
just 7
percent. That
7 percent
share
should
not
allow
the
federal
government
to
dictate
state
and local
education policy.
•
To restore state and local control of education and reduce the
bureaucratic and compliance burden, Congress should allow
states to opt out of
the dozens of federal K–12 education programs authorized
under the
Elementary and Secondary
Education Act,
and instead
allow states to put their share of federal funding toward any
lawful education
purpose under
state law.
This policy
has been
advanced over
the years
via a
proposal known
as the
Academic
Partnerships Lead Us
to Success
(APLUS) Act.
HIGHER
EDUCATION
REFORM
HEA: Accreditation
Reform
Congress
established two primary
responsibilities for the
U.S. Department
of
Education
in
the
HEA:
1)
to
ensure
the
“administrative
capacity
and
financial
responsibility” of
colleges and
universities
that accept
Title IV
funds; and
2) to
ensure the quality of those
institutions. Congress did not endow the Department
of Education with the
authority to involve itself in academic quality issues relating
to colleges
and
universities that participate
in the
Title IV
student aid
program; the
HEA
allows
the agency
only
to
recognize
accreditors, which
are
then
supposed to provide
quality assurance measures.
Unfortunately,
the
Biden
Administration
has
followed closely
in
the
footsteps of
the Obama
Administration by engaging
in a
politically motivated and
incon- sistent
administration
of
the
accrediting
agency
recognition
process.
As
a
result, accreditors
have
transformed into
de
facto
government
agents. Despite
claims
by
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
the department and accreditation
agencies that accreditation is voluntary, the fact
that Americans
are denied
access to
an otherwise widely
available entitle- ment benefit
if the
institution “elects” to
not be
accredited makes accreditation
anything
but voluntary.
Today,
accreditation
determines
whether
Americans
can access
federal
student
aid benefits,
transfer
academic
credits,
enroll
in
higher-level
degree programs,
and even
qualify for
federal
employment.
Unnecessarily
focused on schools in a specific geographic region,
institutional
accreditation
reviews have also become wildly expensive audits by academic
“peers”
that stifle
innovation and
discourage new
institutions of
higher education.
Of
par-
ticular
concern are
efforts by
many accreditation
agencies to
leverage their
Title IV
(student
loans and
grants) gatekeeper
roles to
force institutions
to
adopt
policies that
have
nothing to
do
with
academic quality
assurance and
student outcomes. One
egregious example
of
this
is
the
extent to
which accreditors
have forced
col- leges and
universities,
many
of
them
faith-based institutions,
to
adopt
diversity,
equity,
and
inclusion
policies that
conflict with
federal civil
rights laws,
state laws,
and
the
institutional mission and
culture of
the schools. Perhaps
more distress-
ingly, accreditors,
while
professing support
for academic
freedom and
campus free
speech,
have presided
over
a
precipitous
decline
in
both
over
the
past
decade. Despite
maintaining criteria that demand such policies, accreditors have
done nothing to
dampen the
illiberal
chill that
has swept
across
American campuses
over the past decade.
The current
system is not working. A radical overhaul of the HEA’s
accreditation
requirements
is
thus
in
order.
The
next
Administration
should
work with
Congress to
amend the
HEA and
should
consider the
following
reforms:
•
Prohibit accreditation agencies from leveraging their Title
IV gatekeeper role to mandate that educational institutions
adopt diversity, equity, and inclusion policies.
•
Protect the sovereignty of states to decide governance and
leadership issues for their state-supported colleges and
universities by prohibiting accreditation agencies from
intruding upon the governance of state-supported educational
institutions.
•
Protect faith-based institutions by prohibiting
accreditation agencies
from:
1.
Requiring
standards and
criteria that
undermine the
religious beliefs
of, or require
policies or
conduct that
conflict with,
the
religious
mission or
religious
beliefs of
the institution; and
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
2.
Intruding
on the
governance of colleges
and
universities controlled by a religious organization.
•
Revamp the system for recognizing accreditation agencies
for Title IV purposes
by removing
the
department’s monopoly
on recognition
by (1) authorizing states to recognize accreditation agencies
for Title IV gatekeeping purposes and/or (2) authorizing state
agencies to act as accreditation agencies for institutions
throughout the United
States.
The next
Administration and Congress might also consider amending the HEA
to remove accreditors from
the program triad entirely to allow accreditation
to return
to its
original role
of voluntary
quality
assurance. This
would permit
accreditors
to
put
some
“teeth”
back
into
their
standards
without
creating
high- stakes
disasters, such as
institutional loss of
Title IV
access through
paperwork submission
errors,
a
state
exercising
its constitutional
authority
to
administer
its public
colleges and
universities,
or an
institution freely exercising
the religious
beliefs of its founders. With this option, neither the
department nor the states would
oversee or
recognize
accrediting agencies. The
department’s role would be limited
to evaluating the institution’s compliance with federal
accounting requirements
pursuant to evaluations conducted by appropriately credentialed
auditors who
have no
conflicts of interest
in performing
the review
paid for
by the federal agency charged with overseeing
compliance—not the institutions being reviewed.
HEA:
Student
Loans
•
Beyond immediate
policy moves
and rulemaking
to end
the current
Administration’s abuse of the department’s payment pause and HEA
loan
forgiveness programs, the department
should work
with
Congress
to overhaul
the federal
student loan
program for
the benefit of
taxpayers and students.
The federal government
does not
have the
proper
incentives to
make sound
lending decisions.
The new
Administration should consider:
•
Privatizing all lending programs, including subsidized,
unsubsidized, and
PLUS loans
(both Grad
and Parent).
This would
allow for
market
prices
and signals
to influence
educational borrowing, introducing
consumer-driven
accountability into
higher
education. Pell grants
should
retain their
current
voucher-like
structure.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
If privatizing student lending is
not feasible, then the next Administration should consider the
following reforms:
•
Switch
to
fair-value
accounting
from
FCRA
accounting.
•
Consolidate all
federal loan
programs into
one new
program
that
a) utilizes income-driven repayment, b)
includes no interest rate subsidies or loan forgiveness, c)
includes annual and aggregate limits on borrowing, and d)
includes skin in the game to hold colleges
accountable.
•
Eliminate Grad
PLUS loans
(for graduate
students) and
Parent PLUS
loans (for parents of
undergraduates).
Graduate
students are already eligible for unsubsidized Stafford student
loans; Grad PLUS loans are redundant.
They
also lack some of the safeguards of Stafford
loans,
such
as
annual and
aggregate borrowing
limits. Parent
PLUS loans
are
also
redundant because there are many privately provided alternatives
available.
•
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, which
prioritizes government
and public
sector work
over private
sector
employment, should be terminated.
Whatever
Congress chooses
to
do
with future
loans, there
is
still
the
question
of
the
government’s
responsible
stewardship of
the
existing
student
loan portfolio—a
substantial taxpayer asset.
The current Administration has recklessly engaged in the policy fetish
of forgiving
and canceling
student loans
with abandon.
•
The next Administration should work with Congress to amend
the HEA to ensure that
no
Administration engages
in this kind of
abuse in the future.
•
Specifically, the new Administration should urge the
Congress to amend the
HEA to
abrogate, or substantially
reduce, the
power of
the Secretary to cancel, compromise, discharge, or
forgive the principal balances
of Title
IV student
loans, as
well as
to modify
in any
material way the repayment amounts or terms of Title IV
student loans.
•
Further, the next Administration should propose that
Congress amend the
HEA to
remove the
department’s
authority to forgive
loans based on borrower defense to repayment; instead,
the department
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
should
be authorized
to discharge
loans only
in instances where clear and
convincing evidence exists to demonstrate that an educational
institution engaged in fraud toward a borrower in connection
with his or her enrollment in the institution and the student’s
educational program or activity at the institution.
Cap
indirect
costs at
universities.
Currently,
the
federal
government pays
a
por-
tion
of
the
overhead expenses
associated with
university-based
research.
Known as “indirect
costs,” these
reimbursements
cross-subsidize
leftist agendas
and
the
research
of
billion-dollar
organizations
such
as
Google
and
the
Ford Foundation.
Universities
also use
this influx
of
cash
to
pay
for
Diversity,
Equity, and
Inclusion (DEI)
efforts. To correct course,
•
Congress should cap the indirect cost rate paid to
universities so that it
does not
exceed the
lowest rate
a university
accepts from a
private organization to fund research efforts. This market-
based reform would help reduce federal taxpayer
subsidization of leftist
agendas.
NEW
REGULATIONS
Attacking
the
Accreditation
Cartel
For
a
college
to
participate
in
federal
financial aid
programs, it
must be
accred- ited,
but
accreditors have
been abusing
their
quasi-regulatory
power to
impose non-educational
requirements and ideological
preferences on colleges.
•
The Secretary
of Education
should refuse
to recognize all accreditors that
abuse their power.
•
New accreditors should also
be encouraged
to start
up.
Confronting the Chinese
Communist
Party’s Influence
on Higher
Education
According to media reports, more than 100 universities in the
U.S. received nearly
$100 billion
in gifts
and grants
from
China-based sources
between 2013
and
2020.
Much
of
this
money
derives
from
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
and
its
proxies. The
next Administration
must
•
Reverse the Biden Administration’s refusal to enforce
Section 117 of the HEA, which directs colleges and universities
to report gifts from, and contracts with, sources outside the
U.S. worth
$250,000 or
more.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
•
Investigate postsecondary institutions that fail to honor
their Section 117
obligations
and
make
appropriate
referrals
to
DOJ.
•
Work with
Congress to
amend the
HEA to
tie the
HEA’s foreign
source reporting requirements to an institution's ability to
receive federal
financial assistance,
particularly participation in
programs funded under Titles IV and VI of the HEA.
Allowing
Competency-Based
Education to
Flourish
Competency-based education is a
promising approach that could provide
a high-quality and affordable education to many students.
Since the credit hour, which measures the time in the classroom,
is inappropriate for such programs, the direct assessment method
was introduced to allow competen-
cy-based programs to
participate in the federal financial aid programs. However,
overregulation has hampered the usage of direct
assessment, with the lead- ing competency-based university
choosing to instead convert their courses into credit hours for
compliance purposes. One of the leading obstacles is the
requirement
that
courses
include
“regular
and
substantive”
interaction
between faculty
and students.
•
New regulations should clarify the definition and
requirements of regular
and substantive interaction for
competency-based education, as well as for online programs.
Reforming “Area Studies”
Funding
•
Congress should wind down so-called “area studies” programs
at universities (Title
VI of
the HEA),
which, although
intended to
serve
American
interests, sometimes fund
programs that
run counter
to those
interests.
•
In the
meantime, the next
Administration should promulgate
a new
regulation to require the Secretary of Education to
allocate at least 40 percent of funding to
international business programs that teach about free markets
and economics and require institutions, faculty, and fellowship
recipients to certify that they intend to further the stated
statutory goals of serving American
interests.
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
NEW
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
THAT THE
PRESIDENT
SHOULD
ISSUE
Guidance
Documents
•
The President should immediately reinstate and reissue
Executive Order
13891: Promoting the Rule
of Law
Through
Improved Agency Guidance Documents, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9,
2019), and Executive Order 13892:
Promoting the Rule
of Law
Through
Transparency and Fairness
in Civil
Administrative Enforcement and
Adjudication (Oct. 15, 2019).
These
executive
orders
required
all
federal
agencies
to treat
guidance
documents as
non-binding
in
law
and
practice
and also
forbade
federal
agencies
from
imposing
new standards
of
conduct
on
persons
outside
the
executive
branch
through
guid-
ance
documents.
They required
all
federal
agencies
to
apply
regulations
and
statutes instead
of
guidance
documents
in
any
enforcement
action. President
Biden
revoked these
executive
orders on
January 20,
2021,
demonstrating that these
executive orders
effectively restrained
the
abuses
of
an
expansive
administrative
state.
•
Require APA notice and comment.
The President should issue an
executive
order requiring
the
Office
for
Civil
Rights’
Case
Processing
Manual to
go
through
APA
(Administrative
Procedures
Act)
notice and
comment.
•
Protect the
First
Amendment.
The
President
should issue
an executive order requiring grant applications (SF-424
series) to contain assurances
that
the
applicant
will
uphold
the
First
Amendment
in
funded programs
and work.
•
Minimize bachelor’s degree requirements.
The
President
should issue
an
executive
order
stating
that
a
college
degree
shall
not
be
required
for
any federal
job unless
the
requirements of
the job
specifically
demand it.
•
Eliminate the “list of shame.”
Educational institutions can claim a
religious
exemption
with
the
Office
for
Civil
Rights
at
the
Department of
Education from the strictures of Title IX. In 2016, the Obama
Administration published
on
the
Department
of
Education’s
website
a
list
of colleges
that had
applied for
the exemption. This
“list of
shame” of
faith-based colleges,
as
it
came
to
be
known,
has
since
been
archived
on
ED’s website,
still publicly
available. The
President
should issue
an executive
order removing the
archived list
and preventing such a
list from
being published in the future.
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
NEW AGENCY
POLICIES THAT
DON’T REQUIRE
NEW LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS TO ENACT
Transparency of FERPA
and PPRA
Complaints
•
The Department of Education should be transparent about
complaints filed on behalf of families regarding the Family
Educational Rights
and
Privacy
Act
(FERPA)
and
the
Protection
of Pupil Rights
Amendment (PPRA).
•
At the
same time,
the Department
of Education
should develop
a portal
and resources
for parents
on their
rights under
FERPA
and
PPRA.
This
portal
should also
contain an
explanation of
the
Health
Insurance
Portability and
Accountability
Act
(HIPPA) and
public school
procedures to
demonstrate that the law does not deprive parents of their
right to access any school
health records.
The D.C.
Opportunity Scholarship
Program
In
2011,
Congress
added
new
requirements
to
the
D.C.
Opportunity Scholarship
Program
stating
that participating
private
schools
must
submit
to
site
visits
by
the
program
administrator,
inform
prospective
students
about
the
school’s
accreditation
status, mandate
that
teachers
of
core
subjects
have
bachelor’s
degrees,
and
require
participating
students
to
take
some form
of
nationally
norm-referenced
test.
Notably,
the 2011
reauthorization
also
required,
for
the
first
time,
that
participating
private
schools be
accredited
or
be
on
a
path
to
accreditation.
The
2017
reauthorization
went
further,
requiring
that
each
participating
school
supply
a
certificate
of
accreditation
to the administering entity
upon program entry, demonstrating that the school is
fully accredited
before
being
allowed
to participate.
The
list
of
approved
accreditors
is
entirely
too small
to
serve
the
mission
of
the
diverse
schools
in
the
nation’s
capital.
•
Although the
accreditation regulations should
be removed
entirely by Congress, in the meantime, the next President
should issue an executive order expanding the list of allowable
accreditors.
Transparency Around Program
Performance and DEI
Influence
The
next
President should
issue a
series of
executive orders
requiring:
•
An
accounting
of
how
federal
programs/grants
spread
DEI/CRT/
gender ideology,
•
A review
of outcomes
for GEAR
UP and
the 21st
Century grants
programs,
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
•
The reissuing
of the
report on
school safety
from 2018
with updated
information,
•
The release
of a
report to
Congress on
how to
consolidate
the department and trim nonessential employees,
•
A report on the negative influence of action civics on
students’ understanding
of history
and civics
and their
disposition toward the United
States,
•
An update
of the
Coleman report
to show
the impact
of family
structure on student achievement,
•
A
full
accounting
of
CARES
Act
education
expenditures,
and
•
A report
on how
many dollars
make their
way to
the classroom
in every federal education grant and program.
Pursue
Antitrust
Against
Accreditors
•
The President
should issue
an executive order pursuing
antitrust against college accreditors, especially the
American Bar Association
(ABA).
NEW
POLICIES/REGULATIONS
THAT REQUIRE
COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES AND/OR THE WHITE HOUSE
The
department
must coordinate
any
rulemaking
with the
White House,
the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), DOJ, and other agencies that share
responsibility
with
the
department
in the
administration
or
enforcement
of
stat- ute,
such
as
Titles
VI
and
IX.
Moreover,
regarding
regulations
arising
under
civil rights
laws
administered by
the
department,
Executive
Order
12550
requires
the
Attorney
General to
approve
final
regulations;
the
Assistant
Attorney
General
for Civil
Rights must
approve notices
of proposed
rulemaking.
Organizational Issues
Historical
Budget Information.
Congressional appropriations for the U.S. Department
of Education
have risen
from $14
billion in
1980 to $95.5
billion in
2021, an
astounding increase, especially
in light
of the
lack of
improvements in student outcomes.
Recommend Budget Cuts, Shifts, and
Augmentations, If Any.
Transferring
most
of
the
programs
at the
U.S.
Department
of
Education
to
other
agencies
and
eliminating duplicative
and
ineffective
programs
would
yield
significant
taxpayer
Mandate
for Leadership:
The
Conservative
Promise
CHART
4
IN
BILLIONS
OF
DOLLARS
$120
$100
$80
$60
$40
$20
$0
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
NOTE:
Totals
include
mandatory
and
discretionary
appropriations.
SOURCE:
U.S. Department of Education, “Budget History Tables,” Education
Department Budget History Table,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html
(accessed March 17, 2023).
A
heritage.org
savings.
The
proposal
would immediately
save more
than $17
billion annually
in
various
programs. Savings
over a
decade would
be
far
more robust,
as
the
revenue
responsibility
for
many
formula grant
programs would
be
returned
to
the
states. Some highlights
include:
•
Eliminate competitive grant programs
and reduce
spending on
formula grant programs.
Competitive grant programs operated by
the Department of
Education should be
eliminated, and federal
spending should
be
reduced
to
reflect
remaining
formula grant
programs
authorized
under Title
I of
the Elementary
and Secondary
Education Act
(ESEA)
and
the
handful
of
other
programs that
do
not
fall under
the
competitive/
project
grant category.
Remaining programs
managed by
the
Department
2025
Presidential Transition
Project
of
Education, such
as large
formula grant
programs for
K–12 education,
should
be
reduced
by
10
percent.
This would
cut
approximately
29
programs, most
of which are
discretionary spending. In
total, this
would generate
approximately $8.8 billion in savings.
•
Eliminate the PLUS loan program.
As mentioned above, the
PLUS loan
program, which
provides
graduate
student
loans
and
loans
to
the
parents of
undergraduate
students,
should be
eliminated.
This
would
generate
an estimated
$2.3 billion in savings.
•
End time-based and occupation-based
student loan
forgiveness.
A
low estimate
suggests ending
current student
loan
forgiveness schemes
would save taxpayers $370 billion.
•
Eliminate GEAR-UP.
It is
not the
responsibility of the
federal
government to
provide
taxpayer
dollars
to
create
a
pipeline
from
high
school
to
college.
GEAR UP
should
be
eliminated,
and
its
functions
should
instead
be
handled
privately or
at the
state and
local levels,
where
policymakers are
better equipped
to increase college
preparedness within their
school
districts.
Personnel
The Department of
Education currently employs
approximately 4,400 indi- viduals.
As programs are eliminated or transferred to other agencies,
those employees whose
positions are
determined to
be essential to the
mission would
move
with
their
constituent
programs.
Current
salaries
and
expenses
at
ED
total
$2.2
billion
annually.
AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of
individuals involved in the 2025
Presidential
Transition Project. All
contributors to this
chapter are
listed at
the front
of this
volume, but
Jonathan Butcher, Bob Eitel,
Jim
Blew, Diane Auer
Jones, Erin Valdez, Andrew Gillen, and Max Eden deserve special
mention.
The
author
alone
assumes
responsibility
for
the
content
of
this
chapter,
and
no
views
expressed
herein should
be attributed to any other individual.
Mandate for
Leadership: The Conservative
Promise
ENDNOTES
1.
Milton Friedman,
The
Role of
Government in Education
(1955),
https://la.utexas.edu/users/
hcleaver/330T/350kPEEFriedmanRoleOfGovttable.pdf
(accessed
February
28,
2023).
2.
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Act
of
1965,
Public
Law
89-10.
3.
Higher
Education
Act
of
1965,
Public
Law
89-329.
4.
Elementary
and
Secondary
Schools
Emergency
Relief
Funds.
5.
Rehabilitation
Act
of
1973,
Public
Law
93-112.
6.
Individuals
with
Disabilities
Education
Act,
Public
Law
94-142.
7.
Perkins
Career
and
Technical
Education
Acts,
Perkins
IV,
Public
Law
109-270.
8.
S.
510,
Department
of
Education
Organization
Act,
Public
Law
96-88.
9.
Ambassador Susan
Rice, Gene Sperling, and Clarence Wardell III,
Advancing Equity through the American
Rescue Plan, pg.
26. May 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ADVANCING-
EQUITY-THROUGH-THE-AMERICAN-RESCUE-PLAN.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023).
10.
U.S.
Department of Education, Overview and Mission Statement,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/landing.
jhtml#:~:text=ED's%20mission%20is%20to%20promote,offices%20from%20several%20federal%20agencies
(accessed February 28, 2023).
11.
Jonathan Butcher, “Who Signs Your Paycheck?” Education
Next,
https://www.educationnext.org/who-signs-
your-paycheck-federal-influence-state-education-agencies/#_edn1 (last
updated, April 9, 2018).
12.
Education
at a Crossroads: What Works and What’s Wasted in Education Today,
Subcommittee
on
Oversight
and
Investigations,
Committee
on Education
and
the
Workforce,
U.S. House
of
Representatives,
105th
Cong., 2nd
Sess.,
July
17,
1998,
pp.
xiii
and
xiv.
13.
Every Student
Succeeds
Act,
20
U.S.C.
§
6301
et
seq.
(2015).
14.
20
U.S.C.
§6571.
Under
subchapter
I
of
the
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Act
(Improving
the
Academic Achievement
of
the
Disadvantaged)
and
Section
20
U.S.C.
§1022f;
20
U.S.C.
§1098a.
Under
Title
20, Section 1098a, of the
U.S.
Code, the Secretary is authorized to waive the requirement for
negotiated
rulemaking if he or
she “determines
that applying
such a
requirement with respect
to given
regulations is impracticable,
unnecessary,
or
contrary
to
the
public
interest
(within
the
meaning
of
section
553(b)(3)(B)
of
[the
APA]), and
publishes
the
basis
for
such
determination
in
the
Federal
Register
at
the
same
time
as
the
proposed regulations in question
are
first published.” 20 U.S.C.
§1098a(b)(2). Congressional Research Service,
“Negotiated Rulemaking: In
Brief,” April 12, 2021,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46756 (accessed March 13,
2023).
15.
H.R.
8767, Empowering Parents Act,
117th
Congress.
16.
H.R.
5,
Parents
Bill
of
Rights
Act.
17.
H.J.Res.
99,
Public
Law
115-30.
18.
National
Defense
Authorization
Act
for
Fiscal
Year
2022.
19.
National
Center
for
Education
Statistics,
“Fast
Facts:
Title
I,”
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=158 (accessed February 28,
2023).
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https://www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/the-global-financial-crisis.html
https://www.usbank.com/investing/financial-perspectives/market-news/economic-recovery-status.html
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/011116/3-financial-crises-21st-century.asp
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_entities_involved_in_2007%E2%80%932008_financial_crises
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_January_6_United_States_Capitol_attack#:
https://nhadautu.vn/toa-luu-y-viec-su-dung-tai-lieu-mat-vu-truong-my-lan--van-thinh-phat-d84373.html
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/federal-reserve-act-1913-962/fulltext
https://newrepublic.com/article/174656/claremont-institute-think-tank-trump
https://jacobin.com/2024/02/us-dollar-hegemony-sanctions-imperialism
https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/the-financial-front-of-russias-war
https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/the-financial-front-of-russias-war
https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-the-world-loses-under-bill-gates-vaccine-colonialism/
https://www.americashealthrankings.org/explore/measures/pct_65plus
2022-COVID-19-vaccines-A-crime-against-humanity-The-International-Criminal-Court-to-determine.html
https://www.caclubindia.com/wealth/rothschild-family-net-worth-forbes/
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#:~:text=
https://www.uschamber.com/workforce/understanding-americas-labor-shortage
https://thefga.org/research/expanded-welfare-keeping-americans-from-working/
https://www.stop-now.org/blog/does-the-us-have-a-labor-shortage-or-not?
https://www.globalrailwayreview.com/article/96299/libor-lochman-ulrich-fikar-plane-vs-train/
https://www.raileurope.com/en-us/blog/travel-trains-vs-planes
https://www.elektormagazine.com/articles/high-speed-train-vs-airplane
https://www.europeanfiles.eu/environment/leveraging-the-many-benefits-of-high-speed-rail#
https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/12/14/a-slower-2023-and-uncertain-2024-for-vietnams-economy
https://www.statista.com/statistics/532529/national-debt-of-vietnam/
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080615/china-owns-us-debt-how-much.asp
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chinese-immigration
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Chinese_Americans#:~:text
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0611/june-20-5-ways-the-u.s.-can-get-out-of-debt.asp
https://blog.independent.org/2023/05/24/eliminating-debt-ceiling-14th-amendment/?gad_source=
https://unitedwedream.org/our-work/protect-immigrants-now/biden-stop-deportations-now/
https://homework.study.com/explanation/did-richard-nixon-commit-treason.html
https://www.sj-r.com/story/news/columns/2013/03/19/nixon-s-treason/43771838007/
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/this-is-treason
https://academic.oup.com/book/26083/chapter-abstract/194044598?redirectedFrom=fulltext
https://www.k-state.edu/history/research/eisenlecture/3lecture.html
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v14/d77
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v15/d62
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d112
https://www.c-span.org/video/?15026-1/president-dwight-eisenhower-farewell-address
https://luattaichinh.wordpress.com/2013/01/18/tm-hieu-ve-cuc-du-tru-lin-bang-my/
https://www.vice.com/en/article/3dk9wn/a-bridge-built-by-rockets
Viên Hàn Lâm XH-KH VN - Viện Hàn Lâm KHCNVN - https://vass.gov.vn/Pages/Index.aspx - https://vast.gov.vn/ -
https://hoperemainsonline.com/index.php/errors-in-the-bible/sai-sot-trong-kinh-thanh/
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23317687-e-jean-carroll-v-donald-trump-112422
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-ordered-pay-more-80-million-e-jean-carroll-defamation-trial
Nhà Thanh
https://thieulongtexas.blogspot.com/2014/01/vai-loi-ve-hai-chien-hoang-sa-1974-ky-4.html
https://now.tufts.edu/2023/12/05/saurabh-pals-tufts-solar-vehicle-project
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/persons#p_NVT_1
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-pham-van-dong-7
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d26
https://amac.us/newsline/society/trust-the-science-fauci-finally-admits-pandemic-errors/
https://chinaus-icas.org/research/from-pragmatism-to-unclos-purism/
https://janesdefenceweekly-com.webnode.page/janes-defence-weekly/
https://www.janes.com/publications/janes-defence-intelligence-magazines
https://chinhnghia.com/su-that-hai-chien-hoang-sa-le-van-thu-tra-loi.asp
https://kinhtedothi.vn/hai-phong-du-kien-se-xay-moi-8-tuyen-duong-sat.html
Hành lang_kinh tế Nam Ninh-Lạng Sơn - Hà Nội- Hải Phòng-Quảng Ninh
https://vov.vn/the-gioi/lao-va-trung-quoc-ket-noi-duong-sat-giua-hai-thu-do-post1059461.vov
https://newrepublic.com/article/163088/forever-wars-arent-ending-theyre-just-rebranded
https://now.tufts.edu/2023/10/16/us-foreign-policy-increasingly-relies-military-interventions
https://now.tufts.edu/2019/11/21/why-united-states-only-superpower
https://www.justsecurity.org/88131/finally-ending-americas-forever-war-part-i-diagnosis/
https://now.tufts.edu/2022/08/09/why-government-boosting-computer-chip-efforts-us
https://now.tufts.edu/2023/06/15/how-read-sun-tzus-art-war-way-its-author-intended-it-be-read
https://now.tufts.edu/2023/12/18/what-are-frozen-wars-and-forever-wars
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/09/america-afghanistan-terrorism-forever-war/619999/
https://www.justsecurity.org/82513/just-securitys-russia-ukraine-war-archive/
https://www.justsecurity.org/82513/just-securitys-russia-ukraine-war-archive/
https://theconversation.com/these-three-firms-own-corporate-america-77072
https://www.standardspeaker.com/3-companies-control-a-piece-of-nearly-everything/article_
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/paracel-islands/map/
http://www.chinhnghia.com/su-that-hai-chien-hoang-sa-le-van-thu.asp
https://ongvove.wordpress.com/2018/01/18/bao-trung-quoc-mo-ta-tran-hai-chien-hoang-sa-nam-1974/
https://vntaiwan.catholic.org.tw/vnbible2/mattheu/mattheu.htm
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/integrity-ethics/module-10/key-issues.html#:~:text
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journalism_ethics_and_standards
https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/14th-amendment#:~:tex
https://foundationforfreedomonline.com/elon-musks-top-ten-moments-for-free-speech-in-2023/
https://www.dbh.de/en/know/free-trade-agreements/evfta-eu-vietnam-free-trade-agreement-2/
https://www.sourceofasia.com/evfta-what-are-the-advantages-for-european-and-vietnamese-investors/
https://www.sourceofasia.com/evfta-what-are-the-advantages-for-european-and-vietnamese-investors/
https://www.newsweek.com/vietnam-government-human-rights-reform-2099-1856960
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/1993/mullis/facts/
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https://www.pfizer.com/news/announcements/global-and-us-agencies-declare-end-covid-19-emergency
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https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2809985
https://sciencetalks.org/covid-was-created-by-big-pharma-and-other-fun-conspiracy-theories/
https://www.chathamhouse.org/topics/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri?gclid
https://nextcity.org/features/a-most-internationally-modernized-city?gclid
https://www.boschrexroth.com/en/us/factory-automation/semiconductor-manufacturing/?
https://www.zeiss.com/semiconductor-manufacturing-technology/smt-magazine.html
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18335300.2007.9686895
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https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/four-reasons-why-supporting-ukraine-good-investment
https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/04/why-ukraine-matters-and-why-us-should-help
https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-should-the-united-states-be-interested-in-ukraine/
TTXVN giới thiệu toàn văn Tuyên bố Chung Việt Nam-Trung Quốc
Lịch Sử Việt Nam
Chip Worker Shortage in Vietnam Looms Threatens to stifle new progress
Texas Attorney General Sues Pfizer Misrepresenting Covid-19 Vaccine Efficacy And Conspiring
https://www.reuters.com/legal/pfizer-is-sued-by-texas-over-covid-19-vaccine-claims-2023-11-30/
https://www.newsweek.com/surge-vaccine-lawsuits-forces-biden-admin-hire-more-attorneys-1843385
https://law.georgia.gov/resources/vaccine-mandate-litigation
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