at Capitol.  June 19.1996

 

 

with Sen. JohnMc Cain

 

with Congressman Bob Barr

with General John K Singlaub

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ĐẶC BIỆT

  1. Served  In A Noble Cause

  2. Hiến Chương Liên Hiệp Quốc

  3. Văn Kiện Về Quyền Con Người

  4. Báo Cáo Tình Trạng Nhân Quyền

  5. China Reports US

  6. Liberal World Order

  7. The Heritage Constitution

  8. The Invisible Government Dan Moot

  9. The Invisible Government David Wise

  10. Montreal Protocol Hand Book

  11. Death Of A Generation

  12. Vấn Đề Tôn Gíao

  13. https://live.childrenshealthdefense.org/chd-tv/

  14. https://www.thelastamericanvagabond.com/

  15. https://nhandan.vn/

  16. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/

  17. dnews.com | News of the Palouse since 1911

  18. Legislation/Immigration and Nationality Act

  19. US Citizen Through US Military Service

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https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2022/08/19/1384992/much-azov-about-nothing-how-the-ukrainian-neo-nazis-canard-fooled-the-world

 

 

with General Micheal Ryan


 


3

 

 

CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCIES: MANAGING  THE  BUREAUCRACY

Donald Devine, Dennis Dean Kirk, and Paul Dans

 

 

OVERVIEW

From the very first Mandate for Leadership, the “personnel is policy” theme has been the fundamental principle guiding the government’s personnel management. As the U.S. Constitution makes clear, the President’s appointment, direction, and removal author- ities are the central elements of his executive power.1 In implementing that power, the people and the President deserve the most talented and responsible workforce possible. Who the President assigns to design and implement his political policy agenda will determine whether he can carry out the responsibility given to him by the American people. The President must recognize that whoever holds a government position sets its policy. To fulfill an electoral mandate, he must therefore give per-

sonnel management his highest priority, including Cabinet-level precedence.

The federal government’s immense bureaucracy spreads into hundreds of agen- cies and thousands of units and is centered and overseen at the top by key central personnel agencies and their governing laws and regulations. The major separate personnel agencies in the national government today are:

   The Office of Personnel Management (OPM);

   The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB);

   The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA); and

   The Office of Special Counsel (OSC).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Title 5 of the U.S. Code charges the OPM with executing, administering, and enforcing the rules, regulations, and laws governing the civil service.2 It grants the OPM direct responsibility for activities like retirement, pay, health, training, federal unionization, suitability, and classification functions not specifically granted to other agencies by statute. The agency’s Director is charged with aiding the President, as the President may request, in preparing such civil service rules as the President pre- scribes and otherwise advising the President on actions that may be taken to promote an efficient civil service and a systematic application of the merit system principles, including recommending policies relating to the selection, promotion, transfer, per- formance, pay, conditions of service, tenure, and separation of employees.

The MSPB is the lead adjudicator for hearing and resolving cases and contro- versies for 2.2 million federal employees.3 It is required to conduct fair and neutral case adjudications, regulatory reviews, and actions and studies to improve the workforce. Its court-like adjudications investigate and hear appeals from agency actions such as furloughs, suspensions, demotions, and terminations and are appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

The FLRA hears appeals of agency personnel cases involving federal labor griev- ance procedures to provide judicial review with binding decisions appealable to appeals courts.4 It interprets the rights and duties of agencies and employee labor organizations—on management rights, OPM interpretations, recognition of labor organizations, and unfair labor practices—under the general principle of bargain- ing in good faith and compelling need.

The OSC serves as the investigator, mediator, publisher, and prosecutor before the MSPB with respect to agency and employees regarding prohibited person- nel practices, Hatch Act5 politicization, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act6 issues, and whistleblower complaints.7

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has general respon- sibility for reviewing charges of employee discrimination against all civil rights breaches. However, it also administers a government employee section that investi- gates and adjudicates federal employee complaints concerning equal employment violations as with the private sector.8 This makes the agency an additional de facto factor in government personnel management.

While not a personnel agency per se, the General Services Administration (GSA) is charged with general supervision of contracting.9 Today, there are many more contractors in government than there are civil service employees. The GSA must therefore be a part of any personnel management discussion.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OPM: Managing the Federal Bureaucracy. At the very pinnacle of the modern progressive program to make government competent stands the ideal of professionalized, career civil service. Since the turn of the 20th century,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

progressives have sought a system that could effectively select, train, reward, and guard from partisan influence the neutral scientific experts they believe are required to staff the national government and run the administrative state. Their

U.S. system was initiated by the Pendleton Act of 188310 and institutionalized by the 1930s New Deal to set principles and practices that were meant to ensure that expert merit rather than partisan favors or personal favoritism ruled within the federal bureaucracy. Yet, as public frustration with the civil service has grown, generating calls to “drain the swamp,” it has become clear that their project has had serious unintended consequences.

The civil service was devised to replace the amateurism and presumed corrup- tion of the old spoils system, wherein government jobs rewarded loyal partisans who might or might not have professional backgrounds. Although the system appeared to be sufficient for the nation’s first century, progressive intellectuals and activists demanded a more professionalized, scientific, and politically neutral Administration. Progressives designed a merit system to promote expertise and shield bureaucrats from partisan political pressure, but it soon began to insulate civil servants from accountability. The modern merit system increasingly made it almost impossible to fire all but the most incompetent civil servants. Complying with arcane rules regarding recruiting, rating, hiring, and firing simply replaced the goal of cultivating competence and expertise.

In the 1970s, Georgia Democratic Governor Jimmy Carter, then a political unknown, ran for President supporting New Deal programs and their Great Soci- ety expansion but opposing the way they were being administered. The policies were not actually reducing poverty, increasing prosperity, or improving the envi- ronment, he argued, and to make them work required fundamental bureaucratic reform. He correctly charged that almost all government employees were rated as “successful,” all received the same pay regardless of performance, and even the worst were impossible to fire—and he won the presidency.

President Carter fulfilled his campaign promise by hiring Syracuse University Dean Alan Campbell, who served first as Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Com- mission and then as Director of the OPM and helped him devise and pass the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)11 to reset the basic structure of today’s bureau- cracy. A new performance appraisal system was devised with a five rather than three distribution of rating categories and individual goals more related to agency missions and more related to employee promotion for all. Pay and benefits were based directly on improved performance appraisals (including sizable bonuses) for mid-level managers and senior executives. But time ran out on President Carter before the act could be fully executed, so it was left to President Ronald Reagan and his new OPM and agency leadership to implement.

Overall, the new law seemed to work for a few years under Reagan, but the Carter– Reagan reforms were dissipated within a decade. Today, employee evaluation is back


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

to pre-reform levels with almost all rated successful or above, frustrating any rela- tion between pay and performance. An “outstanding” rating should be required for Senior Executive Service (SES) chiefs to win big bonuses, but a few years ago, when it was disclosed that the Veterans Administration executives who encouraged false reporting of waiting lists for hospital admission were rated outstanding, the Senior Executive Association justified it, telling Congress that only outstanding performers would be promoted to the SES in the first place and that precise ratings were unnec- essary.12 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), however, has reported that pay raises, within-grade pay increases, and locality pay for regular employees and executives have become automatic rather than based on performance—as a result of most employees being rated at similar appraisal levels.13

OPM: Merit Hiring in a Merit System. It should not be impossible even for a large national government to hire good people through merit selection. The government did so for years, but it has proven difficult in recent times to select personnel based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) as the law dictates. Yet for the past 34 years, the U.S. civil service has been unable to distinguish con- sistently between strong and unqualified applicants for employment.

As the Carter presidency was winding down, the U.S. Department of Justice and top lawyers at the OPM contrived with plaintiffs to end civil service IQ exam- inations because of concern about their possible impact on minorities. The OPM had used the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE) gen- eral intelligence exam to select college graduates for top agency employment, but Carter Administration officials—probably without the President’s informed con- currence—abolished the PACE through a legal consent court decree capitulating to demands by civil rights petitioners who contended that it was discriminatory. The judicial decree was to last only five years but still controls federal hiring and is applied to all KSA tests even today.

General ability tests like the PACE have been used successfully to assess the use- fulness and cost-effectiveness of broad intellectual qualities across many separate occupations. Courts have ruled that even without evidence of overt, intentional discrimination, such results might suggest discrimination. This doctrine of dispa- rate impact could be ended legislatively or at least narrowed through the regulatory process by a future Administration. In any event, the federal government has been denied the use of a rigorous entry examination for three decades, relying instead on self-evaluations that have forced managers to resort to subterfuge such as preselecting friends or associates that they believe are competent to obtain qual- ified employees.

In 2015, President Barack Obama’s OPM began to introduce an improved merit examination called USAHire, which it had been testing quietly since 2012 in a few agencies for a dozen job descriptions. The tests had multiple-choice questions with only one correct answer. Some questions even required essay replies: questions


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

that would change regularly to depress cheating. President Donald Trump’s OPM planned to implement such changes but was delayed because of legal concerns over possible disparate impact.

Courts have agreed to review the consent decree if the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures setting the technical requirements for sound exams are reformed. A government that is unable to select employees based on KSA-like test qualifications cannot work, and the OPM must move forward on this very basic personnel management obligation.

The Centrality of Performance Appraisal. In the meantime, the OPM must manage the workforce it has. Before they can reward or discipline federal employees, managers must first identify who their top performers are and who is performing less than adequately. In fact, as Ludwig von Mises proved in his classic Bureaucracy,14 unlike the profit-and-loss evaluation tool used in the private sector, government performance measurement depends totally on a functioning appraisal system. If they cannot be identified in the first place within a functioning appraisal system, it is impossible to reward good performance or correct poor performance. The problem is that the collegial atmosphere of a bureaucracy in a multifaceted appraisal system that is open to appeals makes this a very challenging ideal to implement successfully. The GAO reported more recently that overly high and widely spread perfor- mance ratings were again plaguing the government, with more than 99 percent of employees rated fully successful or above by their managers, a mere 0.3 percent rated as minimally successful, and 0.1 percent actually rated unacceptable.15 Why? It is human nature that no one appreciates being told that he or she is less than outstanding in every way. Informing subordinates in a closely knit bureaucracy that they are not performing well is difficult. Rating compatriots is even consid- ered rude and unprofessional. Moreover, managers can be and often are accused

of racial or sexual discrimination for a poor rating, and this discourages honesty. In 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 1383916 requiring agen-

cies to reduce the time for employees to improve performance before corrective action could be taken; to initiate disciplinary actions against poorly performing employees more expeditiously; to reiterate that agencies are obligated to make employees improve; to reduce the time for employees to respond to allegations of poor performance; to mandate that agencies remind supervisors of expiring employee probationary periods; to prohibit agencies from entering into settlement agreements that modify an employee’s personnel record; and to reevaluate proce- dures for agencies to discipline supervisors who retaliate against whistleblowers. Unfortunately, the order was overturned by the Biden Administration,17 so it will need to be reintroduced in 2025.

The fact remains that meaningfully evaluating employees’ performance is a critical part of a manager’s job. In the Reagan appraisal process, managers were evaluated on how they themselves rated their subordinates. This is critical to


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

responsibility and improved management. It is essential that political executives build policy goals directly into employee appraisals both for mission success and for employees to know what is expected. Indistinguishable from their coworkers on paper, hard-working federal employees often go unrewarded for their efforts and are often the system’s greatest critics. Federal workers who are performing inadequately get neither the benefit of an honest appraisal nor clear guidance on how to improve. Political executives should take an active role in supervising per- formance appraisals of career staff, not unduly delegate this responsibility to senior career managers, and be willing to reward and support good performers.

Merit Pay. Performance appraisal means little to daily operations if it is not tied directly to real consequences for success as well as failure. According to a survey of major U.S. private companies—which, unlike the federal government, also have a profit-and-loss evaluation—90 percent use a system of merit pay for performance based on some type of appraisal system. Despite early efforts to institute merit pay throughout the federal government, however, compensation is still based primarily on seniority rather than merit.

Merit pay for executives and managers was part of the Carter reforms and was implemented early in the Reagan presidency. Beginning in the summer of 1982, the Reagan OPM entered 18 months of negotiations with House and Senate staff on extending merit pay to the entire workforce. Long and detailed talks between the OPM and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress ensued, and a final agreement was reached in 1983 that supposedly ensured the passage of legislation creating a new Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) for all, (not just management) GS-13 through GS-15 employees.

Meanwhile, the OPM issued regulations to expand the role of performance related to pay throughout the entire workforce, but congressional allies of the employee unions, led by Representative Steny Hoyer (D) of government employee– rich Maryland, stoutly resisted this extension of pay-for-performance and, with strong union support, used the congressional appropriations process to block OPM administrative pay reforms. Bonuses for SES career employees survived, but per- formance appraisals became so high and widely distributed that there was little relationship between performance and remuneration.

Ever since the original merit pay system for federal managers (GM-13 through GM-15 grade levels, just below the SES) was allowed to expire in September 1993, little to nothing has been done either to reinstate the federal merit pay program for managers or to distribute performance rating evaluations for the SES, much less to extend the program to the remainder of the workforce. A reform-friendly President and Congress might just provide the opportunity to create a more comprehensive performance plan; in the meantime, however, political executives should use exist- ing pay and especially fiscal awards strategically to reward good performance to the degree allowed by law.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Making the Appeals Process Work. The nonmilitary government dismissal rate is well below 1 percent, and no private-sector industry employee enjoys the job security that a federal employee enjoys. Both safety and justice demand that managers learn to act strategically to hire good and fire poor performers legally. The initial paperwork required to separate poor or abusive performers (when they are infrequently identified) is not overwhelming, and managers might be motivated to act if it were not for the appeals and enforcement processes. Formal appeal in the private sector is mostly a rather simple two-step process, but government unions and associations have been able to convince politicians to support a multiple and extensive appeals and enforcement process.

As noted, there are multiple administrative appeals bodies. The FLRA, OSC, and EEOC have relatively narrow jurisdictions. Claims that an employee’s removal or disciplinary actions violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between an agency and a union are handled by the FLRA, employees who claim their removal was the result of discrimination can appeal to the EEOC, and employ- ees who believe their firing was retribution for being a whistleblower can go to the OSC. While the MSPB specializes in abuses of direct merit system issues, it can and does hear and review almost any of the matters heard by the other agencies.

Cases involving race, gender, religion, age, pregnancy, disability, or national origin can be appealed to the EEOC or the MSPB—and in some cases to both—and to the OSC. This gives employees multiple opportunities to prove their cases, and while the EEOC, MSPB, FLRA, and OSC may all apply essentially the same burden of proof, the odds of success may be substantially different in each forum. In fact, forum shopping among them for a friendlier venue is a common practice, but fre- quent filers face no consequences for frivolous complaints. As a result, meritorious cases are frequently delayed, denying relief and justice to truly aggrieved individuals. The MSPB can and does handle all such matters, but it faces a backlog of an estimated 3,000 cases of people who were potentially wrongfully terminated or disciplined as far back as 2013. From 2017–2022 the MSPB lacked the quorum required to decide appeals. On the other hand, as of January 2023, the EEOC had

a backlog of 42,000 cases.

While federal employees win appeals relatively infrequently—MSPB adminis- trative judges have upheld agency decisions as much as 80 percent of the time—the real problem is the time and paperwork involved in the elaborate process that managers must undergo during appeals. This keeps even the best managers from bringing cases in all but the most egregious cases of poor performance or mis- conduct. As a result, the MSPB, EEOC, FLRA, and OSC likely see very few cases compared to the number of occurrences, and nonperformers continue to be paid and often are placed in nonwork positions.

Having a choice of appeals is especially unique to the government. If lower-pri- ority issues were addressed in-house, serious adverse actions would be less subject


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

to delay. With the proper limitation of labor union actions, the FLRA should have limited reason for appeals. The EEOC’s federal employee section should be transferred to the MSPB, and many of the OCS’s investigatory functions should be returned to the OPM. The MSPB could then become the main reviewer of adverse actions, greatly simplifying the burdensome appeal process.

Making Civil Service Benefits Economically and Administratively Ratio- nal. In recent years, the combined wages and benefits of the executive branch civilian workforce totaled $300 billion according to official data. But even that amount does not properly account for billions in unfunded liability for retirement and other government reporting distortions. Official data also report employment as approximately 2 million, but this ignores approximately 20 million contractors who, while not eligible for government pay and benefits, do receive them indirectly through contracting (even if they are less generous). Official data also claim that national government employees are paid less than private-sector employees are paid for similar work, but several more neutral sources demonstrate that pub- lic-sector workers make more on average than their private-sector counterparts. All of this extravagance deserves close scrutiny.

Market-Based Pay and Benefits. According to current law, federal workers are to be paid wages comparable to equivalent private-sector workers rather than compared to all private-sector employees. While the official studies claim that federal employees are underpaid relative to the private sector by 20 percent or more, a 2016 Heritage Foundation study found that federal employees received wages that were 22 percent higher than wages for similar private-sector workers; if the value of employee benefits was included, the total compensation premium for federal employees over their private-sector equivalents increased to between 30 percent and 40 percent.18 The American Enterprise Institute found a 14 percent pay premium and a 61 percent total compensation premium.19

Base salary is only one component of a federal employee’s total compensation. In addition to high starting wages, federal employees normally receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (available to all employees) and generous scheduled raises known as step increases. Moreover, a large proportion of federal employ- ees are stationed in the Washington, D.C., area and other large cities and are entitled to steep locality pay enhancement to account for the high cost of living in these areas.

A federal employee with five years’ experience receives 20 vacation days, 13 paid sick days, and all 10 federal holidays compared to an employee at a large private company who receives 13 days of vacation and eight paid sick days. Federal health benefits are more comparable to those provided by Fortune 500 employers with the government paying 72 percent of the weighted average premiums, but this is much higher than for most private plans. Almost half of private firms do not offer any employer contributions at all.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The obvious solution to these discrepancies is to move closer to a market model for federal pay and benefits. One need is for a neutral agency to oversee pay hiring decisions, especially for high-demand occupations. The OPM is independent of agency operations, so it can assess requirements more neutrally. For many years, with its Special Pay Rates program, the OPM evaluated claims that federal rates in an area were too low to attract competent employees and allowed agencies to offer higher pay when needed rather than increased rates for all. Ideally, the OPM should establish an initial pay schedule for every occupation and region, monitor turnover rates and applicant-to-position ratios, and adjust pay and recruitment on that basis. Most of this requires legislation, but the OPM should be an advocate for a true equality of benefits between the public and private sectors.

Reforming Federal Retirement Benefits. Career civil servants enjoy retire- ment benefits that are nearly unheard of in the private sector. Federal employees retire earlier (normally at age 55 after 30 years), enjoy richer pension annuities, and receive automatic cost-of-living adjustments based on the areas in which they retire. Defined-benefit federal pensions are fully indexed for inflation—a practice that is extremely rare in the private sector. A federal employee with a preretire- ment income of $25,000 under the older of the two federal retirement plans will receive at least $200,000 more over a 20-year period than will private-sector work- ers with the same preretirement salary under historic inflation levels.

During the early Reagan years, the OPM reformed many specific provisions of the federal pension program to save billions administratively. Under OPM pres- sure, Reagan and Congress ultimately ended the old Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) entirely for new employees, which (counting disbursements for the unfunded liability) accounted for 51.3 percent of the federal government's total payroll. The retirement system that replaced it—the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS)—reduced the cost of federal employee retirement dis- bursements to 28.5 percent of payroll (including contributions to Social Security and the employer match to the Thrift Savings Plan). More of the pension cost was shifted to the employee, but the new system was much more equitable for the 40 percent who received few or no benefits under the old system.

By 1999, more than half of the federal workforce was covered by the new system, and the government’s per capita share of the cost (as the employer) was less than half the cost of the old system: 20.2 percent of FERS payroll vs. 44.3 percent of CSRS payroll, representing one of the largest examples of government savings anywhere. Although the government pension system has become more like private pension systems, it still remains much more generous, and other means might be considered in the future to move it even closer to private plans.

GSA: Landlord and Contractor Management. The General Services Administration is best known as the federal government’s landlord—designing, constructing, managing, and preserving government buildings and leasing and


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

managing outside commercial real estate contracting with 376.9 million square feet of space. Obviously, as its prime function, real estate expertise is key to the GSA’s success. However, the GSA is also the government’s purchasing agent, connecting federal purchasers with commercial products and services in the private sector and their personnel management functions. With contractors performing so many functions today, the GSA therefore becomes a de facto part of governmentwide personnel management. The GSA also manages the Presidential Transition Act (PTA) process, which also directly involves the OPM. A recent proposal would have incorporated the OPM and GSA (and OMB). Fortunately, this did not take place in that form, but it would make sense for GSA and OPM leadership and staff to hold regular meetings to work through matters of common interest such as moderating PTA personnel restrictions and the relationships between contract and civil service employees.

Reductions-in-Force. Reducing the number of federal employees seems an obvious way to reduce the overall expense of the civil service, and many prior Administrations have attempted to do just this. Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama began their terms, as did Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump, by mandating a freeze on the hiring of new federal employees, but these efforts did not lead to permanent and substantive reductions in the number of nondefense federal employees.

First, it is a challenge even to know which workers to cut. As mentioned, there are 2 million federal employees, but since budgets have exploded, so has the total number of personnel with nearly 10 times more federal contractors than federal employees. Contractors are less expensive because they are not entitled to high government pensions or benefits and are easier to fire and discipline. In addition, millions of state government employees work under federal grants, in effect administering federal programs; these cannot be cut directly. Cutting federal employment can be helpful and can provide a simple story to average citizens, but cutting functions, levels, funds, and grants is much more important than setting simple employment size.

Simply reducing numbers can actually increase costs. OMB instructions fol- lowing President Trump’s employment freeze told agencies to consider buyout programs, encouraging early retirements in order to shift costs from current bud- gets in agencies to the retirement system and minimize the number of personnel fired. The Environmental Protection Agency immediately implemented such a program, and OMB urged the passage of legislation to increase payout maximums from $25,000 to $40,000 to further increase spending under the “cuts.” President Clinton’s OMB had introduced a similar buyout that cost the Treasury $2.8 billion, mostly for those who were going to retire anyway. Moreover, when a new employee is hired to fill a job recently vacated in a buyout, the government for a time is paying two people to fill one job.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

What is needed at the beginning is a freeze on all top career-position hiring to prevent “burrowing-in” by outgoing political appointees. Moreover, four fac- tors determine the order in which employees are protected during layoffs: tenure, veterans’ preference, seniority, and performance in that order of importance. Despite several attempts in the House of Representatives during the Trump years to enact legislation that would modestly increase the weight given to performance over time-of-service, the fierce opposition by federal managers associations and unions representing long-serving but not necessarily well-performing constituents explains why the bills failed to advance. A determined President should insist that performance be first and be wary of costly types of reductions-in-force.

Impenetrable Bureaucracy. The GAO has identified almost a hundred actions that the executive branch or Congress could take to improve efficiency and effec- tiveness across 37 areas that span a broad range of government missions and functions. It identified 33 actions to address mission fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the 12 areas of defense, economic development, health, homeland security, and information technology. It also identified 59 other opportunities for executive agencies or Congress to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection across 25 areas of government.20

A logical place to begin would be to identify and eliminate functions and pro- grams that are duplicated across Cabinet departments or spread across multiple agencies. Congress hoped to help this effort by passing the Government Perfor- mance and Results Act of 1993,21 which required all federal agencies to define their missions, establish goals and objectives, and measure and report their per- formance to Congress. Three decades of endless time-consuming reports later, the government continues to grow but with more paper and little change either in performance or in the number of levels between government and the people.

The Brookings Institution’s Paul Light emphasizes the importance of the increasing number of levels between the top heads of departments and the people at the bottom who receive the products of government decision-making. He esti- mates that there are perhaps 50 or more levels of impenetrable bureaucracy and no way other than imperfect performance appraisals to communicate between them.22 The Trump Administration proposed some possible consolidations, but these were not received favorably in Congress, whose approval is necessary for most such proposals. The best solution is to cut functions and budgets and devolve respon- sibilities. That is a challenge primarily for Presidents, Congress, and the entire government, but the OPM still needs to lead the way governmentwide in managing

personnel properly even in any future smaller government.

Creating a Responsible Career Management Service. The people elect a President who is charged by Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution23 with seeing that the laws are “faithfully executed” with his political appointees democratically linked to that legitimizing responsibility. An autonomous bureaucracy has neither


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

independent constitutional status nor separate moral legitimacy. Therefore, career civil servants by themselves should not lead major policy changes and reforms.

The creation of the Senior Executive Service was the top career change intro- duced by the 1978 Carter–Campbell Civil Service Reform Act. Its aim was to professionalize the career service and make it more responsible to the democrat- ically elected commander in chief and his political appointees while respecting the rights due to career employees, very much including those in the top positions. The new SES would allow management to be more flexible in filling and reassigning executive positions and locations beyond narrow specialties for more efficient mission accomplishment and would provide pay and large bonuses to motivate career performance.

The desire to infiltrate political appointees improperly into the high career civil service has been widespread in every Administration, whether Democrat or Republican. Democratic Administrations, however, are typically more successful because they require the cooperation of careerists, who generally lean heavily to the Left. Such burrowing-in requires career job descriptions for new positions that closely mirror the functions of a political appointee; a special hiring authority that allows the bypassing of veterans’ preference as well as other preference categories; and the ability to frustrate career candidates from taking the desired position.

President Reagan’s OPM began by limiting such SES burrowing-in, arguing that the proper course was to create and fill political positions. This simultane- ously promotes the CSRA principle of political leadership of the bureaucracy and respects the professional autonomy of the career service. But this requires that career SES employees should respect political rights too. Actions such as career staff reserving excessive numbers of key policy positions as “career reserved” to deny them to noncareer SES employees frustrate CSRA intent. Another evasion is the general domination by career staff on SES personnel evaluation boards, the opposite of noncareer executives dominating these critical meeting discussions as expected in the SES. Career training also often underplays the political role in leadership and inculcates career-first policy and value viewpoints.

Frustrated with these activities by top career executives, the Trump Adminis- tration issued Executive Order 1395724 to make career professionals in positions that are not normally subject to change as a result of a presidential transition but who discharge significant duties and exercise significant discretion in formulating and implementing executive branch policy and programs an exception to the com- petitive hiring rules and examinations for career positions under a new Schedule

F. It ordered the Director of OPM and agency heads to set procedures to prepare lists of such confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating positions and prepare procedures to create exceptions from civil service rules when careerists hold such positions, from which they can relocate back to the regular civil service after such service. The order was subsequently reversed by President


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Biden25 at the demand of the civil service associations and unions. It should be reinstated, but SES responsibility should come first.

Managing Personnel in a Union Environment. Historically, unions were thought to be incompatible with government management. There is a natural limit to the bargaining power of private-sector unions, but the financial bottom line of public-sector unions is not similarly constrained. If private-sector unions push too hard a bargain, they can so harm a company or so reduce efficiency that their employer is forced to go out of business and eliminate union jobs altogether. There is no such limit in government, which cannot go out of business, so demands can be excessive without negatively affecting employee and union bottom lines.

Even Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt considered union representa- tion in the federal government to be incompatible with democracy. Striking and even threats of bargaining and delay were considered acts against the people and thus improper. It was not until President John Kennedy that union representation in the federal government was recognized—and then merely by executive order. Labor bargaining was not set in statute until the Carter Administration was forced by Congress to do so in order to pass the CSRA, although all bargaining was placed under OPM review.

The CSRA was able to maintain strong management rights for the OPM and agencies and forbade collective bargaining on pay and benefits as well as manage- ment prerogatives. Over time, OPM, FLRA, and agencies’ personnel offices and courts, especially in Democratic Administrations, narrowed management rights so that labor bargaining expanded as management rights contracted. But the man- agement rights are still in statute, have been enforced by some Administrations, and should be enforced again by any future OPM and agency managements, which should not be intimidated by union power.

Rather than being daunted, President Trump issued three executive orders:

   Executive Order 13836, encouraging agencies to renegotiate all union collective bargaining agreements to ensure consistency with the law and respect for management rights;26

   Executive Order 13837, encouraging agencies to prevent union representatives from using official time preparing or pursuing grievances or from engaging in other union activity on government time;27 and

   Executive Order 13839, encouraging agencies both to limit labor grievances on removals from service or on challenging performance appraisals and to prioritize performance over seniority when deciding who should be retained following reductions-in-force.28


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

All were revoked by the Biden Administration29 and should be reinstated by the next Administration, to include the immediate appointment of the FLRA General Counsel and reactivation of the Impasses Panel.

Congress should also consider whether public-sector unions are appropriate in the first place. The bipartisan consensus up until the middle of the 20th cen- tury held that these unions were not compatible with constitutional government.30 After more than half a century of experience with public-sector union frustrations of good government management, it is hard to avoid reaching the same conclusion. Fully Staffing the Ranks of Political Appointees. The President must rely legally on his top department and agency officials to run the government and on top White House staff employees to coordinate operations through regular Cabinet and other meetings and communications. Without this political leadership, the career civil service becomes empowered to lead the executive branch without democratic legitimacy. While many obstacles stand in his way, a President is constitutionally and statutorily required to fill the top political positions in the executive branch

both to assist him and to provide overall legitimacy.

Most Presidents have had some difficulty obtaining congressional approval of their appointees, but this has worsened recently. After the 2016 election, President Trump faced special hostility from the opposition party and the media in getting his appointees confirmed or even considered by the Senate. His early Office of Presidential Personnel (PPO) did not generally remove political appointees from the previous Administration but instead relied mostly on prior political appoin- tees and career civil servants to run the government. Such a reliance on holdovers and bureaucrats led to a lack of agency control and the absolute refusal of the Acting Attorney General from the Obama Administration to obey a direct order from the President.

Under the early PPO, the Trump Administration appointed fewer political appointees in its first few months in office than had been appointed in any recent presidency, partly because of historically high partisan congressional obstructions but also because several officials announced that they preferred fewer political appointees in the agencies as a way to cut federal spending. Whatever the reasoning, this had the effect of permanently hampering the rollout of the new President’s agenda. Thus, in those critical early years, much of the government relied on senior careerists and holdover Obama appointees to carry out the sensitive responsibili- ties that would otherwise belong to the new President’s appointees.

Fortunately, the later PPO, OPM, and Senate leadership began to cooperate to build a strong team to implement the President’s personnel appointment agenda. Any new Administration would be wise to learn that it will need a full cadre of sound political appointees from the beginning if it expects to direct this enormous federal bureaucracy. A close relationship between the PPO at the White House and the OPM, coordinating with agency assistant secretaries of administration


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

and PPO’s chosen White House Liaisons and their staff at each agency, is essential to the management of this large, multilevel, resistant, and bureaucratic challenge. If “personnel is policy” is to be our general guide, it would make sense to give the President direct supervision of the bureaucracy with the OPM Director available in his Cabinet.

 

A REFORMED BUREAUCRACY

Today, the federal government’s bureaucracy cannot even meet its own civil service ideals. The merit criteria of ability, knowledge, and skills are no longer the basis for recruitment, selection, or advancement, while pay and benefits for com- parable work are substantially above those in the private sector. Retention is not based primarily on performance, and for the most part, inadequate performance is not appraised, corrected, or punished.

The authors have made many suggestions here that, if implemented, could bring that bureaucracy more under control and enable it to work more efficiently and responsibly, which is especially required for the half of civilian government that administers its undeniable responsibilities for defense and foreign affairs. While a better administered central bureaucracy is crucial for both those and domestic responsibilities, the problem of properly running the government goes beyond simple bureaucratic administration. The specific deficiencies of the fed- eral bureaucracy—size, levels of organization, inefficiency, expense, and lack of responsiveness to political leadership—are rooted in the progressive ideology that unelected experts can and should be trusted to promote the general welfare in just about every area of social life.

The Constitution, however, reserved a few enumerated powers to the federal government while leaving the great majority of domestic activities to state, local, and private governance. As James Madison explained: “The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the state.”31 Modern progressive politics has simply given the national government more to do than the complex separa- tion-of-powers Constitution allows.

That progressive system has broken down in our time, and the only real solution is for the national government to do less: to decentralize and privatize as much as possible and then ensure that the remaining bureaucracy is managed effectively along the lines of the enduring principles set out in detail here.

 


AUTHORS’ NOTE: The authors are grateful for the collaborative work of the individuals listed as contributors to this chapter for the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. The authors alone assume responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed February 1, 2023).

2.                5 U.S. Code §§ 1101 et seq. and 1103(a)(5), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-II/chapter-11 (accessed February 1, 2023).

3.                5 U.S. Code § 1201, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1201 (accessed February 1, 2023).

4.                 5 U.S. Code § 7101, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7101 (accessed February 1, 2023), and § 7117,

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7117 (accessed February 1, 2023).

5.                S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, August 2, 1939, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

6.                H.R. 995, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Public Law No. 103-353, 101st Congress, October 13, 1994, https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-108/STATUTE-108-Pg3149.

pdf (accessed February 1, 2023).

7.                 5 U.S. Code § 1206, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/1206 (accessed February 1, 2023).

8.                42 U.S. Code § 2000e, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000e (accessed February 1, 2023).

9.                40 U.S. Code § 581, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/40/581 (accessed February 1, 2023).

10.           U.S. National Archives, “Milestone Documents: Pendleton Act (1883),” last reviewed February 8, 2022, https:// www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/pendleton-act (accessed February 2, 2023).

11.           S. 2640, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-454, 95th Congress, October 13, 1978, https://

www.congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1111.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

12.           Donovan Sack and Bill Theobald, “Veterans Affairs Pays $140 Million in Bonuses Amid Scandals,” USA Today, November 11, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/11/veterans-affairs-pays-142-

million-bonuses-amid-scandals/75537586/ (accessed March 15, 2023).

13.           U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of Performance Ratings Across the Federal Government, 2013,” GAO-16-520R, May 9, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-520r.pdf

(accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Management: OPM Needs to Do More to Ensure Meaningful Distinctions Are Made in SES Ratings and Performance Awards, GAO-15-

189, January 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-189.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023); U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Measuring Federal Employee Performance,” WatchBlog, posted October 18, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/blog/2016/10/18/measuring-federal-employee-performance (accessed March 15, 2023); Lisa Rein, “The Federal Workforce, Where Everyone’s Performance Gets Rave Reviews,” The Washington Post, June 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/13/heres-the-news-from-the-

federal-government-where-everyone-is-above-average-way-above/ (accessed March 15, 2023).

14.           Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), https://ia902300.us.archive. org/17/items/mises-pdfs/1944-01-01_LudwigVonMises_Bureaucracy.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

15.           Figure 1, “Permanent, Non-Senior Executive Service Employee Performance Rating Outcomes (All Rating Systems, Calendar Year 2013),” in U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Federal Workforce: Distribution of Performance Ratings Across the Federal Government, 2013,” p. 6.

16.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13839, “Promoting Accountability and Streamlining Removal Procedures Consistent with Merit System Principles,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018), pp. 25343–25347, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11939.pdf (accessed

February 2, 2023).

17.           President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14003, “Protecting the Federal Workforce,” January 22, 2021, in

Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 16 (January 27, 2021), pp. 7231–7233, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-

2021-01-27/pdf/2021-01924.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

18.           Rachel Greszler and James Sherk, “Why It Is Time to Reform Compensation for Federal Employees,” The Heritage Foundation, July 27, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/why-it-time-reform- compensation-federal-employees.

19.           Andrew G. Biggs and Jason Richwine, “Comparing Federal and Private Sector Compensation,” American Enterprise Institute Working Paper No. 2011-02, revised June 2011, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/ uploads/2011/10/AEI-Working-Paper-on-Federal-Pay-May-2011.pdf?x91208 (accessed February 2, 2023).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

20.           See Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, “Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions in Financial Benefits,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-21-544T, May 12, 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao- 21-544t.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

21.           S. 20, Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law No. 103-62, 103rd Congress, August 3, 1993, https://www.congress.gov/103/statute/STATUTE-107/STATUTE-107-Pg285.pdf (accessed

February 2, 2023).

22.           Paul Light, “The Real Crisis in Government,” The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), January 22, 2010, https:// captimes.com/news/opinion/column/paul-c-light-the-real-crisis-in-government/article_9e139318-3d00- 5898-908d-4c7aee1e105d.html (accessed March 15, 2023).

23.           U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section3 (accessed February 2, 2023).

24.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26, 2020), pp. 67631–67635, https://www.govinfo.gov/

content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

25.           See note 17, supra.

26.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13836, “Developing Efficient, Effective, and Cost-Reducing Approaches to Federal Sector Collective Bargaining,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018), pp. 25329–25334, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11913.pdf (accessed

February 2, 2023).

27.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13837, “Ensuring Transparency, Accountability, and Efficiency in Taxpayer-Funded Union Time Use,” May 25, 2018, in Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 106 (June 1, 2018),

pp. 25335–25340, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-06-01/pdf/2018-11916.pdf (accessed February 2, 2023).

28.           See note 16, supra.

29.           See note 17, supra.

30.           Philip K. Howard, Not Accountable: Rethinking the Constitutionality of Public Employee Unions (Garden City, NY: Rodin Books, 2023).

31.           James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 45, January 26, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Madison/01-10-02-0254 (accessed February 1, 2023).


 


Section Two

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE COMMON DEFENSE

 

 

W

 
hile the lives of Americans are affected in noteworthy ways, for better or worse, by each part of the executive branch, the inherent importance of national defense and foreign affairs makes the Departments of Defense

and State first among equals. Originating in the George Washington Administra- tion, the War Department (as it was then known) was headed by Henry Knox, America’s chief artillery officer in the Revolutionary War; Thomas Jefferson, the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, was the first Secretary of State. Despite such long and storied histories, neither department is currently living up to its standards, and the success of the next presidency will be determined in part by whether they can be significantly improved in short order.

“Ever since our Founding,” former acting secretary of defense Christopher Miller writes in Chapter 4, “Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid war is to be prepared for it in peace.” Yet the Department of Defense “is a deeply troubled institution.” It has emphasized leftist politics over military readiness, “Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations,” and “the Biden Admin- istration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have taken a serious toll.” Additionally, Miller writes that “the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a high toll on America’s military.” Moreover, our military has adopted a risk-averse culture—think of masked soldiers, sailors, and airmen—rather than instilling and rewarding courage in thought and action.

The good news is that most enlisted personnel, and most officers, especially below the rank of general or admiral, continue to be patriotic defenders of liberty.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

But this is now Barack Obama’s general officer corps. That is why Russ Vought argues in Chapter 2 that the National Security Council “should rigorously review all general and flag officer promotions to prioritize the core roles and responsi- bilities of the military over social engineering and non-defense related matters, including climate change, critical race theory, manufactured extremism, and other polarizing policies that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’s finest men and women from enlisting.” Ensuring that many of America’s best and bright- est continue to choose military service is essential.

“By far the most significant danger” to America from abroad, Miller writes, “is China.” That communist regime “is undertaking a historic military buildup,” which “could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.” Resisting Chinese expansionist aims “requires a denial defense” whereby we make “the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult.” However, Miller adds that “[c]ritically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear.”

The best gauge of such willingness is congressional approval. Accordingly, we must rediscover and adhere to the Founders’ wise division of war powers, whereby Congress, the most representative and deliberative branch, decides whether to go to war; and the executive, the most energetic and decisive branch, decides how to carry it out once begun. As the past 75 years have repeatedly demonstrated in different ways—from Korea, to Vietnam, to Iraq, to Afghanistan—we depart from our constitutional design at our peril.

Miller writes that we “must treat missile defense as a top priority,” ensure that more of our weapons are made in America, reform the budgeting process, and sustain “an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise.” Across all of our efforts, we must keep in mind that part of peace through strength is knowing when to fight. As George Washington warned nearly two centuries ago, we must con- tinue to be on guard against being drawn into conflicts that do not justify great loss of American treasure or significant shedding of American blood. At the same time, we must be prepared to defend our interests and meet challenges where and when they arise.

An effective diplomatic corps is central to defending our interests and influ- encing world events. Whereas most military personnel have had leftist priorities imposed from above, the problem at State comes largely from within. Former State Department director of policy planning Kiron Skinner writes in Chapter 6, “[L]arge swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predis- posed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.” She adds that the department possesses a “belief that it is an independent institution that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy, and does not need direction from an elected President”—a view that does not align with the Constitution.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The solution to this problem is strong political leadership. Skinner writes, “The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the President and, thereby, the American people.” Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to confirm presidential appointees, she recommends putting appointees into acting roles until such time as the Senate confirms them.

Skinner writes that State should also stop skirting the Constitution’s trea- ty-making requirements and stop enforcing “agreements” as treaties. It should encourage more trade with allies, particularly with Great Britain, and less with adversaries. And it should implement a “sovereign Mexico” policy, as our neighbor “has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country.” In Africa, Skinner writes, the U.S. “should focus on core security, economic, and human rights” rather than impose radical abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives. Divisive symbols such as the rainbow flag or the Black Lives Matter flag have no place next to the Stars and Stripes at our embassies.

When it comes to China, Skinner writes that “a policy of ‘compete where we must, but cooperate where we can’…has demonstrably failed.” The People’s Repub- lic of China’s (PRC) “aggressive behavior,” she writes, “can only be curbed through external pressure.” Efforts to protect or excuse China must stop. She observes, “[M]any were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID escaped from a Chinese research laboratory.” Meanwhile, Skinner writes, “[g]lobal leaders includ- ing President Joe Biden…have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior.” She adds, “In some cases, these voices, like global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney”—or the National Basketball Association (NBA)—“directly benefit from doing business with Beijing.”

Former vice president of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Mora Namdar writes in Chapter 8 that we need to have people working for USAGM who actually believe in America, rather than allowing the agencies to function as anti-American, tax- payer-funded entities that parrot our adversaries’ propaganda and talking points. Former acting deputy secretary of homeland security Ken Cuccinelli says in Chap- ter 5 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a creation of the George

W. Bush era, should be closed, as it has added needless additional bureaucracy and expense without corresponding benefit. He recommends that it be replaced with a new “stand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level” and that the remaining parts of DHS be distributed among other departments.

Former chief of staff for the director of National Intelligence Dustin Carmack writes in Chapter 7 that the U.S. Intelligence Community is too inclined to look in the rearview mirror, engage in “groupthink,” and employ an “overly cautious” approach aimed at personal approval rather than at offering the most accurate, unvarnished intelligence for the benefit of the country. And in Chapter 9, former acting deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development Max


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Primorac asserts that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) must be reformed, writing, “The Biden Administration has deformed the agency by treating it as a global platform to pursue overseas a divisive political and cultural agenda that promotes abortion, climate extremism, gender radicalism, and interventions against perceived systematic racism.”

If the recommendations in the following chapters are adopted, what Skinner says about the State Department could be true for other parts of the federal gov- ernment’s national security and foreign policy apparatus: The next conservative President has the opportunity to restructure the making and execution of U.S. defense and foreign policy and reset the nation’s role in the world. The recom- mendations outlined in this section provide guidance on how the next President should use the federal government’s vast resources to do just that.


4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Christopher Miller

 

 

T

 
he Constitution requires the federal government to “provide for the common defence.”1 It assigns to Congress the authority to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy”2 and speci-

fies that the President is “commander in Chief” of America’s armed forces.3 Ever since our Founding, Americans have understood that the surest way to avoid war is to be prepared for it in peace—but when deterrence fails, we must fight and win.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest part of our federal government. It has almost 3 million people serving in uniform or a civilian capacity throughout the world and consumes approximately $850 billion annually—more than 50 per- cent of our government’s discretionary spending.

The DOD is also a deeply troubled institution. Historically, the military has been one of America’s most trusted institutions, but years of sustained misuse, a two-tiered culture of accountability that shields senior officers and officials while exposing junior officers and soldiers in the field, wasteful spending, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and (most recently) the Biden Administration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have taken a serious toll.

Our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, our impossibly muddled China strategy, the growing involvement of senior military officers in the political arena, and deep confusion about the purpose of our military are clear signals of a disturb- ing decay and markers of a dangerous decline in our nation’s capabilities and will. Additionally, more than 100,000 Americans die annually in large measure because


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

of illicit narcotics flows—more than four times as many people in one year as we lost in our 20-year war against al-Qaeda.

We also are witnessing a transformation in the character of war. The democ- ratization of technology and the collapse of time and space require dramatic, thoughtful changes in how we defend, deter, and fight. As with any huge bureau- cracy—and the DOD is one of the world’s largest—breaking the status quo requires leadership and endurance. Technology is critical to maintaining our warfighting primacy, but we must be leery of the siren song that technology alone can protect us. More important is how new technologies are developed, tested, procured, and used, and that relies on the true competitive advantages of our people: ingenuity, common sense, and thoughtfulness grounded in a free society. Because war will continue to be the most stressful and consequential human endeavor, the most powerful weapon systems will remain the six inches between the ears of our citi- zens and the strength of their hearts and content of their souls.

Military service is the most difficult task we ask of our citizens, and our nation is enormously blessed that so many young, patriotic Americans eagerly volunteer to carry such a heavy burden. We owe them everything, and we must do better. To do better, however, means recognizing and implementing four overriding priorities:

   Priority No. 1: Reestablish a culture of command accountability, nonpoliticization, and warfighting focus.

   Priority No. 2: Transform our armed forces for maximum effectiveness in an era of great-power competition.

   Priority No. 3: Provide necessary support to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) border protection operations. Border protection is a national security issue that requires sustained attention and effort by all elements of the executive branch.

   Priority No. 4: Demand financial transparency and accountability.

This chapter offers recommendations for improving our armed forces and the civilian organizations that support and oversee them.

 

DOD POLICY

By far the most significant danger to Americans’ security, freedoms, and pros- perity is China. China is by any measure the most powerful state in the world other than the United States itself. It apparently aspires to dominate Asia and then, from that position, become globally preeminent. If Beijing could achieve this goal, it could dramatically undermine America’s core interests, including by restricting


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

U.S. access to the world’s most important market. Preventing this from happening must be the top priority for American foreign and defense policy.

Beijing presents a challenge to American interests across the domains of national power, but the military threat that it poses is especially acute and signif- icant. China is undertaking a historic military buildup that includes increasing capability for power projection not only in its own region, but also far beyond as well as a dramatic expansion of its nuclear forces that could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.

The most severe immediate threat that Beijing’s military poses, however, is to Taiwan and other U.S. allies along the first island chain in the Western Pacific. If China could subordinate Taiwan or allies like the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, it could break apart any balancing coalition that is designed to prevent Bei- jing’s hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China does not succeed. This requires a denial defense: the ability to make the subordi- nation of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult. Critically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear given the relative importance of Taiwan to China and to the U.S.

The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism at a time when decades of ill-advised military operations in the Greater Middle East, the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a high toll on America’s military.

This is a grim landscape. The United States needs to deal with these threats forthrightly and with strength, but it also needs to be realistic. It cannot wish away these problems. Rather, it must confront them with a clear-eyed recognition of the need for choice, discipline, and adequate resources for defense.

In this light, U.S. defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the top priority for U.S. defense planning while modernizing and expanding the

U.S. nuclear arsenal and sustaining an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise. U.S. allies must also step up, with some joining the United States in taking on China in Asia while others take more of a lead in dealing with threats from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea. The reality is that achieving these goals will require more spending on defense, both by the United States and by its allies, as well as active support for reindustrialization and more support for allies’ productive capacity so that we can scale our free- world efforts together.

 

Needed Reforms

   Prioritize a denial defense against China. U.S. defense planning should focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

This focus and priority for U.S. defense activities will deny China the first island chain.

1.        Require that all U.S. defense efforts, from force planning to employment and posture, focus on ensuring the ability of American forces to prevail in the pacing scenario and deny China a fait accompli against Taiwan.

2.        Prioritize the U.S. conventional force planning construct to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before allocating resources to other missions, such as simultaneously fighting another conflict.

   Increase allied conventional defense burden-sharing. U.S. allies must take far greater responsibility for their conventional defense. U.S. allies must play their part not only in dealing with China, but also in dealing with threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

1.        Make burden-sharing a central part of U.S. defense strategy with the United States not just helping allies to step up, but strongly encouraging them to do so.

2.        Support greater spending and collaboration by Taiwan and allies in the Asia–Pacific like Japan and Australia to create a collective defense model.

3.        Transform NATO so that U.S. allies are capable of fielding the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia while relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrent, and select other capabilities while reducing the U.S. force posture in Europe.

4.        Sustain support for Israel even as America empowers Gulf partners to take responsibility for their own coastal, air, and missile defenses both individually and working collectively.

5.        Enable South Korea to take the lead in its conventional defense against North Korea.

   Implement nuclear modernization and expansion. The United States manifestly needs to modernize, adapt, and expand its nuclear arsenal. Russia maintains and is actively brandishing a very large nuclear arsenal, but China is also undertaking a historic nuclear breakout.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

1.        Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously.

2.        Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that

there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion.

   Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia.

1.        Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts.

2.        Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions.

 

DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S)

The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance.

The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them.

 

Needed Reforms

   Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.

 

1.        Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles.

2.        The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023.

3.        Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs.

4.        Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs

so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results.

5.        Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline.

 

   Strengthen America’s defense industrial base.

 

1.        Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict.

2.        Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

3.        Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engage in multiyear procurements and block buys. This will improve private-sector rates of return, thereby incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the government. It will also reduce government overhead by reducing the number of procurement competitions.

4.        Prioritize the U.S. and allies under the “domestic end product” and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America, Buy America Act.5 Currently, defense companies are required to manufacture defense items for the U.S. government that are 100

percent domestically produced and at least 50 percent composed of domestically produced components. However, there are loopholes that allow companies to manufacture these items overseas. This can create supply chain and other issues, especially in wartime. Manufacturing components and end products domestically and with allies spurs factory development, increases American jobs, and builds resilience in America’s defense industrial base.

5.      Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or “friendshoring” of manufacturing (kinetic capabilities, castings and forgings, critical materials, microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle batteries); evaluate them according to the strategic landscape; and expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate.

6.        Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors, which encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters competition.

Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses so they also have commercial/private-sector customers and are not solely dependent on defense orders, which can be highly specialized, expensive, and irregular.

7.        Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them of DOD’s needs and how they could work with DOD to meet national security priorities.

 

   Optimize the DOD acquisition community.

 

1.        Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making for prototyping and program-of-record starts and terminations. Most bureaucrats would rather follow a checklist and fail than go outside the procedures and win because failure means negative


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

career repercussions. Senior acquisition leaders should design a system that allows decision-makers to stay within the law but bypass unnecessary departmental regulations that are not in the best interest of the government and hamper the acquisition of capabilities that warfighters require.

2.       The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries should assess their acquisition workforces; determine what additional personnel, resources, and training they need; and develop implementation plans. The goal is to develop, prototype, acquire, and field required capabilities at the speed of relevance to meet America’s pacing threats and maintain a warfighting advantage.

3.        Decentralize Defense Acquisition University (DAU) offerings and expand the DAU mission to include accreditation of non-DOD institutions. The critical shortage of trained and certified acquisition personnel must be addressed with urgency in order to support DOD mission objectives and goals. With the rapid evolution of training and educational technologies, including remote and virtual practices, there is no reason for DAU to maintain a monopoly on the knowledge and certification that are required to perform as acquisition professionals. Further, the cost to private contractors and non-DOD civilians who aspire to such a role limits the supply of trained and certified candidates. DAU has become an unnecessary barrier to entry in a career field that is vital to the DOD mission.

 

DOD RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (RDT&E)

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and assigned broad responsibility for “all defense research and engineering, technology develop- ment, technology transition, prototyping, experimentation, and developmental testing activities and programs, including the allocation of resources for defense research and engineering, and unifying defense research and engineering efforts across the Department,” to the new Under Secretary, who also was tasked with “serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary on all research, engineering, and technology development activities and programs in the Department.”6 This led to the single largest DOD structural change since the Goldwater–Nichols act of 19867 and was organized effectively during President Donald Trump’s Administration.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Needed Reforms

   Champion, engage, and focus the American innovation ecosystem. To maintain leadership in the era of great-power competition and succeed against our adversaries, a key DOD effort must be the creation of mechanisms and processes to embrace America’s most significant competitive advantage: innovation.

1.        Engage and leverage all of America’s scientific, engineering, and high- tech production communities to research, develop, prototype, and rapidly deploy advanced technology capabilities on a continuing basis to preserve our warfighting advantage.

2.        Increase integration and collaboration among the DOD, government labs, and private companies to solve the department’s most difficult problems.

3.        Reduce the number of critical technology areas from 14 to a more manageable number to concentrate effort and resources on those that bear directly on great-power competition.

4.        Rebuild RDT&E infrastructure that resides in Cold War–era facilities and is not well-suited to the current era of rapid development and testing of advanced technology and concepts to the maturity level necessary for acquisition and operational fielding.

5.        Move toward a much more comprehensive independent risk-reduction approach to increase understanding of the technical risks by drawing on the expertise in DOD laboratories and agencies to help acquisition programs succeed.

 

   Improve the rapid deployment of technology to the battlefield. America’s military advantage has derived from the professionalism of our servicemembers and our ability to manifest our technological advantage in battlefield capability. The current era of great-power competition will continue for the foreseeable future, and technology will be the currency of competition. Our ability to prevail will rest on our ability to develop new technologies and move them onto the battlefield more rapidly than our adversaries can.

1.       Accelerate the prototyping cycle to meet immediate battlefield needs.

2.        Require tighter integration with user communities to provide value.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

3.        Establish a pipeline of near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology that is aimed at great-power competition (China) and can be matured, prototyped, and evaluated to support major acquisitions (the ability to produce at scale) to break the cycle of schedule delays and cost overruns from underdeveloped and poorly understood technologies.

 

   Develop a framework to protect the RDT&E enterprise from foreign exploitation. Strategic competition and adaptive adversaries require new thinking about how to protect technology. China has been relentless in stealing U.S. technology, using the full range of measures from influence operations to outright theft. This has been a major factor in its ability to close the gap and in some cases to exceed U.S. capabilities.

1.   Implement a comprehensive approach to preserving U.S. technological leadership that is based on outpacing our adversaries; clear about what we need to protect; tailored to various specific sectors (for example, academia, the defense industrial base, and laboratories); and underpinned with a full range of consequences for attempted or actual theft.

 

DOD FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

The United States must regain its role as the “Arsenal of Democracy.” In fiscal year (FY) 2021, U.S. government foreign military sales (FMS) nosedived to a low of

$34.8 billion from a record high of $55.7 billion in FY 2018.8 This decrease hinders interoperability with partners and allies, decreases defense industrial base capac- ity, and increases the taxpayer burden on the U.S. military’s own procurements. Under previous Administrations, the United States built its reputation as a reliable partner with a strong defense industrial base that could supply military articles and goods in a timely manner. Today’s FMS process is encumbered by byzantine bureaucracy, long contracting times, high costs, and mundane technology.

The United States can change this downward trajectory by improving inter- nal processes that incentivize partners and allies to procure U.S. defense systems, thereby expanding our “defense ecosystem.” We must reverse the recent dip in FMS to ensure both that our partners remain interoperable with the United States and that our defense industrial base regains much-needed capacity in preparation for future challenges.

 

Needed Reforms

   Emphasize exportability with U.S. procurements. The record-low FMS sales in 2021 were driven partly by the high costs of converting weapon systems on the back end of production rather than emphasizing exportability in initial capability planning.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

1.        Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies.

2.        Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions.

   End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9

1.        End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process.

2.        Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification.

   Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone.

1.        Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States.

2.        Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

3.        Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute.

   Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

1.        Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners.

2.        Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases.

 

DOD PERSONNEL

The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing Ameri- ca’s uniform.

The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force.

 

Needed Reforms

   Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force.

1.       Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention.

2.        Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11

3.        Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

(ASVAB)—the military entrance examination—by all students in schools that receive federal funding.12

4.        Encourage Members of Congress to provide time to military recruiters during each townhall session in their congressional districts.

5.        Increase the number of Junior ROTC programs in secondary schools.

   Restore standards of lethality and excellence. Entrance criteria for military service and specific occupational career fields should be based on the needs of those positions. Exceptions for individuals who are already predisposed to require medical treatment (for example, HIV positive

or suffering from gender dysphoria) should be removed, and those with gender dysphoria should be expelled from military service. Physical fitness requirements should be based on the occupational field without consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, or orientation.

 

   Eliminate politicization, reestablish trust and accountability, and restore faith to the force. In 2021, the Reagan National Defense Survey found that only 45 percent of Americans have “a great deal of trust and confidence in the military”—down from 70 percent in 2018.13

1.        Strengthen protections for chaplains to carry out their ministry according to the tenets of their faith.

2.        Codify language to instruct senior military officers (three and four stars) to make certain that they understand their primary duty

to be ensuring the readiness of the armed forces, not pursuing a social engineering agenda. This direction should be reinforced during the Senate confirmation process. Orders and direction motivated by purely partisan motives should be identified as

threats to readiness.

3.        Reinstate servicemembers to active duty who were discharged for not receiving the COVID vaccine, restore their appropriate rank, and provide back pay.

4.        Eliminate Marxist indoctrination and divisive critical race theory programs and abolish newly established diversity, equity, and inclusion offices and staff.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

5.        Restrict the use of social media solely for purposes of recruitment and discipline any armed services personnel who use an official command channel to engage with civilian critics on social media.

6.       Audit the course offerings at military academies to remove Marxist indoctrination, eliminate tenure for academic professionals, and apply the same rules to instructors that are applied to other DOD contracting personnel.

7.        Reverse policies that allow transgender individuals to serve in the military. Gender dysphoria is incompatible with the demands of military service, and the use of public monies for transgender surgeries or to facilitate abortion for servicemembers should be ended.

   Value the military family. Military service requires extreme sacrifices by families.

1.        Support legislation to increase wages and family allowances for active- duty enlisted personnel. No uniformed personnel should ever have to rely on social benefits like as food stamps or public housing assistance.

2.        Improve base housing and consider the military family holistically when considering change-of-station moves.

3.        Improve spouse employment opportunities and protections, including licensing reform,14 and expand childcare.

4.        Audit all curricula and health policies in DOD schools for military families, remove all inappropriate materials, and reverse inappropriate policies.

5.        Support legislation giving education savings account options to military families.15

   Reduce the number of generals. Rank creep is pervasive. The number of 0-6 to 0-9 officers is at an all-time high across the armed services (above World War II levels), and the actual battlefield experience of this officer corps is at an all-time low. The next President should limit the continued advancement of many of the existing cadre, many of whom have been advanced by prior Administrations for reasons other than their warfighting prowess.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

DOD INTELLIGENCE

Our national defense establishment must evolve to meet the rapid, pro- found, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security portfolios—America’s competitive advantage against rivals and adversaries is at serious risk. However, for any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel- ligence Community (IC)/Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) leadership must be addressed.16

The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel and a significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements, eight are within DOD,17 two are independent,18 and seven belong to various other departments and agencies.19 Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities, both military and civilian.”20

The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and independence. If they continue on their current path, however, both the DIE and the Intelligence Com- munity writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence assessments that mislead policymakers.

 

Needed Reforms

   Improve the intelligence process. Defense intelligence assets have been committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since September 11, 2001, at the expense of our strategic objectives, and this has led to increased risk.21 Further, the DIE has evolved into a “customer-based” model with

the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense

of analytical integrity. The result has been a significant politicization of intelligence.

1.       Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders. As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of DIE and IC assessments as needed.

2.       Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering China and Russia).

3.        Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands. Avoid the

temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support a convergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain

those threats.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

4.        Establish and sustain feedback loops to provide insight and direction for continuous improvement and accountability.22 We must revisit our assessments and understand where we got it right and where we got it wrong.

5.        Better exploit publicly available information (PAI) data and foster innovation to improve collection and analysis. We must end the practice of multiple DIE organizations paying to acquire the same PAI data and invest more in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit open-source and classified intelligence data.

6.        Remove policy obstacles that impede available technical solutions and tailored approaches in order to preclude corruption at the point of collection.

7.        Develop statistical discrimination techniques based on relative value to deal with the volume and velocity of available data and information, which are rapidly exceeding our ability to exploit and analyze available data and information efficiently.

   Expand the integration of intelligence activities. The prevalence of asymmetric warfare requires Defense Intelligence to leverage the unique authorities and capabilities of U.S. departments and agencies, as well as our partners and allies, to competitive advantage.

1.        Create an improved cyber defense and capability. We must reevaluate the dual-hat structure between the National Security Agency (NSA) and

U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

2.        Resurrect economic analysis capability to improve our ability to counter Chinese whole-of-government strategies that combine security with predatory economic objectives.

3.       Resurrect critical thinking to provide true strategic intelligence that will enable the U.S. to counter global adversaries and emerging technologies (such as adversary advances in hypersonics, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cyber domain, advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced undersea capabilities) more effectively.

4.        Rebuild human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) and improve their integration with defensive and offensive cyber operations.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

5.        Establish true alignment between DOD and DHS both to improve the defense of critical U.S. infrastructure and national border integrity and to develop vital information that enables defense against foreign targeted disruptions.23

   Restore accountability and public trust. In recent years, public trust in Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia–Ukraine assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being filled by Russia and China around the world. For trust to be restored and sustained, officials must be held accountable.

1.       Restore DIE critical thinking. Establish mechanisms to restore analytic integrity and return to true intelligence-driven operations. The next Administration should eliminate the conflict of interest in the current customer-based model (in which the customer is always right) by enforcing time-tested procedures that guarantee independent analysis, even if it means challenging policymakers’ assumptions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s leadership role should be expanded to include providing analytic top-line views and improve DIE transparency by highlighting diverging views.

2.        Elevate the DIE’s voice in national policy discussions, commensurate with the DIE’s 75 percent share of the IC budget. Present defense intelligence to senior policymakers, either independently to

avoid all-source bias or in consensus products like the National Intelligence Estimates.

 

   Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not advance military readiness. In 2019, following the catastrophic 2015 data breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Defense

Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) accepted transfer of the responsibility to conduct security clearance and suitability investigations for 95 percent of the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. This decision, which grew out of an intention to deconstruct OPM, was wrongheaded on many levels and made the federal bureaucracy dependent on a new overlay of DOD bureaucracy, in a sense instilling DOD control of civilian managers. This function should be returned to OPM except for military security clearance investigations.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

U.S. ARMY

The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term.

All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission.

 

Needed Reforms

   Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs.

1.        Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power.

2.       Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance.

3.        Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness.

4.        Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

5.        Reform recruiting efforts. The Army missed its 2022 recruitment goal by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers.

   Focus on deployability and sustained operations. The U.S. Army’s very lethal ground force capability is irrelevant if it cannot quickly deploy to locations for employment in decisive operations to secure our global security interests. Additionally, Army logisticians provide the ground transportation (of both personnel and equipment); fuel, food, and water; munitions (bombs and bullets); medical supplies and services; and veterinary services (food safety) that are critical to sustainment of the other services.

1.        Immediately increase the production and stockpiling of critical munitions and repair parts.

2.        Prioritize expeditionary logistics in all force design and operational planning to guarantee entry into a contested theater of war.

3.        Increase the level of Joint Force training, synchronization, and coordination focused on logistics.

4.        Prepare to deploy forces from degraded U.S.-based transportation infrastructure that is compromised by opposing forces.

   Transform Army culture and training. The Army can no longer serve as the nation’s social testing ground. A rebuilt Army that is focused again

on its core warfighting mission and empowered it with the tools, resources, and authorities it needs to accomplish that mission must be the next Administration’s highest defense priority.

1.       Stop using the Army as a test bed for social evolution. Misusing the Army in this way detracts from its core purpose while doing little to reshape the American social structure. The Army no longer reflects national demographics to the degree that it did before 1974 when the draft was eliminated.

2.        Demand accountability in senior leaders to reverse the decline in public support for military service.

3.        Reestablish the experiential base for the planning, execution, and leadership of Army formations in large-scale operations. Currently,


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

there are no general or field-grade officers who served as planners or commanders against a near-peer adversary in combat.

4.        Examine the logic of emerging Army concepts about employing massed long-range fires and effects without considering how to gain advantage by closing with and dominating an adversary on land.

5.        Recognize that high-intensity land combat operations cannot be sustained through short-term individual or unit rotations in the style of the sustained low-intensity campaigns conducted over the past 20 years.

6.        Transform how the National Guard is employed during extended operations short of declared war to preclude back-to-back federal and state deployments of National Guard soldiers in order to stabilize and preserve military volunteerism in our communities.

7.        Revamp Army school curricula to concentrate on preparation for large- scale land operations that focus on defeating a peer threat.

8.       Address the underlying causal issues driving increasing Army suicide rates, which have surpassed pre–World War II rates and are now eclipsing the rate among civilians.

 

U.S. NAVY

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “provide and maintain a Navy.” Inherent in this phrase is a recognition that there is a vital national interest in the maritime environment and that this national interest requires sustained planning and investment. This is as true today as it was almost 250 years ago and will remain true into the future.

The U.S. Navy (USN) exists for two primary reasons: to project prompt, sus- tained, and effective combat power globally, both at sea and ashore, and to deter aggression by potential adversaries by maintaining a forward operating presence in conjunction with allies and partners. Today, the People’s Republic of China Peo- ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN’s ability to accomplish its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In the production, employment, and control of maritime forces, the USN must consider the scope and rate of technological change and, where appropriate, adapt its processes and workforce development. In balancing the necessary long-term industrial model of naval platforms against emerging short-term opportunities, the USN must take account of advances that may present vulnerabilities and risks as well as what is assured and secure.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Needed Reforms

   Invest in and expand force structure. The USN’s organizing principle remains platform-centered: vessels manned by sailors. The manned surface and subsurface forces act in concert with land-based, air-based, and space- based forces to project power outside sovereign territory, principally by operating in international waters. Investments must be closely coordinated with these other elements of military power.

1.        Build a fleet of more than 355 ships.26

2.        Develop and field unmanned systems to augment the manned forces.

3.        Require that range and lethality be the key factors in all procurement and sustainment decisions for ships, aircraft, and munitions.

   Reestablish the General Board. In contrast with the Navy General

Board that served ship development so well during the interwar period, the current joint process27 for defining the requirements for major

defense acquisitions is not well-suited to long-term planning of the sort that is needed for USN fleet architecture and shipbuilding. The interwar General Board should serve as a model, empowered with

final decision authority over all requirements documents concerning ships and the major defense systems fielded on ships. The individual board members would ensure a broad base of knowledge as well as

independent thinking.28

   Establish a Rapid Capabilities Office. The USN must transition technology into warfighting capability more rapidly. It must foster a culture of innovation that includes connecting theoretical and intangible ideas with real production environments that produce tangible and practical outcomes and adapting proven processes to advance material solutions.

1.        Harness innovation and willingness to tolerate risk so that “good enough” systems can be fielded rapidly.

2.        Use the Space Development Agency as a model.

3.        Establish an oversight Board of Directors made up of the service chief, service secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Accelerate the purchase of key munitions. It takes years to build and maintain navies but only hours to expend their ordnance in combat. The USN must be prepared to expend large quantities of air-launched and sea-launched stealthy, precision, cruise missiles against targets both at

sea and ashore. Additionally, modern air defense requires the use of high- performance surface-to-air missiles.

1.        Produce key munitions at the maximum rate with significant capacity.

2.       Working with the Congress, employ the widest possible range of techniques to enhance the munitions supply chains and workforce.

   Enhance warfighter development. The USN requires a variety of documented qualifications for personnel to advance in their careers and assume leadership positions. It also requires individual professional qualifications that are focused on warfighting.

1.        Mandate qualifications that demonstrate an understanding of core competence in collective, integrated warfighting, especially based on current plans and technologies.

2.       Elevate the Headquarters Staff focused on Warfighter Development (N7) within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and empower it to develop such requirements.

3.       Require that war games be utilized as experiential learning environments for the participants as a prerequisite for achieving career milestones (department heads, commanding officers, and major commanders).

4.        Highlight in training and leader development that USN forces can and must maintain the ability to operate from and/or defend sovereign territory to include our allies and partners.

5.       Train to balance effects from kinetic to nonkinetic and from lethal to nonlethal through effective command and control.

 

U.S. AIR FORCE

The U.S. Air Force today lacks a force structure with the lethality, survivabil- ity, and capacity to fight a major conflict with a great power like China, deter nuclear threats, and meet its other operational requirements under the National Defense Strategy.29 For 30 years, the Air Force has received less annual funding


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

(if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history.

The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform.

The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning.

 

Needed Reforms

   Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force.

1.       Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives.

2.        Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than

$40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

3.        Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force.

   Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats.

1.        Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year.

2.        Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems.

3.        Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific.

4.        Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints.

5.       Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout.

6.        Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum.

   Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries.

1.       Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise.

2.        Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

3.       Achieve moving target engagement capability and capacity against sea, surface, and ground mobile targets at the scale necessary to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy.

4.        Build resilient basing, sustainment, and communications for survivability in a contested environment.

5.        Establish a vigorous and sufficiently funded electromagnetic spectrum operations recovery plan to make up for more than 20 years of neglect of this mission area.

 

U.S. MARINE CORPS

The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is the maritime land force of the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy. It serves a critical role as an expedition- ary amphibious force that can project power from sea to shore and beyond while performing other specialized missions like securing America’s diplomatic out- posts abroad.

Between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the conclusion of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in August 2022, the Marine Corps engaged in extended operations ashore as directed by the Secretary of Defense, leaving it with little opportunity or ability to train for and execute the naval and amphibious operations for which it is uniquely suited and directed by law. This lengthy diver- gence from its primary mission led to deep concern that the Corps had become a “second land army,” prompting senior Marine Corps leaders to push for the service to return to the sea. In addition, the USMC spent nearly two decades fighting coun- terinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and developed capabilities that were specifically geared to those fights but have limited utility in scenarios involving evenly matched and advanced enemies or amphibious operations that are neces- sary for the projection of naval power.

As a result, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed and began to implement Force Design 2030,31 a plan that, if completed, would be the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since World War II. The suc- cessful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine Corps’ personnel system and the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness.

 

Needed Reforms

   Divest systems to implement the Force Design 2030 transformation.32 Divesting equipment that is less relevant to distributed, low-signature operations in a contested maritime environment will make funds available for modernization.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

1.        Transform USMC force structure.

a.       Eliminate all USMC law enforcement battalions.

b.      Transform at least one Marine Infantry Regiment into a Marine Littoral Regiment.

c.        Reduce the size of remaining infantry battalions.

2.        Divest systems or equipment that are better suited to heavier

U.S. Army units.

a.       Maintain divestment of M1 Abrams tanks.

b.      Eliminate the majority of tube artillery (M777) batteries.

c.        Reduce the number of Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles and the number of their replacements.

3.        Use funds made available by divestment of systems to support new systems that are geared to the likely needs of future conflicts.

a.       Increase the number of rocket artillery batteries (HIMARS).

b.      Increase the number of upgraded Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) companies.

c.        Increase the number of Unmanned Aerial Systems and anti-air systems (including counter-UAS systems).

d.       Develop long-range strike missiles and anti-ship missiles for the Corps.

e.       Modernize USMC infantry equipment.

 

   Transform the USMC personnel paradigm. More than other services, the USMC relies heavily on junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to staff key positions across the force but especially in combat arms. For example,

E-4s routinely hold squad leader billets when the Army normally has E-6s in those billets. The nature of more distributed operations and the increasingly complex responsibilities of a Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon under Force Design 2030 will only put more responsibility on the backs of squad leaders and platoon sergeants, increasing the need for more senior Marines in those critical positions. Additionally, the Corps needs to improve its retention of junior NCOs after their first enlistments (the Marines have much lower rates of reenlistment than other branches).33

1.        Align the USMC’s combat arms rank structure with the U.S. Army’s (squad leader billets are for E-6s, and platoon sergeant billets are for E-7s).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

2.        Create better incentives to retain talented junior NCOs, especially in infantry and other critical military occupational specialties.

3.        Reduce unnecessary deployments to increase dwell time in order to enable more robust primary military education.

   Align Navy amphibious shipbuilding with Force Design 2030. The U.S. Navy has struggled for decades to maintain an amphibious fleet that could support USMC war plans around large-scale amphibious operations. In addition, amphibious shipbuilding has often had to compete against other priorities within a constrained budget and limited shipbuilding capacity.

1.        Develop and produce light amphibious warships (LAWs) to support more distributed amphibious operations, especially in the Pacific.34

2.        Maintain between 28 and 31 larger amphibious warships as opposed to the 25 specified in current Navy shipbuilding plans and the 38 specified before 2020.35

 

U.S. SPACE FORCE

U.S. space forces conduct global space operations to sustain and enhance air, land, and sea effectiveness, lethality, and superiority by providing secure broad- band global communications (precision position, navigation, and timing accuracy); attack warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information); and their assured continuity of operations both by defending U.S. assets and by conducting offensive operations that are capable of imposing unacceptable losses on adversaries that might seek to attack them.

The U.S. Space Force (USSF) was established to assure continuous global and theater combat support from space, to deter attacks against U.S. space assets, and to prevail in space should deterrence fail. The USSF posture was conceived as a balance of offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities designed for maximum effectiveness.

 

Needed Reforms

   Reverse the Biden Administration’s defensive posture. The Biden Administration has eliminated almost all offensive deterrence capabilities and instead will rely solely on defensive capabilities of disaggregation, maneuver, and reconstitution—the most costly, the slowest, and ultimately the most fragile architecture selection.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

1.        Reestablish offensive capabilities to guarantee a favorable balance of forces, efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum, and seriously complicate enemy calculations of a successful first strike against U.S. space assets.

2.        Restore architectural balance in U.S. space forces, both offensive and defensive, to restore deterrence dominance efficiently and quickly.

3.        Rapidly expand space control capability, to include cis-lunar space (the region beginning at geosynchronous altitude and encompassing the moon), to provide early warning of an enemy attack.

4.        Seek arms control and “rules of the road” understandings only when they are unambiguously in the interests of the U.S. and its allies, and prohibit their unilateral implementation.

   Reduce overclassification. The USSF must move beyond the Cold War– era culture of secrecy and overclassification that surrounded military space to facilitate greater coordination and synchronization of efforts across the government and commercial sectors.

Declassify appropriate information about terrestrial and on-orbit space capabilities that threaten the U.S. space constellation, as well as those being pursued by our competitors, to secure the principled right to counter them offensively.

   Implement policies suited to a mature USSF. No longer a “newborn,” the USSF has entered its fourth year of existence, and the lessons learned can be incorporated across all facets of the force to increase its effectiveness.

1.        Restructure from the current “unity of effort” structure to “unity of command.”

2.        Lead the U.S. government’s development of a clear and unambiguous declaratory policy that the United States will operate at will in space and enforce these operations with capabilities that ensure effective deterrence and the ability to impose our will if necessary.

3.        End the current study phase of concept development and issue necessary guidance for the development and fielding of offensive capabilities.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

4.        Alter the Space Development Agency’s current “fail-early” approach and transition to a methodology that maintains aggressive timelines but with significantly greater engineering rigor, with special attention to sustainment, support, and fully integrated space operations.

5.        Increase the number of general officer positions to ensure the Space Force’s ability to compete for resources on a common basis with the other services.

6.        Explore creation of a Space Force Academy to attract top aero–astro students, engineers, and scientists and develop astronauts. The academy could be attached initially to a large existing research university like

the California Institute of Technology or MIT, share faculty and funding, and eventually be built separately to be on par with the other service academies.

 

U.S. CYBER COMMAND

USCYBERCOM was established in 2010 by the Department of Defense to unify the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthen DOD cyberspace capabilities, and integrate and enhance U.S. cyber expertise. Cyber capabilities and threats are evolving rapidly. Accordingly, a conservative Administration should be especially sensitive to and prepared to meet the challenges presented by bureaucratic silos, inappropriately rigid tactical doctrine, and strategic thinking’s historic tendency to lag behind technological capability.

The preliminary evidence from the war in Ukraine suggests that existing cyber doctrine and certain capability and target assumptions may be incorrect or mis- placed. The following recommendations therefore presuppose that there will be a rigorous “lessons learned” analysis and review of existing U.S. doctrine in light of the battlefield evidence.

 

Needed Reforms

   Ensure that USCYBERCOM is properly focused. Mission creep is leading to wasteful overlap with the Department of Homeland

Security, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency.

1.        Separate USCYBERCOM from the National Security Agency per congressional direction.

2.        Conduct effective offensive cyber-effects operations at the tactical and strategic levels.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

3.      Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36

4.        End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify”

U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics.

 

   Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness.

 

1.       Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare.

2.        Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level.

3.        Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level.

4.        Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS).

5.        Expand coordination of joint operations with allies.

6.        Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”37

 

   Rationalize strategy and doctrine.

 

1.        Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes.

2.       Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against

U.S. infrastructure and citizens.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations. There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mis- sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves

(China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran).

 

Needed Reforms

   Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S. can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to

address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels.

1.        Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.”

2.        Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by region in the National Security Strategy.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

3.        Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document.

4.        Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.

   Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe.

1.        Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base.

2.        Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt.

3.        Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region.

 

   Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland.

1.        Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy.

2.        Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

3.        Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner.

4.        Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors.

5.        Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland.

 

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries.

   China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history.

   Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine.

   North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities.

   Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability.

Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment.

 

Needed Reforms

   Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence.

1.        Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft.

2.        Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM.

3.        Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370.

   Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program

in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade.

   Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022 NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence.

1.        Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned.

2.        Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis.

3.        Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example, nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat.

   Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

1.        Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile.

2.        Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development.

3.        Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises.

   Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

1.        Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence.

2.        Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself.

3.        Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail.

 

MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims.

   China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains.

   North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan.

   Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority.

 

Needed Reforms

   Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities.

1.        Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems.

2.        Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42

   Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43

1.        Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44 The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20.

2.        Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast.

   Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S. should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot missiles.

   Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

missile threat to the homeland and to use homeland missile defense only against rogue nations.

1.       Abandon the existing policy of not defending the homeland against Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles and focus on how to improve defense as the Russian and Chinese missile threats increase at an unprecedented rate.45

2.        Invest in future advanced missile defense technologies like directed energy or space-based missile defense that could defend against more numerous missile threats.

   Invest in new track-and-intercept capabilities. The advent of hypersonic missiles and increased numbers of cruise missile arsenals by threat actors poses new challenges to our missile defense capabilities.

1.        Invest in cruise missile defense of the homeland.46

2.       Accelerate the program to deploy space-based sensors that can detect and track missiles flying on nonballistic trajectories.47

3.       Accelerate the Glide Phase Interceptor, which is intended to counter hypersonic weapons.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


AUTHOR’S NOTE: The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation’s security. This chapter provides a blueprint to ensure that the Department can meet our national security needs. Its preparation was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Sergio de la Pena and Chuck DeVore deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

2.                U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

3.                U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

4.                 Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

5.                H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

6.                S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000.

pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

7.                 H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf

(accessed February 16, 2023).

8.                U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed

February 15, 2023).

9.                Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

10.           Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

11.           See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf.

12.           Ibid.

13.           Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

14.          See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses.

15.           See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options.

16.           See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra.

17.           The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI).

18.           The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

19.           The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the

U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

20.           Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

21.           Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023).

22.           U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

23.           The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29,

2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20

of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

24.           U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

25.           “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength,

ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

26.           For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023).

27.           The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023).

28.           The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the

Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry.

29.           See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

30.           U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

31.           General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023).

32.           Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.   pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023).

33.           Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

34.           Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light-

amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

35.           Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional-

amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

36.           See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and

Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023).

37.           U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023).

38.           See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20   to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023).

39.           U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed

February 17, 2023).

40.           U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20.

41.            Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf.

42.            Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

43.            Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023).

44.            Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).


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45.            Forum for American Leadership, “How Biden's Missile Defense Review Can Succeed,” October 21, 2021, https:// forumforamericanleadership.org/missile-defense-review (accessed February 16, 2023).

46.           Tom Karako, Matt Strohmeyer, Ian Williams, Wes Rumbaugh, and Ken Harmon, North America Is a Region, Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, July 2022, https://csis-website-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220714_Karako_North_America.pdf?VersionId=BhIKa8jHHF_ kV94NXRMx6D4m2o6LQqUf (accessed February 16, 2023).

47.            Rebeccah Heinrichs, “Why America Needs the Ability to Track Enemy Missiles from Space,” The Hill, April 16, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/438939-why-america-needs-the-ability-to-track-enemy-

missiles-from-space/ (accessed February 16, 2023).


 


5

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Ken Cuccinelli

 

 

PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION

Our primary recommendation is that the President pursue legislation to dis- mantle the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After 20 years, it has not gelled into “One DHS.” Instead, its various components’ different missions have outweighed its decades-long attempt to function as one department, rendering the whole disjointed rather than cohesive. Breaking up the department along its mission lines would facilitate mission focus and provide opportunities to reduce overhead and achieve more limited government. In lieu of a status quo DHS, we recommend that:

   U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) be combined with

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Citizenship

and Immigration Services (USCIS); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration

Review (EOIR) and Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) into a stand- alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level (more than

100,000 employees, making it the third largest department measured by manpower).

   The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) be moved to the Department of Transportation.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) be moved to the Department of the Interior or, if combined with CISA, to the Department of Transportation.

   The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) be moved to DOJ and, in time of full-scale war (i.e., threatening the homeland), to the Department of Defense (DOD). Alternatively, USCG should be moved to DOD for all purposes.

   The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) be divided in two, with the protective element moved to DOJ and the financial enforcement element moved to the Department of the Treasury.

   The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) be privatized.

   The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) be moved to DOD and the Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction be moved to the FBI.

All of the remaining supporting components could be dismantled because their functions already exist in the moving components as well as the receiv- ing departments. Cutting these costs would save the American taxpayers significant sums.

Unless and until this dismantling recommendation is pursued and achieved, however, DHS will statutorily continue to exist, and it needs many reforms. Accord- ingly, we now turn to recommended changes in DHS as it exists now.

 

MISSION STATEMENT

The Department of Homeland Security protects the American homeland from and prepares for terrorism and other hazards in both the physical and cyber realms, provides for secure and free movement of trade and travel, and enforces U.S. immi- gration laws impartially.

 

OVERVIEW

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent mailings of anthrax spores. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which created the department, states that DHS’s primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism; minimize the damage from and assist in the recovery from any terrorist attacks; prepare and respond to natural and manmade crises and emergencies; and monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and interdict illegal drug trafficking.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats.

This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission.

The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would:

   Secure and control the border;

   Thoroughly enforce immigration laws;

   Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims;

   Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security;

   Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness;


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Secure our coasts and economic zones;

   Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and

   Oversee transportation security.

 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC)

In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS.

Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda.

An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership).

Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

individuals wielding acting Secretary authority should have explicit authority to finalize agency actions, including regulations, to ensure that the department’s homeland security mission is fulfilled.

Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices. Pending a possible presidential deci- sion to shrink or eliminate DHS itself, the next Administration will still have the obligation to protect the homeland as required by law. The Secretary therefore can and should use his or her inherent, discretionary leadership authority to “soft close” ineffective and problematic corners of the department. While those corners are to be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and opera- tional responsibility to mission-essential components of the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. This effort not only would make the department more efficient, but also would support a legislative move to shrink or dismantle the department by showing that the agency can fulfill national security–critical functions without its current bloated bureaucracy.

Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel. To strengthen political decision-making and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used legally and efficiently, the Secretary should make major changes in the distribution of career personnel throughout the department. For example, personnel from parts of the department undergoing soft closure could be redistributed to what will be workload-intensive corners of the department, including national security–critical and transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement capacity should be removed immediately from office billets and deployed to field billets to maxi- mize law enforcement capacity.

Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding. The next Adminis- tration should take steps to restore lawfulness and integrity to the department’s massive regimen of federal grant programs, most of which are managed and dis- tributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary should direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issued grant funding for states, localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demon- strate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission and actions support the broader homeland security mission. All applicants and potential recipients of such grant funding should be required to meet certain pre- conditions for eligibility (except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian funding) or should simply be considered ineligible for funding. Such preconditions should include at least the following:

   Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers.

   Certification by applicants that they are both registered with E-Verify and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

and localities, that would include certification that all components of that government, and not just the applicant agency, are registered with and use E-Verify.

   If the applicant is a state or locality, commitment by that state or locality to total information-sharing in the context of both federal law enforcement and immigration enforcement. This would include access to department of motor vehicles and voter registration databases.

Non-Use of Discretionary Guest Worker Visa Authorities. To stop facili- tating the availability of cheap foreign labor in order to support American workers (particularly poor and middle-class American workers) and follow congressional intent, the Secretary should explicitly cease using at least two discretionary author- ities as part of his or her broader effort to support American workers.

   The Secretary should make it clear that he or she will not use the Secretary’s existing discretionary authority to increase the number of H-2B (seasonal non-agricultural) visas above the statutorily set cap.

   The Secretary should not issue any regulations in support of the “H-2 eligible” country list, the effect of which would prevent favoring certain foreign nationals seeking an H-2 guest worker visa based simply on their nationality.

Restoration of Honesty and Transparency. The Secretary should use his or her inherent authority as leader of the department to follow up with congressional and other partners to disclose information and provide the transparency that has been obstructed during the Biden Administration. The Secretary should proceed from the assumption that congressional inquiries and public information requests were unfulfilled and then seek to fulfill them.

Replacement of the Entire Homeland Security Advisory Committee. The Secretary should plan to quickly remove all current members of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee and replace them as quickly as is feasible.

 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

If all immigration agencies are not merged, including USCIS and ORR, then an appropriate third alternative would be to consolidate ICE and CBP to form a combined Border Security and Immigration Agency (BSIA). This would inte- grate critical interdiction, enforcement, and investigative resources, enhancing coordination and refocusing collective efforts on the vast and complex cross-bor- der threats impacting our nation’s health, safety, and national security. It would


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful trade and travel.

The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of

U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-gov- ernment efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively. In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be desig- nated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community.

A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance, direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White House and DHS leadership review and approval.

The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel. Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement sig- nificantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them offline for extended periods of time.

Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than 20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approv- als, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to efficient and practical resource deployments.

CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whip- ping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP.

The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s compo- nents, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

OT’s function is interwoven with that of its OFO operational counterpart. Combin- ing OT with OFO would achieve streamlined operations and increase OT’s capacity and capability by leveraging OFO’s expansive resources.

CBP, ICE, and USCIS all have authority to issue Notices to Appear (NTA) to removable aliens in their presence, which begins removal proceedings. In most instances, CBP should turn illegal aliens over to ICE for detention, and ICE can then issue any needed NTA. CBP should issue NTAs only in limited situations for humanitarian reasons, such as medical emergencies. In addition, CBP should eliminate use of Notices to Report (NTR) altogether.

CBP’s established national standards of Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) have been widely interpreted and expanded by lower courts. This has resulted in unrealistic and differing detention standards for CBP facilities based on the jurisdiction within which they fall, negatively impacting operations. ICE has suffered similarly. A single nationwide detention standard should be codified that prevents individual states from mandating that federal government agencies adhere to widely expansive and ever-changing sets of standards. Such standards should allow the flexibility to use large numbers of temporary facilities such as tents.

The annual costs associated with establishing and maintaining temporary facil- ities to address the flow of illegal migration and associated care, transportation, and processing are prohibitive, and CBP’s budget is inadequate. CBP is forced to forgo critical mission-essential endeavors to fund the additional associated costs. Often, this requires the reprogramming of funding at the DHS level, which has a negative impact on other DHS components’ operations. This predictable cost that has to be paid from existing CBP and DHS funding levels reduces CBP’s operational readiness and ability to accomplish its diverse and critical missions to protect the American people. The next President should request a realistic budget that fully pays for these costs.

Increased funding is needed for BP to hire additional support personnel, which would relieve uniformed BP agents from administrative duties associated with processing aliens and allow them to return to their national security mission.

Congress should increase funding for facility upgrades at strategic land Ports of Entry (POEs), including expanding state-of-the-art technology such as Non-Intru- sive Inspection equipment. Today, the cartels exploit the aging facilities and lack of adequate technology to smuggle illicit drugs, contraband, and more successfully through our nation’s POEs.

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE)

 

Needed Reforms

Since the formation of DHS, ICE has increasingly been tasked with auxiliary missions that have little or nothing to do with either immigration or customs


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

enforcement. To return ICE to its primary mission, any new Administration that wishes to restore the rule of law to our immigration enforcement efforts should:

   Order ICE to stop closing out pending immigration cases and apply the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as written by Congress.3 The Biden Administration closed out tens of thousands of immigration cases that had already been prepared and were slated for expedited removal processing or hearings before the U.S. Immigration Court. This misguided action constituted an egregious example of lawlessness that allowed thousands of illegal aliens and other immigration violators to go free in the United States.

 

   Direct ICE to stop ignoring criminal aliens identified through the 287(g) program.4 Ultimately, Congress should prevent ICE from ignoring criminal aliens identified by local law enforcement agencies that are partners in the 287(g) program. However, before congressional action, ICE should

be directed to take custody of all aliens with records for felonies, crimes of violence, DUIs, previous removals, and any other crime that is considered a national security or public safety threat as defined under current laws.

   Eliminate T and U visas. Victimization should not be a basis for an immigration benefit. If an alien who was a trafficking or crime victim is actively and significantly cooperating with law enforcement as a witness, the S visa is already available and should be used. Pending elimination of the T and U visas, the Secretary should significantly restrict eligibility for each visa to prevent fraud.

 

   Issue clear guidance regarding detention and bond for aliens. Thousands of illegal aliens are allowed to bond out of immigration detention only to disappear into the interior of the United States where many commit crimes and many others disappear, never to be heard from again. This occurs primarily because of poorly worded bond regulations, contradictory bond policy memoranda, and poor practices for managing released

aliens and the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Program, which requires significant reform.

 

   Prioritize national security in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). ICE should end its current cozy deference to educational institutions and remove security risks from the program. This requires working with the Department of State to eliminate or significantly reduce the number of visas issued to foreign students from enemy nations.


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Most of the foregoing can be accomplished rapidly and effectively through exec- utive action that is both lawful and appropriate. Additionally, ICE should clarify who is responsible for enforcing its criminal and civil authorities. It should also remove self-imposed limitations on its nationwide jurisdiction.

 

   Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Special Agents in the 1811 series should enforce Title 8 and 18 crimes as the biggest part of their portfolio. Alien smuggling, trafficking, and cross-border crime as defined under Title 85 and Title 186 should be the focus of ICE operations.

   The role of ICE Deportation Officers should be clarified. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) should be identified as being primarily responsible for enforcing civil immigration regulations, including the civil arrest, detention, and removal of immigration violators anywhere in the United States, without warrant where appropriate, subject only to the civil warrant requirements of the INA where appropriate.

 

   All ICE memoranda identifying “sensitive zones” where ICE personnel are prohibited from operating should be

rescinded. Rely on the good judgment of officers in the field to avoid

inappropriate situations.

 

   To maximize the efficient use of its resources, ICE should make full use of existing Expedited Removal (ER) authorities. The agency has limited the use of ER to eligible aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the border. This is not a statutory requirement.

 

New Policies

U.S. national security and public safety interests would be well-served if ICE were to be combined with CBP and USCIS, as mentioned above. Additionally, ICE/ HSI, along with CBP, should be full participants in the Intelligence Community.

The use of Blackies Warrants should be operationalized within ICE. These civil search warrants are commonly used for worksite enforcement when agents have probable cause that illegal aliens are employed at a business. This would stream- line investigations.

Safeguarding Americans will require not just securing the border, but con- tinuous vetting and investigations of many aliens who exploited President Biden’s open border for potentially nefarious purposes, including some Afghan evacuees sent directly to the U.S. during America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Budget

   Congress should mandate and fund additional bed space for alien detainees. ICE should be funded for a significant increase in detention space, raising the daily available number of beds to 100,000.

 

   Congress should fund ICE for at least 20,000 ERO officers and 5,000 Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) attorneys.

 

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS)

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is the agency tasked with administering the legal immigration and certain temporary visa programs.

 

Needed Reforms

Since January 2021, USCIS’s priorities have been misaligned, and this has trans- formed it into an open-borders agency, ignoring the critical role that it plays in national security, public safety, and safeguarding the integrity of our immigration system. USCIS should be returned to operating as a screening and vetting agency. Regulatory efforts have focused on easing asylum eligibility in a manner that is guaranteed to exacerbate asylum fraud as people surge at the border. Emphasis also has been placed on removing legal barriers to immigration, such as the use of public benefits. These actions violate statutes, erode congressional intent, and provide a significant magnet for continued illegal immigration.

Additionally, USCIS resources have been misappropriated to focus more on creating and expanding large-scale parole and temporary status programs that violate the law and are otherwise contrary to congressional intent instead of focus- ing on a more secure and efficient process for those who are seeking benefits. The ever-increasing number of applications filed has made it difficult to vet applica- tions adequately for eligibility, fraud, and specific national security and public safety problems.

The Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) is currently a small directorate with assigned officers reporting through the chain of command in the field, and this has led to stovepiping, lack of coordination in national policy, and inconsistencies throughout the agency. To prioritize vetting and fraud detection, FDNS should undergo a structural shift focused on direct reporting from the field to headquarters, reclassification of leadership, and FDNS directives taking prece- dence over those of other component entities. Correcting the current misalignment of agency priorities and resources should begin with this primary shift in focus to vetting and fraud detection. These actions would reform the agency, returning it to its screening and vetting mission in protecting the homeland.

Other structural changes should include reimplementation of the USCIS denat- uralization unit—an effort to maintain integrity in the system by identifying and


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prosecuting criminal and civil denaturalization cases, in combination with the Department of Justice, for aliens who obtained citizenship through fraud or other illicit means. Additionally, USCIS should create a criminal enforcement compo- nent within the agency to investigate immigration benefits fraud under Title 8 (perhaps requiring additional legislative and regulatory authorities for the offi- cers themselves) and to prosecute cases through Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys (SAUSAs) with substantive knowledge in the field. Particular attention should be given to addressing increasing incidents of forced labor trafficking in temporary work visa programs.

While the Biden regulatory agenda has focused on at least two major rules—the credible fear rule and the public charge rule—USCIS has utilized other policy and internal procedural mechanisms to extend employment authorization to large groups of people who are in the country without legal status. The agency has taken quiet steps to cut corners and lessen adjudicatory standards. During a tran- sition period, a complete audit of agency policies, memoranda, and management directives issued during the Biden Administration should be completed, and rescis- sion documents should be prepared for issuance within the first few days of the incoming Administration. Additionally, regulatory documents should be drafted to review or reverse all regulations promulgated during the Biden Administration.

 

New Policies

To advance the national interest, the three core immigration agencies—USCIS, ICE, and CBP—should remerge and have immigration elements outside of DHS (such as ORR of HHS) included. The fragmented immigration enforcement frame- work that developed in the wake of the Homeland Security Act has weakened each agency and should be remediated. Combining these critical agencies would strengthen their capabilities, ensure cooperation, and promote information-shar- ing. Agency responsibilities and the delineation of authorities, such as inconsistent use of deferred action and issuance of NTAs by each agency, have long been a point of contention that would be addressed much more easily if they were recombined into a single entity.

Alternatively, new policies for USCIS as it currently exists should focus on mat- ters that can be addressed through administrative action.

   The workforce should be realigned and, as necessary, retrained on base eligibility and fraud detection rather than speed in processing.

   Training should be returned to Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), which would underscore the enforcement role of USCIS as a vetting agency, and be rebranded accordingly.


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   Management Directives and policies should realign to ensure that the workforce, while adaptable and able to handle the bulk of the USCIS mission, is not allowed to be pulled off mission work to focus on unlawful programs (DACA, mass parole for Afghans, Ukrainians, Venezuelans, etc.), which

divert resources away from nuclear family and employment programs.

The regulatory agenda should include the immediate submission of notices of proposed rulemaking for the Trump Administration’s public charge rule (includ- ing aspects from its original notice of proposed rulemaking), temporary work visa reform, employment authorization reform rules, asylum bars rule, and a third-country transit rule. At a minimum, an enhanced regulatory agenda should include rules strengthening the integrity of the asylum system, parole reform, and U visa reform that prioritizes relief for victims of heinous crimes and ensures that we protect the truest and most deserving victims of crime.

Not all policy changes require formal rulemaking, however, as internal guidance documents are generally exempt under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 In this subregulatory space, USCIS policy memos and operational guidance should reduce the validity of employment authorization documents and end the COVID flexibilities, including the reliance on biometrics reuse. USCIS should also enforce existing regulations by rejecting incomplete applications and petitions, ensuring both that they are completed before accepted for filing and that FDNS signs off on all approved applications and petitions before approval notices are sent to the alien or petitioner. Other efforts should be focused on adjudication standards returning to nearly 100 percent interview requirements for all appropriate cases.

The incoming Administration should spearhead an immigration legislative agenda focused on creating a merit-based immigration system that rewards high- skilled aliens instead of the current system that favors extended family–based and luck-of-the-draw immigration. To that end, the diversity visa lottery should be repealed, chain migration should be ended while focusing on the nuclear family, and the existing employment visa program should be replaced with a system to award visas only to the “best and brightest.”

Internal efforts to limit employment authorization should be matched by con- gressional action to narrow statutory eligibility to work in the United States and mitigate unfair employment competition for U.S. citizens. The oft-abused H-1B program should be transformed into an elite program through which employers are vying to bring in only the top foreign workers at the highest wages so as not to depress American opportunities. Additionally, Congress should:

   Improve the integrity of the temporary work visa programs;

   Repeal Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations;


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Permanently authorize and make mandatory E-Verify; and

   End parole abuse by legislating specific parole standards.

USCIS should make it clear that where no court jurisdiction exists, it will not honor court decisions that seek to undermine regulatory and subregulatory efforts. Finally, USCIS still requires access to all relevant national security and law enforce- ment databases in the same vein as any other agency in the intelligence space. This is a key concept that should be addressed as USCIS is returned to functioning primarily as a vetting agency.

 

Budget

USCIS is primarily fee-funded, operating on revenue derived by those who are seeking immigration benefits, work permits, and naturalization. The total agency budget requested for fiscal year (FY) 2023, including both fees and a small appropri- ation, is slightly less than $6 billion.8 The bulk of funds are derived from application fees through the Immigrant Examinations Fee Account. As a general principle, adju- dication of applications and petitions should be paid by applicants, not American taxpayers. It is critical that any changes in the budget, even in the wake of a realigned agency combined with ICE and CBP, should retain a fee-funded model.

Given the Obama and Biden Administrations’ lack of will, fees should be increased agencywide to keep in step with inflation and the true cost of the adju- dications. The incoming Administration should immediately submit a fee rule that reflects such an increase. Aside from an increase in all fees, the rule should drastically limit the availability for fee waivers and should implement a fee for asylum applications. Additionally, Congress should allow for a 10 percent across- the-board increase in all fees for all fee rules to account for the fact that new fee rules always lag behind budget requirements.

USCIS should strive to increase opportunities for premium processing, a ben- efit by which applicants can expedite their processing times. While this places time burdens on adjudicators, it provides an opportunity for a significant influx of money into the agency, which is not currently available. While simply raising fees to the necessary levels to make the agency run efficiently would be prefera- ble, without the need for expanded premium processing, this short-term measure should be utilized, particularly if longer-term fee rules are unsuccessful.

At least until USCIS is caught up on all case backlogs, all applicants rejected for any benefit or status adjudication should be required to leave the U.S. immediately. Ordinary process can resume once all case backlogs have been adjudicated.

Finally, USCIS should pause the intake of applications in a benefit category when backlogs in that category become excessive. Once USCIS adjudicators can decrease that caseload to a manageable number, application intake should resume.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Personnel

USCIS should be classified as a national security–sensitive agency, and all of its employees should be classified as holding national security–sensitive posi- tions. Leaks must be investigated and punished as they would be in a national security agency, and the union should be decertified. Any employees who cannot accept that change and cannot conform their behavior to the standards required by such an agency should be separated. USCIS’s D.C. personnel presence should be skeletal, and agency employees with operational or security roles should be rotated out to offices throughout the United States. These USCIS employees should live and work in the communities that are most affected by their daily duties and decisions.

 

NECESSARY BORDER AND IMMIGRATION STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

The current border security crisis was made possible by glaring loopholes

in our immigration system. The result was a preventable and predictable his- toric increase in illegal and inadmissible encounters along our southern border. This pulled limited resources from the front lines of our nation’s borders and away from their national security mission, releasing a vast and complex set of threats into our country. To regain our sovereignty, integrity, and security, Congress must pass meaningful legislation to close the current loopholes and prevent future Administrations from exploiting them for political gain or per- sonal ideology.

 

Legislative Proposals

   Title 42 authority in Title 8. Create an authority akin to the Title 42 Public Health authority that has been used during the COVID-19 pandemic to expel illegal aliens across the border immediately when certain non- health conditions are met, such as loss of operational control of the border.

   Mandatory appropriation for border wall system infrastructure. The monies appropriated would be used to fund the construction of additional border wall systems, technology, and personnel in strategic locations in accordance with the Border Security Improvement Plan (BSIP).

   Appropriation for Port of Entry infrastructure. Border security is not addressed solely by systems in between the ports of entry. POEs require technology and physical upgrades as well as an influx of personnel to meet capacity demands and act as the literal gatekeepers for the country. This is the first line of defense against drug and human smuggling operations.


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   Unaccompanied minors

 

1.        Congress should repeal Section 235 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA),9 which provides numerous immigration benefits to unaccompanied alien children and only encourages more parents to send their children

across the border illegally and unaccompanied. These children too often become trafficking victims, which means that the TVPRA has failed.

2.        If an alternative to repealing Section 235 of the TVPRA is necessary, the section should be amended so that all unaccompanied children, regardless of nationality, may be returned to their home countries in a safe and efficient manner. Currently, the TVPRA allows only children from contiguous countries (Canada and Mexico) to be returned while every other unaccompanied minor must be placed into a lengthy process that usually results in the minor’s landing in the custody of an illegal alien family member.

3.        Congress must end the Flores Settlement Agreement by explicitly setting nationwide terms and standards for family and unaccompanied detention and housing. Such standards should focus on meeting human needs and should allow for large-scale use of temporary facilities (for example, tents).

4.        Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act and portions of the TVPRA to move detention of alien children expressly from the Department of Health and Human Services to DHS.

 

   Asylum reform

 

1.        The standard for a credible fear of persecution should be raised and aligned to the standard for asylum. It should also account specifically for credibility determinations that are a key element of the asylum claim.

2.        Codify former asylum bars and third-country transit rules.

3.        Congress should eliminate the particular social group protected ground as vague and overbroad or, in the alternative, provide a clear definition with parameters that at a minimum codify the holding in Matter of A-B- that gang violence and domestic violence are not grounds for asylum.10


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   Parole reform. Congress should end the widespread abuse of parole in contravention of statute and return it to its origins as an extraordinary remedy for very limited purposes.

   NGOs and processing. Congress should halt funds given to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to process and transport illegal aliens into and throughout the United States. Such funds and infrastructure, including the DHS joint processing centers, should be redirected to secure the border, detain aliens, and provide space for immigration court proceedings.

   Other pathways for border crossers. While Congress should use its oversight authority to ensure that Expedited Removal is used to the fullest extent and followed to the letter of the law, other paths for border crossers should be included in a legislative package.

1.        Migrant protection protocols. Update the statutory language providing the basis for the Remain in Mexico program as needed to withstand judicial scrutiny and executive inaction.

2.       Asylum Cooperative Agreements. While the agreements themselves must be negotiated, Congress should mandate that the executive branch work faithfully to negotiate and execute ACAs and set parameters

to ensure that an unwilling executive cannot renege on an existing agreement or abandon the effort.

3.        Other expedited pathways. Congress should explicitly permit programs akin to the Prompt Asylum Claim Review (PACR) and Humanitarian Asylum Review Process (HARP) programs.

 

   Employment authorization

 

1.        Congress should reassert control of employment authorization, which is subject to rampant regulatory abuse, and limit it to certain categories of legal immigrants and non-immigrants.

2.        Congress should also permanently authorize E-Verify and make it mandatory.

 

   State and local law enforcement


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1.        Congress should unequivocally authorize state and local law enforcement to participate in immigration and border security actions in compliance with Arizona v. United States.11

2.        Congress should require compliance with immigration detainers to the maximum extent consistent with the Tenth Amendment and set

financial disincentives for jurisdictions that implement either official or unofficial sanctuary policies.

   Prosecutorial discretion. Congress should restrict the authority for prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement.

  Mandatory detention. Congress should eliminate ambiguous discretionary language in Title 8 that aliens “may” be detained and clarify that aliens “shall” be detained. This language, which contrasts with other “shall detain” language in statute, creates unhelpful ambiguity and allows the executive branch to ignore the will of Congress.

 

Regulations

   Withdraw Biden Administration regulations and reissue new regulations in the following areas:

 

1.        Credible Fear/Asylum Jurisdiction for Border Crossers.

2.        Public Charge.

   T-Visa and U-Visa reform. Unless and until T and U visas are repealed, each program needs to be reformed to ensure that only legitimate victims of trafficking and crimes who are actively providing significant material assistance to law enforcement are eligible for spots in the queue.

 

   Repeal TPS designations.

 

   H-1B reform. Transform the program into an elite mechanism exclusively to bring in the “best and brightest” at the highest wages while simultaneously ensuring that U.S. workers are not being disadvantaged by the program. H-1B is a means only to supplement the U.S. economy and to

keep companies competitive, not to depress U.S. labor markets artificially in certain industries.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization.

 

Executive Orders

   Pathways for border crossers

 

1.        Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries immediately.

2.        Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain in Mexico Protocols.

3.        Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP).

4.        Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel into the interior of the United States, and government flights or transportation for aliens.

5.        Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents) once permanent space is full.

6.        Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and only with the explicit authority of the Secretary.

7.        Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any categorical circumstance.

 

   Enforcement

 

1.        Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement.

2.        Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with the government.


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3.        Designate USCIS as Intelligence Community–adjacent, ensuring that it has access to national security and law enforcement databases.

4.        Rescind all memoranda limiting enforcement of immigration laws including those identifying sensitive zones.

5.        End ICE’s widespread use of termination and administrative closure of cases in immigration court.

 

   Averting or curtailing a mass migration event

 

1.        Provide that whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that an actual or anticipated mass migration of aliens en route to or arriving off the coast of the U.S. presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Secretary may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations prohibiting in whole or in part the introduction of persons from such countries or places as he or she shall designate in order to avert or curtail such mass migration and for such period of time as is deemed necessary, including through the expulsion of such aliens. Such rule and regulation making shall not be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.

2.        Provide that notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the Secretary makes such a determination and then promulgates, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations, the Secretary shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements of Title 8 that the Secretary, in his or her sole discretion, determines are necessary to avert or curtail the mass migration.

 

Subregulatory Matters

   USCIS priorities/structural changes

 

1.        Ensure that focus is returned to vetting, base eligibility of applicants, and fraud detection.

2.        Realign the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) to ensure agencywide consistency on implementation of fraud detection and vetting policies.

3.        Review and repeal any internal agency memo that is inconsistent with the priorities described in this chapter.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown.

   Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI

on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency.

   Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations.

 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

 

Needed Reforms

FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters.

Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters.

FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides


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insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program.

 

Budget Issues

FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds.

The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats.

 

Personnel

FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed.

 

CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA)

 

Needed Reforms

CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

and (2) national coordination of critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet CISA has rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong, the most recent and most glaring example being censorship of so-called misinformation and disinformation.

CISA’s funding and resources should align narrowly with the foregoing two mission requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chem- ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be moved to FEMA; its school security functions should be transferred to state homeland security offices; and CISA should refrain from duplicating cybersecurity functions done elsewhere at the Department of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S. Secret Service.

Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinforma- tion efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Commu- nity, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. At the time of this writing, release of the Twitter Files has demonstrated that CISA has devolved into an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political Left. In any event, the entirety of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee should be dismissed on Day One.

For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for an election—but nothing more. This is of value to smaller localities, particularly by flagging who is attacking their websites. CISA should not be significantly involved closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda.

 

U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG)

 

Needed Reforms

The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power compe- tition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting

U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

New Policies

The Coast Guard’s mission set should be scaled down to match congressio- nal budgeting in the long term, with any increased funding going to acquisitions based on an updated Fleet Mix Analysis. The current shipbuilding plan is insuf- ficient based on USCG analysis, and the necessary numbers of planned Offshore Patrol Cutters and National Security Cutters are not supported by congressional budgets. The Coast Guard should be required to submit to Congress a long-range shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Ideally this should become part of the Navy plan in a new comprehensive naval long-range shipbuilding plan to ensure better coherency in the services’ requirements.

Outside of home waters, and following the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, the Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the nation’s expansive Pacific waters to counter growing Chinese influence and encroachment. Expansion of facilities in American Samoa and basing of cutters there is one clear step in this direction and should be accelerated; looking to free association states (Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) for enhanced and persistent presence, assuming adequate congressional funding, is another such step.

The Secretary of the Navy should convene a naval board to review and reset requirements for Coast Guard wartime mission support. To inform and validate these updated requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard Commandant should execute dedicated annual joint wartime drills focused on USCG’s wartime missions in the Pacific (the money for these activities should be allocated from DOD). An interagency maritime coordination office focused on developing and overseeing comprehensive efforts to advance the nation’s mari- time interests and increase its military and commercial competitiveness should be established.

Given the USCG’s history of underfunded missions, if the Coast Guard is to con- tinue to maintain the Arctic mission, money to do so adequately will be required over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to shifting the Arctic mission to the Navy. Either way, the Arctic mission should be closely coordinated with our Canadian, Danish, and other allies.

 

Personnel

USCG is facing recruitment challenges similar to those faced by the military services. The Administration should stop the messaging on wokeness and diversity and focus instead on attracting the best talent for USCG. Simultaneously, consis- tent with the Department of Defense, USCG should also make a serious effort to re-vet any promotions and hiring that occurred on the Biden Administration’s watch while also re-onboarding any USCG personnel who were dismissed from service for refusing to take the COVID-19 “vaccine,” with time in service credited


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to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements in the recruiting process.

 

U.S. SECRET SERVICE (USSS)

 

Needed Reforms

The U.S. Secret Service must be the world’s best protective agency. Currently, the agency is distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial investigations. The result has been a long series of high-profile embarrassments and security fail- ures, perhaps most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to be inside the Democratic National Committee office on January 6, 2021, while a pipe bomb was outside. Despite the great size and scope of the January 6 inves- tigation, this high-profile incident of danger to a protectee remains unresolved.

The failures of the USSS protective mission are too numerous to list here. A December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight Committee listed dozens of such incidents as well as needed recommendations for reform.14 This chapter adopts those findings and recommendations in whole, especially the finding that USSS’s dual-mission structure detracts from the agency’s protective capabilities.

At the time of that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work hours on protection-related activities as opposed to investigative activities. USSS was established initially to investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For example, as this chap- ter was being written, all 15 of the USSS’s most wanted individuals were wanted for financial crimes, many of them international in nature.

Notably, the last head of the agency left not for a protection-related job, but to be the Chief Security Officer of social media company SnapChat. This is a pattern that has developed over the years, with agents seeking to burnish their online financial crimes credentials to secure corporate security jobs. Coupled with some of the lowest morale in the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of the primacy of its protective mission.

 

New Policies

USSS should transfer to the Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury all investigations that are not related to its protective function. It should begin the logistical operation of closing all field offices throughout the country and internationally to the extent they are not taken over by Treasury or Justice. USSS agents stationed outside of Washington, D.C., should be transferred to work in Immigration and Customs Enforcement field offices where they would continue to be the “boots on the ground” to follow up on threat reports throughout the country and liaise with local law enforcement for visits by protectees.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

The only investigations not related to USSS’s protective function that agents should pursue would be directed by HSI and relate to tracking the financial crimes associated with illegal immigration. This should include tracing remittances, any funds that are used to pay coyotes or the cartels, and payments by businesses to illegal aliens and all other crimes associated with illegal immigration.

USSS should keep visitor logs for all facilities where the President works or resides. The Biden Administration has evaded such transparency with President Biden spending a historic amount of time for a President at his Delaware residence. This has left the American people in the dark as to who is influencing the highest levels of their own government.

 

Budget

The suggested reforms would result in a significant USSS budget reduction, primarily because the agency would relinquish dozens of physical offices through- out the U.S. and internationally. Some amount of savings should be used to fix the personnel problems and for recruitment initiatives aimed at individuals who are inclined to join a protection-focused agency.

 

Personnel

As documented extensively in the above-referenced 2015 bipartisan congressio- nal report, low morale and high turnover are key drivers of USSS problems. With their mission focused on protection, agents would no longer spend the bulk of their time developing unrelated skillsets. Instead, USSS agents could hone their protection skills and pursue a protection career path in the agency rather than quickly leaving USSS for high-paying corporate security jobs.

The Uniform Division (UD) of USSS requires a significant staffing increase. As documented in the bipartisan report, understaffing results in unpredictable and long hours, which in turn result in high turnover, which only compounds the problem.

Another key issue is that UD officers lack the ability to enforce criminal laws outside the immediate vicinity of the White House. As the District of Columbia is a federal jurisdiction and currently is beholden to the trend of progressive pro- crime policies, UD officers should enforce all applicable laws. The result would be to allow UD officers to gain more law enforcement experience—an attractive credential that would improve morale.

 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

The TSA model is costly and unwisely makes TSA both the regulator and the regulated organization responsible for screening operations. As part of an effort to shrink federal bureaucracies and bring private-sector know-how to govern- ment programs, TSA is ripe for reform. The U.S. should look to the Canadian and


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

European private models of providing aviation screening manpower to lower TSA costs while maintaining security. Until it is privatized, TSA should be treated as a national security provider, and its workforce should be deunionized immediately. TSA could privatize the screening function by expanding the current Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to all airports. TSA would turn screening operations over to airports that would choose security contractors that meet TSA regulations and would oversee and test airports for compliance. Alternatively, it could adopt a Canadian-style system, turning over screening operations to a new government corporation that contracts screening service to private contractors. Contractors would bid to provide their services to a set of airports in a particular region, likely with around 10 regions nationally. TSA would continue to set security regulations and test airports for compliance, and the new corporation would establish any oper- ating procedures or customer service standards. With either model, the intelligence

function for domestic travel patterns should remain with the U.S. government.

The federal government could expect to save 15 percent–20 percent from the existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly larger. Service to travelers should also improve.

 

MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (MGMT)

The Management Directorate is unnecessarily large because each individual component also maintains its own respective management office. Too much over- lap and red tape exist between headquarters (HQ) and components with regard to such functions as hiring, information technology, and procurement. Finance is unique given that HQ needs to address reprogramming, and component bud- gets need to roll up into all-department budgets. The Directorate requires intense reform, the specifics of which should be further assessed given its expansive nature. Front Office (FO). Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep understanding of operational management—but who have some experience in government because they will need to understand the nuance of Reduction in Force (RIF), appropriations hurdles when dealing with U.S. government reorganization, etc.—to sit in the MGMT FO (reporting to the Secretary, ultimately either S1 or S2). One of these advisers should understand U.S. government employment law and be prepared to relocate personnel and downsize offices accordingly. This includes reverting to the original understanding of the function of individuals appointed to the Senior Executive Service: competent managers who can work capably with

any subject matter and in any location.

Over the first few months of the Administration, the advisers’ role should be to assess what structural and procedural changes are appropriate. They should dissect the current standing Management Directives and the approval processes in place to implement and/or change them; Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer’s processes and procedures; hurdles to the Office of Chief Procurement


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15

Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO. OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming. This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also through- out the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA per- sonnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented.

To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/ herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and inconsistencies in messaging.

Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share, and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, position- ing FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director. Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where fed- eral facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police, and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally out-

side of the executive branch.

 

OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY)

Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory, analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

PLCY should likewise do a complete inventory, analysis, and evaluation of any of the department’s work, in coordination with social media outlets, to censor or otherwise change or affect Americans’ speech. PLCY should comprehensively report on and publish this history in full so that the American people can know the facts. The department should remove all personnel who participated in any of this activity.

The department has significant authority and budget to provide grants for var- ious purposes. This effort is diffused across components and lacks central policy thought and coordination. PLCY should set a departmentwide policy that estab- lishes how granting choices are to be made and is consistent with the President’s priorities. PLCY should clear all granting decisions to ensure that they are con- sistent with the new policy.

PLCY-Wide Reforms. PLCY should work with Congress to streamline the department’s reporting requirements. Because there has not been a departmen- tal reauthorization bill and these requirements have been added piecemeal over two decades, they significantly overlap and even conflict—wasting resources and distracting from the department’s mission. PLCY should seek the elimination of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.

Issue-Area Reforms. PLCY should bolster its Immigration Statistics program and make it the one-stop shop for the timely production of all department immi- gration statistics and analysis.

 

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A)

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should be eliminated both because it has not added value and because it has been weaponized for domestic politi- cal purposes.

The Intelligence Community (IC) already provides raw intelligence to DHS components. In addition, the FBI, National Counter Terrorism Center, and other agencies where necessary already provide holistic threat assessment products to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as to private-sector entities at both the classified and unclassified levels where appropriate. I&A’s work as an interlocuter between the IC and DHS components’ individual intelligence operations on the one hand and government and the private sector on the other, as well as between the IC and the components, is at best duplicative. At worst, it is used and discussed in the media as a political tool, resulting in more harm than good to the U.S. government and IC writ large.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is not a member of the IC, should create cyber intelligence products in a collaborative fashion with the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Such efforts would lead to timelier usable classified and unclassified products for stakeholders that exceed the quality and capability of I&A’s efforts. This same principle applies to other


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

components as well: CBP, TSA, etc. all have their own intelligence operations and are better situated with their subject-matter experts to make their own assessments. The National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coor- dination (OPS) should absorb those select I&A functions and tactically proficient personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical support to the National Vetting Center). The remainder of I&A should be eliminated. The OPS entity should maintain IC status, and the only intelligence mission set should be to provide situational awareness and the dissemination of operational information or raw intelligence (no analysis or products) at classified and unclassified levels to

executive leadership across the department, not outside of DHS.

 

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)

 

Needed Reforms

OGC should advise principals as to how DHS can execute its missions within the law instead of advising principals as to why they cannot execute regulations, policies, and programs.

Instead of each component’s chief counsel reporting to the Headquarters Gen- eral Counsel (with a solid line) and indirectly to his or her component head (with a dotted line), the accountability should be reversed. Due to the different missions throughout the department, the components can better manage the legal issues of their specific mission than headquarters can. Thus, the chief counsel (or equiv- alent) of each component should report directly to the component head, report indirectly to the DHS General Counsel, and be accountable to the component head. The report to the General Counsel is to ensure consistency of advice across DHS. OGC should hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in turn supervise career staff and manage their output. DHS’s mission is politically charged, and the legal function cannot be allowed to thwart the Administration’s

agenda by providing stilted or erroneous legal positions and decision-making.

OGC should serve as the center of the response to the legal challenges facing the department to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of issues facing the department. It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal positions taken by the department, including those arising in litigation, congressio- nal oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Research Service and pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

OGC should invest in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage the department’s e-discovery. This would be beneficial both in litigation and in responding to congressional oversight. Removing delays in e-discovery processing would also reduce the issuance of subpoenas to the department and the generation of negative press for the Administration that comes from delayed responses.


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The old practice of relying on Executive Secretary taskings to pull documents for congressional requests does not work: It is slow, the metrics for what documents are gathered and how are unclear, and the components do not gather responsive material in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the Office of the Chief Information Officer or a relevant technological element within the department that can pull responsive communications quickly.

 

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA); OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA); AND OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT (OPE)

DHS’s external communications function should be consolidated and reformed

so that the President’s agenda can be implemented more effectively. The Office of Partnership and Engagement should be merged into the Office of Public Affairs. In many Cabinet agencies, outreach to companies and partner organizations is similarly performed by the Office of Public Affairs. This would also accomplish a needed DHS organizational and management reform to decrease the number of direct reports to the Secretary.

Both public and legislative affairs staff in the components should report directly to their respective headquarters equivalent. This would help to avoid a failure by the department to speak with one voice. It would also allow the component staff to perform more efficiently, overseen by expert managers in their trade. This would also allow DHS to respond to crises effectively by shifting staff as needed to the most pressing issues and better use underutilized staff at less active components.

Only political appointees in OLA should interact directly with congressional staff on all inquiries, including budget and appropriations matters. To prevent congres- sional staff from answer shopping among HQ OLA, the DHS OCFO, and components, DHS legislative affairs appropriations staff should be moved from MGMT OCFO into OLA. Regarding components, budget/appropriations staff should move from component budget offices into component legislative affairs offices.

Because dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees either have or claim to have jurisdiction over some DHS function, DHS staff from the Secretary on down spend so much time responding to congressional hearing and briefing requests, letters, and questions for the record that they are left with little time to do their assigned job of protecting the homeland. The next President should reach an agreement with congressional leadership to limit committee jurisdiction to one authorizing committee and one appropriations committee in each cham- ber. If congressional leadership will not limit their committees’ jurisdiction over DHS, DHS should identify one authorizing and appropriations committee in each chamber and answer only to it.

To focus more precisely on the DHS mission, OLA staff should also identify outdated and needless congressional reporting requirements and notify Congress


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

that DHS will cease reporting on such matters. For other congressional reports, OLA should implement a sunset date so that Congress must regularly demonstrate the need for specific data.

In both OPA and OLA, a change in mission and culture is needed. The clients of both components are the President and the Secretary, not the media, external organizations, or Congress. OPA and OLA should change from being compliance correspondents for outside entities airing grievances to serving as messengers and advocates for the President and the Secretary.

 

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION (OPS)

OPS was originally conceived by then-Secretary Jeh Johnson as an entity tasked with coordinating cross-DHS assets on an as-needed basis using a joint operations approach. This role is particularly challenging because of the disparate nature of mission sets across DHS.

OPS should absorb a very small number of tactical intelligence professionals from I&A as the rest of I&A is shut down. Such intelligence officers would be a subordinate element within OPS placed within the National Operations Center. The intelligence officers would provide tactical intelligence support for upcoming or ongoing opera- tions in addition to liaising with their agency/component counterparts. There would be no strategic intelligence analysis done as part of OPS or its new I&A sub-element. In addition to facilitating all-of-DHS coordination on a task-by-task basis, OPS would be responsible for ongoing situational awareness for the Secretary and

Deputy Secretary.

In addition to long-term staffing, OPS would have cycling billets from each of the major agencies and components to facilitate its most effective working rela- tionships across DHS.

 

OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (CRCL) AND PRIVACY OFFICE (PRIV)

The Homeland Security Act established only an Officer of CRCL, not an office.

The only substantive function Congress then assigned to the officer was to review and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights. Since then, Congress and CRCL itself have significantly expanded CRCL’s scope and size well beyond its original intent or helpful purpose. CRCL now operates and views itself as a quasi- DHS Office of Inspector General. This results in a considerable waste of limited component resources, which are routinely tasked to address redundant, overly burdensome, and uninformed demands from CRCL. It is therefore important to recalibrate CRCL’s scope and reach.

The organizational structure of both CRCL and the Privacy Office should be changed to ensure proper alignment with the department’s mission. The Office of General Counsel should absorb both CRCL’s and PRIV’s necessary functions


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and staff. Although the CRCL Officer and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Officer/Privacy Officer are statutory, their offices are not mandatory. CRCL and PRIV Officers and employees should report to a Deputy General Counsel, who would be a political appointee.

The CRCL Officer should focus on equal employment opportunity (EEO) compliance and the civil liberties function and investigate matters only within Headquarters or support components. Operational components’ civil liberties offi- cers should investigate incidents regarding their own agencies. The CRCL Officer should ensure that all civil liberties or civil rights complaints are sent to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for review. If the OIG chooses not to investigate, the CRCL Officer should only provide supportive information on possible courses of action for complainants.

The PRIV Officer and FOIA Officer should focus on FOIA, Privacy Compliance Policy, and Privacy Incident Response. The Deputy General Counsel should provide guidance to DHS leadership regarding Privacy Compliance and Privacy Incident Response. To ensure that only U.S. persons and Lawful Permanent Residents are provided protections as required by the Privacy Act, all DHS issuances should be updated to reflect that DHS protects the privacy of individuals as required by the Privacy Act (U.S. persons and lawful permanent residents);16 the Judicial Redress Act of 2015;17 and any U.S.–European Union Data Protection and Privacy Agreement. Because of the lack of public trust in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,

CRCL and PRIV staff should no longer review intelligence products or provide guidance on any intelligence products or reports.

A consistent, clear, and singular message is necessary for DHS’s mission. Therefore, all communications and/or meetings with any federal, state, local, or nongovernment groups should be limited to the Deputy General Counsel. In addi- tion, given the narrower scope of work, OGC should disband the outside advisory boards and the more than 50 working groups in which CRCL and PRIV currently participate. Finally, CRCL and PRIV should no longer issue bulletins or periodicals.

 

OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION OMBUDSMAN (OIDO) AND OFFICE OF THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN (CISOMB)

OIDO. The Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman should be

eliminated. This requires a statutory change in Section 106 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020.18

OIDO was designed to create another impediment to detention through an additional layer of so-called oversight. Several agencies already perform detention oversight. ICE conducts internal audits of facilities and investigates complaints against ICE agents through the Office of Professional Responsibility. Similarly, CBP accepts individual complaints regarding facilities through the Joint Intake Center


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

and manages complaints against agents through the OPR. In addition, CRCL, OIG, GAO, and Congress all perform detention oversight. These multiple bodies place unmanageable and unreasonable burdens on ICE to manage several sometimes inconsistent audits/inspections at the same time.

If OIDO remains a DHS component, the Secretary should immediately issue a direc- tive stripping CRCL of its immigration portfolio. OIDO is in a better position with dedicated resources and immigration experts to perform this function than CRCL is. Allowing both offices to conduct detention oversight is duplicative and wasteful.

The Secretary should conduct a thorough review of the effectiveness of Direc- tive 0810.1,19 which is widely interpreted as requiring a wholesale referral of cases to OIG. In reality, OIG investigates only a small fraction of them and often sits on cases for longer than the five-day window specified in the directive. Meanwhile, the other agencies wait in limbo to execute their duties.

CISOMB. The Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman should be eliminated. The DHS bureaucracy is too large, and the Secretary has too many direct reports. CISOMB’s policy functions can be performed (and sometimes already are) by OIG and GAO. The specialized case work can be moved into USCIS as a special unit, much like the IRS Taxpayer Advocate. This would require a stat- utory change to Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.20

If CISOMB continues as a DHS component, a policy should be issued that prohibits CISOMB from assisting illegal aliens to obtain benefits. Currently, approximately 15 percent–20 percent of CISOMB’s workload consists of helping DACA applicants obtain and renew benefits, including work authorization. This is not the role of an ombudsman. In addition, the government should be a neutral adjudicator, not an advocate for illegal aliens.

 

AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

It is critical to the achievement of the President’s policy objectives that all agen- cies and departments touching immigration policy work in sync with one another. While there are numerous areas in which such cooperation is critical, immigration has proven to be the most difficult. Accordingly, several objectives will be necessary for each of the following departments.

   Department of Health and Human Services: Agree to move the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to DHS or, alternatively, implement an aggressive and regular effort by the Secretary of HHS to ensure that ORR is fully pursuing presidential objectives in support of DHS.

   Department of Defense: Assist in aggressively building the border wall system on America’s southern border. Additionally, explicitly acknowledge and adjust personnel and priorities to participate actively in the defense


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

of America’s borders, including using military personnel and hardware to prevent illegal crossings between ports of entry and channel all cross-border traffic to legal ports of entry.

   Department of Justice: Agree to move the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the Office of Immigration Litigation to DHS and/or, alternatively, to treat the administrative law judges (immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals) as national security personnel, decertify their union, and move to increase hiring significantly to enable the processing of more immigration cases.

   Department of State: Allow DHS to lead international engagement in the Western Hemisphere on issues of security and migration. Additionally, quickly and aggressively address recalcitrant countries’ failure to accept

deportees by imposing stiff sanctions until deportees are in fact accepted for return (not just promised to be taken).

   Department of Housing and Urban Development: Ensure that only

U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents utilize or occupy federally subsidized housing.

   Department of Education: Deny loan access to those who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and deny loan access to students at schools that provide in-state tuition to illegal aliens.

   Department of Labor: Eliminate the two (of four) lowest wage levels for foreign workers.

   Department of the Treasury: Implement all necessary regulations both to equalize taxes between American citizens and working visa holders and to provide DHS with all tax information of illegal aliens as expeditiously as possible.

   Intelligence Community: Cooperate in the shrinking or elimination of the I&A role in the IC while replacing it with CBP and HSI representation to the IC.


AUTHOR’S NOTE: I had the honor of coordinating the efforts of the experts listed as contributors to this book, nearly all of whom have spent more time inside or interacting with the Department of Homeland Security than myself. I wrote only a small portion of the chapter and relied on the contributors’ experience and expertise to give the chapter both its depth and policy impact. No views expressed herein should be attributed to any single contributor.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, §

101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).

2.                See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News, December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed

March 14, 2023).

3.                H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No.

89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79-

Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).

4.                 Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No. 104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/

PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).

5.                8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023).

6.                18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023).

7.                 5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed

March 14, 2023).

8.                Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/ sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_

Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20

%24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20

President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5.

9.                H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW-

110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).

10.           Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/

download (accessed January 18, 2023).

11.           Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed

January 18, 2023).

12.           Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974] [As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).

13.          U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20 Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).

14.           Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,

U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023).

15.           5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023).

16.           S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo.

gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).

17.           H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www.

congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).

18.           H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023).


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19.           U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general.

pdf (accessed March 15, 2023).

20.           H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023).


 


6

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Kiron K. Skinner

 

 

T

 
he U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national

security interests of the United States.

Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American gov- ernment’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful.

There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.

It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the


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President and, thereby, the American people. Below is the basic but essential road- map for achieving these repairs.

 

HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Founded in 1789, the Department of State was one of the first Cabinet-level agencies in the new American government. The first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, oversaw a small staff, diplomatic posts in London and Paris, and 10 con- sular posts.1 Today, the Department of State has almost 80,000 total employees (including 13,517 foreign service employees and 11,683 civil service employees) in 275 embassies, consulates, and other posts around the world.2

In theory, the State Department is the principal agency responsible for carrying out the President’s foreign policy and representing the United States in other nations and international organizations. To the extent consistent with presidential policy and federal law, the department also supports U.S. citizens and businesses in other nations and vets foreign nationals seeking temporary or permanent entrance to the United States. The State Department also provides humanitarian, security, and other assistance to non-U.S. populations in need, and otherwise advances and supports U.S. national interests abroad. Properly led, the State Department can be instrumental for commu- nicating and implementing a foreign policy vision that best serves American citizens.

As the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart–Rudman Commission) observed more than 20 years ago, the State Department is a “crip- pled institution” suffering from “an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.”3 Unfortunately, this critique remains accurate.

The State Department’s failures are not due to a lack of resources. As one expert has observed, the department “has significantly more at its disposal than was the case at the end of the Cold War, in the mid-1990s, and at the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.”4 A major source, if not the major source, of the State Department’s ineffectiveness lies in its institutional belief that it is an independent institution that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy, and does not need direction from an elected President.

The next President can make the State Department more effective by providing a clear foreign policy vision, selecting political officials and career diplomats that will enthusiastically turn that vision into a policy agenda, and firmly supporting the State Department as it makes the necessary institutional adjustments.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT

Focusing the State Department on the needs and goals of the next President

will require the President’s handpicked political leadership—as well as foreign


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service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration.

Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years.

Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it.

To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration.

Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success.

Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills,


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of political appointees.

Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence well before the new Administration’s first day.

Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately. The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the Presi- dent’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be pri- oritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

 

RIGHTING THE SHIP

Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citi- zens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented immediately:

Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc., pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more import- ant than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars.

Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused


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numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security.

At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned.

The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources.

The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons.

Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission.

Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda.

This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters.

Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate

U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department.

Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end.

Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling


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of immigration and domestic security issues, which are inextricably related. The State Department’s apparent posture toward these two issues, which are of para- mount importance to the American people, has historically been that they are of lesser importance than other issues and that they can be treated as concessions in broader diplomatic engagements. In other instances in which access to the U.S. in the form of immigrant (permanent) and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas could potentially serve as diplomatic leverage, it is almost never used. To some degree, the State Department and many of its personnel appear to view the U.S. immigra- tion system less as a tool for strengthening the United States and more as a global welfare program.

To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of all Americans, this must change. Below are several key areas in which the department’s formal and informal postures must adjust to reflect the current immigration and domestic security environment:

   Visa reciprocity. The United States should strictly enforce the doctrine of reciprocity when issuing visas to all foreign nationals. For too long, the

U.S. has provided virtually unfettered access to foreign nationals from countries that do not respond in kind—including countries that are actively hostile to U.S. interests and nationals. Mandatory reciprocity will convey the necessary reality that other countries do not have an unfettered right

to U.S. access and must reciprocally offer favorable visa-based access to U.S. nationals. The State Department’s reaction time to other countries’ changes in visa policies with respect to the U.S. must be streamlined to ensure it can be updated in real time.

   Section 243(d) visa sanctions. Visa sanctions under section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),8 enacted into law to motivate countries to accept the return of any nationals who have been ordered removed from the U.S., should be quickly and fully enforced. Recalcitrant countries that do not accept receipt of their returned nationals will risk the suspension of issuance of all immigrant visas, all nonimmigrant visas, or all visas. These country-specific sanctions should remain in place until the sanctioned country accepts the return of all its removal-pending nationals and formally commits to future, regular acceptance of its nationals. Black- letter implementation of this law will demonstrate a heretofore lacking

seriousness to the international community that other nations must respect

U.S. immigration laws and work with federal authorities to accept returning nationals—or lose access to the United States.

   Rightsizing refugee admissions. The Biden Administration has engineered what is nothing short of a collapse of U.S. border security and


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

interior immigration enforcement. This Administration’s humanitarian crisis—which is arguably the greatest humanitarian crisis in the modern era, one which has harmed Americans and foreign nationals alike—will take many years and billions of dollars to fully address. One casualty of the

Biden Administration’s behavior will be the current form of the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP).

The federal government’s obligation to shift national security–essential screening and vetting resources to the forged border crisis will necessitate an indefinite curtailment of the number of USRAP refugee admissions. The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, which administers USRAP, must shift its resources to challenges stemming from the current immigration situation until the crisis can be contained and refugee-focused screening and vetting capacity can reasonably be restored.

 

   Strengthening bilateral and multilateral immigration-focused agreements. Restoration of both domestic security and the integrity of the U.S. immigration system should start with rapid reactivation of several key initiatives in effect at the conclusion of the Trump Administration. Reimplementation of the Remain in Mexico policy, safe third-country agreements, and other measures to address the influx of non-Mexican asylum applicants at the United States–Mexico border must be Day

One priorities. Although the State Department must rein in the C-175 authorities of other agencies, the Department of Homeland Security should retain (or regain) C-175 authorities for negotiating bilateral and multilateral security agreements.

   Evaluation of national security–vulnerable visa programs. To protect the American people, the State Department, in coordination with the White House and other security-focused agencies, should evaluate several key security-sensitive visa programs that it manages. Key programs include, but should not be limited to, the Diversity Visa program, the F (student) visa program, and J (exchange visitor) visa program. The State Department’s evaluation must ensure that these programs are not only consistent with White House immigration policy, but also align with its national security obligations and resource limitations.

 

PIVOTING ABROAD

Personnel and management adjustments are crucial preludes to refocus the State Department’s mission, which is implementing the President’s foreign policy agenda and, in so doing, ensuring that the interests of American citizens are given


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

priority. That said, the next President must significantly reorient the U.S. govern- ment’s posture toward friends and adversaries alike—which will include much more honest assessments about who are friends and who are not. This reorien- tation could represent the most significant shift in core foreign policy principles and corresponding action since the end of the Cold War.

Although not every country or issue area can be discussed in this chapter, below are examples of several areas in which a shift in U. S. foreign policy is not only import- ant, but arguably existential. The point is not to assert that everyone in the evolving conservative movement, or, in some cases, the growing bipartisan consensus, will agree with the details of this assessment. Rather, what is presented below demon- strates the urgency of these issues and provides a general roadmap for analysis.

In a world on fire, a handful of nations require heightened attention. Some rep- resent existential threats to the safety and security of the American people; others threaten to hurt the U.S. economy; and others are wild cards, whose full threat scope is unknown but nevertheless unsettling. The five countries on which the next Administration should focus its attention and energy are China, Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and North Korea.

 

The People’s Republic of China

The designs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Com- munist Party, which runs the PRC, are serious and dangerous.9 This tyrannical country with a population of more than 1 billion people has the vision, resources, and patience to achieve its objectives. Protecting the United States from the PRC’s designs requires an unambiguous offensive-defensive mix, including protecting American citizens and their interests, as well as U.S. allies, from PRC attacks and abuse that undermine U.S. competitiveness, security, and prosperity.

The United States must have a cost-imposing strategic response to make Bei- jing’s aggression unaffordable, even as the American economy and U.S. power grow. This stance will require real, sustained, near-unprecedented U.S. growth; stronger partnerships; synchronized economic and security policies; and American energy independence—but above all, it will require a very honest perspective about the nature and designs of the PRC as more of a threat than a competitor.10 The next President should use the State Department and its array of resources to reassess and lead this effort, just as it did during the Cold War. The U.S. government needs an Article X for China,11 and it should be a presidential mandate. Along with the National Security Council, the State Department should draft an Article X, which should be a deeply philosophical look at the China challenge.

Many foreign policy professionals and national leaders, both in government and the private sector, are reluctant to take decisive action regarding China. Many are vested in an unshakable faith in the international system and global norms. They are so enamored with them they cannot brook any criticisms or reforms, let alone


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

acknowledge their potential for being abused by the PRC. Others refuse to acknowl- edge Beijing’s malign activities and often pass off criticism as conspiracy theories. For instance, many were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID-19 escaped from a Chinese research laboratory. The reality, however, is that the PRC’s actions often do sound like conspiracy theories—because they are conspiracies. In addition, some knowingly or not parrot the Communist line: Global leaders includ- ing President Joe Biden, have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior. In some cases, these voices, like the global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney,

directly benefit from doing business with Beijing.

On the other hand, others acknowledge the dangers posed by the PRC, but believe in a moderating approach to accommodate its rise, a policy of “compete where we must, but cooperate where we can,” including on issues like climate change. This strategy has demonstrably failed.

As with all global struggles with Communist and other tyrannical regimes, the issue should never be with the Chinese people but with the Communist dictator- ship that oppresses them and threatens the well-being of nations across the globe.12 That said, the nature of Chinese power today is the product of history, ideology, and the institutions that have governed China during the course of five millennia, inherited by the present Chinese leaders from the preceding generations of the CCP.13 In short, the PRC challenge is rooted in China’s strategic culture and not just the Marxism–Leninism of the CCP, meaning that internal culture and civil society will never deliver a more normative nation. The PRC’s aggressive behavior can only be curbed through external pressure.

 

The Islamic Republic of Iran

The ongoing protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), which are widely viewed as a new revolution, have shown that the Islamic regime, which has been in power since 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader, is at its weakest state in its history and is at odds not only with its own people but also its regional neighbors. Iran is home to a proud and ancient culture, yet its people have strug- gled to achieve democracy and have had to endure a hostile theocratic regime that vehemently opposes freedom. The time may be right to press harder on the Iranian theocracy, support the Iranian people, and take other steps to draw Iran into the community of free and modern nations.

Unfortunately, the Obama and Biden Administrations have propped up the brutal Islamist theocracy that has hurt the Iranian people and threatened nuclear war. For example, the Obama Administration’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, gave the Islamic regime a crucial monetary lifeline after the Green Movement protests in 2009, which, while ultimately unsuccessful, did succeed in weakening the regime and showing the world that younger Iranians want freedom.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Instead of pressuring the Iranian theocracy to move toward democracy, the Obama Administration threw the brutal regime an economic lifeline by giving hundreds of billions of dollars to the Iranian government and providing other sanc- tions relief. This economic relief did not moderate the regime, but emboldened its brutality, its efforts to expand its nuclear weapons programs, and its support for global terrorism. Former President Obama has admitted his lack of support for the Green Movement during his Administration was an error and blamed it on poor advisors—yet those same advisors are involved with the Biden Administration’s insistence on reducing pressure on the theocracy and resurrecting a nuclear deal. The next Administration should neither preserve nor repeat the mistakes of the Obama and Biden Administrations. The correct future policy for Iran is one that acknowledges that it is in U.S. national security interests, the Iranian people’s human rights interests, and a broader global interest in peace and stability for the Iranian people to have the democratic government they demand. This decision to be free of the country’s abusive leaders must of course be made by the Iranian people, but the United States can utilize its own and others’ economic and diplo- matic tools to ease the path toward a free Iran and a renewed relationship with

the Iranian people.

 

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Once a model of democracy and a true U.S. ally, the Bolivarian Republic of Ven- ezuela (Venezuela) has all but collapsed under the Communist regimes of the late Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. In the 24 years since Hugo Chavez was first elected Venezuelan president in 1999, the country has violently cracked down on pro-democracy citizens and organizations, shattered its once oil-rich economy, empowered domestic criminal cartels, and helped fuel a hemispheric refugee crisis. Venezuela has swung from being one of the most prosperous, if not the most prosperous, country in South America to being one of the poorest. Its Communist leadership has also drawn closer to some of the United States’ greatest interna- tional foes, including the PRC and Iran, which have long sought a foothold in the Americas. Indeed, Venezuela serves as a reminder of just how fragile democratic institutions that are not maintained can be. To contain Venezuela’s Communism and aid international partners, the next Administration must take important steps to put Venezuela’s Communist abusers on notice while making strides to help the Venezuelan people. The next Administration must work to unite the hemisphere

against this significant but underestimated threat in the Southern Hemisphere.

 

Russia

One issue today that starkly divides conservatives is the Russia–Ukraine con- flict. The common ground seems to be recognition that presidential leadership in 2025 must chart the course.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   One school of conservative thought holds that as Moscow’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine drags on, Russia presents major challenges to

U.S. interests, as well as to peace, stability, and the post-Cold War security order in Europe. This viewpoint argues for continued U.S. involvement including military aid, economic aid, and the presence of NATO and U.S. troops if necessary. The end goal of the conflict must be the defeat of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a return to pre-invasion border lines.

   Another school of conservative thought denies that U.S. Ukrainian support is in the national security interest of America at all. Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance and is one of the most corrupt nations in the region. European nations directly affected by the conflict should aid in the defense of Ukraine, but the U.S. should not continue its involvement. This viewpoint desires a swift end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia.

   The tension between these competing positions has given rise to a third approach. This conservative viewpoint eschews both isolationism and interventionism. Rather, each foreign policy decision must first ask the question: What is in the interest of the American people? U.S. military engagement must clearly fall within U.S. interests; be fiscally responsible; and protect American freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, all while recognizing

Communist China as the greatest threat to U.S. interests. Thus, with respect to Ukraine, continued U.S. involvement must be fully paid for; limited to military aid (while European allies address Ukraine’s economic needs); and have a clearly defined national security strategy that does not risk American lives.

Regardless of viewpoints, all sides agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is unjust and that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their homeland. Furthermore, the conflict has severely weakened Putin’s military strength and provided a boost to NATO unity and its importance to European nations.

The next conservative President has a generational opportunity to bring res- olution to the foreign policy tensions within the movement and chart a new path forward that recognizes Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. interests in the 21st century.

 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Peace and stability in Northeast Asia are vital interests of the United States. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan are critical allies for ensuring a free and open Indo–Pacific. They are indispensable military, economic, diplomatic, and technology partners. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Korea) must be deterred from military conflict. The United States cannot permit the DPRK to remain a de facto nuclear power with the capacity to threaten the United States or its allies. This interest is both critical to the defense of the Amer- ican homeland and the future of global nonproliferation. The DPRK must not be permitted to profit from its blatant violations of international commitments or to threaten other nations with nuclear blackmail. Both interests can only be served if the U.S. disallows the DPRK’s rogue regime behavior.

 

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS

 

Western Hemisphere

The United States has a vested interest in a relatively united and economically prosperous Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the region now has an overwhelm- ing number of socialist or progressive regimes, which are at odds with the freedom and growth-oriented policies of the U.S. and other neighbors and who increasingly pose hemispheric security threats. A new approach is therefore needed, one that simultaneously allows the U.S. to re-posture in its best interests and helps regional partners enter a new century of growth and opportunity.

The following core policies must be part of this new direction:

   A “sovereign Mexico” policy. Mexico is currently a national security disaster. Bluntly stated, Mexico can no longer qualify as a first-world nation; it has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country. The current dynamic is not good for either

U.S. citizens or Mexicans, and the perfect storm created by this cartel state has negative effects that are damaging the entire hemisphere. The next Administration must both adopt a posture that calls for a fully sovereign Mexico and take all steps at its disposal to support that result in as rapid a fashion as possible.

   A fentanyl-free frontier. The same cartels that parasitically run Mexico are also working with the PRC to fuel the largest drug crisis in the history of North America. These Mexican cartels are working closely with Chinese fentanyl precursor chemical manufacturers, importing those precursor chemicals into Mexico, manufacturing fentanyl on Mexican soil, and

shipping it into the United States and elsewhere. The highly potent narcotic is having an unprecedented lethal impact on the American citizenry. The next Administration must leverage its new insistence on a sovereign Mexico and work with other Western Hemisphere partners to halt the fentanyl crisis and put a decisive end to this unprecedented public health threat.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   A hemisphere-centered approach to industry and energy. The next Administration has a golden opportunity to make key economic changes that will not only provide tremendous economic opportunities for Americans but will also serve as an economic boon to the entire Western Hemisphere.

First, the United States must do everything possible, with both resources and messaging, to shift global manufacturing and industry from more distant points around the globe (especially from the increasingly hostile and human rights-abusing PRC) to Central and South American countries.

“Re-hemisphering” manufacturing and industry closer to home will not only eliminate some of the more recent supply-chain issues that damaged the U.S. economy but will also represent a significant economic improvement for parts of the Americas in need of growth and stabilization.

Similarly, the United States must work with Mexico, Canada, and other countries to develop a hemisphere-focused energy policy that will reduce reliance on distant and manipulable sources of fossil fuels, restore the free flow of energy among the hemisphere’s largest producers, and work together to increase energy production, including for nations that are looking for dramatic economic expansion.

   A “local” approach to security threats. Western Hemisphere nations, including those in the Caribbean, arguably have stronger cultural and historical ties to the United States than most other countries and regions in the world. Yet Central and South America are moving rapidly into the sphere of anti-American, external state actors, including the PRC, Iran, and Russia. Specific countries in the Americas, such as Venezuela, Colombia,

Guyana, and Ecuador, are either increasingly regional security threats

in their own rights or are vulnerable to hostile extra-continental powers. The U.S. has an opportunity to lead these democratic neighbors to fight against the external pressure of threats from abroad and address local regional security concerns. This leadership and collaboration must span all tools at the disposal of U.S. allies and partners, including security-focused cooperation.

 

Middle East and North Africa

The next Administration must re-engage with Middle Eastern and North Afri- can nations and not abandon the region. Without U.S. leadership, the region may tumble further into chaos or fall prey to American adversaries. This recommen- dation requires a multi-dimensional strategy.


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   First, the U.S. must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology and delivery capabilities and more broadly block Iranian ambitions. This means, inter alia, reinstituting and expanding Trump Administration sanctions; providing security assistance for regional partners; supporting, through public diplomacy and otherwise, freedom-seeking Iranian people in

their revolt against the mullahs; and ensuring Israel has both the military means and the political support and flexibility to take what it deems to be appropriate measures to defend itself against the Iranian regime and its regional proxies Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

   Second, the next Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s diplomatic successes by encouraging other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to enter the Abraham Accords. Related policies should include reversing, as appropriate, the Biden Administration’s degradation of the long-standing partnership with Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian Authority should be defunded. A further key priority is keeping Türkiye in the Western fold and a NATO ally. This includes a vigorous outreach to Türkiye to dissuade it from “hedging” toward Russia or China, which is likely to require a rethinking of U.S. support for YPG/PKK [People’s Protection Units/Kurdistan Worker’s Party] Kurdish forces, which Ankara believes are an existential threat to its security. For the foreseeable future— and much longer than one new Administration—Middle Eastern oil will

play a key role in the world economy. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to support its allies and compete with its economic adversaries, including China. Relations with Saudi Arabia should be strengthened in a way that seriously curtails Chinese influence in Riyadh.

   Third, it is in the U.S. national interest to build a Middle East security pact that includes Israel, Egypt, the Gulf states, and potentially India, as a

second “Quad” arrangement. Protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf and in the Red Sea/Suez Canal is vital to the world economy and therefore to U.S. prosperity as well. In North Africa, security cooperation with European allies, especially France, will be vital to limit growing Islamist threats and the incursion of Russian influence through positionings of the Wagner Group.

   The U.S. cannot neglect a concern for human rights and minority rights, which must be balanced with strategic and security considerations. Special attention must be paid to challenges of religious freedom, especially the status of Middle Eastern Christians and other religious minorities, as well as the human trafficking endemic to the region.


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Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa’s importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategic interests is rising and will only continue to grow. Its explosive population growth, large reserves of industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance. Yet as Afri- ca’s strategic significance has grown, the U.S.’s relative influence there has declined. Terrorist activity on the continent has increased, while America’s competitors are making significant gains for their own national interests. The PRC’s companies dominate the African supply chain for certain minerals critical to emerging tech- nologies. African nations comprise major country-bloc elements that shield the PRC and Russia from international isolation for their human rights abuses—and African nations staunchly support PRC foreign policy goals on issues such as Hong Kong occupation, South China Seas dispute arbitration, and Taiwan.

The new Administration can correct this strategic failing of existing policy by prioritizing Africa and by undertaking fundamental changes in how the United States works with African nations.

At a bare minimum, the next Administration should:

   Shift strategic focus from assistance to growth. Reorient the focus of

U.S. overseas development assistance away from stand-alone humanitarian development aid and toward fostering free market systems in African countries by incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private sector engagement in these countries. Development aid alone does little to develop countries and can fuel corruption and violent conflict. While the United States should always be willing to offer emergency and humanitarian relief, both U.S. and

African long-term interests are better served by a free market-based, private growth-focused strategy to Africa’s economic challenges.

   Counter malign Chinese activity on the continent. This should include the development of powerful public diplomacy efforts to counter Chinese influence campaigns with commitments to freedom of speech and the free flow of information; the creation of a template “digital hygiene” program that African countries can access to sanitize and protect their sensitive communications networks from espionage by the PRC and other hostile actors; the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti; and a focus on supporting American companies involved in industries important to U.S. national interests or that have a competitive advantage in Africa.

   Counter the furtherance of terrorism. African country-based terrorist groups like Boko Haram may currently lack the capability to attack the


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United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S. should support capable African military and security operations through the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting foreign military education, training, and security assistance.

   Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the

State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has less- than-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise.

 

   Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly (and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners.

 

Europe

American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade, and political dimensions.

First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge.

Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning


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Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the orbit of the EU.

Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K. input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression.

 

South and Central Asia

Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance, the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14

Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliat- ing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially because both countries are nuclear powers.

The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and eco- nomic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expecta- tion of normal relations with either.


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The priority for statecraft is advancing the U.S.–Indian role as a cornerstone of the Quad, a cooperative framework including the U.S., India, Japan, and Aus- tralia. The Quad is comprised of the key nations in coordinating efforts for a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is an overarching group that nests the key U.S. bilateral and trilateral cooperative efforts that facilitate U.S. collaborative efforts across the Indo–Pacific. The State Department should also encourage the “Quad-Plus” concept that allows other regional powers to participate in Quad coordination on issues of mutual interest. Further, the State Department must support an inte- grated federal effort to deliver a revamped regional strategy for South Asia, as well as leading the execution of key tasks to implement the strategy.15

 

The Arctic

Because of Alaska, the U.S. is an Arctic nation. The Arctic is a vast expanse of land and sea rich in resources including fish, minerals, and energy. For example, the region is estimated to contain 90 million barrels of oil and one-quarter of the world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves.16 The Arctic is lightly populated: Only 4 million people in the world live above the Arctic Circle, with more than half of those living in Russia. Only around 68,000 people in Alaska live above the Arctic Circle.17 However, the sheer immensity of the Alaskan Arctic means its population density is less than one person per square mile.18

The United States has several strong interests in the Arctic region. The rate of melting ice during summer months has led to increased interest not only from shipping and tourism sectors, but also from America’s global competitors, who are interested in exploiting the region’s strategic importance and accessing its bounty of natural resources.

In the not-too-distant future, there will be a growing interest in the Arctic from both state and non-state actors alike. China has been open about its interest in the region, primarily as a highway for trade but also for its rich natural resources. While the PRC’s increasing intervention in Arctic affairs is a bit strained because it does not have an Arctic coastline, Russia does—and Russia has made no secret of its view that the Arctic is vital for economic and military reasons. Russia has invested heavily in new and refurbished Arctic bases and cold-weather equipment and capabilities. The north star of U.S. Arctic policy should remain national sov- ereignty, safeguarded through robust capabilities as well as through diplomatic, economic, and legal attentiveness.

The next Administration should embrace the view that NATO must acknowl- edge that it is, in part, an Arctic alliance. With the likely accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, every Arctic nation except for Russia will be a NATO member state. NATO has been slow to appreciate that the Arctic is a theater that it must defend, especially considering Russia’s brazen aggression against Ukraine. NATO must develop and implement an Arctic strategy that recognizes the importance of


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the region and ensures that Russian use of Arctic waters and resources does not exceed a reasonable footprint.

The U.S. should unapologetically pursue American interests in the Arctic by promoting economic freedom in the region. Economic freedom spurs prosperity, innovation, respect for the rule of law, jobs, and sustainability. Most important, economic freedom can help to keep the Arctic stable and secure.

The U.S. should work to ensure that shipping lanes in the Arctic remain avail- able to all global commercial traffic and free of onerous fees and burdensome administrative, regulatory, and military requirements. While this should be the next Administration’s policy with respect to all countries that might seek to block free-flowing commercial traffic, the next Administration will clearly have to exert substantial attention toward Russia.

Both the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy are vital tools to ensure an unmo- nopolized Arctic. It is imperative that the Navy and Coast Guard continue to expand their fleets, including planned icebreaker acquisitions, to assure Arctic access for the United States and other friendly actors. The remote and harsh con- ditions of the Arctic also make unmanned system investment and use particularly appealing for providing additional situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Coast Guard should also consider upgrading facilities, such as its Barrow station, to reinforce its Arctic capabilities and demonstrate a greater commitment to the region.

The People’s Republic of China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” which is an imaginary term non-existent in international discourse. The United States should work with like-minded Arctic nations, including Russia, to raise legitimate concerns about the PRC’s so-called Polar Silk-Road ambitions.

Concerning Greenland, the opening of a U.S. consulate in Nuuk is welcome. A formal year-round diplomatic presence is an effective way for the U.S. to better understand local political and economic dynamics. Furthermore, given Green- land’s geographic proximity and its rising potential as a commercial and tourist location, the next Administration should pursue policies that enhance economic ties between the U.S. and Greenland.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Defending and protecting the American people and advancing their interests requires the United States to engage in a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral relationships, including participating in international organizations. Working with other governments through international organizations like the United Nations (U.N.) can be tremendously useful—but membership in these organizations must always be understood as a means to attain defined goals rather than an end in itself. Engagement with international organizations is one relatively easy way for the

U.S. to defend its interests and to seek to address problems in concert with other


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nations, but it is not the only option—and American diplomats should be clear- eyed about international organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. When such institutions act against U.S. interests, the United States must be prepared to take appropriate steps in response, up to and including withdrawal. The manifest failure and corruption of the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic is an example of the danger that international organizations pose to U.S. citizens and interests.

The next Administration must end blind support for international organi- zations. If an international organization is effective and advances American interests, the United States should support it. If an international organization is ineffective or does not support American interests, the United States should not support it. Those that are effective will still require constant pressure from

U.S. officials to ensure that they remain effective. Serious consideration should also be given to withdrawal from organizations that no longer have value, quietly undermine U.S. interests or goals, or disproportionately rely on U.S. financial con- tributions to survive.

The Trump Administration’s “tough love” approach to international organiza- tions served American interests. For example, the Trump Administration withdrew from, or terminated funding for, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and the WHO. The results were redeployment of taxpayer dollars to better uses—and other organizations “getting the message” that the United States will not allow itself and its money to be used to undermine its own interests.

The Biden Administration reversed many of these decisions. Currently, U.S. funding for international organizations is more than $16 billion in fiscal year 2021—a sharp increase from $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2015.19 Millions of American taxpayer dollars go to support policies and initiatives that hurt the United States and American citizens.

The next Administration should direct the Secretary of State to initiate a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of U.S. participation in all international organizations. This review should take into account long-standing provisions in federal law that prohibit the use of taxpayer dollars to promote abortion, popu- lation control, and terrorist activities, as well as other applicable restrictions on funding for international organizations and agencies with a view to withholding

U.S. funds in cases of abuses.

International organizations should not be used to promote radical social pol- icies as if they were human rights priorities. Doing so undermines actual human rights and weakens U.S. credibility abroad. The next Administration should use its voice, influence, votes, and funding in international organizations to pro- mote authentic human rights and respect for sovereignty based on the binding


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

international obligations contained in treaties that have been constitutionally ratified by the U.S. government. It must promote a strict text-based interpreta- tion of treaty obligations that does not consider human rights treaties as “living instruments” both within the State Department and within international organi- zations that receive U.S. funding, including by making respect for sovereignty and authentic human rights a litmus test of personnel decisions and elections processes within international organizations.

The U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights focused on the primacy of civil and political rights in its inaugural report, which remains an important guidepost for bilateral and multilateral engagements on human rights. The com- mission’s report is a roadmap for revamping and reenergizing U.S. human rights policy and should be the basis for both structural and policy changes throughout the State Department.20 All U.S. multilateral engagements must be reevaluated in light of the work of the commission, and initiatives that promote controversial policies must be halted and rolled back.

It is paramount to create a healthy culture of respect for life, the family, sover- eignty, and authentic human rights in international organizations and agencies. To support this goal, the U.S. led an effort during the Trump Administration to forge a consensus among like-minded countries in support of human life, women’s health, support of the family as the basic unit of human society, and defense of national sovereignty. The result was the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and Protection of the Family.21 All U.S. foreign policy engagements that were pro- duced and expanded under the Obama and Biden Administrations must be aligned with the Geneva Consensus Declaration and the work of the U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights.

The U.S. government should not and cannot promote or fund abortion in inter- national programs or multilateral organizations. Technically, the United States can prevent its international funding from going toward abortions, but the U.S. will have a greater impact by including like-minded nations and building on the coali- tion launched through the Geneva Consensus Declaration, with a view to shaping the work of international agencies by functioning as a united front.

The COVID-19 pandemic made it painfully clear that both international organi- zations—and some countries—are only too willing to trample human rights in the name of public health. For example, the WHO was, and remains, willing to support the suppression of basic human rights, partially because of its close relationship with human rights abusers like the PRC.

The next Administration should unequivocally embrace the premise that humanity and the international community can simultaneously tackle pandem- ics and other emergent health threats without impeding the rights of people. It must also become a vocal surrogate for people in countries where rights are being suppressed in the name of health. This will likely require greater restrictions on


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the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies.

The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations.

 

SHAPING THE FUTURE

Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies.

The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining.

Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms.

   Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has

remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to

be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function.

Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures


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can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should be a priority.

   Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller agencies, and other offices.

The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the

Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across the federal government. The next Administration should also evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in

the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign assistance authorities.

 

   Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world. Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately,

U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years.

The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as


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a tool to communicate directly with the people of Europe during World War II. During the next half-century, America’s international broadcasting efforts both expanded and increased in sophistication as the United States shifted out of its “hot” war in Europe and into the Cold War with the Soviet Union. U.S. international broadcasting prowess, and the confident willingness to communicate the correctness of American ideals in the face of global resistance, arguably hit its peak near the conclusion of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Soviet and Eastern Bloc Communism, factors including the false

appeal of a so-called peace dividend triggered a slide in the U.S. ability to communicate a pro-freedom message to the rest of the world and in its commitment to do so. Ironically, this slide accompanied the rise of the Internet and mobile phone technologies, which arguably facilitated the most significant revolution in human communication since the invention of the printing press.

The United States must reassert its public diplomacy obligations by restoring its international broadcasting infrastructure as part of the broader

U.S. foreign policy framework, consolidating broadcasting resources and recommitting to people-focused and pro-freedom messaging and content.

   Engage in cyber diplomacy. Cyberspace has become an arena for competition between the U.S. and nations that seek and export digital authoritarianism. Cyberspace protection is critical to national security and deserving of commensurate diplomatic resources. Defined as “the use of diplomatic tools to address issues arising in and through cyberspace,” cyber diplomacy is a key part of the U.S. government’s toolkit for preventing and addressing cyber threats.24

The model for cyberspace that the U.S. espouses is based on democracy and freedom of information. It is “an open, interoperable, secure, reliable,

market-drive, domain that reflects democratic values and protects privacy.”25 Russia and China, meanwhile, are authoritarian regimes that use the Internet to limit public opposition and control information. They have created technological tools to enforce dominance over their peoples, and

at the U.N. and international organizations dealing with cyberspace, they strive to push standards that assist their totalitarian efforts and undermine Western nations.


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Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities

to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged

U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware.

In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26

The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not

stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of

armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines.

These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy.

 

CONCLUSION

The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective.

In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.


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The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.


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ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Department of State, “About the U.S. Department of State: Our History,” https://www.state.gov/about/ (accessed March 9, 2023).

2.                The balance of employment is 2,149 eligible family members and 50,223 locally employed staff. U.S. Department of State, “GTM Fact Sheet: Facts About Our Most Valuable Asset—Our People,” Global Talent Management, December 31, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GTM_Factsheet1222.

pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

3.                U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, February 15, 2001, p. x, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

4.                 See Brett D. Schaefer, “How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3115, April 20, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/political- process/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign.

5.                Historically, roughly one-third of ambassadorial appointments have been political appointments, although Republican Administrations have generally had a higher ratio of political appointments than Democratic Administrations.

6.                U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2.

7.                 News release, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” U.S. Department of State, December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/

(accessed March 9, 2023).

8.                Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. Code § 1101 et seq., § 1253.

9.                See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as a Global Superpower (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016).

10.          For additional context regarding how countering China fits in a more robust U.S. strategy, see James Jay Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3715, July 21, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-policy-strategy-post-biden-era.

11.           The Article X for China would follow George Kennan’s Article X for U.S.–Soviet competition. See George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed March 22, 2023).

12.           Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next Decades,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 221, February 20, 2010, https://www.heritage.org/asia/ report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades.

13.           Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2001), https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1686&context=vjtl (accessed March 9, 2023).

14.           U.S. Department of Defense, Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-

DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed July 28, 2022).

15.           See Jeff Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3721, August 29, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/south-asia-new-strategy.

16.           Emma Bryce, “Why Is There So Much Oil in the Arctic?” Live Science, August 3, 2019, https://www.livescience. com/66008-why-oil-in-arctic.html (accessed February 9, 2023).

17.           “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 26, 2021, p. 6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/177 (accessed

March 9, 2023).

18.           U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “Snapshot: Overcoming the Tyranny of Distance in the Arctic,” April 20, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/20/ snapshot-overcoming-tyranny-distance-arctic (accessed February 9, 2023).

19.           U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2021,” September 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023), and

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2015,” November 1, 2016, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2015/ (accessed March 9, 2023).

20.           U.S. Department of State, Report on the Commission of Inalienable Rights, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).


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21.           “Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family,” October 22, 2021, https://www.theiwh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GCD-Declaration-2021-2.pdf (accessed

March 13, 2023).

22.           U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security.

23.           U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” November 2004, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ perfrpt/2004/html/39764.htm (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” November 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/263637.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023);

U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” February 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2021/01/Dept-Org-Chart-Feb-2020-508.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State, “DOS Org Chart August 2021,” August 2021, https://www.state.gov/department-of-state-organization-chart/ dos-org-chart-august-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023); and U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” May 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/DOS-Org-Chart-5052022-Non-Accessible.

pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

24.           Emily O. Goldman, “Cyber Diplomacy for Strategic Competition: Fresh Thinking and New Approaches Are Needed on Diplomacy’s Newest Frontier,” Foreign Service Journal, June 2021, http://afsa.org/cyber- diplomacy-strategic-competition (accessed March 9, 2023).

25.           Emily Goldman, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Fall 2020), https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TNSR-Vol3- Iss4-Goldman.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

26.           United Nations General Assembly, “Group of Government Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security,” A/76/135, July 14, 2021, https://front.un-arm.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/08/A_76_135-2104030E-1.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023).

27.           Goldman, “Cyber Diplomacy.”


 


7

 

 

 

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Dustin J. Carmack

 

 

MISSION STATEMENT

To arm a future incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools necessary to fortify the United States Intelligence Community; to defend against all foreign enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign nation, devoid of all political motivations; and to maintain constitutional civil liberties.

 

OVERVIEW

The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate bureaucracy spread throughout 18 independent and Cabinet subagencies.1 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC’s mission is “to col- lect, analyze, and deliver foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to America’s leaders so they can make sound decisions to protect our country.”2

An incoming conservative President needs to use these intelligence authorities aggressively to anticipate and thwart our adversaries, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and especially China, while maintaining counterterrorism tools that have demonstrated their effectiveness. This means empowering the right personnel to manage, build, and effectively execute actions dispersed throughout the IC to deliver intelligence in an ever-challenging world. It also means removing redun- dancies, mission creep, and IC infighting that could prevent these collection tools from providing objective, apolitical, and empirically backed intelligence to the IC’s premier customer: the President of the United States.

Today, as Abraham Lincoln famously said, “The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion…. [W]e must think anew, and act


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

anew.”3 The Intelligence Community maintains an incredible capacity to achieve its mission, but both the IC and the somewhat antiquated infrastructure that sup- ports it often place too high a priority on yesterday’s threats and methodologies instead of trying to identify possible future threats or the methodologies that might be needed to combat them. The IC also often spends too much time over- correcting for past mistakes. The unintended consequences include hesitancy, groupthink, and an overly cautious approach that allows personal incentives to drive preset courses.

The IC must be perceived as a depoliticized protector of America’s civil rights and security. The American people are understandably frustrated by the fact that those who abuse power are rarely held to account for their actions. This must change, beginning with leadership that is both committed to ensuring that these agencies faithfully execute the laws of the land under the Constitution and resolved to punish and remove any officials who have abused the public trust.

The IC must also start to look forward, not backward. A concerted, disciplined, leadership-led initiative must be undertaken to refocus and shift IC prioritization, funding, and authorities to new and emerging threats, technologies, and methodol- ogies if the United States is to prevail against its global adversaries.4 Unfortunately, America’s major strategic threat is a nation-state peer and possibly ahead of the

U.S. in strategic areas. An incoming President must understand that today’s intel- ligence competition could well require analyzing technologies the U.S. does not have or compartmentalizing certain information as was done during the Cold War because of intelligence penetration. A future President’s ability to drive the resources needed to defeat another nation-state giant should therefore be the focus of near-term IC reforms.

 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI)

The ODNI was established in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11 and intelli- gence failures leading up to the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq. The office and its functions stem from authorities established under executive orders promulgated by President George W. Bush in 2004, followed by statutory authorizations in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).5

Proponents of an ODNI hoped to establish reforms similar to the Goldwater– Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) reforms of the 1980s, which identified recurring problems within DOD’s command-and-control architecture and led to unified Combatant Commands with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the armed forces and principal military adviser to the President. The ODNI was envisioned as a small but powerful IC coordinating agency led by a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As the President’s principal intelligence adviser, the DNI would lead and provide oversight of the President’s intelligence authorities while wielding a cudgel—budget and appointment


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

authorities—to break institutional silos that had caused past intelligence inte- gration failures.

Originally envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as a strengthened, authoritative position, the final congressionally negotiated product signed by President Bush has led to ambiguous and vague authorities that are dependent on who is selected as DNI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director and their level of support from the White House and National Security Council (NSC). 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow warned in a 2004 hearing that creating a new agency “lacking any existing institutional base…would require authorities at least as strong as those we have proposed or else it would create a bureaucratic fifth wheel that would make the present situation even worse.”6 The ODNI has become that bureaucratic fifth wheel about which Zelikow warned.

For example, under the Bush Administration’s initial legislative proposal, the CIA Director would have been under the “authority, direction, and control” of the DNI and no longer the head of an autonomous agency. Additional mechanisms envisioned full budget authority for the DNI, including within DOD’s intelligence components, as opposed to coordinating authority. Through arduous “sau- sage-making” and relatively quick negotiations, lawmakers produced statutorily vague authorities that traded away the DNI’s ability to direct budgetary authority across the entire IC, including DOD, and left the CIA a subordinate but indepen- dent agency with duties to report to the DNI without explicit directing authority. These statutory developments were what led President Bush’s first choice to serve as DNI, Robert Gates, to turn down the position. In discussions with the White House over the post, Gates noted that the “legislation weakened the lead- ership of the community” and that “instead of a stronger person, you ended up with a weaker person because the DNI had no troops and no additional powers really on the budget, hiring, and firing.”7 Gates noted that success would require the President to “make explicit publicly that the DNI is head of the Intelligence Community, not some budgeter or coordinator,” and that “[t]he position’s only prayer of success is for the president to say plainly…how he sees the job. Without

his explicit mandate…the endeavor is doomed to fail.”8

One of the two DNIs confirmed by the Senate during the Trump Administra- tion, John Ratcliffe, acknowledged that Gates’s theoretical concerns became the practical reality that he inherited:

Prior DNIs were the head of the IC only on paper and were routinely accustomed to yielding IC actions and decisions to the preferences of the CIA and other agencies. My ability to begin reversing that capitulation was

accomplished solely because President Trump made it repeatedly clear to the entire national security apparatus that he expected all intelligence matters to go through the DNI.9


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

To help further the legislative intent behind IRTPA, DNI Ratcliffe advised during the transition of incoming Biden DNI Avril Haines that the DNI should be the only Cabinet-level intelligence official.10 While his recommendation was adopted and has corrected the previously allowed imbalance by making the DNI the only Cabinet official and head of the IC at the table, the ODNI’s effectiveness and direction leave much to be desired.

A conservative President must decide how to empower an individual to oversee and manage the Intelligence Community effectively. To be successful, the DNI and ODNI must be able to lead the IC and implement the President’s intelligence priorities. This includes being able to exercise both budget and personnel authority and being able to rely on timely, useful feedback from subordinate components of the IC, many of which are located within other Cabinet agencies.

The ODNI needs to direct, not replicate in-house, the other IC agencies’ analytic, operational, and management functions. Considerations like mismanagement of human resources, joint-duty assignments, and accelerated growth in senior personnel can cause a President to dictate to his incoming DNI a desire to slash redundant positions and expenditures while simultaneously giving the DNI the authority to drive necessary changes throughout the IC to deal with the nation’s most compelling threats, including those emanating from China. As John Ratcliffe has noted, “These are essential to the DNI having the abilities and authorities to effectively direct, coordinate, and tackle the immense national security challenges ahead for the Intelligence Community as intended under IRTPA.”11

Otherwise, other Cabinet and subordinate IC agencies will continue to regard the ODNI as an annoyance and not as a positive contributor to the National Intel- ligence Program (NIP) budget. They will continue to work around or circumvent ODNI leadership decisions with appropriators and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or seek to wait out an Administration or DNI to prevent a policy or intelligence priority from reaching fruition.

Intelligence and interagency coordination has improved significantly since 9/11. Nevertheless, interagency rivalries and festering issues continue to cause duplication of effort on intelligence analysis and technology purchases as well as overclassification and ever-increasing compartmentalization. Additional issues include the abuse of mandated onboarding approval and reciprocity timelines by some agencies, recruitment and retention failures, and a lack of will to remove underperforming or timely adjudicate the misconduct of senior managers and other employees.

Finally, future IC leadership must address the widely promoted “woke” cul- ture that has spread throughout the federal government with identity politics and “social justice” advocacy replacing such traditional American values as patriotism, colorblindness, and even workplace competence.


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EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333

IRTPA was passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks against the homeland. It was intended to improve the sharing of information among the elements of the IC, recognizing that the nature of the threats we now face blurs the lines between foreign and domestic intelligence in detecting and countering national security threats against the homeland. An equally important objective in passing the most significant intelligence reform since the National Security Act of 194712 was cre- ation of the position of DNI, charged with assuming two of the three principal roles that formerly belonged to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): serving as principal intelligence adviser to the President and leading the IC as an enterprise. Nearly two decades later, the DNI’s record of effectiveness in improving the sharing of information and operating the IC as an enterprise is mixed. Implemen- tation of the DNI’s roles as leader of the IC and principal intelligence adviser to the President has been challenging. However, despite flaws in the legislation and intelligence agencies’ bureaucratic jockeying that undermine the DNI, it is impos- sible to know what would emerge if Congress were to revisit the act. Seeking a legislative solution therefore might carry with it more risks than benefits. Instead, an incoming conservative President’s immediate focus should be on modifying

Executive Order 12333, the President’s direction for implementing IRTPA.13 Executive Order 12333 was last amended on July 30, 2008, by President George

W. Bush.14 The revisions were aligned with IRTPA with significant emphasis on having the IC address the threats to the homeland from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is scant mention of cyber threats and the evolving national security challenges posed by China, Russia, and other U.S. adversaries. By extension, the revised order fell short of stipulat- ing how the DNI would execute his authority to organize the IC in a manner that improves the delivery of timely intelligence to a wide array of customers.

Executive Order 12333 should be amended to take account of the changing landscape of threats and improve the functional aspects of America’s intelligence enterprise. To that end, a revised order should:

 

   Address the threats to the United States and its allies in cyberspace. These threats range from cyberwarfare to information operations. The amended order should clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various U.S. government cyber missions, including the recently created National Cyber Director’s Office and power centers at the NSC, while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens.

Under the DNI’s direction, the cyber mission should explicitly identify how information in the cyber domain will be shared promptly with the warfighters, from law enforcement agencies to the broader IC and state,


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship.

 

  Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities.

The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed.

   Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks.

 

The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of

commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations.

This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved.

As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future.

   Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync.

 

   Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s

Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

threat from China and thereby counter it more effectively. They can also aid the development of export control mechanisms and potential outbound investment screening where necessary. Brief, specific governance language

should be considered that would apply counterterrorist authority models to the broader functions of the U.S. government insofar as they are needed to counter 21st century nation-state threats.

The success of any DNI rests with support from the President. Any revised Executive Order 12333 must serve to express unequivocal support for the DNI in executing the mandates that an amended order would provide.

 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The CIA is a foreign intelligence collection service tasked with collecting human intelligence (HUMINT), providing all-source intelligence analysis and report- ing, and conducting covert action when required to do so by the President. The CIA has its roots in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which the United States established during World War II as a paramilitary and intelligence collection orga- nization. After World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, and the CIA was established in law by the National Security Act of 1947.

As with every agency in government, the President's election sets a new agenda for the country. Public servants must be mindful that they are required to help the President implement that agenda while remaining apolitical, upholding the Constitution and laws of the United States, and earning the public trust. The Pres- ident requires a CIA that provides unbiased and apolitical foreign intelligence information and, when necessary, can act capably and effectively on any covert action findings.

Executing the Mission. The CIA’s success depends on firm direction from the President and solid internal CIA Director–appointed leadership. Decisive senior leaders must commit to carrying out the President’s agenda and be willing to take calculated risks. Therefore:

   The next President-Elect and incoming Presidential Personnel Office should identify a Director nominee who can foster a mission-driven culture by making necessary personnel and structural changes.

   The President-Elect should choose a Deputy Director who, without needing Senate confirmation, can immediately begin to implement the President’s agenda. This includes halting all current hiring to prevent

the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel. Additional appointees should be placed within the agency as needed to assist the Director in supervising its functioning.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   The Director and Deputy Director should request briefings on all CIA activities and presence overseas, as well as any CIA-controlled access programs and existing covert action findings, without exception.

   The Director and Deputy Director should meet with all directorates and mission centers, prioritizing those that are aligned most closely with the President’s priorities and calibrating collection and operations based on the President’s intelligence requirements. This includes any areas where the CIA might be conducting its own diplomacy parallel to official State Department policy. It must be clear that the CIA’s liaison relationships overseas must follow and not contradict those set at the policy level by the President through the State Department.

The other principal offices responsible for executing the CIA’s mission include the Directorate of Operations, Directorate of Analysis, Directorate of Science and Technology, Directorate of Support, and Directorate of Digital Innovation. If senior leadership finds any program or operation to be inconsistent with the President’s agenda, the Director should immediately halt that program or operation.

Reining in Bureaucracy. The CIA’s bureaucracy continues to grow. Because mid-level managers lack accountability, there are areas in which personnel are not responsive to any authority, including the President. The President should instruct the Director to hire or promote new individuals to lead the various directorates and mission centers. This new crop of mid-level leaders should carry out clear directives from senior CIA leadership, which means more accountability and new ways of thinking to benefit the mission.

In addition, the President should task the Director with significantly broadening recruitment, expediting onboarding practices, and shifting resources away from headquarters, including terminal generalist GS-15s when OPM buyouts, forced rotations, or up-and-out personnel policies are set for particular positions. The CIA must find creative ways to align mission requirements with hiring needs, recruit diverse sets of individuals with unique backgrounds, and become more open to hiring private-sector experts directly into senior positions. In addition, the Director should break the cabal of bureaucrats in D.C. by permanently moving various directorates, such as Support and Science and Technology, out of Virginia and possibly open campuses outside of D.C. where analysts and other experts could contribute virtually.

Redirecting Resources. Certain CIA employees and offices have focused on promoting divisive ideological or cultural agendas and fostering a damaging cul- ture of risk aversion and complacency. As soon as possible, the Director should divert resources from any activities that promote unnecessary and distracting social engineering. The Director should implement changes in promotion criteria


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

that reward individuals for creative thinking and quality of recruitments and prod- ucts rather than numeric metrics or the achievement of benchmarks that are not essential to the mission.

Not all careers in espionage are created equal, and the Director should incentiv- ize and reward applicants who are willing to accept high risks over those who are climbing the ranks simply by doing business as usual. The Director should refocus the CIA to an OSS-like culture and mandate that all CIA employees acquire, as a condition of securing senior (GS-14+) rank, additional or enhanced language skills, technical or cyber expertise, or field training or serve in overseas assignments.

 

COVERT ACTION

Covert action can be a valuable tool in helping further the President’s foreign policy agenda if implemented in concert with other forms of government power. As codified in the U.S. Code, “the term ‘covert action’ means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military con- ditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly….”16

The President initiates a covert action with a written finding that explains why “such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States.”17 The statute assumes the President will use the CIA as the principal action element to achieve the objectives of covert action findings; however, the President need not feel constrained to utilize only the CIA: “[E]ach finding shall specify each depart- ment, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action.”18

For example, the Department of Defense maintains certain clandestine capa- bilities under Title 10 authorities that may resemble but far exceed in scale similar capabilities outside of DOD. Generally, such DOD capabilities can be employed outside a combat theater only if they are determined to be traditional military activities. In practical terms, this means that many DOD capabilities, including those in the space and cyber domains, can be employed only after the initiation of armed conflict.19 Given the range of global threats the United States faces today, the President should consider whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should be used to support potential covert actions.

The problem, unfortunately, is that certain elements in the State Department, IC, and DOD trade on risk aversion or political bureaucracy to delay execution of the President’s foreign policy goals. A future conservative President should therefore identify individuals on the transition team who are familiar with the implementation of covert action with a view to placing them in key NSC, CIA, ODNI, and DOD positions. These knowledgeable teams can assist in any review of current covert actions and, potentially, planning for new actions.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Immediately after the inauguration, the President should task the NSC’s Senior Director for Intelligence Programs with conducting a 60-day review of any current covert action findings, including their effectiveness; evaluating new covert actions that might be needed to implement the President’s foreign policy goals; and report- ing back to the President. Such an assessment should be conducted independently of the agencies responsible for the actions under review. As part of the review, the Senior Director for Intelligence Programs should identify which departments or agencies, such as the CIA or DOD, are best equipped to achieve the objectives set out in new and existing findings.

After the 60-day review, the President should demand creative thinking and a clear strategy as to how covert action fits within the President’s broader foreign policy strategy, to include possibly modifying or rescinding any current findings, drafting new findings, and streamlining or eliminating needless bureaucracy, par- ticularly at State, to facilitate more expeditious decisions on tactical covert action. Careful thought should be given to the metrics by which the effectiveness of covert action programs will be measured to ensure the appropriate use of government resources and to guard against the possibility of covert action’s being used with little scrutiny in ways that are inconsistent with overt foreign policy goals.

 

ODNI AND CIA ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The ODNI and CIA operate under authority provided by the Central Intelli- gence Agency Act of 1949,20 which means they have greater latitude than the rest of the federal government with respect to the hiring and firing of personnel. Both organizations and other areas of the IC have struggled from a human resources and talent management standpoint to recruit, onboard, and maintain personnel in a timely fashion to fill the IC’s ever-changing needs. At a time when the Intelli- gence Community needs significantly more personnel with the proper technical, language-capable, and diverse backgrounds, including applicants from elements of the business community, the incoming Directors of both agencies need to make this effort a top priority.

Past DNIs’ Chiefs of Staff and additional front-office staff historically have come from outside the IC, commonly under a misconstrued “staff-reserve” structure that is intended to avoid a Schedule C designation within the IC. The Director should handpick qualified, properly cleared personnel for front-office and mana- gerial leadership positions, such as the DNI’s Chief of Staff and heads of Legislative Affairs and Strategic Communications, to oversee those divisions with career IC staff reporting to them.

The incoming DNI and CIA Director should also consider changes in the Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS)/Senior Intelligence Services (SIS). Senior officers should be required to sign mobility agreements that allow ODNI and CIA leadership to move them within the IC every two years if necessary. Many qualified


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

and distinguished senior officers serve throughout the IC, but some long-serving generalist officers no longer perform at a high capacity, are management-driven, do not serve the IC’s changing needs, and limit junior officers’ prospects for growth and advancement. An incoming Administration should consider studying and implementing additional requirements as a condition for promotion to GS-15/ SNIS/SIS and explore concepts such as “Up and Out” beginning at the GS-14/15 levels and above for some fields.

The IC should evaluate areas of bloat and underperforming cadre and work with OPM on authority for voluntary separation buyouts. Allowing ODNI and CIA leadership to shrink size and reduce duplication of effort while promoting healthy turnover within their senior ranks would encourage new ideas and perspectives from mid-career officers and, potentially, from employees hired from outside their agencies. The ODNI and CIA should maximize their direct-hire and incen- tive-building authorities to bring in talented and properly cleared individuals to serve in positions requiring technical, language, and cyber expertise.

Finally, the human resources and talent management systems for onboarding purposes at the ODNI, CIA, and some other elements of the IC are fundamentally broken. For example, according to current CIA Director William Burns, it recently took more than 600 days, on average, for a CIA applicant to receive his or her necessary security clearance.21 Although security clearance procedures have been somewhat improved in recent years and Burns has committed CIA to reducing that to no more than 180 days, degradation in other areas of the process has limited the IC’s capacity to attract qualified and needed expertise.

 

PREVENTING THE ABUSE OF INTELLIGENCE FOR PARTISAN PURPOSES

The intelligence function must be protected from bottom-up and top-down

politicization if it is to play its proper role in our national security decision-mak- ing process. Unfortunately, both types of politicization have occurred recently to the detriment of the Intelligence Community’s reputation and credibility. More important, the politicization of intelligence risks contributing to policy fail- ures (as we saw with the Iraq War) or even undermining our democratic system here at home.

In particular, the IC must restore confidence in its political neutrality to rectify the damage done by the actions of former IC leaders and personnel regarding the claims of Trump–Russia collusion following the 2016 election and the suppression of the Hunter Biden laptop investigation and media revelations of its existence during the 2020 election. But the problem is not confined to the executive branch struggle between the IC and policymakers; it also relates to the IC’s relationship with Congress as evinced by DNI James Clapper’s failure to answer honestly in response to congressional questions about government surveillance programs.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The ODNI and CIA are undergoing a crisis of confidence based on several factors. First, President Barack Obama’s CIA Director, John Brennan, gravely damaged the CIA by minimizing the Directorate of Operations and exploiting intelligence analy- sis as a political weapon after he left office. Brennan's role in the letter signed by 51 former intelligence officials before the 2020 election is unclear, but in dismissing the Hunter Biden laptop as “Russian disinformation,” the CIA was discredited, and the shocking extent of politicization among some former IC officials was revealed. Restoring respect for the IC as an independent provider of information and analysis while also ensuring that it is responsive to the legitimate needs of poli- cymakers will require reinforcing essential norms and institutions. However, we should also recognize that achieving the perfect balance that avoids the pathologies of too much distance or too much closeness and responsiveness to policymakers is not only difficult, but probably impossible.22 Thus, given the very nature of the business and the political process, much will depend on the promotion of certain

norms or virtues on both sides of the principal–agent relationship. Specifically:

   The DNI and CIA Director should use their authority under the National Security Act of 1947 to expedite the clearance of personnel to meet mission needs and remove IC employees who have abused their positions of trust. An area of particular concern is that personnel under investigation for improprieties have been allowed to retire before internal investigations have been completed. Directors of both agencies must instill further confidence in their workforces, Congress, and the American people that they can and will deal effectively with personnel that fail to live up to their oath to the Constitution, adhere to ethical and moral standards as expected by America’s taxpayers, and faithfully execute the law.

   The President should direct the DNI and the Attorney General, by direction of the respective Inspectors General and IC Analytic Ombudsman, to conduct a further audit of all IC equities of past politicization and abuses

of intelligence information. For example, a recent IC ombudsman analysis during the 2020 election cycle noted, “If our political leaders in the White House and Congress believe we are withholding intelligence because of organizational turf wars or political considerations, the legitimacy of the Intelligence Community’s work is lost.”23

   The President should immediately revoke the security clearances of any former Directors, Deputy Directors, or other senior intelligence officials who discuss their work in the press or on social media without prior clearance from the current Director. IC agencies, including the CIA, should minimize their public presence and vigorously investigate any and all leaks


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of information, classified or otherwise. The ODNI and CIA should fire or refer for prosecution any employee who is suspected of leaking information, and penalties should include the removal of pension benefits for those who are found guilty. Additional tools are needed to prevent leaked intelligence from being used as a weapon in policy debates by IC leaders or decision- makers in the executive branch or Congress.

   In addition, the Department of Justice should use all of the tools at its disposal to investigate leaks and should rescind damaging guidance by Attorney General Merrick Garland that limits investigators’ ability to identify records of unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the media. Personnel have sufficient access to legitimate whistleblower

claims under protections provided by Inspectors General and Congress. The Director and IC must prioritize hiring additional counterintelligence and security personnel to assist in this effort.

   Military and civilian IC training should include stronger emphasis on the norm of political neutrality, including a mandatory course on

professionalism and repercussions for abuse in the execution of duties in all degree programs at the National Intelligence University.

   Intelligence leaders need to model norms of neutrality and respect for the decision-making authority of the President, appointed officials, and Congress. This includes building trust with key decision-makers by not using their positions and privileged access to information to influence policymaking indirectly or directly in an inappropriate fashion (especially by engaging in threat inflation). IC leaders should practice extreme restraint in engaging with the public and the media. They should seek to work in the shadows rather than in the limelight. Potential restrictions on such appearances could supplement this norm, preventing political leaders from using IC officials to support an Administration position as they do with military leaders.

   Retired IC leaders should similarly support the neutrality norm by not becoming public figures.

   Congress should not use IC leaders as pawns in policy struggles with the President or the other party during their appearances before committees of the House and Senate. While Congress has a proper oversight role, it should distinguish between information that needs to be public and information that should be discussed in private with members of the IC. A DNI should call “balls and strikes” to those on both sides of the aisle on Capitol


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Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives.

   Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary.

   Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25

 

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)

A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities.

Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized.

Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed.

Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets,

   Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures,

   An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and

   Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act.

 

CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES

The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear.

A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include:

   What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition?

   How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?


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Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the Asia–Pacific in, for example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China.

Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter China’s capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. No longer can America’s information and technological dominance be assumed. China’s gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. China’s centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum infor- mation sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics.

The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally non- government and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In addition, to combat China’s economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General.

Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China’s unique and more com- prehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy. Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. “When people ask me why I did that,” he explained in an interview, “I say, ‘Because no one would let me increase it by 40%.’ I had an $85 billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and military intelligence program. My perspective was, ‘Whatever we’re spending on countering China, it isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount

importance that the “whole of government” be rowing together.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC)

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms.

Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to

include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities.

Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities.

When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts.


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The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually:

 

In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34

NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA.

 

ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM

Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from:

   The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations;

   Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11;

   Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and

   Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Historically, this tradecraft has been passed on in the form of unwritten rules learned on the job and in agency-specific training classes, but increasingly since the intelligence reforms of 2004, they have been codified IC-wide under the direction of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration.

A RAND study of U.S. intelligence tradecraft notes that the “vast majority of intelligence analysts reside outside the Central Intelligence Agency and do work that is tactical, operational, and current.”35 The study goes on to note that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has as many analysts as the CIA has and that the National Security Agency (NSA) has several times as many analysts, as does the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), indicating both the breadth of the IC’s technical collection and its emphasis both on developing analysts who can interpret secret human or technical intelligence in quick-turnaround pieces and on countering tactical, asymmetric threats like terrorism.

During the Cold War, however, there was a more balanced analytic focus with greater emphasis on strategic intelligence issues as a means of outcompeting the Soviet Union. This kind of analysis deals not only in secrets, but also in myster- ies—making well-founded but ultimately unknowable predictions about future actions by a competitor or adversary. The tradecraft necessary to succeed in stra- tegic analysis requires substantive regional and topical expertise developed over the years to supplement experience in the daily collection and understanding of secrets. Institutionally, it also requires that agencies’ analytic processes be open to discussion, debate, and dissent because analysts must work together to describe a probable range of future outcomes and warn about unproven current threats rather than using the collection to solve a single puzzle with a defin- itive answer.

Regarding its mission to follow longer-term issues, the IC is falling short in resourcing and in openness to dissenting opinions, which (if taken seriously) can help responsible officials respond more effectively to threats and threat actors. The IC Analytic Ombudsman has expressed concern that hyperpartisanship “has threatened to undermine the foundations of our Republic, penetrating even into the Intelligence Community.”36

For example, the Ombudsman noted in a report on the IC’s handling of elec- tion-threat analysis in 2020 that, in his view, CIA officials had deliberately downplayed dissenting views and coordination comments expressed by experts at the National Intelligence Council and elsewhere who felt there was evidence of Beijing’s intent to exert at least some influence on the 2020 election as opposed to the consensus view that Beijing did not interfere in U.S. elections. Senior CIA analysts and leaders made it “difficult to have a healthy analytic conversation in a confrontational environment” while violating multiple official IC tradecraft standards. By not allowing dissents or considering alternatives, the CIA exercised “undue influence on intelligence.”37 Subsequent exposure of China-linked online


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influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur-

vive or not according to their merits.

To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose.

An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about

its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing.

With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions.

“Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies.

These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine.

To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information.

One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing


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a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect.

Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine.

Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information.

   Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification.

   Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls.

The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include:

   Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection.

   More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs).

   Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Enhanced metrics for accuracy of classification.

   A general simplification of the overall system for the benefit of users.

On the back end, an ODNI-run declassification process that is faster, nimbler, default-to-automated, and larger-scale should be a priority.

Additionally, investments in IT are required to deal with the growing volumes of CNSI collected and produced in the digital age, along with many years’ worth of existing analog and digital holdings that could provide valuable historical insights. An incoming Administration needs to explore options to prioritize funding for innovation in declassification management: for example, by establishing a budget line item specifically for the modernization of declassification or designating fund- ing for program classification management as a special-interest item.

The Administration will also need to transition to using technology, including tools and services for managing Big Data (which provide a robust electronic record repository, making information within and across agencies easier to organize and locate and facilitating more rapid review and release capabilities for records of emerging interest); artificial intelligence/machine learning (which, when incor- porated into existing business practices, enables machine interpretation of unstructured text and data, applies decision support technology to enable more consistent classification decisions, and expedites reviews between agencies); and expansion of Commercial Cloud services (which facilitate the rapid testing and deployment of new tools and technologies).

However, technology is not a panacea; human expertise in information holdings and routine validation of the technology will always be necessary. With or with- out machine assistance, agencies will require more people and more varied skill sets to improve their ability to meet the electronic records era’s classification and declassification demands and serve an incoming Administration’s goals.

Broader U.S. Government and IC Intelligence Needs. Increasingly, con- flicts among U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are conducted in the realms of technology and finance.40 This challenge requires new tools, authorities, and technological expertise across the U.S. government, par- ticularly at the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is housed at the Treasury Department.

An incoming conservative President should task his DNI and Secretary of Commerce with increasing coordination, the resources needed for BIS and SCIF capacity, and proper and necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of multifaceted adversaries such as China. This would include additional work with private-sector expertise, granting clearances to niche sector experts and United States citizen commercial and financial partners as needed.


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Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operat- ing under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help

them succeed.

In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets. Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S. companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its succes- sor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothet- ical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S., suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy

regulations.

In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-At- lantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges. Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activi- ties,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelli- gence programs.

An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States. Restrictions on data exports have been part of the trade conflict, but now they could seriously harm our military and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, restrictions on U.S. intelligence collection hurt the Europeans themselves, especially as the United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Europeans.48

Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight standards that no European country meets. At the same time, exports of data to China are unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. That violates World Trade Organization agreements as an arbitrary and discriminatory data protection stan- dard. It is a betrayal by a nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that struck down prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in constitutional law but in a treaty among European nations. If the EU accepted an international agreement that data may flow to the United States under a more reasonable stan- dard than the one adopted by the court, that interpretation would be binding, at least as a gloss on the earlier treaty.

The United States has never seriously pushed back against the EU; now is the time. An incoming President should ask for an immediate study of the implemen- tation of Executive Order 14086 and suspend any provisions that unduly burden intelligence collection. At the same time, in negotiations with the Europeans, the United States should make clear that the continued sharing of intelligence with EU member states depends on successful resolution of this issue within the first two years of a President’s term. It is time for a real solution, not the 30 years of stopgaps imposed by Brussels.

President’s Daily Brief (PDB). An incoming conservative President should make clear what the President’s Daily Brief is and is not. The PDB should be for the President specifically, with a much narrower distribution and addressing areas of strategic concern. During the transition, the future National Security Advisor, along with the DNI, should conduct a review of current PDB recipients and deter- mine which should remain recipients when the President’s term begins.

Instead of being used as the statement of record for the agencies, the PDB often misses the areas of interest for Presidents and their senior advisers. The President should want the PDB to focus on providing the information needed for the often imperfect and complex decisions that a President needs to make, which should always be based on the best intelligence that can be gathered. Where consensus and agreement are possible, an IC-coordinated product is excellent, but insights provided by properly channeled dissent can lead a President to ask relevant ques- tions of his DNI and IC.

A future DNI determines the PDB briefer based on recommendations made by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (MI). His- torically, briefers have come from the CIA, but a future President and DNI should


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consider a primary briefer or a rotation of briefers from other IC elements. Addi- tionally, the entirety of the PDB staff and production should be located at ODNI.

National Intelligence Council (NIC). The National Intelligence Council is the IC’s premier analytic organization and includes more than a dozen National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom leads the IC’s analysis within a regional (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) or functional (cyber, counterproliferation, economics, etc.) mission area. This includes authoring National Intelligence Estimates on major strategic issues with the entire IC, overseeing and deconflicting the annual analytic plans of each agency, and weighing in on day-to-day major analytical issues, sometimes individually (for example, by writing the NIC’s strategic memos or pro- viding detailed expert briefings to the President before major decisions).

Historically part of the CIA, the NIC was reorganized into the ODNI as was the PDB. It retains the CIA’s objective analytic culture and is staffed primarily with CIA officers; however, as many as 25 percent of its NIOs over the decades have come from academia or the private sector, bringing in much-needed outside expertise to collate and understand intelligence with perspective and skills that are not necessarily nurtured within the IC. In recent years, there has been a greater emphasis on encouraging officers from other agencies—particularly the DIA, NSA, and FBI—to serve as NIOs or as their deputies.

To encourage greater analytic independence and debate, the incoming Admin- istration should require that non-CIA officers comprise at least 50 percent of the NIC’s membership and that the first-among-equals NIC Chairman is an outsider from one of the three major IC agencies with reporting responsibility to the PDDNI. Opening these senior analytic roles to the best analysts regardless of agency would also encourage the continued maturation of analytic cadres and tradecraft at those agencies and give them an equal voice in interagency analytical disputes, which in turn would give the President access to the best thinking and a variety of sources and perspectives from across the entire IC rather than from the CIA alone.

IC Chief Information Officer. The Intelligence Community Chief Informa- tion Officer (ICCIO) directs and oversees all aspects of the classified IT budget for all of the IC’s 18 elements. As the DNI’s principal adviser for technology, the ICCIO must be well-versed in technology, acquisitions, operations, and intra-agency coop- eration to advance our technical prowess and simultaneously direct a bureaucracy that, left unchecked, will serve each element’s own preferences. To ensure that procured and implemented technology and policy reflect the Administration’s agenda, the ICCIO must have the support of the DNI and possess the ability to command cooperation between and promote interoperability across IC members. Because of the unique responsibilities entrusted to this position, incumbency has seesawed between political appointees and career civilians; due to its con- gressionally capped salary, the position is often filled by an SES-level member administratively detailed to support the DNI. At times, the ICCIO is incorrectly


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

referred to as the ODNI CIO. By law, and to secure unbiased execution across all of the IC’s 18 elements, the same individual may not serve as ICCIO and ODNI CIO. They are two distinct positions.

Critical areas and IC IT portfolio priorities for the ICCIO include but are not limited to:

   Transparent accounting and allocation of IT investments across the IC, including commercial cloud computing and storage (C2E);

   Recognized and uniform security access for people, systems, and capabilities to enable interoperability across IC elements;

   5G/6G data transmission and network interoperability, which is vital to IC element operations;

   Artificial intelligence and machine learning;

   Quantum cryptography and post-quantum encryption (PQE); and

   Cybersecurity infrastructure where Biden Administration changes have realigned and reassigned management oversight and IT architecture responsibilities to NSA and DHS/CISA, conflicting with ICCIO- delineated roles.

An incoming Administration should appoint the ICCIO as a primary member of the DNI staff along with the ODNI General Counsel, IC Chief Financial Officer, and ODNI Chief Operating Officer.

The President-Elect should require immediate reviews of the progress in imple- menting post-quantum encryption at a minimum for IC and Defense systems but preferably throughout the government. The President’s National Security Memo- randum specifying “the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035”49 needs to be revised in light of the magnitude of the threat. Accounting for the investment that will be needed to secure IT systems for national security should be a top priority.

ODNI, CIA, and IC Technology Issues. In recent years, the IC has had a mandate from multiple Administrations to advance technology needs for intelli- gence—needs that have seen massive changes as a result of such threats as China’s advancements in technology and data infrastructure. Many of the projects coming out of ODNI and CIA’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) focus on expen- sive, AI-driven open-source work, but there is likely duplication of effort in areas where the private sector and entrepreneurs are already making progress.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) and S&T should focus primarily on challenging technology problems. Avoiding duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector in such areas as practical defense cyber intelligence and artificial intelligence research would help to focus the agen- cies on the complex shadow tasks at hand while simultaneously freeing limited resources for advancement in other areas.

President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and PIAB Intelligence Oversight Board. The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) is charged with pro- viding the President with an independent source of advice on the IC’s effectiveness while offering insights into the IC’s future plans. The Board is meant to have access to all information needed to perform its functions and to have direct access to the President. The Intelligence Oversight Board is a standing committee within the PIAB. These entities should be tasked with giving independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of national security focused on long-term, enduring issues central to advancing and protecting American interests. This should include taking a broader, deeper look at critical trends, developments, and their implications for U.S. national and economic security relying on unclassified and open-source information.

The Importance of Space. With China developing increasingly capable space and counterspace technologies and Russia taking more aggressive action in space, space has emerged as the latest warfighting domain. In response, the DNI cre- ated the Office of the Space Executive (OSX) in 2018 as an experiment to promote greater integration of IC space activities without incurring excessive overhead. The DNI mandated greater collaboration across the enterprise without adding personnel, altering authorities, and increasing budgets.

The Space Executive’s design reflects the original design principles of the ODNI. The ODNI was explicitly not designed to be a departmental headquarters with com- mand and control of the 18 agencies’ vast bureaucracies. Rather, it was designed to be small and lightweight with a mission to coordinate and integrate the criti- cal activities of the IC’s 18 agencies without creating new bureaucracy. That goal should remain in force, and calls by outside entities or Congress to add new centers and layers should be rejected.

The Office of the Space Executive has been recognized as an effective governance model and has spawned similar efforts, including the Election Threats Executive, Economic and Threat Finance Executive, and Cyber Executive. With this in mind, the following initiatives should be pursued:

   Expand collaboration with partners. For too many decades, the IC and DOD have acquired and operated satellites independently. To

improve their ability to meet the threat posed by China and Russia, the IC and DOD should:


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

1.        Explore new methods for better integrating our space assets,

2.        Examine the possibility of joint programs, and

3.        Fully utilize unique Title 10 and Title 50 authorities to execute space defense (and offense) strategies jointly.

Additionally, the IC should support building international alliances with like-minded partners beyond the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing nations. Increasingly, potential allied nations (and their commercial companies) are developing innovative space capabilities to augment and strengthen the U.S. space defense and intelligence posture.

   Refocus space-related intelligence collection. The IC has developed a space threats collection posture predicated on three assumptions:

1.        The best information on developing space threats comes from collection against the adversaries’ military institutions on Earth,

2.        There should be a clear dividing line between DOD’s intelligence activities and the IC’s, and

3.        Only government-developed “exquisite” capabilities can inform threat analysis and decision-making effectively.

Developments by our adversaries and the emergence of a vibrant commercial space marketplace over the past decade have rendered all three assumptions false and even dangerous. The IC must therefore refocus and invest in methods that will enable it to characterize accurately the threats that already exist in space, not just on the ground; break down barriers

to information sharing and collaboration with the DOD; and embrace commercially derived capabilities that can be adapted to a national security mission—all while emphasizing the need to protect critical supply chains and the cybersecurity needs that result from an increasingly government– commercial low Earth orbit.

Our nation’s economic and national security depends on being able to advance America’s leadership position in space, which is eroding in the face of increasing threats from adversaries and our own inaction.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

AN UNFINISHED EXPERIMENT

The Intelligence Community, including specifically the role of the DNI and ODNI, is an unfinished experiment. The envisioned design principle was a conser- vative one: a small, network-centric model for enterprise coordination as opposed to a large monolithic bureaucracy like DHS. The ODNI, however, has reverted in some ways to a bureaucratic and hierarchical model characterized by limited effectiveness.

Historically, the CIA has undercut the DNI and maintains primacy in the IC hierarchy, especially regarding the White House. An incoming conservative Pres- ident can right the ship and return the IC governance model to first principles by using a limited but empowered leadership and coordination design to serve the nation’s intelligence and national security needs while reclaiming the public trust with fiscal responsibility, political neutrality, personnel accountability, tech- nological prowess, and necessary human capital needed to counter the immense nation-state and asymmetrical threats facing our country.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in

the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. No particular policy statement, reform recommendation, or other view expressed herein should be attributed to any individual contributor or to the author.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                “Two independent agencies—the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Nine Department of Defense elements—the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and intelligence elements of the five DoD services; the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force. Seven elements of other departments and agencies—the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “What We Do: Members of the IC,” https://www.dni. gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic (accessed March 8, 2023).

2.                Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Mission,” https://www.intelligence.gov/mission#:~:text=The%20 Intelligence%20Community's%20mission%20is,law%20enforcement%2C%20and%20the%20military (accessed February 24, 2023).

3.                Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ documents/second-annual-message-9 (accessed March 6, 2023).

4.                 Christopher Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China,” LinkedIn, March 14, 2023, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/

seven-questions-next-president-need-intelligence-community-porter/?trackingId=Dl9RF5CnSwWnAO7r9gg HiQ%3D%3D (accessed March 18, 2023).

5.                H.R. 2845, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law No. 108-458, 108th Congress, December 17, 2004, https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/publ458/PLAW-108publ458.pdf (accessed

March 6, 2004).

6.                Testimony of Philip Zelikow, Executive Director, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, in hearing, Assessing America’s Counterterrorism’s Capabilities, Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate, 108th Congress, 2d Session, August 3, 2004, p. 55, https://ia802906.us.archive.org/31/items/gov. gpo.fdsys.CHRG-108shrg95506/CHRG-108shrg95506.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023).

7.                 Michael Allen, Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence After 9/11 (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013), p. 155; Interview with Robert Gates, April 19, 2012.

8.                Allen, Blinking Red, p. 154; Robert Gates e-mail to Andy Card, January 11, 2005; handwritten note from Robert Gates, January 20, 2005.

9.                Interview with John Ratcliffe, December 15, 2022.

10.           Ibid.

11.           Ibid.

12.           S. 258, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus.

s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

13.           President Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” December 4, 1981, in

Federal Register, Vol. 46, No. 235 (December 8, 1981), pp. 59941–59954, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/

pkg/FR-1981-12-08/pdf/FR-1981-12-08.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

14.           President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13470, “Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,” July 30, 2008, in Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 150 (August 4, 2008), pp. 45325–45342, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-08-04/pdf/E8-17940.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). See also President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13355, “Strengthened Management of

the Intelligence Community,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004),

pp. 53593–53597, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20051.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

15.           U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, “Trusted Workforce 2.0 and Continuous Vetting,” https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/cv/ (accessed March 9, 2023).

16.           50 U.S. Code § 3093(e), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093 (accessed February 24, 2023).

17.           50 U.S. Code § 3093(a).

18.           50 U.S. Code § 3093(a)(4).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

19.           Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023).

20.           H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https://

govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

21.           Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023).

22.       See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89.

23.           Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023).

24.           Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31.

25.           Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58.

26.           S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed

March 6, 2023).

27.           The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023).

28.           An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023).

29.           Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.”

30.           H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

31.           Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased-

cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023).

32.           H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf

(accessed March 6, 2023).

33.           President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in

Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/

pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

34.           Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023).

35.           Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

36.           Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023).

37.           “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter.

38.           President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/

FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).

39.           President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in

Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/

pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).

40.            Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war-

semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023).

41.            Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023).

42.            Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023).

43.            Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside-

the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023).

44.            U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023).

45.            “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023).

46.            “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023).

47.            President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283–

62297, (accessed March 7, 2023).

48.           Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023).

49.            President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-

to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).


8

 

 

 

 

MEDIA AGENCIES

 

 

U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA

Mora Namdar

 

MISSION STATEMENT

The mission of United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) is to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democ- racy.1 However, this mission statement does not reflect the current work of the agency. The mission is noble, but the execution is lacking. To fulfill its mission, USAGM should also aim to present the truth about America and American policy— not parrot America’s adversaries’ propaganda and talking points.2

 

OVERVIEW

Originally formed as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) in 1994, the BBG changed its name in 2018 to the United States Agency for Global Media. The USAGM is a sub-Cabinet agency of the U.S. government with a budget of just under $1 billion. The agency oversees two government broadcasting networks: the Voice of America (VOA) and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). USAGM also oversees 100 percent of the grant funding for several “independent” grantee organizations, including the Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and the newly formed Open Technology Fund (OTF).3

   The Voice of America provides news and information in 48 languages to a weekly audience of more than 326 million people worldwide. For more


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

than 80 years, VOA journalists have supplied news and information about the U.S., audience-specific regions of interest and concern, and the world at large. VOA radio and television signals are broadcast to approximately 3,500 affiliates, and satellite transmissions reach countries where free speech is banned or where civil society is under threat.4

VOA uses digital, web, and mobile media as well, which, while sometimes useful in propagating valuable information globally, has created specific violations of the agency’s prohibition against broadcasting to the domestic

U.S. audience—particularly with regard to flagrantly political content, as has been the practice with recent and current VOA content directors and managers.5 The network once had a generally well-received brand value, but it has deteriorated under decades of poor leadership and a loss of its once-prized unbiased reporting. There are bright spots within VOA, but mismanagement and declining production values have diluted its once- great reputation as a singular voice in American news broadcasting abroad.

   The Office of Cuba Broadcasting oversees Radio and Television Martí, a multimedia hub of news, information, and analysis that provides the people of Cuba with programs through satellite television, radio, and digital media. These programs present news and information about Cuba’s oppressive government from the outside world that would otherwise be heavily restricted.6 The OCB remains a critical avenue of truth to the Cuban people but has been threatened with crippling budget and operational constraints, including empathetic attitudes toward Communist Cuban leadership coupled with organizational hostility toward the OCB by certain elements of USAGM leadership. During the Biden Administration, the OCB has been threatened with closure, while also suffering chilling reductions in force.7

   The Middle East Broadcasting Network is an Arabic-language news organization with a weekly audience of 27.4 million people in 22 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The MBN consists of two television networks, radio, websites, and social media platforms. Together, they deliver news and analysis on the region, American policies, and Americana. The MBN has correspondents throughout the Middle East and North Africa.8

   Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is a private, nonprofit, multimedia broadcasting corporation that serves as a surrogate media source in 27 languages and 23 countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Founded in the early days of the Cold War (Radio Free Europe in 1949 and Radio Liberty in 1953) and merged in 1976, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were intended to execute edgy and daring information

operations and unrestricted news reporting deep behind the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately, like other broadcast organizations under USAGM, RFE/RL has surrendered much of its rich history to an approach that favors political trends as opposed to operations that support and represent America abroad. While there are some bright spots within RFE/RL, much of the network has redundant programming with certain VOA language services, often with competing, counterproductive, or dissimilar messaging.

The recent addition of RFE/RL’s Hungarian-language service, Szabad Európa, falls outside the intended scope of RFE/RL’s charter by targeting a democratically elected, pro-American European and NATO ally.

Not least, RFE/RL has been plagued by several serious espionage-related security risks within its ranks.9

   Radio Free Asia is a private, nonprofit multimedia news corporation that brings news and uncensored content to people in six Asian countries that restrict free speech, freedom of the press, and access to reliable information. RFA also provides educational and cultural programming, as well as forums for audiences to engage in open dialogue and freely express opinions. RFA utilizes on-the-ground reporters and networks of in-country sources, citizen journalists, and eyewitnesses who provide leads, tips, images, and video.10

Several reports from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) were released showing waste and self-dealing, including security vulnerabilities and RFA lead- ership awarding insiders millions of dollars of grant funding.11 For example, as the OIG stated in one report, the then-president of RFA “established the Free-

dom2Connect Foundation (Foundation)” and thereafter “awarded two contracts, totaling $1.2 million” to the foundation she herself founded.12 Furthermore:

 

[The] OIG found that RFA did not comply with Federal procurement requirements for grantees. OIG identified instances in which RFA and its agents did not comply with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] conflict-of-interest procurement requirements for grantees. Specifically,

OIG found that RFA entered into 14 contracts, totaling $4.0 million (51 percent of the amount of OTF FYs 2012 and 2013 project-related

contracts), with organizations that had some affiliation with either RFA officials or members of OTF Advisory Council.13


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This same leadership proceeded to wastefully form the Open Technology Fund as its own independent grantee with the help of USAGM senior management prior to the tenure of Trump-appointed leadership.

   The Open Technology Fund’s goal is to provide funding to support the research, development, and implementation of Internet freedom

technologies that circumvent censorship. OTF was formed under dubious circumstances by using consolidation rules to usurp the mission and funding of USAGM’s pre-existing Office of Internet Freedom (OIF), which funded far more diverse technologies with much greater transparency. OTF, however, operates with far less transparency and strictly restricts funding to

“open source” technology. OTF does not support any technology with even partially “closed source” code, notwithstanding that such closed-source code would provide more protection against hacking.

Although OTF touts large user numbers, this could not be substantiated upon requests for information, and it was discovered by former senior USAGM leadership that OTF makes extremely small, insubstantial donations to much larger messaging applications and technology to bolster its unsubstantiated claims.14 Despite its vibrant self-lobbying and publicity efforts, OTF remains a wasteful and redundant boondoggle. Its grantee status was suspended by Trump-appointed USAGM leadership for a number of reasons, including noncompliance with its grant terms and for actions that resulted in several fraud and waste investigations.15

The OIF, which predates OTF, was historically under USAGM’s Office of Chief Strategy Officer and for years had been performing the same tasks as OTF within USAGM headquarters for the benefit of all USAGM broadcast networks. With much greater transparency, OIF succeeded with fewer staff while simultaneously fielding more diverse and robust technologies. Absent a meaningful organizational impact analysis to justify the wastefulness of the decision-making process, OTF usurped the entire OIF budget and was set up as a new grantee organization.

Exacerbating matters, OIF was shut down in order to provide massive grants to the opaque activities of OTF and its founding leadership, who went on a free-spending boondoggle for high-end Washington, D.C., office space, furnishings, and top salaries for its leadership team. Numerous career staff whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm about OTF to Trump- appointed leadership, citing concerns about the OIG reports, wasteful spending, and other substantive performance matters.16 Nonetheless, the


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Biden Administration reinstated OTF to full operational status and ceased all investigations immediately after assuming office.

 

ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

Late in the Trump Administration, following the long-delayed Senate confirma- tion of Michael Pack as USAGM Chief Executive Officer (CEO),17 agency leadership rapidly initiated long-overdue and necessary reforms,18 including security reforms repeatedly requested by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that had been ignored by USAGM leadership.19 Unfortunately, as was the case with the OTF, the Biden Administration immediately reinstated personnel who had been fired for gross security violations, placing the agency back into its previously failed posture—one that poses a danger to national security.

The Firewall Saga. The vital error in USAGM’s current organizational/cul- tural calculus is the agency’s selective application of a journalistic “firewall.” The amorphous interpretation of a firewall shifts, depending on which Administration is in office and who is asking questions.

Although a firewall should ensure journalistic independence, it has been used without formal regulation for decades in order to shirk legitimate oversight of everything from promoting adversaries’ propaganda to ignoring journalistic safety. Often, the “firewall” is touted when journalists are either promoting anti-American propaganda that parrots adversarial regime talking points or promoting politically biased viewpoints in opposition to the VOA charter.20

Such weak oversight, alien to any other large media network or news organi- zation—particularly one derivative of U.S. foreign policy and national security goals—was erroneously enshrined in a document known as the Firewall Regula- tion.21 The Firewall Regulation was entered into the Federal Register on the eve of the Senate confirmation of President Donald Trump’s USAGM CEO, Michael Pack. It was the quintessential “midnight reg” designed to throttle the statutory and executive authority of the agency head. It stipulated that agency management, by standards unknown to most large broadcast companies, was forbidden from engaging in oversight and direction of content in any way—even false content. It ran counter to the law, including the Smith–Mundt Act,22 and it was harmful to the agency itself and to the foreign policy and national security goals of the

U.S. government.

Even content that went well beyond fair and accurate reporting on U.S. domestic and political problems could not be reined in by front office leadership under the Firewall Regulation. Soon, VOA’s White House correspondent was posting content highly critical of, and personally insulting to, the U.S. President—in contradiction of VOA’s own journalistic standards, policies, and procedures. USAGM career offi- cials considered such content sacrosanct and bravely independent “journalistic”


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

content protected by the “spirit of” the Firewall Regulation—despite ample evi- dence to the contrary.

Late in the Trump Administration, USAGM political leadership, following an intensive U.S. Department of Justice review, revoked the Firewall Regulation over the protests of journalistic organizations—none more vociferous than VOA itself.23 While the abuses of the Firewall Regulation are particularly disconcerting, they encompass just a fraction of similar overreaches of the agency’s journalistic mission. Current and former USAGM/VOA leadership who wanted to maintain virtually zero accountability and oversight waged a campaign of interference, resistance, and disinformation to stifle change at the agency. Perhaps not coincidentally, various media outlets with relationships to former and future USAGM leadership published near-daily criticisms of Trump Administration appointees and also of grantee organi- zation leaders who were appointed by CEO Pack to implement long-overdue reforms.24 Agency Mission Failure. Currently, the USAGM, by and large, is not fulfilling

its mission, which remains so ill-defined and ambiguous that it enables the organi- zation to go about its business largely unguided with little to no oversight. Rather than providing news and information in an accurate, reliable way that promotes and supports freedom and democracy, the agency is mismanaged, disorganized, ineffective, and rife with waste and redundancy.

These shortfalls are either oriented toward, or directly contribute to, the agen- cy’s media organizations joining the mainstream media’s anti-U.S. chorus and denigrating the American story—all in the name of so-called journalistic inde- pendence. Indeed, content during the Trump Administration was rife with typical mainstream media talking points assailing the President and his staff. The few bright spots within VOA and the OCB are often stifled instead of supported. Top- level talent often leaves the agency or is met with obstacles rather than support.25 Opportunities for modernization and effective strategy are ignored, and wasteful spending and misallocation of resources are the norm in an environment in which nepotism is rampant and political gamesmanship protects bad actors.

Amanda Bennett26 was confirmed as USAGM CEO in 2022 after two years of being blocked by several Members of Congress. Legal advocacy organization America First Legal Foundation even wrote to President Joe Biden asking him to withdraw her nomination,27 citing several severe national security failures while she was director of VOA.28 Her tenure as director during the Obama Administration (and her holdover into the beginning of the Trump Administration) was marred with operational failures, security failures, and credibility failures. Those failures are reportedly ongoing during her current tenure as CEO.29

NECESSARY REFORMS

Security Issues. The Office of Personnel Management30 and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence flagged severe security failures during four


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extensive investigations of the USAGM, each conducted during a 10-year period between 2010 and 2020.31 Security personnel and former agency senior leadership ignored these issues and allowed them to persist.32

In brief, the USAGM is vulnerable to exploitation by foreign spies. During the last six months of the Trump Administration, known foreign intelligence opera- tives were removed from the OCB and RFE/RL. During the 10-year period between 2010 and 2020, both the OPM and the ODNI found that the USAGM’s Office of Security (under the Office of Management) had grossly ignored and flouted many of the federal government’s most critical and long-standing information and per- sonnel security protocols, regulations, and practices.33

During the investigative period—in which the findings were largely, if not wholly, ignored by agency senior leadership—over 1,500 USAGM personnel (nearly 40 percent of its total workforce) were performing their Tier 3 and Tier 5 national-security-sensitive positions with falsified and/or unauthorized suitabil- ity-for-employment determinations and with access to sensitive federal buildings and information systems. In many cases, records (including Social Security num- bers), were falsified or replaced with notional placeholders, and fingerprints (in many dozens of cases) were never submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for basic background investigations.

By the time these issues were addressed by members of the Trump Adminis- tration, more than 500 personnel with unauthorized access and clearances had left the USAGM and rolled into other federal agencies with reciprocal clearance authorizations. Many others disappeared into U.S. society. As of January 2021, the USAGM had not yet determined the whereabouts of these individuals.34

The USAGM must never again be entrusted with delegated authority over its personnel security programs and suitability determinations until such time as it can prove that these failures will not happen again. These responsibilities must remain with the Department of Defense and the Office of Personnel Management, to which they were transferred in the final weeks of the Trump Administration.

Journalists’ Security. Agency journalists, both on and off American soil, have faced danger,35 yet their superiors have done little to protect them. Whistleblowers and Trump Administration officials found that protection of USAGM American and foreign journalists employed by USAGM networks and grantee organizations was severely lacking.

Against often-significant resistance, political appointees forced action to enable broadcasters (who were under verified threats) to broadcast from remote locations while being protected by federal law enforcement officers. Likewise, political appointees met resistance from senior career officials when insisting that foreign-based journalists in high-risk countries make their locations known to the agency in the event they required rescue, extraction, or safe housing. Such safety measures, argued career officials, would somehow represent a violation of


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

journalistic independence. With only rare exceptions, resistance to the most basic journalist safety measures was the knee-jerk response from USAGM career officials. Wasting Taxpayer Dollars. The USAGM’S current operations, properly man- aged, can be conducted on less than $700 million per year. Prior to the arrival of President Donald Trump’s appointees in June 2020, budgeting, financial responsi- bility, and spending totaled over $800 million per year, with virtually no oversight or supervision. Waste, unnecessary spending, nepotism for pet projects, redundant

programs, and unnecessary hiring abounded.

Consolidation and Reduction of Redundant Services. Currently, the USAGM funds numerous redundant services through its own offices, through Voice of Amer- ica and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and through its grantees. For example, VOA has a Mandarin-language service but also funds redundant services through Radio Free Asia. VOA also has a Farsi-language service that duplicates one funded through Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Surplus services in the same languages are often unnecessary and counterproductive. Fiscal responsibility and transparency should return to the USAGM, with consolidation being a cornerstone of the strategy.

As noted previously, the Open Technology Fund duplicates activities that already existed at the USAGM in the Office of Internet Freedom. Numerous career whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm to President Trump’s USAGM political team about OTF’s abuse and overreach.36 Its opaque, expensive, and unnecessary usurpation of an existing USAGM office is an egregious example of government waste and illustrates the general disdain for U.S. taxpayers that is rife within this agency. Full reinstatement of OIF would allow full agency and congres- sional oversight into how so-called “Internet freedom” money is being spent.37

J-1 Visa Program Abuses. Rather than use the appropriate I visa38 intended for foreign journalists, the USAGM uses the J-1 “cultural exchange” visas to allow foreign nationals to transition easily into jobs that American citizens with cul- tural and linguistic expertise could satisfy. The J-1 visa is intended for cultural and academic exchange programs, among others—none of which include journalism.39 Additionally, J-1 visas are meant for non-immigrant temporary exchanges. The USAGM’s J-1 visa holders often go on to apply for permanent residency, which violates the intention of this visa.

Shortwave Transmission Upgrades and Improvements. Non-web-based technologies that are proven and durable, such as shortwave radio transmission stations, have been grossly deemphasized in budgeting in favor of newer web- based technologies. This move is dangerously short-sighted and puts the U.S. at a perilous strategic disadvantage in the event of a major conflict, particularly with Russia or China.

There is great concern about the vulnerability of undersea cable trunks that make up the Internet cloud. The vast majority of global Internet traffic—95 per- cent—is transmitted through these cables, including news transmissions and


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

web-based content produced by the USAGM’s broadcast networks. While the robust and popular use of the Internet is ideal during peacetime, during times of major conflict, widespread damage to the undersea cables that carry communi- cations across the globe can reasonably be expected. Long-lasting power outages are also likely, such as those Ukraine experienced in the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion.

The USAGM’s responsibility for the only U.S. global shortwave radio capability is of critical strategic importance if America is to carry its message to people seeking information and freedom within conflict zones. Shortwave technologies also make it possible to carry broadcasts in areas where Internet traffic is severely restricted, as it is in many authoritarian states today.

 

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Personnel. Personnel is one of the biggest concerns for the USAGM and its grantees. Attracting talented staff who will stay and letting go of poorly perform- ing personnel are hurdles. Additionally, whistleblowers have come forward with numerous credible allegations of illegal nepotism and improper hiring practic- es.40 Past agency leaders have ignored national security procedures when hiring and have failed to adequately vet staff.41 Government hiring policies and federal law must be followed, and serious policy changes must be implemented to end these practices.

 

Relevant Government Entities

   The White House. As an executive branch agency, the USAGM ostensibly should report to the President and coordinate activities with the

National Security Council (NSC)—especially given the direct and implied national security aspects of the agency’s messaging globally. However, there currently is no specific office in the White House or NSC liaison

for the USAGM.

The original network, VOA, functioned under the Office of Coordinator of Information as early as 1941, the War Department’s Office of War Information from 1942 to 1945, the State Department from 1945 to 1953, and the U.S. Information Agency from 1953 until the creation of the independent Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1999. Although some oversight and management functions of the agency are provided by the State Department, the USAGM otherwise has little connectivity to larger departments or agencies and even less to the White House. With the

dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, the USAGM has virtually been under its own supervision and guidance. The results have been dismal.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   The State Department. VOA was most effective before and during the Cold War when it was under the direct supervision and control of the War and State Departments, respectively. If VOA is not put in the direct chain of command under the NSC, serious consideration should be given to putting VOA under the direct supervision of the Office of Global Public Affairs at the Department of State. The Office of Global Public Affairs was formed during

the Trump Administration by consolidation of the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs and Bureau of Global Public Affairs.

Ensuring that taxpayer-funded TV, radio, and messaging tells America’s story is imperative and should be coordinated with the existing foreign- language social media platforms at the State Department. Currently, VOA’s foreign-language TV programming is unreliable in telling America’s story, given its amorphous interpretation of its independence firewall and its waning adherence to certain provisions of the Smith–Mundt Act depending on which political party is in office.

The VOA firewall is meant to protect broadcasters from government interference with content; however, USAGM staff have abused the firewall and used it as an offensive measure to block oversight. Additionally, the Smith–Mundt Act stipulates that USAGM services are meant to tell the American story abroad—never to domestic audiences—but the agency has used its taxpayer funding to promote partisan messaging in the U.S. One of the most egregious examples was when, in 2020, it bought ads on its foreign- language social media sites to disseminate a Biden campaign ad and targeted it to a major Muslim population in Michigan.42 Moreover, VOA often airs foreign adversaries’ propaganda, which is antithetical to its congressionally mandated core mission. State Department oversight or “command” may be one way to ensure that VOA and the rest of the USAGM returns and adheres to its original mission.

Clear lines of command and communications between the USAGM and an appropriate office of the National Security Council are also sorely lacking, as has been any reasonable accountability for USAGM senior leadership and strategy. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs and Undersecretary for Diplomacy and Public Affairs should also be in the accountability loop for agency actions. While the U.S. Secretary of State technically has a seat on the board of the agency, it is a toothless seat that is often deferred to the undersecretary and/or assistant secretaries noted above. This position should be relevant and directive when U.S. foreign policy and strategic communications are at stake.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

For example, the years-long delay in confirming the Trump-appointed CEO left disastrous holdover leadership from the previous Administration.

Employing effective leadership, even in an acting capacity, while a new CEO is awaiting Senate confirmation is necessary to prevent a repeat of this behavior.

   Congress. The USAGM receives its budget and mandates directly from Congress. Often, changes in major functions at the agency happen because of the lobbying efforts of a few connected individuals—often grantees lobbying for more funds and less accountability. Those changes can and

do handcuff leadership from any meaningful oversight. An overhaul of the agency with review from Congress to modernize, streamline, and reduce waste must be done with congressional support.

   Key nongovernmental stakeholders, allies, and non-allies. These include industry groups, nonprofits, trade associations, foundations, and activist organizations, for example, America First Legal Foundation,43 USAGM Watch,44 BBG-USAGM Watch,45 and Whistleblower Protection Project.46

 

CONCLUSION

The USAGM is a story of a lost opportunity both to help restore the world’s con- fidence in the promise and ideals of America and to set a high mark for journalistic integrity and unbiased reporting. These two areas have suffered severely under two decades of USAGM mismanagement and lack of oversight. Finding solutions to these problems and the restoration of the agency’s networks must be the priorities of future agency leadership.

To accomplish this, the USAGM must be fully reformed top to bottom with congressional and White House support. The possibility of consolidating not only the agency’s subparts, but bringing the entire agency under the supervision of the NSC, the State Department, or both would dramatically aid that reform.

If the de facto aim of the agency simply remains to compete in foreign markets using anti-U.S. talking points that parrot America’s adversaries’ propaganda, then this represents an unacceptable burden to the U.S. taxpayer and a negative return on investment. In that case, the USAGM should be defunded and disestablished. If, however, the agency can be reformed to become an effective tool, it would be one of the greatest tools in America’s arsenal to tell America’s story and promote freedom and democracy around the world.


AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective effort involving many individuals to whom thanks is owed. These individuals include, but are not limited to, Victoria Coates, Michael Pack, Frank Wuco, and several brave whistleblowers who prefer not to be named. Their efforts were integral to the chapter and are greatly appreciated.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING

E

 
Mike Gonzalez

very Republican President since Richard Nixon has tried to strip the Corpora- tion for Public Broadcasting (CPB) of taxpayer funding. That is significant not

just because it means that for half a century, Republican Presidents have failed to accomplish what they set out to do, but also because Nixon was the first President in office when National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which the CPB funds, went on air.

In other words, all Republican Presidents have recognized that public funding of domestic broadcasts is a mistake. As a 35-year-old lawyer in the Nixon White House, one Antonin Scalia warned that conservatives were being “confronted with a long-range problem of significant social consequences—that is, the development of a government-funded broadcast system similar to the BBC.”47

All of which means that the next conservative President must finally get this done and do it despite opposition from congressional members of his own party if necessary. To stop public funding is good policy and good politics. The reason is simple: President Lyndon Johnson may have pledged in 1967 that public broadcasting would become “a vital public resource to enrich our homes, educate our families and to provide assistance to our classrooms,”48 but public broadcasting immediately became a liberal forum for public affairs and journalism.

Not only is the federal government trillions of dollars in debt and unable to afford the more than half a billion dollars squandered on leftist opinion each year, but the government should not be compelling the conservative half of the country to pay for the suppression of its own views. As Thomas Jefferson put it, “To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagations of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.”49

 

A DEMONSTRATED PATTERN OF BIAS

Conservatives will thus reward a President who eliminates this tyrannical sit- uation. PBS and NPR do not even bother to run programming that would attract conservatives. As Pew Research demonstrated in 2014, 25 percent of PBS’s audi- ence is “mostly liberal,” and 35 percent is “consistently liberal.” That is 60 percent liberal compared to 15 percent conservative (11 percent “mostly conservative” and 4 percent “consistently conservative”).50

NPR’s audience is even to the Left of that, with 67 percent liberal (41 percent “consistently liberal” and 26 percent “mostly liberal”), compared with 12 percent conservative (3 percent and 9 percent “consistently conservative” and “mostly con- servative,” respectively).51 That may be an acceptable business model for MSNBC or CNN, but not for a taxpayer-subsidized broadcaster.


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DEFUNDING THROUGH THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

Cutting off the CPB is logistically easy. The solution lies in the budgetary process. In 2022, the CPB submitted to the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appro- priations Committees its budget justification for fiscal year (FY) 2023. In it, the CPB requested that Congress give it a $565 million advance appropriation—a $40 million increase compared to its FY 2022 funding.52 Unlike most other agencies, the CPB receives advance appropriations that provide them with funding two years ahead of time, which insulates the agency from Congress’s power of the purse and oversight. This special budgetary treatment is unjustified and should be ended.

The 47th President can just tell the Congress—through the budget he proposes and through personal contact—that he will not sign an appropriations spending bill that contains a penny for the CPB. The President may have to use the bully pulpit, as NPR and PBS have teams of lobbyists who have convinced enough Members of Congress to save their bacon every time their taxpayer subsidies have been at risk since the Nixon era.

Defunding CPB would by no means cause NPR or PBS—or other public broad- casters that benefit from CPB funding, including the even-further-to-the Left Pacifica Radio and American Public Media—to file for bankruptcy. The mem- bership model that the CPB uses, along with the funding from corporations and foundations that it also receives, would allow these broadcasters to continue to thrive. As George Will wrote, “If ‘Sesame Street’ programming were put up for auction, the danger would be of getting trampled by the stampede of potential bidders.”53 Indeed, “Sesame Street” is on HBO now, which shows its potential as a money earner.

 

PUBLIC INTEREST VS. PRIVILEGE

Stripping public funding would, of course, mean that NPR, PBS, Pacifica Radio, and the other leftist broadcasters would be shorn of the presumption that they act in the public interest and receive the privileges that often accompany so acting. They should no longer, for example, be qualified as noncommercial education sta- tions (NCE stations), which they clearly no longer are. NPR, Pacifica, and the other radio ventures have zero claim on an educational function (the original purpose for which they were created by President Johnson), and the percentage of on-air programming that PBS devotes to educational endeavors such as “Sesame Street” (programs that are themselves biased to the Left) is small.

Being an NCE comes with benefits. The Federal Communications Commis- sion, for example, reserves the 20 stations at the lower end of the radio frequency (between 88 and 108 MHz on the FM band) for NCEs. The FCC says that “only noncommercial educational radio stations are licensed in the 88–92 MHz ‘reserved’ band,” while both commercial and noncommercial educational stations may


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

operate in the “non-reserved” band.54 This confers advantages, as lower-frequency stations can be heard farther away and are easier to find as they lie on the left end of the radio dial (figuratively as well as ideologically).

The FCC also exempts NCE stations from licensing fees. It says that “Noncom- mercial educational (NCE) FM station licensees and full service NCE television broadcast station licensees are exempt from paying regulatory fees, provided that these stations operate solely on an NCE basis.”55

NPR and PBS stations are in reality no longer noncommercial, as they run ads in everything but name for their sponsors. They are also noneducational. The next President should instruct the FCC to exclude the stations affiliated with PBS and NPR from the NCE denomination and the privileges that come with it.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Agency for Global Media, https://www.usagm.gov/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

2.                Ben Weingarten, “Security Failures USG Media Agency Prove Need to Hire Americans First,” Newsweek, August 10, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/security-failures-usg-media-Agency-prove-need-hire-

americans-first-opinion-1523895 (accessed March 20, 2023).

3.                U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Who We Are,” https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/history/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

4.                 U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Voice of America,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/voa/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

5.                Daniel Lippman, “Deleted Biden Video Sets Off a Crisis at Voice of America,” Politico July 30, 2020, https:// www.politico.com/news/2020/07/30/deleted-biden-video-sets-off-a-crisis-at-voice-of-america-388571 (accessed March 20, 2023).

6.                U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Office of Cuba Broadcasting,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/ocb/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

7.                Rafael Bernal, “Bipartisan Group Asks Office of Cuba Broadcasting to Rescind Layoffs,” September 13, 2022, The Hill, https://thehill.com/latino/3641445-bipartisan-group-asks-office-of-cuba-broadcasting-to-rescind- layoffs/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

8.                U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Middle East Broadcasting Networks,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/mbn/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

9.                U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/ FA00/20210930/114085/HMKP-117-FA00-20210930-SD002.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).

10.           U.S. Agency for Global Media, “Radio Free Asia,” https://www.usagm.gov/networks/rfa/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

11.           U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of Radio Free Asia Expenditures, June 2015, https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/aud-fm- ib-15-24_1.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).

12.           Ibid.

13.           Ibid., p. 16.

14.           Susan Crabtree, “‘Lax’ Internet Freedom Group Balks at New Pack Oversight,” https://www.realclearpolitics. com/articles/2020/08/24/lax_internet_freedom_group_balks_at_new_pack_oversight_144043.html (accessed March 22, 2023).

15.           Ibid.

16.           Ibid.

17.           Nomination of Michael Pack to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2020), https:// www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-congress/1590 (accessed March 20, 2023).

18.           James Robbins, “More Rot at America’s Public Diplomacy Mouthpiece,” The Hill, November 7, 2020, https:// thehill.com/opinion/national-security/524924-more-rot-at-americas-public-diplomacy-mouthpiece/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

19.          U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Suitability Agency Executive Programs, Follow Up Review of U.S. Agency for Global Media, July 2020, https://bbgwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/OPM-SuitEA- July-2020.pdf (accessed March 20, 203).

20.           If the agency were not an extension of U.S. foreign policy and national security goals, then its staffing positions would not be classified in their entirety as Tier 3 and Tier 5 national-security sensitive positions, which they are. See U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13.

21.           Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 115 (June 15, 2020), pp. 36150–36153.

22.           U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (“Smith–Mundt Act”), Public Law 80–402.

23.           Jessica Jerreat, “USAGM CEO Criticized Over Move to Rescind Firewall Regulation,” October 28, 2020, https:// www.voanews.com/a/usa_usagm-ceo-criticized-over-move-rescind-firewall-regulation/6197671.html (accessed March 20, 2023).

24.           Byron York, “America’s Lost Voice,” Washington Examiner, February 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonexaminer. com/politics/americas-lost-voice (accessed March 20, 2023).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

25.           Sasha Gong, “VOA Problems: Racism, Xenophobia, Mediocrity, and Nepotism,” BBG-USAGM Watch, December 25, 2018, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20220105101300/https://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/voa-

problems-racism-xenophobia-mediocrity-and-nepotism/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

26.           U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, “Big Mistake in Rewarding Failed Voice of America (VOA) Managers

U.S. Agency for Global Media Managers,” November 11, 2022, https://www.usagmwatch.com/big-mistake- in-rewarding-failed-voice-of-america-voa-and-u-s-Agency-for-global-media-usagm-managers/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

27.           America First Legal Foundation,“AFL Asks Biden Administration to Withdraw Nomination of Amanda Bennett Citing National Security and Related Failures,” June 30, 2022, https://aflegal.org/afl-asks-biden- administration-to-withdraw-nomination-of-amanda-bennett-citing-national-security-and-related-failures/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

28.           U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13.

29.           U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, “Extraordinary Leadership Dysfunction at USAGM Continues,” October 4, 2022, https://www.usagmwatch.com/extraordinary-leadership-dysfunction-at-usagm-continues/ (accessed

March 20, 2023).

30.           U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Follow-Up Review of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Suitability Program.

31.           Ibid.

32.           U.S. Agency for Global Media, Consolidation Report, p. 13.

33.           U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Follow-Up Review of the U.S. Agency for Global Media Suitability Program.

34.           Robbins, “More Rot at America’s Public Diplomacy Mouthpiece.”

35.           U.S. Department of Justice, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Kidnapping Conspiracy Charges Against an Iranian Intelligence Officer And Members Of An Iranian Intelligence Network,” July 13, 2021, https://www.

justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-kidnapping-conspiracy-charges-against-iranian (accessed March 20, 2023).

36.           James Robbins, “The Trouble with the Open Technology Fund,” Newsweek, August 9, 2020, https://www. newsweek.com/trouble-open-technology-fund-opinion-1528998 (accessed March 20, 2023).

37.           Susan Crabtree, “Lax Internet Freedom Group Balks at New Pack Oversight,” Real Clear Politics, August 24, 2020, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/08/24/lax_internet_freedom_group_balks_at_new_

pack_oversight_144043.html (accessed March 20, 2023).

38.           U.S. Department of State, “Visas for Members of the Foreign Media, Press, and Radio,” https://travel.state. gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/employment/visas-members-foreign-media-press-radio.html (accessed March 20, 2023).

39.       Authorized positions for J-1 visas include: au pair, camp counselor, college/university student, government visitor, intern, international visitor, physician, professor, research scholar, secondary school student, short-term scholar, specialist, STEM initiatives, summer work travel, teacher, and trainee. See U.S. Department of State, “Exchange Visitor Visa,” https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/study/exchange.html (accessed March 20, 2023).

40.            News release, “McCaul Demands Answers on USAGM Personnel and Management,” Foreign Affairs Committee, October 28, 2021, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-demands-answers-on-

usagm-personnel-and-management/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

41.            U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, “USAGM: Past Leaders Ignored National Security Procedures, Failed to Adequately Vet Staff,” August 8, 2020, https://www.usagmwatch.com/usagm-past-agency-leaders-ignored- national-security-procedures-failed-to-adequately-vet-staff/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

42.            U.S. Agency for Global Media, “CEO Pack Launches Investigation Into Pro-Biden VOA Content, U.S. Election Interference,” July 30, 2020, https://www.usagm.gov/2020/07/30/ceo-pack-launches-investigation-into-pro-

biden-voa-content-u-s-election-interference/ (accessed March 22, 2023).

43.            America First Legal Foundation, “AFL Asks Biden Administration to Withdraw Nomination of Amanda Bennet Citing National Security and Related Failures,” June 30, 2022, https://aflegal.org/afl-asks-biden- administration-to-withdraw-nomination-of-amanda-bennett-citing-national-security-and-related-failures/ (accessed March 20, 2023).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

44.            U.S. Agency for Global Media Watch, https://www.usagmwatch.com/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

45.            BBG-USAM Watch, https://bbgwatch.com/bbgwatch/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

46.            Whistleblower Protection Project, “Congress Releases Long-Awaited Investigative Report on Chronically Mismanaged USAGM,” February 9, 2022, https://whipproj.org/congress-releases-long-awaited-usagm-

investigative-report-revealing-Agencys-chronic-mismanagement/ (accessed March 20, 2023).

47.            National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “Nixon Administration Public Broadcasting Papers, Summary of 1971,” February 23, 1979, https://current.org/1979/02/nixon-administration-public-

broadcasting-papers-summary-of-1971/ (accessed March 21, 2023).

48.            President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address, January 10, 1967, https://www.infoplease.com/ primary-sources/government/presidential-speeches/state-union-address-lyndon-b-johnson-january-10-1967 (accessed March 21, 2023).

49.            Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball, eds., Jefferson: Political Writings (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 390.

50.           Pew Research Center, “Where News Audiences Fit on the Political Spectrum,” October 21, 2014, http://www. journalism.org/interactives/media-polarization/outlet/pbs/ (accessed March 21, 2023.

51.           Ibid.

52.          Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Corporation for Public Broadcasting Appropriation Request and Justification FY 2023/FY 2025, Submitted to the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 28, 2022,

p. 2, https://www.cpb.org/sites/default/files/appropriation/FY-2023-2025-CPB-Budget-Justification.pdf

(accessed March 21, 2023).

53.           George F. Will, “Public Broadcasting’s Immortality Defies Reason,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2017, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/public-broadcastings-immortality-defies-reason/2017/06/02/f5de02be- 46fe-11e7-a196-a1bb629f64cb_story.html?utm_term=.8df3a01f6ca6 (accessed March 21, 2023).

54.           Federal Communications Commission, “FM Radio,” https://www.fcc.gov/general/fm-radio (accessed March 21, 2023).

55.           Federal Communications Commission, “Regulatory Fee Exemptions for FY 2021,” FCC Regulatory Fees Factsheet No. DA-21-1142, September 10, 2021, p. 2.


 


9

 

 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Max Primorac

 

 

MISSION

The U.S. Agency for International Development leads the U.S. government’s international development and disaster assistance programs. USAID helps com- munities to lead their own development journeys by reducing the impact of conflict; preventing hunger and the spread of pandemic disease; and counteracting the driv- ers of violence, instability, transnational crime, and other threats. In alignment with U.S. national security interests, the agency promotes American prosperity through initiatives that expand markets for U.S. exports; encourage innovation; create a level playing field for U.S. businesses; and support more stable, resilient, and democratic societies that are less likely to act against American interests and more likely to respect family, life, and religious liberty.

 

OVERVIEW

USAID was established during the presidency of John F. Kennedy pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 19611 to promote the foreign policy, security, and national interests of the United States. At the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, it sought to halt the spread of Communism by assisting peoples in the developing world in their efforts to advance economically, socially, and politically. The agency helped to transition Central and Eastern Europe from socialism to free market–based democracies. Today, USAID leads the U.S. government’s global development and humanitarian disaster assistance responses.

Over the years, USAID expanded the number of countries assisted, the scope and size of its activities, and especially its budget. The Trump Administration faced


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

an institution marred by bureaucratic inertia: programmatic incoherence; waste- ful spending; and dependence on huge awards to a self-serving and politicized aid industrial complex of United Nations agencies, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and for-profit contractors. Once started, programs continue almost indefinitely—in many countries, for decades. USAID’s multibillion-dollar humanitarian programs that were once 80 percent in response to natural disasters are now 80 percent in response to violent, man-made crises and have become a permanent and immiserating feature of the global landscape.

Under the Trump Administration, USAID focused on ending the need for for- eign aid by placing countries onto a Journey to Self-Reliance.2 The Administration restructured the agency to reflect this strategic approach to development, stream- lined procurement procedures to diversify its partner base, increased awards to cost-effective local (including faith-based) organizations, and improved inter- nal governance. It instituted pro-life and family-friendly policies. It promoted international religious freedom as a pillar of the agency’s work and built up an unprecedented genocide-response infrastructure.

The Biden Administration has deformed the agency by treating it as a global platform to pursue overseas a divisive political and cultural agenda that promotes abortion, climate extremism, gender radicalism, and interventions against perceived systemic racism. It has dispensed with decades of bipartisan consensus on foreign aid and pursued policies that contravene basic American values and have antago- nized our partners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It has decoupled U.S. assistance from free-market reforms that are the keystone of economic and political stability and has teamed with global institutions to impose central planning diktats on an unprecedented scale. Wasteful budget increases requested by the Administration and appropriated by Congress have outstripped USAID’s capacity to spend funds responsibly, and U.S. foreign aid has been transformed into a massive and open- ended global entitlement program captured by—and enriching—the progressive Left. The next conservative Administration should scale back USAID’s global foot- print by, at a minimum, returning to the agency’s 2019 pre–COVID-19 pandemic budget level. It should deradicalize USAID’s programs and structures and build on the conservative reforms instituted by the Trump Administration. This will require working closely with the U.S. Congress to make deep cuts in the interna- tional affairs “150 Account” while granting USAID greater flexibility in spending

its appropriated funds to achieve better developmental outcomes.

 

KEY ISSUES

Aligning U.S. Foreign Aid to U.S. Foreign Policy. U.S. foreign aid is too often disconnected from the strategy and practice of U.S. foreign policy. Its coordination is made difficult as the aid budget is divided among approximately 20 offices, agen- cies, and departments that provide some form of foreign assistance.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The USAID Administrator should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) with the rank of Deputy Secretary at the Department of State in charge of all U.S. foreign assistance. The DFA role would empower this person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance programs across the U.S. government and carry out the agenda of the next con- servative President more effectively. A version of this role existed during the last two years of the George W. Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration eliminated it in 2009.

Countering China’s Development Challenge. Through its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective of displacing the United States as the premier global power. The PRC leverages its transactions—termed “debt traps” by many critics—to strengthen its global influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. In Latin America, 25 of 29 countries participate in the BRI, and the PRC ranks as the region’s largest trading partner. Since 2005, Chinese state-owned banks have issued $138 billion in loans to Latin American countries, and other Chinese entities have invested an additional $140 billion. In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global energy development.

The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of all BRI loans are in financial distress, leading many countries to seek emergency financial help from Western donors. Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial deci- sions by governments, advancing China’s geostrategic interests, and creating an unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. For example, Brazil, a world leader in shoe production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap Chinese imports. China’s mercantilist penetration of the developing world and the negative consequences for developing countries’ healthy economic growth have undercut U.S. strategic relationships in those countries and wasted billions in U.S. foreign aid.

During the Trump Administration, USAID:

   Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3 that contrasted America’s development approach based on liberty,

sovereignty, and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political subordination to Beijing.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Launched its first Digital Strategy4 to promote safe 5G access in emerging markets and combat Beijing’s efforts to equip regimes with tools to

stifle democracy.

   Struck bilateral development relationships with Japan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan to support projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

   Established an office in Greenland to help counter China’s claims of being “a near Arctic state” and reoriented its programming across Asia—including establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia—in line with America’s Indo- Pacific strategy.5

   Joined with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to help coastal countries detect and halt illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and confront

criminal activities practiced by state-run Chinese fishing fleets that violate international norms, ravage fishing industries in developing countries, worsen food insecurity, rob vulnerable communities of their livelihoods, and deplete maritime resources.

USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations. An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and USAID–U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Working Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China lens. A senior executive–level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Adminis- trator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat.

The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’s counter-China architecture to waste away, subordinating our national security interests to progressive climate politics in which Communist China is viewed as a global partner.

The next conservative Administration should restore and build on the Trump Administration’s counter-China infrastructure at USAID, end the climate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of

U.S. national security interests, rewarding those countries that resist China’s debt diplomacy. It should finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to any partner that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly. USAID’s Bangkok-based Regional Development Mission for Asia should focus its strategic attention on supporting cross-border initiatives designed to counter Chinese influence.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Climate Change. Upon taking office, President Biden issued executive orders to “put the climate crisis at the center of U.S. foreign policy and national security” and mitigate “the devastating inequalities that intersect with gender, race, ethnic- ity, and economic security.”6 USAID subsequently declared itself “a climate agency” and redirected its private-sector engagement strategy—teaming with America’s corporate sector to wean countries off foreign aid through private investment and trade—to support the Administration’s global policy to “transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy.”

The Administration has incorporated its radical climate policy into every USAID initiative. It has joined or funded international partnerships dedicated to advancing the aims of the Paris Climate Agreement and has supported the idea of giving trillions of dollars more in aid transfers for “climate reparations.”

The Biden Administration’s extreme climate policies have worsened global food insecurity and hunger. Its anti–fossil fuel agenda has led to a sharp spike in global energy prices. Inflation has hit the poor the hardest as they expend a higher proportion of income on food purchases. Farmers in poor countries can no longer afford to buy expensive natural gas–based fertilizers that are key to achieving high yields of food production. Under advice from climate radicals, the government of Sri Lanka even banned chemical fertilizers entirely without having any replace- ments in place. The result has been hunger and violent political instability.

The aid industry claims that climate change causes poverty, which is false. Enduring conflict, government corruption, and bad economic policies are the main drivers of global poverty. USAID’s response to man-made food insecurity is to provide more billions of dollars in aid—a recipe that will keep scores of poor countries underdeveloped and dependent on foreign aid for years to come.

The impact on Africa is especially acute. South Africa, for example, relies on coal-powered plants to generate 80 percent of its power needs. It would need $26 billion in foreign aid to make the full transition away from coal. Multiplying this amount by dozens of other countries on the continent, the financial resources needed to transition away from fossil fuels are unachievable. In Latin America, countries that are global leaders in oil and gas production have sharply curtailed their energy production in line with climate activists, upending the hemisphere’s major source of export revenues and condemning it to years of economic and polit- ical instability.

USAID should cease its war on fossil fuels in the developing world and support the responsible management of oil and gas reserves as the quickest way to end wrenching poverty and the need for open-ended foreign aid. The next conservative Administration should rescind all climate policies from its foreign aid programs (specifically USAID’s Climate Strategy 2022–20307); shut down the agency’s offices, programs, and directives designed to advance the Paris Climate Agreement; and narrowly limit funding to traditional climate mitigation efforts. USAID resources


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

are best deployed to strengthen the resilience of countries that are most vulner- able to climatic shifts. The agency should cease collaborating with and funding progressive foundations, corporations, international institutions, and NGOs that advocate on behalf of climate fanaticism.

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Agenda. USAID installed advisers on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) committees “in all its Bureaus, Offices, and [overseas] Missions” and created “an agency-wide dashboard and DEI scorecard for all bureaus, offices, and missions” to track staff compliance with the Adminis- tration’s DEI directives. A Chief DEI Officer oversees this DEI infrastructure and sits in the Administrator’s office. DEI directives are now part of all agency policies and are incorporated as standard clauses in all contract and grant awards. Those seeking to do business with the agency must “describe the approaches they will use to diversify their partner base.”8 USAID often ties DEI to “gender and climate equity,” corrupting every aspect of the agency’s overseas work.

The upshot has been to racialize the agency and create a hostile work environ- ment for anyone who disagrees with the Biden Administration’s identity politics. This pursuit of ideological purity threatens merit-based professional advancement for staff who do not overtly conform, hyperpoliticizes what should be a nonpartisan federal workplace environment, creates an institutionalized cadre of progressive political commissars, corrupts the award process, and discourages potential con- tractors and grantees that disagree with this radical agenda from applying for USAID funding.

The next conservative Administration should dismantle USAID’s DEI apparatus by eliminating the Chief Diversity Officer position along with the DEI advisers and committees; cancel the DEI scorecard and dashboard; remove DEI requirements from contract and grant tenders and awards; issue a directive to cease promotion of the DEI agenda, including the bullying LGBTQ+ agenda; and provide staff a confidential medium through which to adjudicate cases of political retaliation that agency or implementing staff suffered during the Biden Administration. It should eliminate funding for partners that promote discriminatory DEI practices and consider debarment in egregious cases.

As federal departments and agencies cannot play partisan politics, staff—irre- spective of hiring mechanism—as well as implementers and grantees that engage in ideological agitation on behalf of the DEI agenda should be dismissed, and enti- ties should be debarred. The next conservative Administration should return the authority over all civil rights issues at USAID to the agency’s Office of Civil Rights, which is the appropriate locus for ensuring that all Americans have guaranteed equality of career opportunity at USAID.

Refocusing Gender Equality on Women, Children, and Families. Instead of protecting women’s and children’s unalienable human rights and propelling their ability to thrive in society, past Democrat Administrations have nearly erased


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

what females are and what femininity is through “gender” policies and practices. For instance, these Administrations have diluted USAID’s focus on assisting vul- nerable women, children, and families around the globe by adding protections for and ideological advocacy on behalf of progressive special-interest groups. USAID now aggressively promotes abortion on demand under the guise of “sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights,” “gender equality,” and “women’s empowerment” and advocates for those who claim minority status or vulnerability. Families are the basic unit of and foundation for a thriving society. Without women, there are no children, and society cannot continue. As evidenced by the confirmation testimony of now-Associate Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the progressive Left has so misused and altered the definition of what a “woman” is that one of our U.S. Supreme Court Justices was unable to delineate clearly the fundamental biological and sexual traits that define the group of which she is a part. USAID cannot advocate for and protect women when they have been erased globally along with the values and traditional structures that have supported them. The next conservative Administration should rename the USAID Office of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) as the USAID Office of Women, Children, and Families; refocus and realign resources that currently support programs in GEWE to the Office of Women, Children, and Families; redes- ignate the Senior Gender Coordinator as an unapologetically pro-life politically appointed Senior Coordinator of the Office of Women, Children, and Families; and eliminate the “more than 180 gender advisors and points of contact…embedded in

Missions and Operating Units throughout the Agency.”9

In addition, the next conservative Administration should rescind President Biden’s 2022 Gender Policy and refocus it on Women, Children, and Families and revise the agency’s regulation on “Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle.”10 It should remove all references, exam- ples, definitions, photos, and language on USAID websites, in agency publications and policies, and in all agency contracts and grants that include the following terms: “gender,” “gender equality,” “gender equity,” “gender diverse individu- als,” “gender aware,” “gender sensitive,” etc. It should also remove references to “abortion,” “reproductive health,” and “sexual and reproductive rights” and con- troversial sexual education materials.

In the past, the word “gender” was a polite alternative to the word “sex” or term “biological sex.” The Left has commandeered the term “gender,” which used to mean either “male” or “female,” to include a spectrum of others who are seeking to alter biological and societal sexual norms. The promotion of gender radicalism is anathema to the traditional norms of many societies where USAID works, causes resentment by tying lifesaving assistance to rejecting the aid recipient’s own firmly held fundamental values regarding sexuality, and produces unnecessary conster- nation and confusion among and even outright bias against men.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

The next Administration should ensure that USAID’s goal in service of its mission is to help protect and propel all members of society—women, children, and men—from conception to natural death. To do so, USAID’s Office of Women, Children, and Families should strive to ensure that communities have their basic human needs, without which they will be unable to thrive, met first and foremost. Basic human needs include equal and safe access to potable water, sanitation, food, education, health care, houses of worship, justice, pregnancy and family resource centers, working capital, electricity, technology, and business opportunities. The Office of Women, Children, and Families should implement the Geneva Consen- sus Declaration on Women’s Health and Protection of the Family and prioritize partnerships with local organizations, including faith-based organizations (FBOs). Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance. Protecting life should be among the core objectives of United States foreign assistance. Shortly after taking office, how- ever, President Biden issued a memorandum that reversed a myriad of pro-life policies and revoked the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy, widely known as the Mexico City Policy. Biden also restored funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which supports and implements

China’s coercive abortion and sterilization regimen.

PLGHA requires foreign NGOs, as a condition of receiving assistance, to agree not to perform or actively promote abortions as a method of family planning in foreign countries. Previous pro-life Presidents beginning with Ronald Reagan applied these conditions to family planning assistance, but President Trump for the first time expanded the Mexico City Policy to protect “global health assistance furnished by all departments or agencies” (estimated to be $8.8 billion annually). The Biden Administration restored abortion subsidies to pro-abortion NGOs including Planned Parenthood International and MSI Reproductive Choices. In reversing PLGHA, Biden declared a radical assault on the policy of protecting life, choosing instead to promote abortion on demand around the world under the guise of “sexual and reproductive health and rights.” USAID’s priority of funding the global abortion industry negates programs that promote life, women’s health,

and the family.

Even under PLGHA, several loopholes allowed support for the global abortion industry to continue. International NGOs that perform and promote abortions overseas like Population Services International, Pathfinder, PATH, the Population Council, EngenderHealth, and WomanCare Global International continued to receive funding from USAID under PLGHA and now, under Biden, receive tens of millions more in U.S. taxpayer dollars in foreign assistance annually without any oversight. When the United Nations Secretariat promoted abortion and abor- tion-inducing drugs under the umbrella of “sexual and reproductive health” as an element of its COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan in May 2020, the exemptions in PLGHA for humanitarian aid and multilateral organizations


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

illuminated another loophole in the policy’s effectiveness in safeguarding U.S. tax- payer dollars from being used to promote abortion.

Pro-abortion groups also have received funds under other categories of foreign aid that fall outside the scope of global health assistance, including women-related and economic assistance programs. Members of Congress have advocated closing these loopholes by extending PLGHA to all foreign assistance through the Protect- ing Life in Foreign Assistance Act, sponsored by Senator Mike Lee (R–UT) and Representative Virginia Foxx (R–NC).11 Current law in the Foreign Assistance Act gives the President broad authority to set “such terms and conditions as he may determine” on foreign assistance, which legally empowers the next conservative President to expand this pro-life policy.

To stop U.S. foreign aid from supporting the global abortion industry, the next conservative Administration should issue an executive order that, at a minimum, reinstates PLGHA and summarily blocks funding to UNFPA but also closes loop- holes by applying the policy to all foreign assistance, including humanitarian aid, and improving its enforcement. The executive order to reinstate PLGHA should be drafted broadly to apply to all foreign assistance. It should simultaneously rescind President Biden’s memorandum entitled “Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad,” issued on January 28, 2021.12 The new pro-life executive order should apply to foreign NGOs, including subgrantees and subcontractors, and remove exemptions for U.S.-based NGOs, public international organizations, and bilateral government-to-government agreements. All entities funded by USAID, both directly and indirectly, should report their compliance with the PLGHA, and USAID should institute penalties, including debarment from future federal funding, for violations of it. The new executive order also should instruct the Administrator of USAID to publish reports on implementation of the PLGHA by both prime and sub-prime recipients.

In addition, the Helms Amendment should continue to be applied, as it has been by both Republican and Democratic Administrations for more than 50 years, as a complete ban on the use of taxpayer dollars to pay for abortions abroad.

International Religious Freedom. Conservatives believe international religious freedom is central to USAID’s development efforts. President Trump’s Executive Order 13926 on “Advancing International Religious Freedom”13 instructed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, to budget at least $50 million a year for programs that advance international reli- gious freedom and “ensure that faith-based and religious entities, including eligible entities in foreign countries, are not discriminated against on the basis of religious identity or religious belief when competing for Federal funding.”

Under the Trump Administration, the agency set up a senior-level Chief Adviser for International Religious Freedom who reported directly to the Administra- tor with the task of coordinating a “whole-of-USAID” approach to achieving this


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

priority. It created a robust genocide-response capability. USAID affirmed the agency’s partnerships with faith-based organizations through its rule on “Partic- ipation by Religious Organizations in USAID Programs;”14 “Partnership Guidance and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for Faith Based Organizations;” and “Legal Guidance and Answers to FAQs for USAID Staff.”

Today, USAID officials and their progressive partners have resisted efforts to promote religious freedom, especially as it relates to abortion and gender ideology, which are anathema to the traditional societies where USAID funds programs (in addition to many U.S. taxpayers). U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken repudiated his predecessor’s focus on religious freedom.

The next conservative Administration must champion the core American value of religious freedom, which correlates significantly with poverty reduction, eco- nomic growth, and peace. It should train all USAID staff on the connection between religious freedom and development; integrate it into all of the agency’s programs, including the five-year Country Development and Coordination Strategies due for updates in 2025; strengthen the missions’ relationships with local faith-based leaders; and build on local programs that are serving the poor. Congress should appropriate funding to USAID specifically to support persecuted religious minori- ties in line with Executive Order 13926.

Streamlining Procurement and Localizing the Partner Base. USAID is a grantmaking and contracting agency that disburses billions of dollars of federal funding in developing countries through implementing partners, such as U.N. agen- cies, international NGOs, for-profit companies, and local nongovernmental entities. In rare instances, such as in Jordan and Ukraine, the agency provides direct budget support to finance the operations of host-country governments. USAID far more often counts on expensive and ineffective large contracts and grants to carry out its programs. It justifies these practices based on speed and a lower administrative burden on its institutional capacity.

Partnering and procurement reform was a pillar of the Trump Administration’s effort to secure better development results, cut costs, and advance the Journey to Self-Reliance strategy of exiting countries from aid. In December 2018, USAID launched its first Acquisition and Assistance Strategy to streamline procurement processes; introduce innovation into its programming; and diversify its partner base away from large, expensive, and partisan implementers. The strategy counted on local NGOs, including faith-based entities already on the ground, to provide the agency with less costly and more effective alternatives to the aid giants. The strategy also prioritized global partnerships with the private sector—corporations, investors, diasporas, and private philanthropies—the source of real capital invest- ment, innovation, and efficiencies that can maximize the impact of taxpayer dollars. Under the Biden Administration, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the aid industrial complex has recaptured the agency and stifled further reforms.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

The next conservative Administration should immediately implement language on key policy topics as standard provisions in all grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. These provisions should include language on implementing the Policy on Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance, imposing conditions on funding to multilateral organizations, and increasing accountability and transparency.

To ensure that USAID exercises its existing authorities to streamline procure- ment processes, the next conservative Administration should name a political appointee as the agency’s Senior Procurement Executive and Director of the agen- cy’s Office of Assistance and Acquisitions (OAA) in the Bureau of Management (M). The head of M/OAA is one of the most important positions at USAID, as the office is ground zero for controlling the disbursement of U.S. foreign aid. The White House should empower the Administrator and his or her designees to make determina- tions concerning the scale and scope of awards and increase the transparency and accountability of subawards, which can escape public scrutiny and promote pro- gressive policies during conservative Administrations. USAID should use existing authority to use program funds to expand its roster of contracting and agreement officers to accelerate the delivery of funds for disaster responses to a more diverse collection of implementers.

Accomplishing the next conservative Administration’s policy goals at USAID will require that political appointees have knowledge of, responsibility for, and visibility into the design and awarding of grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements. The Administration should restore the Senior Official Accountabil- ity Review (SOAR) or create a similar process to ensure that proposed programs above a certain dollar threshold in Total Estimated Cost/Total Estimated Amount receive a close review by policymakers in each bureau and office and, for large awards, in the agency’s front office.

“Localization” is a buzzword within the aid community but correctly assumes that more funding through local organizations produces better aid outcomes. Shift- ing from giant U.S.-based implementers has proved difficult to achieve, however, given intense internal bureaucratic resistance; opposition from the aid industrial complex; and foot-dragging from progressives, who view local NGOs—especially faith-based NGOs prominent in Africa and Latin America—as obstacles to promot- ing abortion, gender radicalism, climate extremism, and other woke ideas.

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has shown that localization at scale is possible within a short time span. Over the four years of the Trump Administration, the multibillion-dollar program increased the amount of funding disbursed to local entities from about 25 percent to nearly 70 percent with positive overall results. This model should be replicated across all of USAID. In addition, the next conservative Administration should expand use of the New Partnership Initiative (NPI) to every bureau and office; reset the requirements for USAID’s overseas missions to craft and execute NPI action plans; and assign each


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

mission a minimum percentage of its portfolio that must go to new, underutilized, and local partners. Crucial to the strategy will be increasing the use of open com- petition that lowers barriers to entry and fixed-amount awards that carry less of a compliance burden along with eliminating cost-plus reimbursement contracts that favor large companies. Before advancing a new program, the agency should be required to assess existing local activities to avoid undercutting or duplicating them. At every opportunity, USAID should build on existing local initiatives.

Global Health. The United States is the world’s largest funder of global health initiatives. For more than 60 years, the American people have offered health assis- tance to the world and saved millions of lives. The USAID Bureau for Global Health (GH), the second largest within USAID, oversees a multibillion-dollar operation to support maternal and child health; voluntary family planning; PEPFAR and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) (both started under President George W. Bush); and other initiatives against other infectious and neglected tropical diseases. Effective use of funds is essential to maximize care for the world’s neediest people. Countries with strong health institutions and sound public health practices responded quickly to and recovered more rapidly from the COVID-19 pandemic. This demonstrates the importance of “localization,” by which USAID helps gov- ernments and the private sector in developing countries to strengthen their own ability to address needed training, services, accountability, and organiza-

tional capacity.

Unfortunately, many USAID-funded global health activities remain rooted in patterns that began decades ago and measure improvements in terms of inputs— money spent—instead of outcomes achieved. From the 1950s to 1970s, the major recognized threats to human health were infectious diseases such as polio and smallpox, and USAID funded programs “in” a country, not “with” a country. Mater- nal and child health, food, water, and sanitation programs were often intermittent. USAID consistently financed population control, contraception, and abortion as essential to “development.” Most programs focused on one disease or condition but had little integration with other global health activities. Chronic diseases were ignored.

Consequently, the next conservative Administration should focus on updating the Global Health Bureau’s portfolio, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to supporting women, children, and families; building host-country institutional capacity; increasing awards to local and faith-based partners (expanding what occurred during the Trump Administration with the NPI); and improving USAID’s ability to coordinate with local partners.

Updating Funding Priorities. The Bureau should identify and eliminate out- dated and ineffective concepts and focus on funding innovation. A rigorous review is necessary to ensure that current programs and funding streams avoid wasting taxpayer dollars and prioritize what is needed now and what works.


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Focusing on Holistic Health Care and Support for Women, Children, and Families. The continued high rate of maternal and infant mortality is a persistent global tragedy. Contrary to current publicity, this problem is not solved by abortion. Families genuinely cherish children. The next leadership at USAID must focus attention on women and children’s health (including unborn children) as well as health risks across life spans, including childhood infections, cervical cancer, adolescent risks, and family stability, by utilizing a coordinated approach. The Bureau should implement a “Request for Application for Resilient Families” that harvests collaborative funds from siloed programs and makes individuals and the family, not diseases or conditions, the true focus of intervention.

Increasing USAID Collaboration with Faith-Based Organizations. FBOs

historically have been much more successful in outreach to remote and vulnerable populations, based on trust built through decades of service. The value of collab- orating with FBOs was demonstrated in the October 2020 Evidence Summit on Religious Engagement. In sub-Saharan Africa, FBOs often provide more than 80 percent of health care, especially to the extremely poor. In contrast, the Global Health Bureau historically has provided 85 percent of its funding to large U.S. NGOs with significant overhead costs, as a result of which only 20 percent–30 percent of funding reaches people in need.15

Leveraging the Strength and Experience of Presidential Initiatives. Mil- lions of people are alive today because of the American people’s investment in PEPFAR and PMI. The training, laboratory, clinical intervention, health educa- tion, data collection, and organizational platforms of these programs became the bedrock for responding to the COVID pandemic. It is time for these programs to become part of an integrated, strong, and sustainable network of health care and public health in developing countries. A smooth transition to national ownership and funding, however, will require better coordination of USAID’s own stovepiped programs with PEPFAR and PMI.

Strengthening the Collection and Use of Data. Good decisions are based on accurate data. For decades, global health programs have relied mostly on statis- tical modeling (rather than actual data) or survey data (the weakest type of data). Poor data quality undermines both the evaluation and improvement of desired outcomes achieved by our global health programs. The Trump Administration implemented critical updates of PEPFAR’s systems for the collection and reporting of data to increase transparency and hold funded partners and overseas missions accountable. The next conservative Administration should apply these reforms to all of USAID’s global health programs.

Strengthening Private-Sector Engagement. The Bureau’s Center for Inno- vation and Impact (CII) should be empowered to expand networks of private and faith-based health organizations that can develop projects using develop- ment-impact bonds, capital funds, and innovative technologies, including with the


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Millennium Challenge Corporation and the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. More flexible and agile CII funding will spur innovation within the Bureau and help to enhance countries’ self-reliance in the provision of health care.

Improving Bureau Hiring, Staffing, and Recruitment Practices. The Global Health Bureau should address its own management challenges by modifying the high ratio of contractors to direct hires, holding career leadership accountable for effective management, and building more flexibility in emergency responses. Bureau personnel suffer from “mission drift,” burnout, and a lack of vision. New directives, social agendas, and extra layers of review have obscured core activities and caused talent to leave the agency. Conservative leadership must return the focus to development and improved workforce morale and focus on global out- comes and the efficient use of taxpayer dollars.

Holding the U.N., the World Health Organization (WHO), and Other Mul- tilateral Organizations Accountable. Leadership should designate a political appointee to help coordinate cross-agency efforts to hold the U.S. government’s multilateral partners (U.N. and WHO agencies and other international organiza- tions) to a higher level of financial and programmatic accountability, including assurances that language promoting abortion will be removed from U.N. docu- ments, policy statements, and technical literature. The United States must have more prominent representation in international technical committees and regu- lation-setting organizations to ensure the proper execution of American resources, the preservation of our values, the protection of innovation, and the vitality of our biomedical sector.

Global Humanitarian Assistance. The U.S. government is the world’s largest humanitarian actor, annually disbursing billions of dollars in lifesaving assistance— food, water, shelter, emergency health care, and related protection support—to tens of millions of vulnerable people. Funded by the U.S. Congress through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, USAID pays for nearly half of the budget of the Nobel Prize–winning U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) as well as dozens of simultaneous operations that range from responses to hurricanes in Central America to tackling outbreaks of Ebola in Central Africa and caring for millions of people displaced by ongoing conflicts.

USAID’s emergency responses once were focused primarily on natural cata- clysms such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Today, the agency spends more than 80 percent of its humanitarian budget on chronic man-made crises. Most of these “emergency responses” began years ago and absorb billions of dollars annu- ally with no end in sight. Every year sees financial demands grow in response to new conflicts, most recently Ukraine. The budget of the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) has doubled compared to just a few years ago, and BHA can no longer manage its funds responsibly. A politically powerful foreign aid industry that


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benefits financially from extending and expanding these large-scale programs for years, even decades, ensures little scrutiny of these ever-increasing appropriations. The massive growth in “emergency” aid distorts humanitarian responses, wors- ens corruption in the countries we support, and exacerbates the misery of those we intend to help. The permanence of this assistance, particularly in countries where we have little to no in-country presence and must rely on U.N. agencies to self-monitor, has morphed into a co-governance scheme in which the U.S. govern- ment effectively finances the social services obligations of corrupt regimes that threaten the United States. These governments can then redirect scarce budget resources away from costly health and education toward financing their wars, sup- porting terrorism, repressing their citizens, and enriching themselves. Examples

of this abuse are spread throughout the world.

   Over the past decade, the U.S. government has expended $14 billion in aid to Syria where the bloody regime of Bashar al-Assad—a close ally of Iran and Russia—skims nearly half of foreign aid through inflated official exchange rates, the diversion of food baskets to its military units, and procurement arrangements with compromised local contractors.

   Yemen, once the breadbasket of the Arabian Peninsula, is now dependent on billions of dollars of aid as formerly productive Yemeni farmers cannot compete against “free food” while irrigation systems remain in disrepair, leaving the country to suffer from water shortages during long summer droughts and flooding during its rainy season. Iran-backed Houthi rebels divert substantial amounts of aid to support their war efforts.

   In Afghanistan, the aid infrastructure built over 20 years of American military presence that three Presidents wanted to end collapsed with the failure of U.S.-trained Afghan forces to repel the Taliban’s 2021 advances.

Yet the country has received nearly $1 billion more in U.S. humanitarian aid since the Taliban’s takeover and absent a U.S. embassy to ensure that it is not diverted to the Taliban and other terrorist groups.

   In Burma, U.S. aid finances all of the food and medical care for hundreds of thousands of persecuted Rohingya that the military regime forces to live in open-air concentration camps.

   In northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of Yazidis—targeted for genocidal extermination by ISIS—remain in miserable camps unable to return home because of the Iraqi government’s refusal to clear out Iran-backed militias occupying their homeland.


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In effect, humanitarian aid is sustaining war economies, creating financial incentives for warring parties to continue fighting, discouraging governments from reforming, and propping up malign regimes.

Nefarious actors reap billions of dollars in profits from diversions of our human- itarian assistance, but so do international organizations. The WFP charges 36 percent in overhead while Oxfam International’s overhead has reached 70 percent in Yemen, reflecting the high costs of foreign staff, security, and logistics. With pow- erful lobbies in Washington, D.C., and in leadership positions throughout USAID and the Department of State, the aid industry adroitly exploits Congress’s dispo- sition to increase funding year on year to assist those in dire need but provides no evidence to justify the mounting budget requests.

In 2020, USAID’s leadership fused formerly bifurcated food and nonfood emergency relief operations into a single Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to improve the management of the agency’s largest portfolio, but this reform was not sufficient to address the problem. The next Administration should resize and repurpose USAID’s humanitarian aid portfolio to restore its original purpose of providing emergency short-term relief, prepare vulnerable communities for tran- sition, and do no harm in the following ways:

   Work with Congress to make deep cuts in the IDA budget by ending programs that do more harm than good in places controlled by malign actors, such as in Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan, where our aid is consumed by fraud, diversion, and partner overhead costs.

   Require USAID and the State Department to devise country-based exit strategies that term-limit the duration of humanitarian responses and transition funding from emergency to development projects. This will require robust diplomacy to press host governments to integrate displaced persons in lieu of keeping them in expensive and dehumanizing camps financed by the international community.

   Transition from large awards to expensive, inefficient, and corrupt U.N. agencies, global NGOs, and contractors to local, especially faith-based, entities that are already operating on the ground. This approach provides a far less expensive and more effective alternative for aid delivery. Local partners more ably navigate corrupt environments and are more likely

to steer vulnerable populations away from dependence on aid toward self-sufficiency.

   Require that BHA avail itself of existing IDA authorities that it fails to use, including to dispense with the cost-reimbursement model that disqualifies


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undercapitalized local NGOs; accept other donor vetting of local partners; streamline the award-approval process; and expand the use of fixed-amount awards to rein in cost overruns.

   Direct USAID’s Bureau for Management to hire more procurement officers for BHA to strengthen the Bureau’s award management capacity and reduce the incentives to issue large awards to aid industry giants.

   Allow BHA to manage the process of hiring Personal Services Contractors.

   Require BHA’s partners to adopt stricter vetting procedures to prevent aid from being diverted to terrorists.

   Increase efforts to obtain greater contributions, not just pledges, for humanitarian operations from other donors and make this a condition for receiving additional U.S. aid.

 

Leveraging Foreign Aid to Unleash the Power of America’s Private Sector. During the 1960s, when USAID was launched, 80 percent of financial flows from the United States to the developing world was in the form of U.S. government assistance. Today, that figure is under 10 percent, overtaken by private investment, remittances, and private charities, all demonstrating the power of America’s pri- vate sector to promote wealth-generating economic development in poor countries. Leaders in the developing world routinely press U.S. officials about their preference for “trade and investment, not aid.”

Instead, the Biden Administration is leveraging private-sector financing to promote its climate and other progressive agendas worldwide. The next conser- vative Administration must return USAID to a foreign aid model that leverages its resources to promote private-sector solutions to the world’s true development problems and end the need for future foreign aid. Private capital investment in these markets is the greatest enabler of job creation and sustainable economic growth throughout the developing world.

A key tool of American soft-power leadership is the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Launched in December 2019, DFC sought to unleash the power of America’s private sector to advance our interests by providing emerging markets with blended financing opportunities to help end wretched poverty, create new markets for U.S.-made products, strengthen bilateral partnerships in strategic parts of the world, and offset China’s predatory loans and investments. The Trump Administration launched a USAID–DFC Working Group to maximize development outcomes and review individual investment projects through a counter-China lens and ensure a cohesive interagency development response.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

As development agencies, USAID and DFC must do a better job of aligning their respective activities and closely integrate both structurally and operation- ally. The easiest way to foster this alignment is to “dual hat” the role of DFC’s chief development officer so that he or she serves simultaneously in both institu- tions. Like all U.S. federal bodies, DFC should be restored to its original intent of deploying its commercial risk-reducing financial services instead of its current misuse as another global vehicle to promote economy-killing climate programs, meet irrelevant diversity objectives, and overfocus on low-impact or misguided gender-based activities.

Branding. A deeply embedded culture within the foreign aid bureaucracy views public recognition of U.S. assistance as secondary to a larger philanthropic mission and is embarrassed by the American flag. Citing vaguely defined secu- rity concerns, USAID’s implementers—U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and contractors—often fail to credit the American people for the billions of dollars in assistance they provide the rest of the world even as they engage in self-promoting public relations to raise other donor funds. This approach has negative foreign policy implications as China relentlessly promotes its own self-serving efforts to gain influence and resources. Worst of all, malign actors sometimes appropriate credit for unbranded U.S. assistance: Houthi terrorists, for example, claim to pro- vide for the people under their occupation with anonymous U.S. humanitarian aid. The United States is in a struggle for influence with China, Russia, and other competitors, and American generosity must not go unacknowledged. The next conservative Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s brand- ing policy, which revamped ADS Chapter 320, to force the aid bureaucracy to fully credit the American people for the aid they are providing. The Senior Advisor for Brand Management in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) (dis- cussed infra) should be a political appointee who is responsible for maximizing the visibility of U.S. assistance by enforcing branding policy on every grant, coopera- tive agreement, and contract. The LPA should liaise with counterparts at the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to ensure local media pickup of these activities.

OTHER OFFICES AND BUREAUS

Office of Administrator. The next conservative Administration should leave in place the current structure of two presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for Management. The Deputy Administrators and the Chief of Staff must be individuals with extensive previous service in the executive branch, ideally at foreign-affairs agencies, and be fluent in the language and practice of federal procurement.

Bureau for Foreign Assistance. As noted above, the next conservative Administration should name the USAID Administrator as Director of Foreign Assistance (F) at the Department of State with the rank of Deputy Secretary. It


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should reorient the bulk of F staff from focusing on the formulation of the annual President’s budget proposal to the execution of already appropriated resources. This should include eliminating the duplicative Mission and Bureau Resource Requests; speeding up the availability of appropriations by delivering to Congress within 60 days the report required by Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA); and fast-tracking the approval of Congressional Notifications (CNs) and other pre-obligation requirements.

Management Bureau. As indicated previously, the next conservative Admin- istration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Senior Procurement Executive and Director of the agency’s Office of Acquisition and Assistance (M/ OAA). Political appointees with the appropriate credentials (including warrants) should be placed within M/OAA, and the agency should exercise its authority to engage qualified experts from other federal departments and agencies and outside of government (if they are free of conflicts of interest) on the Technical Commit- tees that review applications for USAID’s contract and grant competitions. The Administration should change the designation of USAID’s Competition Advocate to an individual favorable to innovative types of contracts that can reduce the aid oligopoly’s grip on the agency.

Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. As soon as possible after Inauguration Day, the next conservative Administration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) and Director of the Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. USAID’s White House Liaison must be an individual with substantial experience with federal personnel sys- tems. The White House Office of Presidential Personnel should allow the USAID Administrator to explore with counterparts at the Office of Personnel Management whether the agency could hire personnel under both the Administratively Deter- mined authority and Schedule C of the Excepted Service of the Federal Civil Service. USAID should be one of the agencies to pilot-test a reinstated Executive Order 13957,16 which created a Schedule F within the Excepted Service, and should aggres- sively recruit and place candidates into term-limited positions under Schedule A of the Excepted Service (especially veterans). The new CHCO should examine how the existing members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) at USAID should be reworked throughout the agency and should institute an SES Mobility Program to encourage the regular rotation of senior career leaders, including through details

to other departments and agencies.

Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The next conservative Admin- istration should shift the policy functions of the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) to the Office of Budget and Resource Management (BRM), located in the Office of the Administrator. It should rename BRM the Office of Budget, Policy, and Resource Management (BPRM) and staff the policy team with political appointees. The Administration should also move the responsibility for reviewing


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and processing proposed changes in USAID’s policy bible, the Automated Direc- tives System (ADS), from the Management Bureau to the new BPRM.

Even before these changes, the Assistant Administrator for PPL should decree an immediate freeze on changes in the ADS and agencywide policy documents to allow for the priority publication of amendments to reflect the new Administra- tion’s viewpoint. All major agency policies should be reviewed and amended or withdrawn within the new Administration’s first calendar year in office.

Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs. The next conservative Admin- istration should invest no more than 10 percent of USAID’s allocation of Administratively Determined politically appointed positions in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs. A priority for these positions (combined with hires under Schedule A) should be the review and editing of the agency’s public-facing web pages and social media accounts to eliminate material that does not conform to the new Administration’s policies. The agency should accelerate the review of Con- gressional Notifications within LPA and publish all CNs and congressional reports. To ensure consistency and clarity of public messaging, LPA should gain direct authority over the communications staff scattered through USAID’s various Bureaus and Offices. LPA should expand its public-facing efforts to include con- servative allies that are active in global development and humanitarian aid work, including industry groups, nonprofits, trade associations, foundations, and advo- cacy organizations, and correspondingly reduce the aid industrial complex’s grip

on USAID’s corporate relationships.

Office of General Counsel. Along with the Director of M/OAA, the General Counsel is one of the two or three most important positions at USAID and should be a priority for immediate appointments. Because proper legal interpretation of executive orders and internal USAID policy is crucial, the next conservative Administration should recruit and appoint a commanding team of Schedule C attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel (OGC). Within weeks of Inau- guration Day, OGC should issue clear guidance on the eligibility of faith-based organizations for USAID funding.

Office of Budget Resources and Management. The Director of Budget Resources and Management should be a political appointee empowered as part of the Administrator’s senior management team. BRM’s highest priorities should be to prepare the report required by Section 653(a) according to the Administrator’s guidance, institute a fast-track process for the submission of Congressional Notifica- tions, and identify already appropriated resources to reprogram immediately to fund the new Administration’s priorities. The next conservative Administration should consider prioritizing the placing of young political appointees in BRM over LPA.

Bureau for Democracy, Development, and Innovation. A key outcome of the transformation of USAID undertaken during the Trump Administration, the Bureau for Democracy, Development, and Innovation (DDI) is the home for most


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of the agency’s non-health, nonhumanitarian funding as well as almost all of its sectoral appropriations directives, including those that reflect the pet projects of individual Members of Congress. The Bureau is the policy and financial nexus at USAID for most of the Biden Administration’s radical priorities in foreign assis- tance, including gender, climate change, and the promotion of identity-based politics. On the positive side, DDI is also the Bureau in charge of areas that will be crucial to a reorientation of USAID, including trade, economic growth, inno- vation, partnerships with the private sector, and the agency’s relationship with communities of faith.

The next conservative Administration should make the rapid staffing of key DDI positions a high priority. Besides the Senate-confirmed Assistant Administrator, the Directors of each of the Centers and Hubs in the Bureau will need political leadership. Almost every one of the agencywide policies that cover DDI’s areas of responsibility will need to be edited or rewritten entirely as soon as possible. The next conservative Administration should harvest DDI’s central appropriations to fund new priorities, especially working with ethnic and religious minorities and faith-based organizations and joint ventures with the private sector in education and energy. All DDI programs should issue funding opportunities restricted to new and underutilized partners modeled on the NPI.

 

REGIONS

Asia. Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the battle against Communist China’s efforts to exploit the development needs of poor countries for geopolitical gain. America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should guide USAID’s approaches to disbursing foreign aid in the region.

USAID should intensify its bilateral relationships with pro–free market Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India so that they can jointly advance private-sector solutions to secure financing for power generation, infrastructure, digital con- nectivity, investment and trade expansion, and other economic activities. USAID enjoys a strong in-country presence in India, buttressed by recent coordination on the global response to COVID-19 as India is a global leader in vaccine produc- tion. Those ties should be expanded. So too should development cooperation with Taiwan, which boasts effective pandemic response capacity that should be shared with developing countries.

China’s island-hopping efforts to capture vulnerable Pacific states is a direct strategic threat to U.S. maritime supremacy and homeland security, and USAID and its allied donors should neutralize these efforts through the deployment of targeted assistance such as helping countries combat the effects of China’s ille- gal fishing. While China outpaces the ability of the democratic alliance to deploy state-backed financing to developing countries, it is unable to compete with our collective private-sector capacity to deploy trillions of dollars of capital.


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Pakistan is a prime example of foreign aid policies disconnected from U.S. national interests. The country has been the recipient of more than $12 billion in

U.S. foreign aid since 2010, yet it remains intensely anti-American and corrupt, has backed the Taliban continuously since 2001, jump-started North Korea’s nuclear bomb program, brutalizes its religious minorities, and is a willing client of China while taking on unrepayable loans from the U.S. taxpayer-funded International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

Middle East. The Middle East is far more vulnerable today than it was in 2020 because the Biden Administration’s strategy for the region is adrift. Tunisia has slid into autocracy, Iraq is plummeting further into Iran’s orbit, and U.S. soldiers continue to risk their lives for unclear ends amid the ruins of Syria. Meanwhile, billions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid props up regimes allied with Iran.

President Trump’s Abraham Accords signaled the end of the centrality of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which paralyzed U.S. approaches to the region, and focused instead on Iran as the principal threat to America from this region. During the Trump Administration, USAID’s allocations reflected the new opportunities created by the Accords and sought to strengthen regional alliances against Iran through expanded regional trade and investment and to promote genuine polit- ical stability tethered to strong American leadership. USAID formally partnered with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Morocco, Qatar, and Kuwait to catalyze regional partnerships in Africa. Under the Biden Administration, however, USAID has returned to a model that deepens the region’s dependence on aid.

A new conservative President should reset USAID’s programming in the Middle East in line with our national security interests and committed to the goal of ending the need for foreign aid through development that is led by the private sector. Specifically:

   Foreign aid must advance the Abraham Accords. Increased trade and investment between Israel and its Arab neighbors represent the most effective path toward reducing poverty, fostering the emergence of a middle class, and solidifying peace. USAID should therefore focus its development assistance on countries such as Morocco and Sudan through joint investment collaboration with the more economically advanced economies such as the UAE and Israel.

   USAID should consider cutting aid to states allied to Iran, limiting assistance in these countries to the advancement of narrow strategic priorities and support for basic American values, such as aid to persecuted religious minorities. USAID continues to expend hundreds of millions of dollars in nonhumanitarian aid to antagonistic regimes in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. After billions of dollars of aid and many


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years of effort, these countries remain hopelessly dysfunctional—a fact that exposes the failure of a foreign aid model that is disconnected to our national security and without exit strategies to promote self-reliance. We must admit that USAID’s investments in the education sector, for example, serve no other purpose than to subsidize corrupt, incompetent, and

hostile regimes.

   USAID should undergo operational changes to secure better development outcomes by reducing its missions’ footprints in the Middle East given that most personnel in the region are unable to leave their highly protected and expensive compounds and carry out their oversight functions. It should redirect program funding away from expensive and poorly performing international partners to more cost-effective local entities that require a minimal USAID field presence.

Africa. Since its inception, USAID has had a strong presence in Africa, saving millions of lives through its pandemic and infectious disease responses, especially for malaria and HIV-AIDS. It has led global efforts to provide lifesaving emergency assistance to those who are fleeing conflict and suffering from devastating natural disasters. American generosity knows no equal.

Yet the agency’s efforts to reduce poverty and hunger have failed as it spends ever-higher amounts of aid partnering with a costly and ineffective aid indus- trial complex that has little interest in “working itself out of a job.” Long-term, multibillion-dollar humanitarian responses lack exit strategies, while numer- ous development projects lead neither to measurable results nor to government reforms. Despite the tens of billions of dollars spent, the continent remains poor, unstable, and riven with conflict, corruption, and Islamic terrorism. This situation has also resulted in vast illegal migration from the continent.

Failure to generate wealth has provided opportunities for China to step in and become the continent’s leader in trade, loans, and investment. As a result, Beijing controls most of the continent’s strategic minerals that are critical to advanced technology. Moreover, USAID is criticized by Africans for exporting cultural values that are anathema to their traditional norms, further abetting Chinese continen- tal supremacy.

The Biden Administration’s radical global climate policies have cut off billions in investment to develop clean fossil fuels, denying Africa’s billion-plus people access to cheap energy to further their own development and finance their own social services in health, water, education, and agriculture, while increasing its dependence on China’s renewables industry. It has exacerbated hunger by increas- ing the costs of fertilizers to levels that many African farmers can no longer afford. Poverty-inducing dependence on aid grows daily.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

USAID efforts in Africa require a rethink. In 2025, USAID will update its five- year Country Development and Cooperation Strategies. This will give the next Administration an opportunity to pursue a new development course for Africa that promotes economic self-reliance, catalyzes private-sector solutions for job creation through increased trade and investment, terminates legacy and nonper- forming programs, and supports diversified energy approaches. Critically, it must hold China accountable for its extractive investments that violate international labor, environmental, and anticorruption norms and practices; undercut business opportunities for U.S. companies; and sabotage Africa’s development.

   USAID, in collaboration with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and U.S. Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service, should use its convening power, diplomatic heft, and risk-reducing instruments

to facilitate U.S.–African business relationships and expand Prosper Africa, launched by the Trump Administration to “bring[] together services from across the U.S. Government to help companies and investors do business in

U.S. and African markets.”17

   The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)18 provides Africa duty- free access to U.S. markets. The next Administration should extend AGOA beyond its 2025 term but within a strategic framework that rewards good governance and pro–free market economic policies. There is no point in wasting massive sums of aid to countries whose governments fail to keep their promises to reform.

   USAID should build on, not compete with, private-sector initiatives launched by global churches, corporate philanthropists, and diaspora groups that have already invested billions of dollars in self-reliance– based projects.

Japan has committed $30 billion in aid to Africa over three years to stem China’s economic and political grip on the continent. Gulf-based sovereign funds also are investing billions in African energy, infrastructure, mining, water, food production, information and communications technology, and other strategic industries. Other allied donors are promoting investment-based aid. There is no lack of funding to support Africa’s economic rise. What is lacking is strategic direction among U.S. government foreign aid agencies.

PEPFAR has saved countless lives over the years and constitutes America’s most successful aid program. During the Trump Administration, PEPFAR increased the share of funding to local entities from about 20 percent to nearly 70 percent with


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commensurate improvements that have had lasting impact. The next Administra- tion should extend that localization model to all global health and humanitarian assistance in view of how local African entities have strengthened their capacity for direct management of U.S. programs. Correspondingly, USAID should aggressively ramp down its partnerships with wasteful, costly, and politicized U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and Beltway contractors. All new programs in Africa should build on existing local initiatives that enjoy the support of the African people.

Latin America. U.S. foreign assistance throughout the Western Hemisphere is designed to respond to national security threats that emanate from the region, such as illicit drug and arms trafficking; illegal immigration flows; terrorism; pandemics; and strategic threats from China, Russia, and Iran. Over the past decade, the United States has provided billions of dollars in security, humani- tarian, and development assistance in Central America and the Andes, including

$1 billion in food and non-food emergency aid to millions of Venezuelan refu- gees who have fled the Maduro dictatorship. USAID is always first to respond to natural disasters in Central America and the Caribbean and employs a network of dedicated experts in the region to deliver this assistance. During the COVID pandemic, the United States provided millions of doses of vaccines and other emergency health support.

Yet years of foreign aid have failed to bring peace, prosperity, and stability to the hemisphere. Poverty, joblessness, and social unrest have led to leftist electoral victories from Mexico to Chile. These regimes are hostile to American interests and private enterprise, breed corruption, implement radical policies that will further impoverish their people and threaten their democracies, and are more open to striking partnerships with Communist China. Left-wing authoritarian kleptocra- cies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela deny their people basic freedoms, violently and ruthlessly suppress any dissent, repress communities of faith, and generate such misery that hundreds of thousands of their citizens have attempted to cross our southern border over the past two years. No recent Administration has made any progress in reducing the chaos and desperation in Haiti.

Conversely, Latin America is a major global source of energy and food, which generates substantial income that can finance internal social and economic devel- opment. The nations of the hemisphere share a natural and massive geographic trade and investment advantage through their proximity to the United States, supplemented by free-trade agreements. The United States remains the favored destination for higher education and business opportunities for Latin Americans. Successful diasporas in the United States serve as powerful economic, cultural, and political bridges to every country in the region.

The Trump Administration focused on promoting trade and investment, especially in infrastructure, through an interagency effort called América Crece (America Grows), by which USAID played a key role in providing technical


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

assistance to create a more enabling environment to attract private investment. The Biden Administration canceled the program.

The next conservative Administration should reassess all programs of U.S. for- eign aid to Latin America and terminate those that have failed to achieve results after years of effort. Instead, USAID should:

   Focus its resources on strengthening the fundamentals of free markets, such as clear property rights and a functioning judiciary, and on promoting labor and pension reforms, lower taxes, and deregulation in order to increase trade and investment within the region and with the United States as the genuine path to economic and political stability.

   Challenge the socialist ideas that have captured too many of the region’s governments and their nations’ youth.

   Fund partnerships with the private sector and support civil-society groups, including university centers and think tanks that advocate for pro–free market and democratic ideas.

Finally, Latin America is the perfect proving ground for reducing USAID’s reli- ance on large U.S.-based implementers, and the agency should commit to shifting all of its portfolio in the region to local organizations by 2030.

 

PERSONNEL

The Trump Administration agenda for USAID was undercut from the outset both by recalcitrant career personnel and by inexperienced political personnel. The next conservative Administration should implement personnel policies from the beginning so that the agency can be effectively managed according to high stan- dards. The rapid deployment of reforms will require key experienced personnel installed quickly at USAID’s headquarters and missions. Delay will only impede progress. In general, areas of focus should be appointing effective lawyers in key positions, reforming career hiring/firing mechanisms, and getting a grip on the grantmaking process.

The Administration should staff the Office of the General Counsel with at least four politically appointed attorneys (besides the General Counsel). The General Counsel should have two political deputies, one of whom should cover Human Capital and Talent Management (HCTM) and the other the Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA).

The Administration should name a political appointee with long experience in federal personnel systems as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer and Director of HCTM. This appointee would help to scope and shepherd position descriptions,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

clearances, and other components of the hiring process that are necessary for immediate onboarding while coordinating with the White House to bring in new appointees and make internal career employee changes. On Day One, USAID should halt all agencywide training and replace it with training modules to advance the President’s agenda.

The Administration should appoint a Senior Accountable Official (SAO) to report on the agency’s adherence to Administration policy priorities, including on Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance, critical race theory, climate change, gender, and diversity and inclusion. It should also create a program to staff hard-to-fill positions overseas.

Finally, the Administration should create a recruiting program for veterans and other groups to participate in career job opportunities at USAID. Former mis- sionaries, veterans, members of diasporas, and faith community stakeholders with overseas experience should be recruited to work at USAID on Schedule A appoint- ments, as Institutional Services Contractors, as Personal Services Contractors, and as Foreign Service Officers.

 

CONCLUSION

The next conservative Administration will have a unique opportunity to realign

U.S. foreign assistance with American national interests and the principles of good governance and more accurately reflect the U.S. taxpayer’s unmatched charita- ble desire to help those in need. It can build on a strong baseline of conservative reforms undertaken by the Trump Administration to counter Communist China’s strategy of world domination. However, this will require that bold steps are taken on Day One to undo the gross misuse of foreign aid by the current Administration to promote a radical ideology that is politically divisive at home and harms our global standing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Dr. William Steiger, Bethany Kozma, and Dr. Alma Golden deserve special mention. The author assumes full responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed therein should be attributed to any other individual.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                S. 1983, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law No. 87-195, 87th Congress, September 4, 1961, https://www.

govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg424-2.pdf (accessed January 19, 2023).

2.                U.S. Agency or International Development, “Journey to Self-Reliance Fact Sheet,” June 3, 2020, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1870/journey-self-reliance-fact-sheet#:~:text=WHAT%20 IS%20THE%20JOURNEY%20TO%20SELF-RELIANCE%3F%20USAID%20is,greater%20

developmentoutcomesandworktowardatimewhenforeignassistanceisnolongernecessary.%20 It%E2%80%99s%20called%20the%20Journey%20to%20Self-Reliance (accessed March 17, 2023).

3.                News release, “U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Mark Green’s Interview with

C-Span’s ‘Newsmakers’ Host Susan Swain and Washington Post’s Carl Morello and Wall Street Journal’s Ben Kesling,” U.S. Agency for International Development, November 26, 2018, https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/news- information/press-releases/nov-26-2018-administrator-mark-green-interview-cspan-newsmakers (accessed March 17, 2023).

4.                 U.S. Agency for International Development, Digital Strategy 2020–2024, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-05/USAID_Digital_Strategy.pdf.pdf://www.usaid.gov/digital-development/usaid-digital-strategy (accessed March 17, 2023).

5.                “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” declassified in part by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. O’Brien, January 5, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp- content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023), and Robert C. O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” January 5, 2021, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).

6.                News Release, “Fact Sheet: Prioritizing Climate in Foreign Policy and National Security,” The White House, October 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/21/fact-sheet-

prioritizing-climate-in-foreign-policy-and-national-security/ (accessed January 28, 2023).

7.                 U.S. Agency for International Development, Climate Strategy 2020–2030, April 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/ sites/default/files/2022-11/USAID-Climate-Strategy-2022-2030.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).

8.                Adva Saldinger, “USAID Steps Up ‘Languishing’ Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Effort,” Devex.com, December 15, 2021, http://www.devex.com/news/usaid-steps-up-languishing-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-

effort-102316 (accessed January 28, 2021).

9.                U.S. Agency for International Development, “Gender Equity and Women Empowerment,” https://www.usaid. gov/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment (accessed January 30, 2023).

10.           U.S. Agency for International Development, “Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle,” ADS Chapter 25, partial revision date January 22, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-12/205.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).

11.           S. 137, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/137#:~:text=Protecting%20Life%20in%20Foreign%20 Assistance%20Act.%20This%20bill,support%20for%20an%20entity%20that%20conducts%20 such%20activities (accessed January 20, 2023), and H.R. 534, Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance

Act, 117th Congress, introduced January 28, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house- bill/534?s=1&r=450 (accessed January 20, 2023).

12.          President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Memorandum on Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad,” Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, The White House, January 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandum-

on-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/ (accessed March 18, 2023).

13.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13926, “Advancing International Religious Freedom,” June 2, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 109 (June 5, 2020), pp. 34951–34953, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/

FR-2020-06-05/pdf/2020-12430.pdf (accessed January 20, 2023).

14.           22 Code of Federal Regulations § 205.1, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-II/part-205 (accessed March 18, 2023).

15.           Contributor’s notes from internal USAID meetings.


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16.           President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13957, “Creating Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” October 21, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 207 (October 26, 2020), pp. 67631–67635, https://www.govinfo.gov/

content/pkg/FR-2020-10-26/pdf/2020-23780.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).

17.           Prosper Africa, “Increasing Trade & Investment Between the U.S. and African Countries,” https://www. prosperafrica.gov/ (accessed March 18, 2023).

18.           H.R. 434, Trade and Development Act of 2000, Public Law 106-200, 106th Congress, May 18, 2000, Title I, Subtitle A, https://agoa.info/images/documents/2385/AGOA_legal_text.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023).


 


Section Three

 

 

 

 

THE GENERAL WELFARE

 

 

W

 
hen our Founders wrote in the Constitution that the federal government would “promote the general Welfare,” they could not have fathomed a massive bureaucracy that would someday spend $3 trillion in a single

year—roughly the sum, combined, spent by the departments covered in this section in 2022. Approximately half of that colossal sum was spent by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) alone—the belly of the massive behemoth that is the modern administrative state.

HHS is home to Medicare and Medicaid, the principal drivers of our $31 trillion national debt. When Congress passed and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law these programs, they were set on autopilot with no plan for how to pay for them. The first year that Medicare spending was visible on the books was 1967. From that point on through 2020—according to the American Main Street Initia- tive’s analysis of official federal tallies—Medicare and Medicaid combined cost $17.8 trillion, while our combined federal deficits over that same span were $17.9 trillion. In essence, our deficit problem is a Medicare and Medicaid problem.

HHS is also home to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the duo most responsible—along with President Joe Biden—for the irrational, destructive, un-American mask and vaccine mandates that were imposed upon an ostensibly free people during the COVID-19 pandemic. All along, it was clear from randomized controlled trials— the gold standard of medical research—that masks provide little to no benefit in preventing the spread of viruses and might even be counterproductive. Yet the CDC ignored these high-quality RCTs, cherry-picked from politically malleable


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

“observational studies,” and declared that everyone except children and infants below the age of two should don masks. Under COVID, as former director of HHS’s Office of Civil Rights Roger Severino writes in Chapter 14, the CDC exposed itself as “perhaps the most incompetent and arrogant agency in the federal government.” Nor is the CDC the only villain in this play. Severino writes of the National Institutes of Health, “Despite its popular image as a benign science agency, NIH was responsible for paying for research in aborted baby body parts, human animal chimera experiments”—in which the genes of humans and animals are mixed, “and gain-of-function viral research that may have been responsible for COVID-19.” Severino writes that “Anthony Fauci’s division of the NIH”—the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—“owns half the patent for the Moderna COVID- 19 vaccine,” and “several NIH employees” receive “up to $150,000 annually from Moderna vaccine sales.” That would be the same experimental mRNA vaccine that the CDC now wants to force on children, who are at little to no risk from COVID-19

but at great risk from public health officials.

The incestuous relationship between the NIH, CDC, and vaccine makers—with all of the conflict of interest it entails—cannot be allowed to continue, and the revolving door between them must be locked. As Severino writes, “Funding for scientific research should not be controlled by a small group of highly paid and unaccountable insiders at the NIH, many of whom stay in power for decades. The NIH monopoly on directing research should be broken.” What’s more, NIH has long “been at the forefront in pushing junk gender science.” The next HHS secretary should immediately put an end to the department’s foray into woke transgen- der activism.

HHS also pushes abortion as a form of “health care,” skirting and sometimes blatantly defying the Hyde Amendment in the process. Severino writes that the “FDA should…reverse its approval of chemical abortion drugs because the polit- icized approval process was illegal from the start.” In addition, HHS programs often violate the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of conscience-protection laws. Severino writes that the HHS “Secretary should pursue a robust agenda to pro- tect the fundamental right to life, protect conscience rights, and uphold bodily integrity rooted in biological realities, not ideology.” The next secretary should also reverse the Biden Administration’s focus on “‘LGBTQ+ equity,’ subsidizing single-motherhood, disincentivizing work, and penalizing marriage,” replacing such policies with those encouraging marriage, work, motherhood, fatherhood, and nuclear families.

If there is another department that has gone off the rails like HHS during the Obama and Biden Administrations, it is the once proud Department of Justice (DOJ). As former counselor to the attorney general Gene Hamilton writes in Chap- ter 17, the department “has a long and noble history”—Edmund Randolph, the first attorney general, took office the same year as President Washington—yet its


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longstanding reputation has been marred by the Biden Administration’s abuse of the department’s powers for its own ends. Hamilton writes that the department’s “unprecedented politicization and weaponization” under Biden and Attorney General Merrick Garland, resulting in “politically motivated and viewpoint-based prosecutions” of political enemies and indifference to the crimes of political allies, has made the department “a threat to the Republic.” The most important thing for the next attorney general to do is to refocus the department on its core functions of “protecting public safety and defending the rule of law,” while restoring its “values of independence, impartiality, honesty, integrity, respect, and excellence.”

This is especially true of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). A bloated, arrogant, increasingly lawless organization, especially at the top, “the FBI views itself as an independent agency” that is “on par with the Attorney General,” rather than as an agency that is under the AG and fully accountable to him or her. To rein in this “completely out of control” bureau and remind it of its place within—rather than at the top of—the DOJ hierarchy, Hamilton writes that the FBI’s separate Office of General Counsel (with “approximately 300 attorneys”), separate Office of Legislative Affairs, and separate Office of Public Affairs should all be abolished. Requiring the FBI to get its legal advice from the wider department “would serve as a crucial check on an agency that has recently pushed past legal boundary after legal boundary.” Indeed, Hamilton writes, “[t]he next conservative Administra- tion should eliminate any offices within the FBI that it has the power to eliminate without any action from Congress.”

Elsewhere, DOJ should target violent and career criminals, not parents; work to dismantle criminal organizations, partly by rigorously prosecuting interstate drug activity; and restart the Trump Administration’s “China Initiative” (to address Chinese espionage and theft of trade secrets), which the Biden Administration “ter- minated…largely out of a concern for poor ‘optics.’” It should also enforce existing federal law that prohibits mailing abortifacients, rather than harassing pro-life demonstrators; respect the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech, rather than trying to police speech on the internet; and enforce federal immigra- tion laws, rather than pretending there is no border.

In contrast to DOJ’s long history, the Department of Education (the depart- ment, or ED), discussed by Lindsey Burke in Chapter 11, is a creation of the Jimmy Carter Administration. The department is a convenient one-stop shop for the woke education cartel, which—as the COVID era showed—is not particularly concerned with children’s education. Schools should be responsive to parents, rather than to leftist advocates intent on indoctrination—and the more the federal government is involved in education, the less responsive to parents the public schools will be. This department is an example of federal intrusion into a traditionally state and local realm. For the sake of American children, Congress should shutter it and return control of education to the states.


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Short of this, the Secretary of Education should insist that the department serve parents and American ideals, not advocates whose message is that children can choose their own sex, that America is “systemically racist,” that math itself is racist, and that Martin Luther King, Jr.’s ideal of a colorblind society should be rejected in favor of reinstating a color-conscious society. The next head of this department will have a lot to do—hopefully culminating in the department’s closure and the salutary restoration of educational control to states, localities, and parents.

The next Secretary of Energy will similarly have much work to do. Under the next President, the Department of Energy should end the Biden Administration’s unprovoked war on fossil fuels, restore America’s energy independence, oppose eyesore windmills built at taxpayer expense, and respect the right of Americans to buy and drive cars of their own choosing, rather than trying to force them into electric vehicles and eventually out of the driver’s seat altogether in favor of self-driving robots. As former commissioner of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Bernard L. McNamee says in Chapter 12, “A conservative President must be committed to unleashing all of America’s energy resources and making the energy economy serve the American people, not special interests.”

In Chapter 10, Daren Bakst writes that the Biden Administration’s Department of Agriculture claims to be “transforming the food system as we know it.” But the government “does not need to transform the food system”; instead, “it should respect American farmers, truckers,” and families. In Chapter 13, former chief of staff at the Environmental Protection Agency Mandy Gunasekara writes that the EPA’s “current activities and staffing levels far exceed its congressional mandates and purpose,” whereas its “initial success” in its “infancy” (in the 1970s) was a product of “clear mandates, a streamlined structure, [and] recognition of the states’ prominent role.” Having since become a “coercive” agency, full of embedded activ- ists, its “structure and mission should be greatly circumscribed.”

Former secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Dr. Benjamin S. Carson writes in Chapter 15 that HUD is beset with “mission creep” and regularly crosses the line into exercising quasi-legislative powers. In the next Administration, it should refocus on its core duties and keep “noncitizens…from living in federally assisted housing,” provide enhanced “oversight of foreign own- ership of [U.S.] real estate,” and “reinvigorate paths to upward economic mobility” and economic “self-sufficiency.” In Chapter 18, former acting assistant secretary of policy at the Department of Labor Jonathan Berry writes that the department and related agencies should pursue pro-family, pro-worker policies to help “restore the family-supporting job as the centerpiece of the American economy,” in lieu of the current Administration’s “left-wing social-engineering agenda”—“the most assertive” in history—which empowers race, gender, and climate-change activists at the expense of American workers.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

In Chapter 19, on the Department of Transportation (DOT), former DOT deputy assistant director for research and technology Diana Furchtgott-Roth writes, “In pursuit of an anti-fossil-fuel climate agenda never approved by Congress, the Biden Administration has raised fuel economy requirements to levels that cannot real- istically be met” by most gas-powered cars, thereby reducing Americans’ freedom while increasing costs. Lastly, former acting chief of staff at the Department of Veterans Affairs Brooks D. Tucker, echoing concerns expressed in other chapters, writes in Chapter 20 that the Veterans Affairs (VA) must be “accountable to the needs and problems of veterans, not subservient to the parochial preferences of the bureaucracy.”


 


10

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Daren Bakst

 

A

merican farmers efficiently and safely produce food to meet the needs of individuals around the globe. Because of the innovation and resilience of the nation’s farmers, American agriculture is a model for the world. If

farmers are allowed to operate without unnecessary government intervention, American agriculture will continue to flourish, producing plentiful, safe, nutritious, and affordable food.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) can and should play a limited role, with much of its focus on removing governmental barriers that hinder food pro- duction or otherwise undermine efforts to meet consumer demand. The USDA should recognize what should be self-evident: Agricultural production should first and foremost be focused on efficiently producing safe food.

This chapter provides important background on the USDA and identifies many of the USDA-specific issues that will be faced by an incoming Administration. It provides specific recommendations for the next Administration about how to address these issues and lays out a conservative vision for what the USDA should look like in the future.

 

MISSION STATEMENT

The current mission statement as stated by the Biden Administration highlights the broad scope of the USDA:

 

To serve all Americans by providing effective, innovative, science-based public policy leadership in agriculture, food and nutrition, natural resource


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

protection and management, rural development, and related issues with a commitment to delivering equitable and climate smart opportunities that inspire and help America thrive.1

 

The first part of the mission statement regarding the issues covered is not new to the Biden Administration; it reflects the overly broad nature of the USDA’s work. However, the language bringing in equity and climate change is new to the Biden Administration and part of the USDA’s express effort to transform agricultural production.2

The USDA’s new vision statement illuminates the focus of this effort:

 

An equitable and climate smart food and agriculture economy that protects and improves the health, nutrition and quality of life of all Americans, yields healthy land, forests and clean water, helps rural America thrive, and feeds the world.3

 

This effort is one of a federal central plan to put climate change and envi- ronmental issues ahead of the most important requirements of agriculture—to efficiently produce safe food. The USDA would apparently use its power to change the very nature of the food and agriculture economy into one that is “equitable and climate smart.” As an initial matter, the USDA should not try to control and shape the economy, but should instead remove obstacles that hinder food production. Further, it should not place ancillary issues, such as environmental issues, ahead of agricultural production itself.

A Proper Mission Statement. Even before the Biden Administration’s rad- ical effort to reshape the USDA’s work, the USDA’s mission was and is too broad, including serving as a major welfare agency through implementation of programs such as food stamps. This far-reaching mission is not the fault of the USDA, but of Congress, which has given the department its extensive power.

Congress must limit the USDA’s role. A proper mission would clarify that the department’s primary focus is on agriculture and that the USDA serves all Amer- icans. The USDA’s “client” is the American people in general, not a subset of interests, such as farmers, meatpackers, environmental groups, etc.

Within this agricultural focus, the USDA should develop and disseminate information and research (the historical role of the USDA); identify and address concrete threats to public health and safety arising directly from food and agri- culture; remove unjustified foreign trade barriers blocking market access for American agricultural goods; and generally remove government barriers that undermine access to safe and affordable food across the food supply chain.

Core principles should be included within any mission statement, including a recognition that farmers, and the food system in general, should be free from unnecessary government intervention. Further, there should be clear statements


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

about the importance of sound science to inform the USDA’s work and respect for personal freedom and individual dietary choices, private property rights, and the rule of law.

Taking these factors into account, below is a model USDA mission statement:

 

To develop and disseminate agricultural information and research, identify and address concrete public health and safety threats directly connected to food and agriculture, and remove both unjustified foreign trade barriers for U.S. goods and domestic government barriers that undermine access to safe and affordable food absent a compelling need—all based on the importance of sound science, personal freedom, private property, the rule of law, and service to all Americans.

 

OVERVIEW

In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the legislation that created the USDA.4 The department had a very narrow mission focused on the dissemi- nation of information connected to agriculture and “to procure, propagate and distribute among the people new valuable seeds and plants.”5 During the last 160 years, the scope of the USDA’s work has expanded well beyond that narrow mis- sion—and well beyond agriculture itself. In addition to being a distributor of farm subsidies, the USDA runs the food stamp program and other food-related wel- fare programs and covers issues including conservation, biofuels, forestry, and rural programs.

Based on the USDA’s fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget summary, outlays are esti- mated at $261 billion: $221 billion for mandatory programs and $39 billion for discretionary programs.6 These outlays are broken down as follows: nutrition assis- tance (70 percent); farm, conservation, and commodity programs (14 percent); “all other,” which includes rural development, research, food safety, marketing and regulatory, and departmental management (11 percent); and forestry (5 percent).7 The USDA has provided a summary of its size, explaining, “Today, USDA is com- prised of 29 agencies organized under eight Mission Areas and 16 Staff Offices, with nearly 100,000 employees serving the American people at more than 6,000

locations across the country and abroad.”8

 

MAJOR PRIORITY ISSUES AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

For an incoming Administration, there are numerous issues that should be addressed at the USDA. This chapter identifies and discusses many of the most important issues. The initial issues discussed should be priority issues for the next Administration:

Defend American Agriculture. It is deeply unfortunate that the first issue identified must be a willingness of the incoming Administration to defend Amer- ican agriculture, but this is precisely what the top priority for that Administration


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

should be. As previously discussed, the Biden Administration is seeking to use the federal government to transform the American food system.9 The USDA web site explains:

 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), alongside Biden–Harris Administration leadership and the people of this great country, has embarked on another historic journey: transforming the food system as we know it— from farm to fork, and at every stage along the supply chain.10

 

The federal government does not need to transform the food system or develop a national plan to intervene across the supply chain. Instead, it should respect American farmers, truckers, and everyone who makes the food supply chain so resilient and successful. One of the important lessons learned during the COVID- 19 pandemic was how critical it is to remove barriers in the food supply chain—not to increase them.

The Biden Administration’s centrally planned transformational effort mini- mizes the importance of efficient agricultural production and instead places issues such as climate change and equity front and center. The USDA’s Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2022–2026 identifies six strategic goals, the first three of which focus on issues such as climate change, renewable energy, and systemic racism. In the Secretary of Agriculture’s message, there is only one mention of affordable food— and nothing about efficient production and the incredible innovation and respect for the environment that already exists within the agricultural community.11

The Biden Administration’s USDA strongly supported12 the recent United Nations (U.N.) Food Systems Summit. According to the USDA:

The stated goal of the Food Systems Summit was to transform the way the world produces, consumes and thinks about foods within the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to meet the challenges of poverty, food security, malnutrition, population growth, climate change, and natural resource degradation.13

Not unlike those who oppose reliable and affordable energy production, there is a disdain, especially by some on the Left, for American agriculture and the food system.14 The Biden Administration’s vision of a federal government developing a plan that “fixes” agriculture and focuses on issues secondary to food production is very disturbing.

A recent USDA-created program captures both the disrespect for American farmers and the Biden Administration’s effort to dictate agricultural practices. The USDA explained that it was concerned with farmers not transitioning to organic farming, and therefore announced that it will dedicate $300 million to


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

induce farmers to adopt organic farming.15 There was no recognition that farmers know how to farm better than D.C. politicians16 or a that organic food is expensive17 and land-intensive.18 The Biden Administration has also been pushing so-called “climate-smart”19 agricultural practices which received additional support in the partisan Inflation Reduction Act.20

American agriculture should not need defending. According to the USDA’s latest data, farm output nearly tripled (a 175 percent increase) from 1948 to 2019, while the amount of land farmed decreased. In fact, as farm output increased by 175 percent, all agricultural inputs increased by only 4 percent.21

In 2021, despite high food prices—a major problem and regressive—Ameri- can consumers spent an average of about 10 percent of their personal disposable income on food, which is close to historic lows. For decades, this share has been in decline.22 America’s farmers efficiently produce food using fewer resources, making it possible for food to be affordable. This reality is not only something that should be defended but also touted as a prime example of what makes American agricul- ture so successful. The connection between efficiency and affordability seems lost in the Biden Administration’s effort to transform the food system.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Proactively Defend Agriculture. From the outset, the next Administration should: Denounce efforts to place ancillary issues like climate change ahead of food productivity and affordability when it comes to agriculture.

   Remove the U.S. from any association with U.N. and other efforts to push sustainable-development schemes connected to food production.

   Defend American agriculture and advance the critical importance of efficient and innovative food production, especially to advance safe and affordable food.

   Stress that ideal policy should remove obstacles imposed on American farmers and individuals across the food supply chain so that they can meet the food needs of Americans.

   Clarify the critical importance of efficiency to food affordability, and why a failure to recognize this fact especially hurts low-income households who spend a disproportionate share of after-tax income on food compared to higher-income households.23

To accomplish these objectives, a new Administration should announce its principles through an executive order, the USDA should remove all references


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

to transforming the food system on its web site and other department-dis- seminated material, and it should expressly and regularly communicate the principles informing the objectives listed above, as well as promote these prin- ciples through legislative efforts. The USDA should also carefully review existing efforts that involve inappropriately imposing its preferred agricultural practices onto farmers.

Address the Abuse of CCC Discretionary Authority. With the exception of federal crop insurance, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is generally the means by which agricultural-related farm bill programs are funded. The CCC is a funding mechanism, which, in simple terms, has $30 billion a year at its disposal.24 Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (Charter Act)25 gives the Secretary of Agriculture broad discretionary authority to spend “unused” CCC money. However, in general, past Agriculture Secretaries have not used this power to any meaningful extent. This changed dramatically during the Trump Administration, when this discretionary authority was used to fund $28 billion in “trade aid” to farmers, consisting primarily of the Market Facilitation Program.

In 2020, this authority was used for $20.5 billion in food purchases and income subsidies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.26

At the time, critics warned that this use of the CCC, which in effect created a USDA slush fund, would lead future Administrations to abuse the CCC, such as by pushing climate-change policies.27 Predictably, this is precisely what the Biden Administration has done, using the discretionary authority to create programs out of whole cloth, arguably without statutory authority,28 for what it refers to as climate-smart agricultural practices.29

The merits of the various programs funded through the CCC discretionary authority is not the focus of this discussion. The major problem is that the Secre- tary of Agriculture is empowered to use a slush fund. Billions of dollars are being used for programs that Congress never envisioned or intended.

Concern about this type of abuse is not new. In fact, from 2012 to 2017, Congress expressly limited the Agriculture Secretary’s discretionary spending authority under the Charter Act.30 And this was before the recent massive discretionary CCC spending occurred.

The use of the discretionary power is a separation of powers problem, with Congress abrogating its spending power. This power is ripe for abuse—as could be expected with any slush fund—and it is a possible way to get around the farm bill process to achieve policy goals not secured during the legislative process.

The next Administration should:

   Refrain from using section 5 discretionary authority. The USDA can address this abuse on its own by following the lead of most Administrations and not using this discretionary authority.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   Promote legislative fixes to address abuse. Ideally, Congress would repeal the Secretary’s discretionary authority under section 5 of the Charter Act. There is no reason to maintain such authority. If Congress needs to spend money to assist farmers, it has legislative tools, including the farm bill and the annual appropriations process, to do so in a timely fashion. While not an ideal solution, Congress could also amend the Charter Act to require prior congressional approval through duly enacted legislation before any money is spent.

At a minimum, Congress should amend the Charter Act to:

   Limit spending to directly help farmers and ranchers address issues due to unforeseen events not already covered by existing programs and that constitute genuine emergencies that must be addressed immediately.

   Prohibit the CCC from being used to assist parties beyond farmers and ranchers.

   Clarify that spending is only to address problems that are temporary in nature and ensure that funding is targeted to address such problems.

   Tighten the discretion within section 5 and identify ways for improper application of the Charter Act to be challenged in court.

Reform Farm Subsidies. Too often, agricultural policy becomes synonymous with farm subsidy policy. This is unfortunate, because making them synony- mous fails to recognize that agricultural policy covers a wide range of issues, including issues that are outside the proper scope of the USDA, such as environ- mental regulation.

However, there is no question that farm subsidies are an important issue within agricultural policy that should be addressed by any incoming Adminis- tration. There are several principles that even subsidy supporters would likely agree upon, including the need to reduce market distortions. Subsidies should not influence planting decisions, discourage proper risk management and innovation, incentivize planting on environmentally sensitive land, or create barriers to entry for new farmers. Farm subsidies can lead to these market distortions and there- fore, it would hardly be controversial to ensure that any subsidy scheme should be designed to avoid such problems.

The overall goal should be to eliminate subsidy dependence. Despite what might be conventional wisdom, many farmers receive few to no subsidies,31 with most subsidies going to only a handful of commodities. According to the Congres- sional Research Service (CRS), from 2014 to 2016, 94 percent of farm program


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

support went to just six commodities—corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, soybeans, and wheat—that together account for only 28 percent of farm receipts.32 Although many farmers do not receive much in the way of subsidies, especially those in the areas of livestock and specialty crops (fruit, vegetable, and nuts),33 there are still a sig- nificant number of farmers growing row crops like corn and cotton that do receive significant farm subsidies.

The primary subsidy programs include the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) program,34 the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program,35 and the federal crop insur- ance program.36 Farmers can participate on a crop-by-crop basis in the ARC program or the PLC program. These programs cover about 20 different crops.37 The ARC program protects farmers from what are referred to as “shallow” losses, pro- viding payments when their actual revenues fall below 86 percent of the expected revenues for their crops.38 The PLC program provides payments to farmers when commodity prices fall below a fixed, statutorily established reference price.39

The federal crop insurance program is broader in scope than ARC and PLC, and in crop year 2019 covered 124 commodities.40 Farmers pay a portion of a premium to participate in the program. Taxpayers on average pay about 60 per- cent41 of the premium. As explained by CRS, “Revenue Protection was the most frequently purchased policy type in 2019, accounting for almost 70 [percent] of policies purchased.”42

While there are certainly other subsidy programs besides ARC, PLC, and federal crop insurance, one program that deserves special mention is the federal sugar program. This program, unlike most other subsidy programs, intentionally tries to restrict supply43 and thereby drives up prices. The program costs consumers as much as $3.7 billion a year.44

When it comes to reforming subsidy programs, the next Administration will primarily have to look to legislative solutions. The next Administration should champion legislation that would:

   Repeal the federal sugar program. The federal government should not be in the central planning business, and the sugar program is a prime

example of harmful central planning. Its very purpose is to limit the sugar supply in order to increase prices. The program has a regressive effect, since lower-income households spend more of their money to meet food needs compared to higher income households.45

   Ideally, repeal the ARC and PLC programs. Farmers eligible to participate in ARC or PLC are generally already able to purchase federal crop insurance, policies that protect against shortfalls in expected revenue whether caused by lower prices or smaller harvests. The ARC program is especially egregious because farmers are being protected from shallow


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

losses, which is another way of saying minor dips in expected revenue. This is hardly consistent with the concept of providing a safety net to help farmers when they fall on hard times. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in one of its options to reduce the federal deficit, has once again identified repealing all Title I farm programs, including ARC, PLC, and the federal sugar program.46

 

   Stop paying farmers twice for price and revenue losses during the same year. Farmers can receive support from the ARC or PLC programs and the federal crop insurance program to cover price declines and revenue shortfalls during the same year. Congress should prohibit this duplication by prohibiting farmers from receiving an ARC or PLC payment the same year they receive a crop insurance indemnity.

   Reduce the premium subsidy rate for crop insurance. On average, taxpayers cover about 60 percent47 of the premium cost for policies purchased in the federal crop insurance program. One of the most widely supported and bipartisan policy reforms is to reduce the premium subsidy that taxpayers are forced to pay.48 At a minimum, taxpayers should not pay more than 50 percent of the premium. After all, taxpayers should not have to pay more than the farmers who benefit from the crop insurance policies.

CBO has found that reducing the premium subsidy to 47 percent would save $8.1 billion over 10 years and have little impact on crop insurance participation or on the number of covered acres.49 In that analysis, there would be a reduction in insured acres of just one-half of 1 percent, and only 1.5 percent of acres would have lower coverage levels. 50 This reform is basically all benefit with little to no cost. In its recently released report identifying options to reduce the federal deficit, CBO found that reducing

the premium subsidy to 40 percent would save $20.9 billion over 10 years.51 Beyond these legislative reforms, the next Administration should:

   Communicate to Congress the necessity of transparency and a genuine reform process. The White House and the USDA should make it very clear that the farm bill process, including reform of farm subsidies, must be con- ducted through an open process with time for mark-up and the opportunity for changes to be made outside the Agriculture Committee process.

The farm bill too often is developed behind closed doors and without any chance for real reform. The White House, given the power of the bully pulpit,


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

must demand a genuine reform process and express unwavering support for a USDA that shapes a safety net that considers the interests of farmers, while also remembering the interests of taxpayers and consumers. Any safety net for farmers should be a true safety net—one that helps farmers when they have experienced serious unforeseen losses (preferably when there has been a disaster or unforeseen natural event causing damage) and that exists to help them in unusual situations.

 

   Separate the agricultural provisions of the farm bill from the nutrition provisions. To have genuine reform and proper consideration of the issues, agricultural programs should be considered in separate legislation distinct from food stamps and the nutrition part of the farm bill, and reauthorization of such programs should be fixed on different timelines to ensure this separation. Agricultural and nutritional programs, which are distinct from each other, have been combined together for political reasons, something which is readily admitted by proponents of this logrolling. When it comes to American agriculture and welfare programs, they deserve sound policy debates, not political tactics at the expense of thoughtful discourse.

Move the Work of the Food and Nutrition Service. The USDA implements many means-tested federal support programs, including the largest food assis- tance program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known as food stamps), and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Food Program. The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) oversees these programs and other food and nutrition programs, including the Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion,52 which handles the USDA’s work on the “Dietary Guidelines for Americans” (Dietary Guidelines).53 Food nutrition programs include: SNAP; WIC; the National School Lunch Program (NSLP); the School Breakfast Program (SBP); the Child and Adult Care Food Program; the Nutrition Program for the Elderly; Nutrition Service Incentives; the Summer Food Service Program; the Commodity Supplemental Food Program; the Temporary Emergency Food Program; the Farmer’s Market Nutrition Program; and the Spe- cial Milk Program.

The next Administration should:

 

   Move the USDA food and nutrition programs to the Department of Health and Human Services. There are more than 89 current means- tested welfare programs, and total means-tested spending has been estimated to surpass $1.2 trillion between federal and state resources.54 Because means-tested federal programs are siloed and administered in separate agencies, the effectiveness and size of the welfare state remains


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

largely hidden. There are means-tested food-support programs in the USDA (specially FNS), whereas most means-tested programs are at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). All means-tested anti- poverty programs should be overseen by one department—specifically HHS, which handles most welfare programs.

Reform SNAP. Ostensibly, SNAP sends money through electronic-bene- fit-transfer (EBT) cards to help “low-income” individuals buy food. It is the largest of the federal nutrition programs. Food stamps are designed to be supplemented by other forms of income—whether through paid employment or nonprofit support. SNAP serves 41.1 million individuals—an increase of 4.3 million people during the Biden years.55 In 2020, the food stamp program cost $79.1 billion. That number continued to rise—by 2022, outlays hit $119.5 billion.56

The next Administration should:

   Re-implement work requirements. The statutory language covering food stamps allows states to waive work requirements that otherwise apply to work-capable individuals—that is, adult beneficiaries between the ages 18 and 50 who are not disabled and do not have any children or other dependents in the home.57

Even in a strong economy, work expectations are fairly limited: Individuals who are work-capable and without dependents are required to work or prepare for work for 20 hours per week.58 The work requirements are then implemented unless the state requests a waiver from the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services.59 Waivers from statutory work requirements can be approved in two instances: an unemployment rate of more than 10 percent or a lack of sufficient jobs.60

The Trump Administration bolstered USDA work expectations in the food stamp program. In February 2019, FNS issued a modest regulatory change that applied only to able-bodied individuals without dependents—

beneficiaries aged 18 to 49, not elderly or disabled, who did not have children or other dependents in the home (ABAWD).61 The FNS rule changed

when a state could receive a waiver from implementing the ABAWD work requirement.

Under the new rule, in order to waive the work requirement, the state’s unemployment rate had to be above 6 percent for more than 24 months. The rule also defined “area” in such a way that states would be unable to combine non-contiguous counties in order to maximize their waivers.62 Of


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

the more than 40 million food stamp beneficiaries, the Trump rule would have applied only to 688,000 individuals in fiscal year 2021.63

The Trump reform was scheduled to go into effect, but a D.C. district court federal judge enjoined the rule.64 The USDA filed an appeal in late December 2020,65 but the Biden Administration withdrew from defending the challenge, and the rule was never implemented.66

Beyond the able-bodied work requirement, FNS should implement better regulation to clarify options for states to implement the general work requirement. This requirement is an option states can apply to work- capable beneficiaries aged 16 to 59. If beneficiaries’ work hours are below 30 hours a week, states can implement the general work requirements to

oblige beneficiaries to register for work or participate in SNAP Employment and Training or workfare assigned by the state SNAP agency.67 Increased clarity for states would include items like states being required to offer employment and training spots for those that request them—not simply budgeting for every currently enrolled able-bodied adult.

   Reform broad-based categorical eligibility. Federal law permits states to enroll individuals in food stamps if they receive a benefit from another program, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. However, under an administrative option in TANF called broad- based categorical eligibility (BBCE), ”benefit” is defined so broadly that it includes simply receiving distributed pamphlets and 1–800 numbers.68 This definition, with its low threshold to trigger a “benefit,” allows individuals to bypass eligibility limits—particularly the asset requirement (how much the applicant has in resources, such as bank accounts or property).69 Adopting the BBCE option has even allowed millionaires to enroll in the food

stamp program.70

The Trump Administration proposed to close the loophole with a rule

to “increase program integrity and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.”71 The regulation was not finalized before the end of the Trump Administration.

   Re-evaluate the Thrifty Food Plan. In a dramatic overreach, the Biden Administration unilaterally increased food stamp benefits by at least 23 percent in October 2021.72 Through an update to the Thrifty Food Plan, in which the USDA analyzes a basket of foods intended to provide a nutritious diet, the USDA increased food stamp outlays by between $250 billion and

$300 billion over 10 years.73


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Although the 2018 farm bill instructed FNS to update the Thrifty Food Plan by 2023 and every five years thereafter, every previous Thrifty Food Plan has been always cost-neutral ( just an inflation update)—exactly what CBO estimated as cost of the 2018 farm bill.74

The Biden Administration may have skirted regulations and congressional authority to increase the overall cost of the program. In fact, Senate and House Republicans requested that the Government Accountability Office investigate the legal authorities and process that the USDA undertook to arrive at such an unprecedented increase.75

   Eliminate the heat-and-eat loophole. States can artificially boost a household’s food stamp benefit by using the heat-and-eat loophole. The amount of food stamps a household receives is based on its “countable” income (income minus certain deductions). Households that receive benefits from the Low-Income Heat and Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) are eligible for a larger utility deduction. In order to make households eligible for the higher deduction, and thus for greater food stamp benefits, states have distributed LIHEAP checks for amounts as small as $1 to food stamp recipients.

The 2014 farm bill tightened this loophole by requiring that a household must receive more than $20 annually in LIHEAP payments to be eligible for the larger utility deduction and subsequently higher food stamp benefits.76 Nonetheless, states continue to inflate their standard utility allowances. Under the Trump Administration, the USDA proposed a rule, which was not finalized, that would have standardized the utility allowance.77

Reform WIC. Turning to WIC, this program distributes money through EBT cards to help low-income women, infants, and children under six purchase nutri- tion-rich foods and nutrition education (including breastfeeding support). As of August 2022, approximately 6.3 million people participated in WIC each month to purchase food.78 In 2021, WIC federal outlays were $5 billion.79

The next Administration should:

   Reform the state voucher system. State agencies control WIC costs by approving only one brand of infant formula through competitive bidding for infant formula rebate contracts. Because 50 percent of baby formula is purchased through the federal WIC program, it is vital that

regulation for these competitive bidding contracts does not unintentionally create monopolies.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Re-evaluate excessive regulation. As for baby formula regulations generally, labeling regulations and regulations that unnecessarily delay the manufacture and sale of baby formula should be re-evaluated.80 During the Biden Administration, there have been devastating baby formula shortages.

Return to the Original Purpose of School Meals. Federal meal programs for K–12 students were created to provide food to children from low-income families while at school.81 Today, however, federal school meals increasingly resemble enti- tlement programs that have strayed far from their original objective and represent an example of the ever-expanding federal footprint in local school operations.

The NSLP and SBP are the two largest K–12 meal programs provided by federal taxpayer money. The NSLP launched in 1946 and the SBP in 1966, both as options specifically for children in poverty.82 During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal policymakers temporarily expanded access to school meal programs, but some lawmakers and federal officials have now proposed making this expansion per- manent.83 Yet even before the pandemic, research found that federal officials had already expanded these programs to serve children from upper-income homes, and these programs are rife with improper payments and inefficiencies.

Heritage Foundation research from 2019 found that after the enactment of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) in 2010, the share of students from middle- and upper-income homes receiving free meals in states that participated in CEP doubled, and in some cases tripled—all in a program meant for children from families with incomes at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty line (Children from homes at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible for free lunches, while students from families at or below 185 percent of poverty are eligible for reduced-priced lunches).84

Under CEP, if 40 percent of students in a school or school district are eligible for federal meals, all students in that school or district can receive free meals. However, the USDA has taken it even further, improperly interpreting the law85 to allow a subset of schools within a district to be grouped together to reach the 40 percent threshold, As a result, a school with zero low-income students could be grouped together with schools with high levels of low-income students, and as a result all the students in the schools within that group (even schools without a single low-in- come student) can receive free federal meals.86 Schools can direct resources meant for students in poverty to children from wealthier families.

Furthermore, the NSLP and SBP are among the most inaccurate federal programs according to PaymentAccuracy.gov, a project of the U.S. Office of Man- agement and Budget and the Office of the Inspector General.87 Before federal auditors reduced the rigor of annual reporting requirements in 2018, the NSLP had wasted nearly $2 billion in taxpayer resources through payments provided to ineligible recipients.88 Even after the auditing changes, which the U.S. Government


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

Accountability Office said results in the USDA not “regularly assess[ing] the pro- grams’ fraud risks,” the NSLP wasted nearly $500 million in FY 2021.89 The SBP now wastes nearly $200 million annually.90

Despite the ongoing effort to expand school meals under CEP and the evidence of waste and inefficiency, left-of-center Members of Congress and President Biden’s Administration have nonetheless proposed further expansions to extend federal school meals to include every K–12 student—regardless of need.91 The Administra- tion recently proposed expanding federal school meal programs offered during the school year to be offered during the summer as part of the “American Families Plan,” and also proposed expanding CEP. Other federal officials, including Senator Bernie Sanders (I–VT), have, in recent years, proposed expanding the NSLP to all students.92 To serve students in need and prevent the misuse of taxpayer money, the next Administration should focus on students in need and reject efforts to transform

federal school meals into an entitlement program.

Specifically, the next Administration should:

   Promulgate a rule properly interpreting CEP. The USDA should issue a rule that clarifies that only an individual school or a school district as a whole, not a subset of schools within a district, must meet the 40-percent

criteria to be eligible for CEP. Education officials should be prohibited from grouping schools together.

   Work with lawmakers to eliminate CEP. The NSLP and SBP should be directed to serve children in need, not become an entitlement for students from middle- and upper-income homes. Congress should eliminate CEP. Further, the USDA should not provide meals to students during the summer unless students are taking summer-school classes. Currently, students can get meals from schools even if they are not in summer school, which has, in effect, turned school meals into a federal catering program.93

 

   Restore programs to their original intent and reject efforts to create universal free school meals. The USDA should work with lawmakers

to restore NSLP and SBP to their original goal of providing food to K–12

students who otherwise would not have food to eat while at school.

Federal school meals should be focused on children in need, and any efforts to expand student eligibility for federal school meals to include all K–12 students should be soundly rejected. Such expansion would allow an inefficient, wasteful program to grow, magnifying the amount of wasted taxpayer resources.

Reform Conservation Programs. Farmers, in general, are excellent stewards of the land, if not for moral or ethical considerations, then out of self-interest to


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

make sure their land and—by extension, their livelihoods—remain intact. Farmers are often called the original conservationists.94

When evaluating federal conservation programs, it is important to remember the importance of the land to farmers. In terms of USDA federal conservation programs, both the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) and Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) oversee numerous programs.95

As a general matter, the next Administration should ensure that these programs address genuine and specific environmental concerns with a focus on currently existing environmental problems, not those that are speculative in nature. These conservation programs should have clearly identifiable goals, with the success or failure of these programs being directly measurable. Any assistance to farmers to take specific actions should not be provided unless the assistance will directly and clearly help to address a specific environmental problem. Further, any assistance to encourage farmers to engage in certain practices should only be provided if farmers would not have adopted the practices in the first place.

There are specific issues that the next Administration should address. The Conservation Reserve Program,96 which is run by FSA, pays farmers to not farm some of their land. This program has recently received attention, as agricultural groups rightfully seek to farm without penalty voluntarily idled land, in light of the consequences to food prices of Russia invading Ukraine.97

There is also a need to reform USDA’s conservation easements. These easements are a powerful tool to incentivize long-term preservation of ecosystems while still allowing farmers to benefit economically. However, when farmers and ranchers sign conservation easements with the USDA, they can be enforced in perpetuity. Future generations, be they the descendants of the landowner or new residents, are bound by those conditions.

Ecosystems and topography naturally change over time, but without legislative change, easement requirements will not.

The next Administration should:

 

   Champion the elimination of the Conservation Reserve Program. Farmers should not be paid in such a sweeping way not to farm their land. If there is a desire to ensure that extremely sensitive land is not farmed, this should be addressed through targeted efforts that are clearly connected to addressing a specific and concrete environmental harm. The USDA should work with Congress to eliminate this overbroad program.

 

   Reform NRCS wetlands and erodible land compliance and appeals. Problematic NRCS overreach could be avoided entirely by removing its authority to prescribe specific practices on a particular farm operation in order to ensure continued eligibility to participate in USDA farm programs,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

and to require instead that each farm (as a function of eligibility) must have created a general best practices plan. Such a plan could be approved by the local county Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD). The local SWCD commissioners are elected by their peers in each respective county and are better suited than the NRCS to provide guidance for farm operations in their respective jurisdictions.

At a minimum, a new Administration should support legislation to divest more power to the states (and possibly local SWCDs) regarding erodible land and wetlands conservation.98

   Reform easements. The new Administration should, to the extent authorized by law, limit the use of permanent easements and collaborate with lawmakers to prohibit the USDA from creating new permanent easements.99

Other Major Issues and Specific Recommendations. Although the following issues have not been listed as “priority,” these issues are still extremely important, and the next Administration should address them.

Only meat and poultry from federally inspected facilities can be sold in inter- state commerce.100 Even meat and poultry from USDA-approved state-inspected facilities may only be sold in intrastate commerce, with limited exceptions.101 This is despite the fact that states with USDA-approved inspection programs must meet and enforce requirements that are “at least equal to” those imposed under the Federal Meat and Poultry Products Inspection Acts and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978.102 This is an unnecessary regulatory barrier that makes it difficult to get meat and poultry into interstate commerce to create more options for consumers and farmers. Legislation entitled the New Mar- kets for State-Inspected Meat and Poultry Act of 2021 would help to remove this obstacle.103

The next Administration should:

 

   Promote legislation that would allow state-inspected meat to be sold in interstate commerce. These barriers to the sale of meat and poultry from USDA-approved state-inspected facilities should be removed.

Eliminate or Reform Marketing Orders and Checkoff Programs. Mar- keting orders and checkoff programs for agricultural commodities are similar in many ways. They both allow private actors within an industry to collaborate with the federal government to compel other competitors within an industry to fund the respective marketing order or checkoff program. There are currently 22 checkoff


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

programs,104 and they focus on research and promotion of commodities such as beef and eggs. Marketing orders cover research and promotion, but also cover issues such as quality regulations and volume controls. The latter issue, volume controls, is a means to restrict supply, which drives up prices for consumers. Fortunately, there are few active volume controls.105

Marketing orders and checkoff programs are some of the most egregious pro- grams run by the USDA. They are, in effect, a tax—a means to compel speech—and government-blessed cartels. Instead of getting private cooperation, they are tools for industry actors to work with government to force cooperation.

The next Administration should:

 

   Reduce the number and scope of marketing orders and checkoff programs. The USDA should reject any new requests for marketing orders and checkoff programs to the extent authorized by law and eliminate existing programs when possible. While the programs work differently, there are often petition processes and other ways that make it difficult for affected parties to get rid of the marketing orders and checkoff programs,106 and the USDA itself may not even be required to honor requests to terminate a program.107 The USDA should make the process easier. Further, the USDA should reject any effort to bring back volume controls to limit supplies of commodities.

 

   Work with Congress to eliminate marketing orders and checkoff programs. These programs should be eliminated, and if industry actors want to collaborate, they should do so through private means, not using the government to compel cooperation.

   Promote legislation that would require regular votes. There should be regular voting for parties subject to checkoff programs and marketing orders. For example, the voting should occur at least every five years, to

determine whether a marketing order or checkoff program should continue. The USDA should be required to honor the results of such a vote. Through regular voting, parties can demonstrate their support for a marketing order or checkoff program and ensure that those administering them will be held accountable.

Focus on Trade Policy, Not Trade Promotion. The USDA’s Foreign Agri- cultural Service (FAS) covers numerous issues, including “trade policy,” which is a reference to removing trade barriers, among other things, to ensure an envi- ronment conducive to trade.108 It also covers trade promotion.109 This includes programs like the Market Access Program110 that subsidizes trade associations,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

businesses, and other private entities to market and promote their products overseas. FAS should play a proactive and leading role to help open upmarkets for American farmers and ranchers. There are numerous barriers, such as sani- tary and phytosanitary measures, blocking American agricultural products from gaining access to foreign markets.111 However, FAS should not help businesses and industries promote their exports, something these businesses and industries can and should do on their own.

The next Administration should:

   Push legislation to repeal export promotion programs. The USDA should work with Congress to repeal market development programs like the Market Access Program and similar programs.

Remove Obstacles for Agricultural Biotechnology. Innovation is critical to agricultural production and the ability to meet future food needs. The next Admin- istration should embrace innovation and technology, not hinder its use—especially because of scare tactics that ignore sound science. One of the key innovations in agriculture is genetic engineering. According to the USDA, “[C]urrently, over 90 percent of U.S. corn, upland cotton, and soybeans are produced using GE [genet- ically engineered] varieties.”112

Despite the importance of agricultural biotechnology, in 2016, Congress passed a federal mandate to label genetically engineered food.113 This legislation was argu- ably just a means to try to provide a negative connotation to GE food. There are other challenges as well for agricultural biotechnology. For example, Mexico plans to ban the importation of U.S. genetically modified yellow corn.114

The next Administration should:

   Counter scare tactics and remove obstacles. The USDA should strongly counter scare tactics regarding agricultural biotechnology and adopt policies to remove unnecessary barriers to approvals and the adoption of biotechnology.

   Repeal the federal labeling mandate. The USDA should work with Congress to repeal the federal labeling law, while maintaining federal preemption, and stress that voluntary labeling is allowed.

 

   Use all tools available to remove improper trade barriers against agricultural biotechnology. The USDA should work closely with the Office of the United States Trade Representative to remove improper barriers imposed by other countries to block U.S. agricultural goods.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

Reform Forest Service Wildfire Management. The United States Forest Service is one of four federal government land management agencies that admin- ister 606 million acres, or 95 percent of the 640 million acres of surface land area managed by the federal government.115 Located within the USDA, the Forest Service manages the National Forest System, which is comprised of 193 million acres.116 As explained by the USDA, “The USDA Forest Service’s mission is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations.”117

The Forest Service should focus on proactive management of the forests and grasslands that does not depend heavily on burning. There should be resilient forests and grasslands in the wake of management actions. Wildfires have become a primary vegetation management regime for national forests and grasslands.118 Recognizing the need for vegetation management, the Forest Service has adopted “pyro-silviculture” using “unplanned” fire,119 such as unplanned human-caused fires, to otherwise accomplish vegetation management.120

The Forest Service should instead be focusing on addressing the precipitous annual amassing of biomass in the national forests that drive the behavior of wildfires. By thinning trees, removing live fuels and deadwood, and taking other preventive steps, the Forest Service can help to minimize the consequences of wildfires.

Increasing timber sales could also play an important role in the effort to change the behavior of wildfire because there would be less biomass. Timber sales and timber harvested in public forests dropped precipitously in the early 1990s and still remain very low. For example, in 1988, the volume of timber sold and harvested by volume was about 11 billion and 12.6 billion board feet (BBF), respectively.121 In 2021, timber sold was 2.8 BBF and timber harvested was 2.4 BBF.

In 2018, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13855 to, among other things, promote active management of forests and reduce wildfire risks.122 The executive order stated, “Active management of vegetation is needed to treat these dangerous conditions on Federal lands but is often delayed due to challenges associated with regulatory analysis and current consultation requirements.”123 It further explained the need to reduce regulatory obstacles to fuel reduction in forests created by the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act.124

The next Administration should:

 

   Champion executive action, consistent with law, and proactive legislation to reduce wildfires. This would involve embracing Executive Order 13855, building upon it, and working with lawmakers to promote active management of vegetation, reduce regulatory obstacles to reducing fuel buildup, and increase timber sales.


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Eliminate or Reform the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA, in collaboration with HHS, publishes the Dietary Guidelines every five years.125 For more than 40 years, the federal government has been releasing Dietary Guidelines,126 and during this time, there has been constant controversy due to questionable recommenda- tions and claims regarding the politicization of the process.

In the 2015 Dietary Guidelines process, the influential Dietary Guidelines Advi- sory Committee veered off mission and attempted to persuade the USDA and HHS to adopt nutritional advice that focused not just on human health, but the health of the planet.127 Issues such as climate change and sustainability infiltrated the process. Fortunately, the 2020 process did not get diverted in this manner. How- ever, the Dietary Guidelines remain a potential tool to influence dietary choices to achieve objectives unrelated to the nutritional and dietary well-being of Americans. There is no shortage of private sector dietary advice for the public, and nutrition and dietary choices are best left to individuals to address their personal needs. This includes working with their own health professionals. As it is, there is constantly changing advice provided by the government, with insufficient qualifications on the advice, oversimplification to the point of miscommunicating important points,

questionable use of science, and potential political influence.

The Dietary Guidelines have a major impact because they not only can influence how private health providers offer nutritional advice, but they also inform federal programs. School meals are required to be consistent with the guidelines.128

The next Administration should:

   Work with lawmakers to repeal the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA should help lead an effort to repeal the Dietary Guidelines.

 

   Minimally, the next Administration should reform the Dietary Guidelines. The USDA, with HHS, should develop a more transparent process that properly considers the underlying science and does not overstate its findings. It should also ensure that the Dietary Guidelines focus on nutritional issues and do not veer off-mission by focusing on unrelated issues, such as the environment, that have nothing to do with nutritional advice. In fact, if environmental concerns supersede or water down recommendations for human nutritional advice, the public would be receiving misleading health information. The USDA, working with lawmakers, should codify these reforms into law.

 

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Based on the recommended reforms identified as ideal solutions, the USDA would look different in many respects. One of the biggest changes would be a USDA that is not focused on welfare, given that means-tested welfare programs would


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be moved to HHS. The Food and Nutrition Service that administers the food and nutrition programs would be eliminated.

The Farm Service Agency, which administers many of the farm subsidy pro- grams, would be significantly smaller in size if the ideal farm subsidy reforms were adopted.

Most important, a conservative USDA, as envisioned, would not be used as a governmental tool to transform the nation’s food system, but instead would respect the importance of efficient agricultural production and ensure that the government does not hinder farmers and ranchers from producing an abundant supply of safe and affordable food.

For a conservative USDA to become a reality, and for it to stay on course with the mission as outlined, the White House must strongly support these reforms and install strong USDA leaders. These individuals almost certainly will be faced with opposition from some in the agricultural community who would fight changing subsidies in any fashion, although many of the reforms would likely be embraced by those in agriculture.

There would be strong opposition from environmental groups and others who want the federal government to transform American agriculture to meet their ideo- logical objectives. Finally, there would be opposition from left-of-center groups who do not want to reform SNAP and would expand welfare and dependency—such as through universal free school meals—as opposed to reducing dependency.

Reducing the scope of government and promoting individual freedom may not always be easy, but it is something that conservatives regularly should strive for. The listed reforms to the U.S. Department of Agriculture would help to accom- plish these objectives and are well worth fighting for to achieve a freer and more prosperous nation.

 

CONCLUSION

This chapter started with a discussion of the incredible success of American farmers and American agriculture in general. This is how the chapter should close as well. Americans are blessed with an agricultural sector, and a food system in general, which are worthy of incredible respect. A conservative USDA should appreciate this while recognizing that its role is to serve the interests of all Amer- icans, not special interests. By being a champion of unleashing the potential of American agriculture, a conservative USDA would help to ensure a future with an abundant supply of safe and affordable food for individuals and families in the United States and across the globe.


AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author would like to thank all the contributors for their assistance, expertise, and insight into the development of this chapter. In addition, special thanks are due to Rachael Wilfong, who was instrumental in getting the chapter ready for submission.


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ENDNOTES

1.                U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

2.                See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System,” https://www.usda. gov/fst (accessed December 14, 2022).

3.                U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1.

4.                 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150 Years,” https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/ history (accessed December 16, 2022).

5.                The law stated, “[T]here is hereby established at the seat of government of the United States a Department of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” Gladys L. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13, https://babel. hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33 (accessed December 16, 2022).

6.                U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p. 2.

7.                 Ibid., p. 2.

8.                U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, p. 3, https://www.usda.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

9.                News release, “USDA Announces Framework for Shoring Up the Food Supply Chain and Transforming the Food System to Be Fairer, More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supply- chain-and-transforming (accessed December 14, 2022).

10.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System.”

11.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, pp. 1–2.

12.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Background on the U.S. Approach to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit,” August 4, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UN-

Food-Systems-Summit.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

13.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,” https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/un- summit (accessed December 14, 2022).

14.           Mark Bittman et al., “How a National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could- save-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html (accessed December 14, 2022); Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, “No, We Don’t Need to Transform the American Food System,” The Daily Signal, February 26, 2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/ no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/ (accessed December 14, 2022); and Daren Bakst, “Biden’s Food Conference Should Put People First, Not Environmental Extremism,” The Daily Signal,

September 22, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-people-

first-not-environmental-extremism/ (accessed December 14, 2022).

15.           News release, “USDA to Invest Up to $300 Million in New Organic Transition Initiative,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 22, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300-

million-new-organic-transition-initiative (accessed December 14, 2022).

16.           Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s Green New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures, November 14, 2022, https://www. farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster (accessed December 16, 2022).

17.           See, for example, Catherine Greene et al., “Growing Organic Demand Provides High-Value Opportunities for Many Types of Producers,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6, 2017, https://www. ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunities- for-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20 by%20the%20consumer (accessed December 14, 2022), and Andrea Carlson, “Investigating Retail Price Premiums for Organic Foods,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016, https://www.ers. usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/ (accessed December 16, 2022). Further, there are many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit of organic food. One


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meta study found that “[t]he published literature lacks strong evidence that organic foods are significantly more nutritious than conventional foods.” Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., “Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 5 (September 4, 2012), pp. 348–366, https://

www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007 (accessed December 16, 2022).

18.           Steve Savage, “USDA Data Confirm Organic Yields Significantly Lower Than With Conventional Farming,” Genetic Literacy Project, February 16, 2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirm- organic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/ (accessed December 16, 2022).

19.           See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021, https://www.regulations. gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001 (accessed December 16, 2022).

20.           Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117–169.

21.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture (1948–2019),” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivity-

growth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/ (accessed December 14, 2022).

22.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4 Percent of Disposable Income to 10.3 Percent in 2021,” July 15, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/

chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967 (accessed December 14, 2022).

23.       U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021, Table 1101, https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu- income-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No.176, April 5, 2017, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf.

24.           Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA Slush Fund,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6052, February 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/ budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda.

25.           Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, Public Law 80–806.

26.           Bakst and Sewall, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power.”

27.           Ibid., p. 3.

28.           Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021,” November 1, 2021, https://www.

regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst (accessed December 16, 2022).

29.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program.”

30.           Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606 (accessed December 16, 2022).

31.           “Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall, 14 percent of U.S. farms participated in Federal crop insurance programs.” Christine Whitt, Noah Miller, and Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, pp. 24 and 26, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247. pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which apparently does not cover crop insurance, included payments beyond just commodity payments, such as conservation payments.

32.           Randy Schnepf, “Farm Safety-Net Payments Under the 2014 Farm Bill: Comparison by Program Crop,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 11, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

33.           Although livestock and specialty crop producers do receive some subsidies, former American Farm Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman captured the subsidy issue well. He “dismisse[d] outright the claim that farmers couldn’t survive without subsidy money. ‘Why does the livestock industry survive without subsidies?’ he ask[ed]. ‘Why does the specialty crop [fruit and vegetable] industry survive?’” Tamar Haspel, “Why Do Taxpayers Subsidize Rich Farmers?” The Washington Post, March 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d- f3d931db7f68_story.html (accessed March 18, 2023).


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34.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “ARC/PLC Program,” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/ programs-and-services/arcplc_program/index (accessed December 16, 2022).

35.           Ibid.

36.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Crop Insurance at a Glance,” May 31, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/risk-management/crop-insurance-at-a-glance/ (accessed December 16, 2022).

37.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Agriculture Risk Coverage (ALC) & Price Loss Coverage (PLC),” Farm Service Agency Fact Sheet, August 2019, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/ FactSheets/2019/arc-plc_overview_fact_sheet-aug_2019.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

38.           See, for example, U.S Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage Handbook, last amended October 5, 2020, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/1- arcplc_r01_a10.pdf (accessed March 18, 2023); Mesbah Motamed, “Federal Commodity Programs Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage Address Price Yield Risks Faced by Producers,” U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, August 6, 2018, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/ august/federal-commodity-programs-price-loss-coverage-and-agriculture-risk-coverage-address-price- and-yield-risks-faced-by-producers/ (accessed March 18, 2023); and Taxpayers for Common Sense, “Shallow

Loss Agriculture Programs 101,” https://www.taxpayer.net/agriculture/shallow-loss-agriculture-programs-101/ (accessed March 18, 2023).

39.           Ibid.

40.            Stephanie Rosch, “Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 18, 2021, p. 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46686 (December 14, 2021).

41.            Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032: Volume II; Smaller Reductions, December 2022, p. 6, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-12/58163-budget-options-small-effects.pdf

(accessed December 14, 2022).

42.            Rosch, “Federal Crop Insurance: A Primer,” p. 17.

43.            “Farm Bill Primer: Sugar Program,” Congressional Research Service In Focus, updated May 15, 2018, https:// www.everycrsreport.com/files/2018-05-15_IF10689_42900e56be67f5cfa17e40953ad9acb54561d3db.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

44.            See, for example, Agralytica, “Economic Effects of the Sugar Program Since the 2008 Farm Bill & Policy Implications for the 2013 Farm Bill,” June 3, 2013, p. 1, https://fairsugarpolicy.org/wordpress/wp-content/

uploads/2018/03/AgralyticaEconomicEffectsPaperJune2013.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

45.            U.S. Department of Labor, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes,” and Bakst and Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them.”

46.            Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032, p. 3. See also Congressional Budget Office, “Reduce Subsidies in the Crop Insurance Program,” in Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2021 to 2030,” December 9, 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/56815

(accessed December 14, 2022).

47.            Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032, p. 6.

48.            “Reduce Premium Subsidies in the Federal Crop Insurance Program,” Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023, https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/2.350.171.html.

49.            Congressional Budget Office, “Reduce Subsidies in the Crop Insurance Program.”

50.           Ibid.

51.           Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit, 2023 to 2032, p. 6.

52.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP),” https://www.fns.usda.gov/cnpp (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, “About CNPP,” Food and Nutrition Service, https://www.fns.usda.gov/about-cnpp (accessed December 16, 2022).

53.           Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “Purpose of the Dietary Guidelines,” https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/ about-dietary-guidelines/purpose-dietary-guidelines (accessed December 16, 2022).

54.           Robert Rector and Vijay Menon, “Understanding the Hidden $1.1 Trillion Welfare System and How to Reform It,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3294, April 5, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/ understanding-the-hidden-11-trillion-welfare-system-and-how-reform-it.


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55.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “SNAP Data Tables,” Food and Nutrition Service, December 9, 2022, https:// www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap (accessed December 16, 2022).

56.           Ibid.

57.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “SNAP Work Requirements,” May 2019, https:// www.fns.usda.gov/snap/work-requirements#:~:text=Work%20at%20least%2080%20hours,least%2080%20 hours%20a%20month (accessed December 16, 2022).

58.           7 U.S. Code § 2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2015 (accessed December 16, 2022).

59.           Ibid.

60.           7 U.S. Code § 2015(o)(4). The USDA has approved nearly all waivers under the “lack of sufficient jobs” option.

61.           Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 234 (December 5, 2019) p. 66782, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-

2019-12-05/pdf/2019-26044.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

62.           Ibid., p. 66795.

63.           Ibid., pp. 66807–66810.

64.           District of Columbia, et al. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 496 F. Supp. 3d 213 (2020), https://oag.dc.gov/ sites/default/files/2020-10/SNAP-ABAWD-Opinion.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

65.           Ibid. On December 16, 2020, the Trump Administration appealed the District Court decision. See, for example, News release “Fudge Slams Administration for Appealing ABAWD Ruling,” House Committee on Agriculture, December 16, 2020, https://agriculture.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2069 (accessed

December 16, 2022).

66.           News release, “Statement by Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack on D.C. Circuit Court’s Decision

Regarding ABAWDs Rule,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, March 24, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/media/ press-releases/2021/03/24/statement-agriculture-secretary-tom-vilsack-dc-circuit-courts (accessed December 16, 2022).

67.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, “SNAP Employment and Training Screening and Referral Guidance,” July 13, 2022, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/et-screening-and-referral-guidance (accessed December 16, 2022).

68.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Regulatory Reform at a Glance: Proposed Rule; Revision of SNAP Categorical Eligibility,” July 2019, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ BBCE_Fact_Sheet_%28FINAL%29_72219-PR.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

69.           7 Code of Federal Regulations § 273.8 (1978), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/7/273.8 (accessed

December 16, 2022).

70.            Kristina Rasmussen, “How Millionaires Collect Food Stamps,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2018, https:// www.wsj.com/articles/how-millionaires-collect-food-stamps-1516044026 (accessed December 14, 2022).

71.            Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 142 (July 24, 2019), pp. 35570–55581, https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2019/07/24/2019-15670/revision-of-categorical-eligibility-in-the-supplemental-nutrition- assistance-program-snap (accessed December 14, 2022).

72.            News release, “USDA Modernizes the Thrifty Food Plan, Updates SNAP Benefits,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 16, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2021/08/16/usda-modernizes-

thrifty-food-plan-updates-snap- (accessed December 14, 2022).

73.            Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office, letter to Congressman Jason Smith, June 23, 2022, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-06/58231-Smith.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

74.           Congressional Budget Office, “H.R. 2, as Passed by the House of Representatives and as Passed by the Senate,” July 24, 2018, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54284 (accessed December 16, 2022).

75.            News release, “Republican AG Committee Leadership Urge GAO Review of USDA Thrifty Food Plan Scheme,”

U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, August 13, 2021, https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov/news/ documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=7013 (accessed December 14, 2022).

76.            “The 2014 Farm Bill: Changing the Tradition of LIHEAP Receipt in the Calculation of SNAP Benefits,” updated February 12, 2014, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R42591, https://crsreports.congress. gov/product/pdf/R/R42591/24 (accessed March 18, 2023).

77.            Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 192 (October 3, 2019), pp. 52809–52815, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/

FR-2019-10-03/pdf/2019-21287.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

78.            U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Data Series, 2018 to 2022,” https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program (accessed December 14, 2022).


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79.            U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “WIC Data Tables,” December 9, 2022, https:// www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program (accessed December 16, 2022).

80.           U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Regulations and Information on the Manufacture and Distribution of Infant Formula,” May 16, 2022, https://www.fda.gov/food/infant-formula-guidance-documents-regulatory- information/regulations-and-information-manufacture-and-distribution-infant-formula (accessed December 14, 2022).

81.          U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the National School Lunch Program,” January 17, 2008, https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/program-history (accessed December 14, 2022).

82.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “School Breakfast Program History,” July 24, 2013, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sbp/program-history (accessed December 14, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “History of the National School Lunch Program.”

83.          Crystal FitzSimons, “Free School Meals for All Is the Key to Supporting Education and Health Outcomes,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol 41, No. 1 (2022), pp. 358–364, https://econpapers.repec.org/ article/wlyjpamgt/v_3a41_3ay_3a2022_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a358-364.htm (accessed December 14, 2022).

84.           Jonathan Butcher and Vijay Menon, “Returning to the Intent of Government School Meals: Helping Students in Need,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3399, March 22, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2019-03/BG3399.pdf.

85.           Daren Bakst and Jonathan Butcher, “A Critical Fix to the Federal Overreach on School Meals,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4976, July 11, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/hunger-and-food-programs/report/ critical-fix-the-federal-overreach-school-meals.

86.           Ibid., and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Community Eligibility Provision,” April 19, 2019, https://www.fns.usda.gov/cn/community-eligibility-provision (accessed December 16, 2022).

87.           See Payment Accuracy, https://www.paymentaccuracy.gov/ (accessed December 16, 2022).

88.           Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity Scorecard,” https://www.cfo.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/Q3/ FNS%20National%20School%20Lunch%20Program%20(NSLP)%20Payments%20Integrity%20Scorecard%20  FY%202022%20Q3.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022).

89.           U.S. Government Accountability Office, “School Meals Programs: USDA Has Reported Taking Some Steps to Reduce Improper Payments But Should Comprehensively Assess Fraud Risks,” GAO–19–389, May 21, 2022, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-389 (accessed December 14, 2022).

90.           Payment Accuracy, “Payment Integrity Scorecard.”

91.           White House, “Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan,” April 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-american-families-plan/ (accessed December 14, 2022).

92.           Universal School Meals Program Act of 2021, S. 1530, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://www.congress.gov/ bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1530 (accessed December 14, 2022).

93.           See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Find Meals for Kids When Schools Are Closed,” Food and Nutrition Service, September 22, 2022, https://www.fns.usda.gov/meals4kids (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Seamless Summer and Other Options for School,” July 16, 2013, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sfsp/seamless-summer-and-other-options-schools (accessed

December 16, 2022).

94.           Tom Driscoll, “From the Field: Farmers Are the Original Conservationists,” National Farmers Union, August 30, 2017, https://nfu.org/2017/08/30/from-the-field-farmers-are-the-original-conservationists/ (accessed

December 16, 2022).

95.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “Conservation Programs,” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/ programs-and-services/conservation-programs/index (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Programs and Initiatives,” https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/ programs-initiatives (accessed December 16, 2022).

96.           U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “Conservation Reserve Program: About the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),” https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation- programs/conservation-reserve-program/ (accessed December 16, 2022).


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

97.           American Bakers Association et al., letter to U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, March 23, 2022, https://www.dropbox.com/s/yfyv04ilkom11zd/USDA%20Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Vilsack%20on%20 Tools%20to%20Address%20Global%20Commodity%20Supply%20Challenges%203.23.22_.pdf?dl=0 (accessed

December 15, 2022). It is also necessary to increase food production to mitigate high food inflation. Approximately 25 percent of idled land is considered prime farmland. Therefore, one-quarter of idled land is merely idling,

not producing food—and this does not include other land that may viably be used for food production. The Conservation Reserve Program should be eliminated. There are also two issues connected to property rights and fairness that should be addressed: challenging NRCS determinations and problems with USDA easements. To be eligible for many USDA programs, farmers must comply with certain conservation provisions enforced by NRCS. Conservation compliance of wetlands and highly erodible lands consist of federal restrictions that prevent farmers from using parts of their property. If farmers plant crops or modify the areas federal officials deem protected, farmers can lose all access to USDA programs and support. For farmers, there are real, practical concerns to challenging NRCS determinations, including the time and costs of challenging the federal bureaucracy. NRCS is empowered to declare areas wetlands and highly erodible areas, which are therefore off limits for farming. If these wetland-or-erodible-declared areas are used in a manner deemed unacceptable by federal officials, NRCS may revoke access to federal resources and subsidies by making technical determinations that carry potential penalties. There must be a fair and reasonable process for farmers to challenge such actions. See Daren Bakst, “Food Price Inflation Continues to Worsen. Here’s What Should Be Done About It,” The Daily Signal, April 25, 2022, https:// www.dailysignal.com/2022/04/25/food-price-inflation-continuing-to-worsen-heres-what-should-be-done-

about-it/ (accessed December 15, 2022); American Bakers Association et.al., letter to Vilsack; U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Conservation Compliance Appeals Process,” https://www. nrcs.usda.gov/getting-assistance/compliance/conservation-compliance-appeals-process (accessed December 15, 2022); and Chris Bennett, “Regulatory Hell: Farmer and Veteran Wins 10-Year Wetlands Fight With Government,” AG Web, August 30, 2021, https://www.agweb.com/news/crops/crop-production/regulatory-hell-farmer-and-

veteran-wins-10-year-wetlands-fight (accessed December 15, 2022).

98.           Fortunately, there are already resources available to help states establish their own wetlands conservation programs. One particular example, the American Legislative Exchange Council’s Wetlands Mapping and Protection Act model policy, is available for states to define the procedures, guidelines, and administration of wetlands programs. American Legislative Exchange Council, “Wetlands Mapping and Protection Act,” November 16, 2017, https://alec.org/model-policy/wetlands-mapping-and-protection-act/ (accessed December 16, 2022). The new Administration should focus on best practices instead of imposing prescriptive federal practices. It should support the policies contained within the “NRCS Wetland Compliance and Appeals Reform Act” and modify NRCS compliance rules to protect farmers and ranchers by adding protections against regulatory overreach—such as banning the practice of re-engaging farmers in new technical determinations appeals processes for the same areas of their farms. See NRCS Wetland Compliance and Appeals Reform Act, S. 4931, 117th Cong., 2nd Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4931?s=1&r=8 (accessed December 15, 2022).

99.           Ibid

100.      See, for example, Daren Bakst and Jeremy Dalrymple, “Reducing Federal Barriers for the Sale of Meat,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5078, June 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/report/ reducing-federal-barriers-the-sale-meat, and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “State Inspection Programs,” updated January 12, 2023, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state- inspection-programs (accessed December 15, 2022).

101.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Cooperative Interstate Shipping Program,” September 7, 2022, https://www.fsis.usda.gov/inspection/state-inspection-programs/cooperative-

interstate-shipping-program (accessed December 15, 2022).

102.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, “State Inspection Programs.”

103.      The Senate bill removes obstacles for both meat and poultry. The House version does not appear to cover poultry. New Markets for State-Inspected Meat and Poultry Act of 2021, S. 107, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/107#:~:text=This%20bill%20allows%20meat%20and,be%20 sold%20in%20interstate%20commerce (accessed December 15, 2022), and Expanding Markets for State- Inspected Meat Processors Act of 2021, H.R. 1998, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th- congress/house-bill/1998 (accessed December 15, 2022).


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

104.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, “Specialty Crops Marketing Orders & Agreements,” https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/fv (accessed December 15, 2022).

105.      See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, “Commodities Covered by Marketing Orders,” https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/commodities (accessed March

18, 2023), and Elayne Allen and Darren Bakst, “How the Government Is Mandating Food Waste,” August 19, 2016, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/08/19/how-the-government-is-mandating-food-waste/ (accessed

March 18, 2023).

106.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Beef Checkoff Program Petition Process,” https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/research-promotion/ beef/petition (accessed December 16, 2022); “Beef Producers: Do You Want to Vote on the Checkoff?” Beef Magazine, July 28, 2020, https://www.beefmagazine.com/marketing/beef-producers-do-you-want-vote- checkoff (accessed December 16, 2022); and Steve White, “Group Seeking Beef Checkoff Referendum Asks for Access to Producer Database,” Nebraska TV, May 4, 2021, https://nebraska.tv/news/ntvs-grow/group-seeking- beef-checkoff-referendum-asks-for-access-to-producer-database (accessed December 16, 2022). As reported, “There has not been a referendum of the mandatory National Beef Checkoff Program in 35 years.”

107.      See, for example, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 213 (November 8, 2021), p. 61718, https://www.govinfo.gov/

content/pkg/FR-2021-11-08/pdf/2021-24301.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

108.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Topics,” https://www.fas.usda.gov/topics (accessed December 15, 2022).

109.      Ibid.

110.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Market Access Program (MAP),” https://www.fas. usda.gov/programs/market-access-program-map (accessed December 16, 2022).

111.      To learn about trade barriers for food and agricultural products, see, for example, News release, “USTR Releases 2022 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, March 31, 2022, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/ march/ustr-releases-2022-national-trade-estimate-report-foreign-trade-barriers (accessed

December 16, 2022).

112.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Recent Trends in GE Adoption,” September 14, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-u-s/recent-

trends-in-ge-adoption/ (accessed December 15, 2022).

113.      National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Public Law 114–216.

114.      Noi Mahoney, “Trade Dispute Arising Over Mexico’s Plan to Block Imports of Genetically Modified Corn,” Freight Waves, November 22, 2022, https://www.freightwaves.com/news/trade-dispute-arising-over-

mexicos-plan-to-block-imports-of-gm-corn (accessed December 15, 2022), and News release, “Grassley, Ernst, Urge USTR to Intervene In Mexico’s Ban on American Corn,” Office of Chuck Grassley, November 14, 2022, https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-ernst-urge-ustr-to-intervene-in-mexicos-ban- on-american-corn (accessed December 15, 2022).

115.      “The Federal Land Management Agencies,” Congressional Research Service In Focus, updated February 16, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10585.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

116.      Ibid.

117.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, Fiscal Year 2023: Budget Justification, March 2022, p. 1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/30a-2023-FS.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

118.      Forests and Rangelands, The National Strategy: The Final Phase in the Development of the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, April 2014, https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/strategy/ strategy/CSPhaseIIINationalStrategyApr2014.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

119.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “Unplanned Fires,” https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/ landmanagement/resourcemanagement/?cid=stelprd3804071 (accessed December 16, 2022).

120.      See, for example, Sherry Devlin, “A Conversation with Jim Hubbard: Unplanned Wildfires Rule West’s Forests,” TreeSource, March 28, 2017, https://treesource.org/news/lands/jim-hubbard-forest-service-wildfires/

(accessed December 16, 2022).


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121.      U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “FY 1905–2021 National Summary Cut and Sold Data Graphs,” https://www.fs.usda.gov/forestmanagement/documents/sold-harvest/documents/1905-2021_Natl_ Summary_Graph_wHarvestAcres.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, “Forest Products Cut and Sold from the National Forests and Grasslands,” https://www.fs.usda. gov/forestmanagement/products/cut-sold/index.shtml (accessed December 16, 2022).

122.      Donald J. Trump, “Promoting Active Management of America’s Forests, Rangelands, and Other Federal Lands to Improve Conditions and Reduce Wildfire Risk,” Executive Order 13855, December 21, 2018, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800866/pdf/DCPD-201800866.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022).

123.      Ibid.

124.      Ibid.

125.      Dietary Guidelines for Americans, https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/ (accessed December 16, 2022).

126.      Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “History of the Dietary Guidelines,” https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/ about-dietary-guidelines/history-dietary-guidelines (accessed December 16, 2022).

127.      Daren Bakst, “Extreme Environmental Agenda Hijacks Dietary Guidelines: Comment to the Advisory Committee,” The Daily Signal, July 17, 2014, https://www.dailysignal.com/2014/07/17/extreme-environmental- agenda-hijacks-dietary-guidelines-comment-advisory-committee/ (accessed December 16, 2022).

128.      Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, S. 3307, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th- congress/senate-bill/3307/text (accessed December 16, 2022), and Dietary Guidelines for Americans, “Current Dietary Guidelines,” https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/usda-hhs-development-dietary-guidelines (accessed December 16, 2022).


11

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Lindsey M. Burke

 

 

MISSION

Federal education policy should be limited and, ultimately, the federal Depart- ment of Education should be eliminated. When power is exercised, it should empower students and families, not government. In our pluralistic society, fami- lies and students should be free to choose from a diverse set of school options and learning environments that best fit their needs. Our postsecondary institutions should also reflect such diversity, with room for not only “traditional” liberal arts colleges and research universities but also faith-based institutions, career schools, military academies, and lifelong learning programs.

Elementary and secondary education policy should follow the path outlined by Milton Friedman in 1955, wherein education is publicly funded but education decisions are made by families. Ultimately, every parent should have the option to direct his or her child’s share of education funding through an education sav- ings account (ESA), funded overwhelmingly by state and local taxpayers, which would empower parents to choose a set of education options that meet their child's unique needs.

States are eager to lead in K–12 education. For decades, they have acted inde- pendently of the federal government to pioneer a variety of constructive reforms and school choice programs. For example, in 2011, Arizona first piloted ESAs, which provide families roughly 90 percent of what the state would have spent on that child in public school to be used instead on education options such as private school tuition, online courses, and tutoring. In 2022, Arizona expanded the program to be available to all families.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

The future of education freedom and reform in the states is bright and will shine brighter when regulations and red tape from Washington are eliminated. Federal money is inevitably accompanied by rules and regulations that keep the influx of funds from having much, if any, impact on student outcomes. It raises the cost of education without raising student achievement. To the extent that federal taxpayer dollars are used to fund education programs, those funds should be block- granted to states without strings, eliminating the need for many federal and state bureaucrats. Eventually, policymaking and funding should take place at the state and local level, closest to the affected families.

Although student loans and grants should ultimately be restored to the private sector (or, at the very least, the federal government should revisit its role as a guarantor, rather than direct lender) federal postsecondary education investments should bolster economic growth, and recipient institutions should nourish academic freedom and embrace intellectual diversity. That has not, however, been the track record of federal higher education policy or of the many institutions of higher education that are hostile to free expression, open academic inquiry, and American exceptionalism. Federal post- secondary policy should be more than massive, inefficient, and open-ended subsidies to “traditional” colleges and universities. It should be rebalanced to focus far more on bolstering the workforce skills of Americans who have no interest in pursuing a four- year academic degree. It should reflect a fuller picture of learning after high school, placing apprenticeship programs of all types and career and technical education on an even playing field with degrees from colleges and universities. Rather than continuing to buttress a higher education establishment captured by woke “diversicrats” and a de facto monopoly enforced by the federal accreditation cartel, federal postsecondary education policy should prepare students for jobs in the dynamic economy, nurture institutional diversity, and expose schools to greater market forces.1

 

OVERVIEW

For most of our history, the federal government played a minor role in education. Then, over a 14-month period beginning in 1964, Congress planted the seeds for what would become the U.S. Department of Education (ED or the department). In July of that year, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964, after Congress reached a consensus that the mistreatment of black Americans was no longer tolerable and merited a federal response. In the case of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)2 and the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA),3 Congress sought to improve educational outcomes for disadvantaged students by providing additional compensatory funding for low-income children and lower-income college students.

Spending on ESEA and the HEA—part of Johnson’s “War on Poverty”—grew exponentially in the years that followed. By Fiscal Year 2022, ESEA programs received $27.7 billion in appropriations, in addition to $190 billion that came


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

through the pandemic’s Elementary and Secondary Schools Emergency Relief (ESSER) Funds,4 which relied on ESEA formulas. The same year, the department spent more than $2 billion just to administer Title IV of the HEA, which authorizes federal student loans and Pell grants. It provided $22.5 billion in Pell grants, and it oversaw outlays of close to $100 billion in direct student loans.

Since 1965, Congress has continued to layer on dozens of new laws and pro- grams as federal “solutions” to myriad education problems. In 1973, it passed the Rehabilitation Act,5 and, in 1975, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)6 to address educational neglect of students with disabilities. In 2002, it cre- ated the Institute for Education Sciences to consolidate education data collection and fund research. Congress has also enacted a series of Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Acts, including Perkins V in 2018.7

Congress could have, and once did, distribute management of federal education programs outside of a single department. But for those interested in expanding federal funding and influence in education, this unconsolidated approach was less than ideal, because a single, captive agency would allow them to promote their agenda more effectively across Administrations. Eventually, the National Educa- tion Association made a deal and backed the right presidential candidate— Jimmy Carter—who successfully lobbied for and delivered the Cabinet-level agency.

When it was established in 1979—becoming operational in 1980—the agency was supposed to act as a “corralling” mechanism. Carter signed the Department of Education Organization Act8 into law in 1979, believing in part that it would reduce administrative costs and improve efficiency by housing most of the federal education programs that had proliferated in the wake of Johnson’s War on Poverty under one roof.

It has had the opposite effect. Instead, special interest groups like the National Education Association (NEA), American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and the higher education lobby have leveraged the agency to continuously expand federal expenditures—a desirable funding stream from their vantage point because federal budgets are not constrained like state and local budgets that must be balanced each year. By FY 2022, the department’s discretionary and mandatory appropriation topped $80 billion, not including student loan outlays. Each of its programs has attendant federal strings and red tape.

One recent example is the Biden Administration’s requirement that state educa- tion agencies and school districts submit “equity” plans as a condition of receiving COVID recovery ESSER funds in the American Rescue Plan (ARP).9 This exercise led to the hiring of numerous new government employees as the rules were pro- mulgated, plans were created after collecting public feedback, and those plans were eventually deemed satisfactory.

The next Administration will need a plan to redistribute the various congres- sionally approved federal education programs across the government, eliminate


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

those that are ineffective or duplicative, and then eliminate the unproductive red tape and rules by entrusting states and districts with flexible, formula-driven block grants. This chapter details that plan.

As the next Administration executes its work, it should be guided by a few core principles, including:

   Advancing education freedom. Empowering families to choose among

a diverse set of education options is key to reform and improved outcomes, and it can be achieved without establishing a new federal program. For example, portability of existing federal education spending to fund families directly or allowing federal tax credits to encourage voluntary contributions to K–12 education savings accounts managed by charitable nonprofits, could significantly advance education choice.

   Providing education choice for “federal” children. Congress has a special responsibility to children who are connected to military families, who live in the District of Columbia, or who are members of sovereign tribes. Responsibility for serving these students should be housed in agencies that are already serving these families.

   Restoring state and local control over education funding. As Washington begins to downsize its intervention in education, existing funding should be sent to states as grants over which they have full control, enabling states to put federal funding toward any lawful education purpose under state law.

   Treating taxpayers like investors in federal student aid. Taxpayers should expect their investments in higher education to generate economic productivity. When the federal government lends money to individuals for a postsecondary education, taxpayers should expect those borrowers to repay.

 

   Protecting the federal student loan portfolio from predatory politicians. The new Administration must end the practice of acting like the federal student loan portfolio is a campaign fund to curry political support and votes. The new Administration must end abuses in the loan forgiveness programs. Borrowers should be expected to repay their loans.

   Safeguarding civil rights. Enforcement of civil rights should be based on a proper understanding of those laws, rejecting gender ideology and critical race theory.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   Stopping executive overreach. Congress should set policy—not Presidents through pen-and-phone executive orders, and not agencies through regulations and guidance. National emergency declarations should expire absent express congressional authorization within 60 days after the date of the declaration.

Bolstered by an ever-growing cabal of special interests that thrive off federal largesse, the infrastructure that supports America’s costly federal intervention in education from early childhood through graduate school has entrenched itself. But, unlike the public sector bureaucracies, public employee unions, and the higher education lobby, families and students do not need a Department of Education to learn, grow, and improve their lives. It is critical that the next Administration tackle this entrenched infrastructure.

 

NEEDED REFORMS

Federal intervention in education has failed to promote student achievement. After trillions spent since 1965 on the collective programs now housed within the walls of the department, student academic outcomes remain stagnant. On the main National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), reading out- comes on the 2022 administration have remained unchanged over the past 30 years. Declines in math performance are even more concerning than students’ lack of progress on reading outcomes. Fourth- and eighth-grade math scores saw the largest decline since the assessments were first administered in 1990. Average fourth-grade math scores declined five points, and average eighth-grade math scores declined eight points. Just one-third of eighth graders nationally are proficient in reading and math. Just 27 percent of eighth graders were pro- ficient in math in 2022, and just 31 percent of eighth graders scored proficient in reading in 2022.

The NAEP Long-term Trend Assessment shows academic stagnation since the 1970s, with particular stagnation in the reading scores of 13-year-old students since 1971, when the assessment was first administered. Math scores, though modestly improved, are still lackluster.

Additionally, the department has created a “shadow” department of education operating in states across the country. Federal mandates, programs, and proclama- tions have spurred a hiring spree among state education agencies, with more than 48,000 employees currently on staff in state agencies across the country. Those employees are more than 10 times the number of employees (4,400)10 at the federal Department of Education, and their jobs largely entail reporting back to Washing- ton. Research conducted by The Heritage Foundation’s Jonathan Butcher finds that the federal government funds 41 percent of the salary costs of state educa- tion agencies.11


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

 

CHART 1

Trends in Fourth- and Eighth-Grade Reading

 

EIGHTH-GRADE READING, AVERAGE SCORES

270

 

 

 

 

 

265

 

 

 

 

 

260

 

 

 


255

1992


1994


1998


’02 ’03


2005


2007


2009


2011


2013


2015


2017


2019


2022


 

 

FOURTH-GRADE READING, AVERAGE SCORES

225

 

 

 

 

 

220

 

 

 

 

 

215

 

 

 


210

1992


1994


1998


2000


’02 ’03


2005


2007


2009


2011


2013


2015


2017


2019


2022


 

 

SOURCES: The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average Scores,” Grade 4, https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/ reading/nation/scores/?grade=4 (accessed March 17, 2023), and The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average Scores,” Grade 8, https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/reading/nation/scores/?grade=4 (accessed March 17, 2023).

 

A heritage.org


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

This bloat has persisted for decades. In 1998, a commission led by Repre- sentative Pete Hoekstra released a critical report based on extensive fieldwork, interviews, and analysis of the Department of Education. The report, Education at a Crossroads: What Works and What’s Wasted in Education Today, detailed the suffocating bureaucratic red tape Carter’s agency had wrapped around states.12 The commission estimated that states completed nearly 50 million hours of paperwork just to get their federal education spending, which at that time, they estimated, resulted in just 65 cents to 70 cents of each federal taxpayer dollar making its way to the classroom. The situation has only worsened since the Hoekstra report. More recent evidence of Washington’s bureaucratic paperwork burden can be found in the growing number of non-teaching staff in public schools across the country, which doubled relative to growth in student enrollment from 1992 to 2015.

The labyrinthian nature of federal education programs—convoluted funding formulas, competitive grant applications, reporting requirements, etc.—has likely contributed to the considerable bureaucratic bloat in state and local school districts across the country and is one of the key areas of needed reform. Streamlining exist- ing programs and funding so that dollars are sent to states through straightforward per-pupil allocations or in the form of grants that states can put toward any lawful edu- cation purpose under state law would bring a needed easing of the federal compliance burden. The federal government should confine its involvement in education policy to that of a statistics-gathering agency that disseminates information to the states.

To improve educational opportunities for all Americans, the next Administra- tion should work with Congress to pass a Department of Education Reorganization Act to reform, eliminate, or move the department’s programs and offices to appro- priate agencies. The following is an overview of what should happen within each of the offices and to each of the programs currently operated by the department.

 

PROGRAM AND OFFICE PRIORITIZATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT

 

Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE)

The OESE is comprised of 36 programs, ranging from Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and Impact Aid, to programs for Native American students and the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program.

 

   Reduce the number of programs managed by OESE, and transfer some remaining programs to other federal agencies.

 

   Transfer Title I, Part A, which provides federal funding for lower- income school districts, to the Department of Health and Human Services, specifically the Administration for Children and Families. It should be administered as a no-strings-attached formula block grant.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Restore revenue responsibility for Title I funding to the states over a 10-year period.

 

OESE also currently manages the federal Impact Aid program, which provides fund- ing to school districts to compensate for reductions in property tax revenue due to the presence of federal property (such as that associated with a military base or tribal lands).

 

   Eliminate Impact Aid not tied to students.

 

   Move student-driven Impact Aid programs to the Department of Defense Education Authority (DoDEA) or the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Indian Education.

 

   Transfer all Indian education programs to the Bureau of Indian Education.

 

   The D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, which provides vouchers to low-income children living in the nation’s capital—appropriate as

D.C. is under the jurisdiction of Congress—should be expanded into a universal program, formula-funded, and moved to the Department of Health and Human Services.

 

   All other programs at OESE should be block-granted or eliminated.

 

Office of Career, Technical, and Adult Education

   Transfer the Office of Career, Technical, and Adult Education’s few programs to the Department of Labor, but

 

   Move the Tribally Controlled Postsecondary Career and Technical Education Program to the Bureau of Indian Education.

 

Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS)

The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) houses nearly two dozen programs, ranging from funding for the Individuals with Dis- abilities Education Act (IDEA) and the National Technical Institute for the Deaf to Special Olympics Funding and the American Printing House for the Blind.

 

   Most IDEA funding should be converted into a no-strings formula block grant targeted at students with disabilities and distributed directly to local education agencies by Health and Human Service’s Administration for Community Living.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   Transfer the Vocational Rehabilitation Grants for Native American students to the Bureau of Indian Education.

 

   Phase out earmarks for a variety of special institutions, as originally envisioned.

 

   To the extent that OSERS supports federal efforts to enforce our laws against discrimination of individuals with disabilities, those assets should be moved to the Department of Justice (DOJ) along with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).

 

Office for Postsecondary Education (OPE)

   The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate or move OPE programs to ETA at the Department of Labor.

 

   Funding to institutions should be block-granted and narrowed to Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and tribally controlled colleges.

 

   Move programs deemed important to our national security interests to the Department of State.

 

Institute of Education Sciences (IES)

   Move ED’s statistical office, the National Commission for Education Statistics (NCES), to the Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau. If Congress believes the federal government can play a valuable research role, those research centers can be moved to the National Science

Foundation. If Congress decides to maintain IES as an independent agency,

it needs to address major governance and management issues that keep it from being a productive contributor to the knowledge base related to teaching and learning.

 

Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA)

   The next Administration should completely reverse the student loan federalization of 2010 and work with Congress to spin off FSA and its student loan obligations to a new government corporation with professional governance and management.

 

With a statutory charge that it preserve the federal student loan portfolio for the benefit of the taxpayers and students, this new entity would be (1) profession- ally governed by an agency head and board of trustees appointed by the President


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

 

CHART 2

Trends in Fourth- and Eighth-Grade Mathematics

 

EIGHTH-GRADE MATH, AVERAGE SCORES

300

 

 

 

290

 

 

 

280

 

 

 

270

 

 


260

1990 1992


1996


2000


2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019


2022


 

 

FOURTH-GRADE MATH, AVERAGE SCORES

250

 

 

 

240

 

 

 

230

 

 

 

220

 

 


210

1990 1992


1996


2000


2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019


2022


 

 

SOURCES: The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average Scores,” Grade 4, https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/ mathematics/nation/scores/?grade=4 (accessed March 17, 2023), and The Nation’s Report Card, “National Average Scores,” Grade 8, https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/mathematics/nation/scores/?grade=4 (accessed March 17, 2023).

 

A heritage.org


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CHART 3

Long-Term Trends for Nine– and 13–Year-Olds

 

READING, AVERAGE SCORES

300

 

 

280

 

 

260

 

 

240

 

 

220

 


200

1971


1975


1980


1984


’88 ’90 ’92 ’94 ’96


1999


2004


2008


2012


2020


 

 

MATH, AVERAGE SCORES

 

13–YEAR-OLDS

285           280

 

NINE–YEAR-OLDS

244            241

 

 

 
300

 

 

280

 

 

260

 

 

240

 

 

220

 


200

1978


1982


1986


’90


’92


’94


’96


1999


2004


2008


2012


2020


 

 

 

SOURCE: The Nation’s Report Card, “NAEP Data Explorer,” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx? n=PET&s=WCSSTUS1&f=W (accessed March 17, 2023).

 

A heritage.org


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

with the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) funded with annual appropriations from Congress; and (3) operated by professional managers. Federal loans would be assigned directly to the Treasury Department, which would manage collections and defaults. The new federal student loan authority would manage the loan port- folio, handle borrower relations, administer loan applications and disbursements, monitor institutional participation and accountability issues, and issue regulations.

 

Office for Civil Rights (OCR)

   OCR should move to the Department of Justice. The federal government has an essential responsibility to enforce civil rights protections, but Washington should do so through the Department of Justice and federal courts. The OCR at DOJ should be able to enforce only through litigation.

 

Additional Bureaus and Offices

For those attorneys, accountants, experts, and specialists in the department's remaining offices subject to closure whose positions might nevertheless be a key component of serving the mission—positions that might include the Office of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary, Office of the Undersecretary, Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Finance and Operations, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Office of Communications and Outreach, and Office of Legislative and Congressional Affairs—the opportunity to join other agencies based on their expertise and the needs of other agencies should be made available. For example, OGC higher education lawyers would join the newly independent Federal Student Aid Office or the Department of Labor, and OGC civil rights attor- neys would join DOJ. These positions must first be determined to serve a continued mission need prior to being transferred.

 

   Attorneys, accountants, experts, and specialists in the department’s remaining offices subject to closure, and whose positions are indispensable to serving the mission, should have the opportunity to join other agencies.

 

Current Laws Relating to the Department of Education That Require Repeal

In order to fully wind down the Department of Education, Congress must pass

and the President must sign into law a Department of Education Reorganization Act (or Liquidating Authority Act) to direct the executive branch on how to devolve the agency as a stand-alone Cabinet-level department.

 

   Congress should pass and the next President should sign a Department of Education Reorganization Act.


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Current Regulations Promulgated by or Relevant to the Agency That Should Be Rolled Back or Eliminated

While the next Administration works to distribute department programs

across the federal government, it will need to thoroughly review the many educa- tion-related regulations promulgated by the Biden Administration. There are five primary regulatory targets (as of December 2022) that require the next Adminis- tration’s attention: regulations on (1) Charter School Grant Program Priorities; (2) Civil Rights Data Collection; (3) Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program Final Regulations; (4) Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance (Title IX); and (5) Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities (Equity in IDEA). The next Administration should also review regulatory changes to the school meals program (under the Department of Agriculture) and changes to the Income-Driven student loan program. Additional Biden Administration regulations on (1) gainful employment, administrative capa- bility, and financial responsibility for institutions that participate in the federal student loans and grant programs; (2) Title VI, (3) accreditation of postsecondary institutions, and (4) female athletics are expected in to be released in 2023.

 

   Thoroughly review the many education-related regulations promulgated by the Biden Administration, as well as the school meals program and the Income-Driven student loan program.

 

Charter School Grant Programs

Congress first authorized the Charter School Program (CSP) in 1994 [Title X, Part C of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 8061 et seq. (1994)]. It most recently reauthorized the program in 2015 as part of the Every Student Succeeds Act.13 On March 14, 2022, the department published a notice concerning proposed priorities, requirements, definitions, and grant selection criteria relating to the award of federal grants to applicants in CSP. This proposal increases the federal footprint in the charter school sector by ignor- ing statute and adding to the list of requirements imposed on charter schools.

 

   The new Administration must take immediate steps to rescind the new requirements and lessen the federal restrictions on charter schools.

 

Civil Rights Data Collection

On December 13, 2021, OCR published a notice concerning proposed revisions to OCR’s Mandatory Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) in which it proposed


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to create and collect data on a new “nonbinary” sex category (in addition to the current “male” or “female” sex categories) and to retire data collection that indi- cates the number of (1) high school–level interscholastic athletics sports in which only male and female students participate, (2) high school–level athletics teams in which only male or female students participate, and (3) participants on high school–level interscholastic athletics sports teams in which only male or only female students participate. These poorly conceived changes are contrary to law, fail to take account of student privacy interests and statutory protections favoring parental rights under the Protection of Pupils Rights Amendment, and jettison longstanding data collections that assist in the enforcement of Title IX.

 

   The new Administration must quickly move to rescind these changes, which add a new “nonbinary” sex category to OCR’S data collection and issue a new CRDC that will collect data directly relevant to OCR’s statutory enforcement authority.

 

Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program Final Regulations

Effective July 1, 2023, the department promulgated final regulations addressing

loan forgiveness under the HEA’s provisions for borrower defense to repayment (“BDR”), closed school loan discharge (“CSLD”), and public service loan forgive- ness (“PSLF”). The regulations also included prohibitions against pre-dispute arbitration agreements and class action waivers for students enrolling in institu- tions participating in Title IV student loan programs. Acting outside of statutory authority, the current Administration has drastically expanded BDR, CSLD, and PSLF loan forgiveness without clear congressional authorization at a tremendous cost to the taxpayers, with estimates ranging from $85.1 to $120 billion.

 

   The new Administration must quickly commence negotiated rulemaking and propose that the department rescind these regulations.

 

   The next Administration should also rescind Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) GEN 22-11 and DCL GEN 22-10 and its letters to accreditation agencies dated July 19, 2022, which are attempts to undercut Florida’s SB 7044, providing universities more flexibility on accreditation.

 

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance (Title IX)

With its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published on July 12, 2022, the Biden

Education Department seeks to gut the hard-earned rights of women with its changes to the department’s regulations implementing Title IX, which prohibits


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discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs and activities. Instead, the Biden Administration has sought to trample women’s and girls’ athletic oppor- tunities and due process on campus, threaten free speech and religious liberty, and erode parental rights in elementary and secondary education regarding sensitive issues of sex. The new Administration should take the following steps:

 

   Work with Congress to use the earliest available legislative vehicle to prohibit the department from using any appropriations or from

otherwise enforcing any final regulations under Title IX promulgated by the department during the prior Administration.

 

   Commence a new agency rulemaking process to rescind the current Administration’s Title IX regulations; restore the Title IX regulations promulgated by then-Secretary Betsy DeVos on May 19, 2020; and define “sex” under Title IX to mean only biological sex recognized at birth.

 

   Work with Congress to amend Title IX to include due process requirements; define “sex” under Title IX to mean only biological sex recognized at birth; and strengthen protections for faith-based educational institutions, programs, and activities.

 

The Trump Administration’s 2020 Title IX regulation protected the founda- tional right to due process for those who are accused of sexual misconduct. The Biden Administration’s proposed change to the interpretation of Title IX disposes of these rights.

 

   The next Administration should move quickly to restore the rights of women and girls and restore due process protections for accused individuals.

 

At the same time, there is no scientific or legal basis for redefining “sex” to “sexual orientation and gender identity” in Title IX. Such a change misrepresents the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock, threatens the American system of federalism, removes important due process protections for students in higher education, and puts girls and women in danger of physical harm. Facilitating social gender transition without parental consent increases the likelihood that children will seek hormone treatments, such as puberty blockers, which are experimental medical interventions. Research has not demonstrated positive effects and long- term outcomes of these treatments, and the unintended side effects are still not fully understood.


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  The next Administration should abandon this change redefining “sex” to mean “sexual orientation and gender identity” in Title IX immediately across all departments.

 

   On its first day in office, the next Administration should signal its intent to enter the rulemaking process to restore the Trump

Administration’s Title IX regulation, with the additional insistence that “sex” is properly understood as a fixed biological fact. Official notice-and-comment should be posted immediately.

 

   At the same time, the political appointees in the Office for Civil Rights should begin a full review of all Title IX investigations that were conducted on the understanding that “sex” referred to gender identity and/or sexual orientation.

 

   All ongoing investigations should be dropped, and all school districts affected should be given notice that they are free to drop any policy changes pursued under pressure from the Biden Administration.

 

   The OCR Assistant Secretary should prepare a report of OCR’s actions for the new Secretary of Education, who should—by speech or letter— publicize the nature of the overreach engaged in by his predecessor.

 

   The Secretary should make it clear that FERPA allows parents full access to their children’s educational records, so any practice of paperwork obfuscation on this front violates federal law.

 

Title VI—School Discipline and Disparate Impact

Assuring a safe and orderly school environment should be a primary consid- eration for school leaders and district administrators. Unfortunately, federal overreach has pushed many school leaders to prioritize the pursuit of racial parity in school discipline indicators—such as detentions, suspensions, and expulsions— over student safety. In 2014, the Obama Administration issued a Dear Colleague Letter that muddied the standard for civil rights enforcement under Title VI for student discipline cases. Before the DCL, a school would be in violation of federal law for treating black and white students differently for the same offense (dispa- rate treatment); under the Obama Administration schools were at risk of losing federal funding if they treated black and white students equally but had aggregate differences in the rates of school discipline by race (disparate impact).

OCR leveraged federal civil rights investigations as policy enforcement tools; these investigations could only end when school districts agreed to adopt lenient


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discipline policies, commonly known as “restorative justice.” Academic studies, as well as student and teacher surveys, suggest that academics and school climate have been harmed substantially by this push.

The Trump Administration rescinded the Obama Administration’s guidance on school discipline and corrected the Obama Administration’s overreach in Title VI enforcement.

 

   The next Administration should continue the policy of the Trump Administration in this area and direct the department to conduct a comprehensive review of all Title VI cases to ascertain to what extent these cases include allegations of disparate impact.

 

   OCR should also review all resolution agreements with school districts to conform with this policy.

 

   As part of this effort, the new Administration should also direct the department and DOJ jointly to issue enforcement guidance stating that the agencies will no longer investigate Title VI cases that exclusively rest on allegations of disparate impact.

 

   To the extent that the Biden Administration publishes guidance or promulgates a regulation on this topic, the next Administration should rescind the guidance and commence rulemaking to rescind the regulation.

 

Getting the federal government out of the business of dictating school discipline policy is a good start. But if the next conservative Department of Education simply rescinds the Biden-era regulation, it could very easily be enforced again on Day One through a Dear Colleague Letter by another leftist Administration.

 

   In addition to rescinding the policy and any related guidance, the next Secretary should work with the next Attorney General on a regulation that would clarify current regulations to state that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act does not include a disparate impact standard.

 

As law professor Gail Heriot has noted, the alleged existence of a disparate impact standard under Title VI makes everything presumed illegal unless given special dispensation by the federal government.

 

   Although it would require political capital from the White House, given that mainstream news outlets are sure to frame it as an attack


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on civil rights, the next conservative Administration should take sweeping action to assure that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act is not inverted through a disparate impact standard to provide a pretext for theoretically endless federal meddling.

 

Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities; Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities (Equity in IDEA)

   Effective January 18, 2017, the department issued final regulations under Part B of IDEA that require states to consider race and ethnicity in the identification, placement, and discipline of students with disabilities. The new Administration should rescind this regulation.

 

Students should never be denied access to special education services because of their race or ethnicity, but this is happening in school districts across the country thanks to the Obama Administration’s Equity in IDEA regulation. This was not the intent of the regulation, but it is an inevitable byproduct of its flawed assumptions. The Obama Administration looked at the racial statistics on special education assignment and made two assumptions: that African American students were dis- proportionately overrepresented, and that this overrepresentation constituted a harm that required federal pressure to ameliorate.

School districts deemed to overrepresent minority students in special education assignment, or in discipline amongst special education students, are tagged by their state education agencies as engaging in “significant disproportionality,” and are required to reallocate 15 percent of their IDEA Part B money into coordinated early intervening services that are intended to address the “root causes of dispro- portionality.” In practice, this can mean raiding special education funding to pay for CRT-inspired “equity” consultants and professional development.

This is especially problematic given that both of the assumptions behind Equity in IDEA are flawed. Special education services provide extra assistance to students; they do not harm them. And according to the most rigorous research on the subject, conducted by Penn State’s Paul Morgan, black students are actually underrep- resented in special education once adequate statistical controls are made. That means that this regulation effectively further depresses the provision of valuable services to an already underserved group.

 

   The next Administration should immediately commence rulemaking to rescind the Equity in IDEA regulation. No replacement regulation

is required.

 

   The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) should prepare a digest of the best research on this subject and share


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it directly with state superintendents and state special education leaders across the country, who have been led by this regulation to believe a false problem diagnosis. Every effort should be made to dissuade states from continuing to operate on the assumption that overrepresentation requires state intervention after the federal pressure is rescinded.

 

Provide School Meals to Children in Need; Do Not Use Federal Meals to Support Radical Ideology

In May 2022, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) tried to advance a

radical political agenda using the federal school meal program. Nearly a century ago, federal lawmakers adopted the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP) and other services that provide meals for K–12 students to give children from low-income families access to food while at school. Since the 1940s, federal lawmakers have greatly expanded these meal programs, creating an entitlement for nearly all students, regardless of family income levels, and have turned the meal programs into some of the most wasteful federal pro- grams in Washington. Now, the USDA is threatening to withhold federal taxpayer spending for these meals from schools that do not implement Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 so that the term “sex” is replaced with “sexual

orientation and gender identity” (SOGI).

 

   The next Administration should prohibit the USDA or any other federal agency from withholding services from federal or state agencies—including but not limited to K–12 schools—that choose not to replace “sex” with “SOGI” in that agency’s administration of Title IX.

 

The Administration will have significant support for this policy change among state officials and Members of Congress. Twenty-two state attorneys general filed a lawsuit after the USDA’s announcement that the agency intended to withhold spending from schools that do not replace sex with SOGI. Members of Congress also introduced legislation in 2022 that would prohibit the agency from carrying out its intentions regarding Title IX.

 

Phase Out Existing Income-Driven Repayment Plans

While income-driven repayment (IDR) of student loans is a superior approach relative to fixed payment plans, the number of IDR plans has proliferated beyond reason. And recent IDR plans are so generous that they require no or only token repayment from many students.

 

   The Secretary should phase out all existing IDR plans by making new loans (including consolidation loans) ineligible and should implement


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a new IDR plan. The new plan should have an income exemption equal to the poverty line and require payments of 10 percent of income above the exemption. If new legislation is possible, there should be no loan forgiveness, but if not, existing law would require forgiving any remaining balance

after 25 years.

President Biden has proposed a new income-driven repayment program that would be extremely generous to borrowers, requiring only nominal payments from most students. It would turn every policy lever to the most generous setting on record (e.g., lowering the percentage of income owed from 10 percent to 25 per- cent under existing plans to 5 percent, lowering the number of years of payment required from 20 or 25 years to 10 years, and increasing income exemption from 150 percent to 225 percent of the poverty line). The median borrower who earns an associate degree would owe only $15 a month, regardless of how much he or she had borrowed. The median bachelor’s degree borrower would owe only $68 a month. This plan essentially converts these student loans into delayed grant programs.

 

OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REQUIRES

 

Reform Federal Education Data Collection

The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and other data col- lections currently release data by race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, English language proficiency, disability, and sex. However, one of the most important—if not the most important—factor influencing student educational achievement and attainment is family structure. As education scholar Ian Rowe has noted, NAEP already collects data on students’ family structure; it just does not make those data publicly available.

 

   The Department of Education (or whichever agency collects such data long term) should make student data available by family structure to the public, including as part of its Data Explorer tool.

 

   As discussed above, data collection efforts should be consolidated under the Census Bureau.

 

   Data collection efforts in higher education should also be improved by housing higher education data at the Department of Labor. This would provide more transparency in evaluating postsecondary education and workforce training program outcomes; contextualize those results based on trends observed more generally; enable the adjusting of real


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wages to account for regional differences in earnings and cost of living; and develop a reliable methodology for risk adjusting institutional and program outcomes to more accurately reflect the value added of education programs (as opposed to their admissions selectivity).

Currently the Department of Education relies on graduation rates and average earnings as proxies for educational quality. Both of those outcomes, however, are highly dependent upon a student’s socioeconomic background, sex, family status, and other factors. Colleges and universities with selective admissions policies post the strongest outcomes, primarily because they admit mostly low-risk, traditional students. Open enrollment institutions post the weakest outcomes, largely because life is challenging and complicated for low-income and non-traditional students, who may be forced to drop out when a work schedule changes, a child needs more attention, or an unexpected repair or medical bill makes continuing impossible. Such confounding factors make it difficult to isolate the impact of educational qual- ity versus socioeconomic factors on student outcomes. The Department of Health and Human Services faced similar challenges in trying to evaluate healthcare out- comes since social determinants of health result in worse health outcomes among those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, have low educational attainment levels, have struggled with addiction, or have poor diet and exercise habits. Without risk adjustment of outcomes, hospitals treating wealthy patients will always appear to be delivering good care, and hospitals treating low-income patients will appear to be delivering poor care. Higher education outcomes data should be similarly “risk adjusted” to more carefully isolate the impact of educational quality versus socioeconomic status and other factors on college outcomes.

 

Reform the Negotiated Rulemaking Process at ED

The U.S. Department of Education is required by statute14 to engage in nego- tiated rulemaking prior to promulgating new regulations under Subchapter 1 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as well as Subchapters II (Teacher Quality Enhancements) and IV of the Higher Education Act of 1964 (Student Assistance). The purpose of negotiated rulemaking is to engage a committee of stakeholders early in the drafting of proposed regulations to ensure that the reg- ulation can be implemented as written, to understand any potential unintended consequences, and to seek suggestions from stakeholders on alternative solutions. The goal is for the negotiators to reach a consensus, thus smoothing the way to promulgate a new rule.

Although it is helpful for the department to receive stakeholder input, the negotiated rulemaking process has become an expensive and time-consuming undertaking. Consensus is only rarely reached, enabling the department to pursue its own path. The department’s master calendar (which requires final rules to be


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

published by October 1 if they are to be implemented by July 1st of the subsequent year) compounds the problem, making it unduly challenging to update regulations as needed to keep pace with changes in education, finance, accounting, pedagogy, and student assessment.

In recent decades, negotiated rulemaking has become a veritable three-ring circus, replete with negotiators who use their Twitter accounts and other social media feeds during negotiations to denigrate the process and their peer negoti- ators in real time. A few Members of Congress use the public comment process to deliver political speeches, apparently to raise their own profiles but without adding any new information to the process. Some advocacy groups have latched onto the process for fundraising purposes, sometimes misrepresenting negotiation language to agitate followers and supporters and encourage them to make financial contributions. At times, the department itself has appeared to sabotage consensus, which enables them to write the regulation as they wish and without regard to the concerns raised by negotiators.

 

   The Department of Education should work with Congress to amend the HEA to eliminate the negotiated rulemaking requirement. At

a minimum, Congress should allow the department to use public hearings rather than negotiated rulemaking sessions.

 

Reform the Office of Federal Student Aid

This proposal urges the new Administration to end the abuse of FSA’s loan for- giveness programs, to manage the federal student loan portfolio in a professional way, and to work with Congress for a long-term overhaul of the program for the benefit of students and taxpayers.

 

   The new Administration must end the prior Administration’s abuse of the agency’s payment pause and HEA loan forgiveness programs, including borrower defense to repayment, closed school discharge, and Public Service Loan Forgiveness.

 

   The new Administration should also take immediate steps to commence the rulemaking process to rescind or substantially modify the prior Administration’s HEA regulations.

 

   The federal government does not have the proper incentives to make sound lending decisions, so the new Administration should consider returning to a system in which private lenders, backed by government guarantees, would compete to offer student loans, including subsidized and unsubsidized, loans. This would allow for


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

market prices and signals to influence educational borrowing, introducing consumer-driven accountability into higher education. Pell grants should retain their current voucher-like structure.

If Congress is unwilling to reform federal student aid, then the next Adminis- tration should consider the following reforms:

 

   Switch to fair-value accounting from FCRA accounting, and

 

   Consolidate all federal loan programs into one new program that

 

1.        Utilizes income-driven repayment,

 

2.        Includes no interest rate subsidies or loan forgiveness,

 

3.        Includes annual and aggregate limits on borrowing, and

 

4.        Requires “skin in the game” from colleges to help hold them accountable for loan repayment.

 

The Biden Administration has mercilessly pillaged the student loan portfolio for crass political purposes without regard to the needs of current taxpayers or future students. This must never happen again.

 

   As detailed in Section III, the next Administration should work with Congress to spin off federal student aid into a new government corporation with professional governance and management.

 

NEW POLICY PRIORITIES FOR 2025 AND BEYOND

 

New Legislation That Should Be Prioritized

For nearly 250 years, Congress has incorporated public and private institutions, including banks, the District of Columbia’s city government, and other organiza- tions that federal officials deem to be conducting operations in the public interest. Such charters offer a certain status to organizations, often viewed as a “seal of approval” according to one Congressional Research Service report, which can help these organizations in their fundraising and other advocacy efforts.

When the nation’s largest teacher association, the National Education Associ- ation (NEA), cites its federal charter, it lends the NEA a level of significance and suggests an effectiveness that is not supported by evidence. In fact, the NEA and the nation’s other large teacher union, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT),


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

use litigation and other efforts to block school choice and advocate for additional taxpayer spending in education. They also lobbied to keep schools closed during the pandemic. All of these positions run contrary to robust research evidence showing positive outcomes for students from education choice policies; there is no conclusive evidence that more taxpayer spending on schools improves student outcomes; and evidence finds that keeping schools closed to in-person learning resulted in negative emotional and academic outcomes for students. Furthermore, the union promotes radical racial and gender ideologies in schools that parents oppose according to nationally representative surveys.

 

   Congress should rescind the National Education Association’s congressional charter and remove the false impression that federal taxpayers support the political activities of this special interest group.

 

This move would not be unprecedented, as Congress has rescinded the federal charters of other organizations over the past century. The NEA is a demonstrably radical special interest group that overwhelmingly supports left-of-center policies and policymakers.

 

   Members should conduct hearings to determine how much federal taxpayer money the NEA has used for radical causes favoring a single political party.

 

Parental Rights in Education and Safeguarding Students

   Federal officials should protect educators and students in jurisdictions under federal control from racial discrimination by reinforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and prohibiting compelled speech. Specifically, no teacher or student in Washington, D.C., public schools, Bureau of Indian Education schools, or Department of Defense schools should be compelled to believe, profess, or adhere to any idea, but especially ideas that violate state and federal civil rights laws.

 

By its very design, critical race theory has an “applied” dimension, as its found- ers state in their essays that define the theory. Those who subscribe to the theory believe that racism (in this case, treating individuals differently based on race) is appropriate—necessary, even—making the theory more than merely an analyti- cal tool to describe race in public and private life. The theory disrupts America’s Founding ideals of freedom and opportunity. So, when critical race theory is used as part of school activities such as mandatory affinity groups, teacher training programs in which educators are required to confess their privilege, or school


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

assignments in which students must defend the false idea that America is sys- temically racist, the theory is actively disrupting the values that hold communities together such as equality under the law and colorblindness.

 

   As such, lawmakers should design legislation that prevents the theory from spreading discrimination.

 

   For K–12 systems under their jurisdiction, federal lawmakers should adopt proposals that say no individual should receive punishment or benefits based on the color of their skin.

 

   Furthermore, school officials should not require students or teachers to believe that individuals are guilty or responsible for the actions of others based on race or ethnicity.

 

Educators should not be forced to discuss contemporary political issues but neither should they refrain from discussing certain subjects in an attempt to pro- tect students from ideas with which they disagree. Proposals such as this should result in robust classroom discussions, not censorship. At the state level, states should require schools to post classroom materials online to provide maximum transparency to parents.

 

   Again, specifically for K–12 systems under federal authority, Congress and the next Administration should support existing state and federal civil rights laws and add to such laws a prohibition on compelled speech.

 

Advancing Legal Protections for Parental Rights in Education

While the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts have consistently rec- ognized that parents have the right and duty to direct the care and upbringing of their children, they have not always treated parental rights as co-equal to other fundamental rights—like free speech or the free exercise of religion. As a result, some courts treat parental rights as a “second-tier” right and do not properly safe- guard these rights against government infringement. The courts vary greatly over which species of constitutional review (rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny) to apply to parental rights cases.

This uncertainty has emboldened federal agencies to promote rules and poli- cies that infringe parental rights. For example, under the Biden Administration’s proposed Title IX regulations, schools could be required to assist a child with a social or medical gender transition without parental consent or to withhold infor- mation from parents about a child’s social transition (e.g., changing their names or


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

pronouns). The federal government could demand that schools include curriculum or lessons regarding critical race or gender theory in a way that violates parental rights, especially if it requires minors to disclose information about their religious beliefs, or beliefs about race or gender in violation of the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (20 USC Sec. 1232h).

To remedy the lack of clear and robust protection for parental rights, the next Administration should:

 

   Work to pass a federal Parents’ Bill of Rights that restores parental rights to a “top-tier” right. Such legislation would give families a fair hearing in court when the federal government enforces any policy against parents in a way that undermines their right and responsibility to raise, educate, and care for their children. The law would require the government to satisfy “strict scrutiny”—the highest standard of judicial review—when the government infringes parental rights.

 

   Further ensure that any regulations that could impact parental rights contain similar protections and require federal agencies to demonstrate that their action meets strict scrutiny before a final rule is promulgated.

 

At the same time, Congress should also consider equipping parents with a private right of action. Two federal laws provide certain privacy protections for students attending educational institutions or programs funded by the department. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects the privacy of student education records and allows parents and students over the age of 18 to inspect and review the student’s education records maintained by the school and to request corrections to those records. FERPA also authorizes a number of excep- tions to this records privacy protection that allow schools to disclose the student’s education records without the consent or knowledge of the parent or student. The Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA) requires schools to obtain paren- tal consent before asking questions, including surveys, about political affiliations or beliefs; mental or psychological issues; sexual behaviors or attitudes; critical appraisals of family members; illegal or self-incriminating behavior; religious prac- tices or beliefs; privileged relationships, as with doctors and clergy; and family income, unless for program eligibility.

The difficulty for parents is that FERPA and PPRA do not authorize a private right of action. If a school refuses to comply with either statute, the only remedy is for the parent or student (if over the age of 18) to file an administrative complaint with the U.S. Department of Education, which must then work with the school to obtain compliance before taking any action to suspend or terminate federal


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financial assistance. Investigations can take months if not years. The department has never suspended or terminated the funding for an educational institution or agency for violating FERPA or PPRA. In essence, Congress has granted parents and students important statutory rights without an effective remedy to assert those rights.

   The next Administration should work with Congress to amend FERPA and PPRA to provide parents and students over the age of 18 years with a private right of action to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, together with attorneys’ fees and costs if a prevailing party, against educational institutions and agencies that violate rights enshrined in these statutes. This will empower parents and students, level the playing field between families and education bureaucracies, and encourage institutional compliance with these statutory requirements.

 

Protect Parental Rights in Policy

In addition to strengthening legal protections for parents, the next Adminis- tration should:

   Prioritize legislation advancing such rights. Promising ideas have appeared in bills introduced in the 117th Congress such as H.R.8767, the Empowering Parents Act,15 sponsored by Representative Bob Good (R-VA);

H.R. 6056, the Parents’ Bill of Rights Act,16 sponsored by Representative Julia Letlow (R-LA); and H.J.Res. 99,17 proposing an amendment to the Constitution relating to parental rights, sponsored by Representative Debbie Lesko (R-AZ).

 

   These congressional actions should be carefully reviewed to make sure they complement state Parents' Bills of Rights, such as those passed in Georgia (2022), Florida (2021), Montana (2021), Wyoming

(2017), Idaho (2015), Oklahoma (2014), Virginia (2013), and

Arizona (2010).

 

As documented by writers such as Abigail Shrier and others, the American Society of Plastic Surgeons documented a four-fold increase in the number of biological girls seeking gender surgery between 2016 and 2017. Larger increases were found in the U.K. from 2009 to 2019 and 2017 to 2018. These statistics and others point to a social contagion in which minor children, especially girls, are attempting to make life-altering decisions using puberty blockers and other hor- mone treatments and even surgeries to remove or alter vital body parts. Heritage Foundation research finds that providing easier access to such treatments and


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

surgeries without parental involvement does not reduce the suicidality of these young people and may even increase suicide rates.

 

   The next Administration should take particular note of how radical gender ideology is having a devastating effect on school-aged children today—especially young girls.

 

School officials in some states are requiring teachers and other school employ- ees to accept a minor child’s decision to assume a different “gender” while at school—without notifying parents. In California, New Jersey, and certain districts in Kansas and elsewhere, educators are prohibited from informing parents about children’s confusion over their sex if the children do not want their parents to know. Such policies allow schools to drive a wedge between parents and children. The next Administration should work with Congress to provide an example to state lawmakers by requiring K–12 districts under federal jurisdiction, including Wash- ington, D.C., public schools, Bureau of Indian Education schools, and Department of Defense schools, with legislation stating that:

 

   No public education employee or contractor shall use a name to address a student other than the name listed on a student’s birth certificate, without the written permission of a student’s parents or guardians.

 

   No public education employee or contractor shall use a pronoun in addressing a student that is different from that student’s

biological sex without the written permission of a student’s parents or guardians.

 

   No public institution may require an education employee or contractor to use a pronoun that does not match a person’s biological sex if contrary to the employee’s or contractor’s religious or moral convictions.

 

State lawmakers should use this model and adopt similar provisions for public schools within their borders. Federal lawmakers should not allow public school employees to keep secrets about a child from that child’s parents.

 

Advance School Choice Policies

The D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, a voucher program providing scholarships to children from low-income families living in the nation’s capital to attend a private school of choice, is capped at $20 million annually and limited to


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

students at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty line. The maximum schol- arship amount is $9,401 for students in kindergarten through eighth grade and

$14,102 for students in grades nine through 12. The average scholarship amount is around $10,000, or less than half of the current per-student funding amount in

D.C. Public Schools.

 

   Congress should expand eligibility to all students, regardless of income or background, and raise the scholarship amount closer to the funding students receive in D.C. Public Schools (spending per student in 2020 was $22,856).

 

   All families should be able to take their children’s taxpayer-funded education dollars to the education providers of their choosing— whether it be a public school or a private school.

 

   Congress should additionally deregulate the program by removing the requirement of private schools to administer the D.C. Public Schools assessment and allowing private schools to control their admissions processes.

 

Provide Education Choice for Populations Under the Jurisdiction of Congress

The federal government oversees three school systems that Washington should

transform into examples of quality learning environments for every child in those systems: students attending schools in Washington, D.C.; students in active-duty military families, including students attending schools operated by the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense; and students attending schools on tribal lands, which include schools under the Bureau of Indian Education. In each of these systems, federal lawmakers should allow every student the option of using an education savings account so that parents can select different education products and services to meet their child’s needs.

Nearly 50,000 students attended public schools in the District of Columbia in the 2021–2022 school year. In 2022, fourth grade math students scored 11 points lower than fourth graders in 2019, which means District children lost an entire year of learning over the course of the pandemic. Eighth graders also lost an entire year of learning in math.

 

   Federal lawmakers should offer District students the opportunity to use education savings accounts. A portion of a child’s federal education spending should be deposited in a private spending account that parents can use to pay for personal tutors, education therapists, books and curricular


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

materials, private school tuition, transportation and more—accounts modeled after the accounts in Arizona, Florida, West Virginia, and seven other states.

 

   Members of Congress should design the same account system for students in active-duty military families, including students

attending schools that receive funding under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).18

Heritage Foundation research found that if even 10 percent of the students eli- gible for accounts under such a proposal transferred from an assigned school to an education savings account, the change for the sending district would be 0.1 percent of that school district’s K–12 budget. Even in heavily impacted districts (districts with a large number of students receiving Impact Aid), the budgetary effect would be less than 2 percent. Yet these children would then have the chance to receive a customized education that meets their unique needs. As with state ESA programs, families who are homeschooling are distinct in statute from families who use an ESA to customize an education at home.

Furthermore, research from the Claremont Institute used documents pro- vided by a whistleblower demonstrating how educators at Department of Defense schools around the world are using radical gender theory and critical race theory in their lessons. This instructional material discards biology in favor of political indoctrination and applies critical race theory’s core tenets advocating for more racial discrimination. Such ideas are highly unpopular among parents, accord- ing to nationally representative surveys, and the course material attempts to indoctrinate students with radical ideas about race and the ambiguous concept of “gender.”

Finally, schools on tribal lands and under the auspices of the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) are among the worst-performing public schools in the country. Research from Rep. Burgess Owens’ office reports that the graduation rate for BIE students is 53 percent, lower than the average for Native American students in public schools around the country, and nearly 30 percentage points lower than the national average for all students. In 2015, Arizona lawmakers expanded the state’s education savings account program to include children living on tribal lands, and by 2021, nearly 400 Native American children were using the accounts.

 

   Federal officials should design a federal education savings account option for all children attending BIE schools.

 

The next Administration should make the K–12 systems under federal juris- diction examples of quality learning opportunities and education freedom.


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Washington should convert some of the lowest-performing public school systems in the country into areas defined by choices, creating rigorous learning options for all children and from all backgrounds, income levels, and ethnicities.

 

Expand Education Choice Through Portability of Existing Federal Funds

Setting education policy on the right track long term would require sunsetting the U.S. Department of Education altogether. Doing so would not result in fewer resources and less assistance for children with special needs or from low-income families. Rather, closing the federal behemoth would better target existing taxpayer resources already set aside for these students by shifting oversight responsibilities to federal and state agencies that have more expertise in helping these populations. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the federal law gov- erning taxpayer spending on K–12 students with special needs. The law stipulates that students have a right to a “free and appropriate education,” and 95 percent of children with special needs attend assigned public schools. The education is not always appropriate, however: Special education is fraught with legal battles. Some argue that the education of children with special needs is the most litigated area of K–12 education. Thus, despite a nearly 50-year-old federal law that sees regular revision and reauthorization and approximately $13.5 billion per year in federal taxpayer spending, parents still struggle to establish intervention plans for their students with public school district officials regarding the physical and educational

requirements for their children with special needs.

State-level education options often exclusively serve children with special needs for these very reasons. Florida, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina, and North Carolina, to name a few states, all have education savings accounts or K–12 private school scholarship options for children with special needs.

 

   Federal lawmakers should move IDEA oversight and implementation to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

 

   Officials should then consider revising IDEA to require that a child’s portion of the federal taxpayer spending under the law be made available to families so parents can choose how and where a child learns.

 

   IDEA already allows families to choose a private school under certain conditions, but federal officials should update the law so that families can use their child’s IDEA spending for textbooks, education therapies, personal tutors, and other learning expenses, similar to the way in which parents use education savings accounts in states such as Arizona and Florida. These micro-education savings accounts


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

would give the families of children with special needs approximately $1,800 per child to help meet a child’s unique learning needs.

   Members of Congress and the White House should consider a similar update to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Title I is the largest portion of federal taxpayer spending under this federal education law, and the section provides additional taxpayer resources to schools or groups of schools in lower income areas. Federal taxpayers committed $16.3 billion to Title I in FY 2019, spending that is dedicated to students in low-income areas of the U.S. Per student, this spending amounts to more than $1,400 for a child in a large city and approximately $1,300 for a student in a remote, rural area.19

 

Research finds, though, that this enormous investment has not produced positive results for children in need. The achievement gap between children from the highest and lowest income deciles has not improved over the past 50 years. And recent, dismal outcomes on the National Assessment of Educational Progress showed declines for all students, with math scores registering declines for the first time in history.

 

   Initially, the responsibilities for administering and overseeing Title I should be moved to HHS, along with IDEA.

 

   Students attending schools that receive Title I spending should also have access to micro-education savings accounts that allow families to choose how and where their children learn according to their needs.

 

   Parents should be allowed to use their child’s Title I resources to help pay for private learning options including tutoring services and curricular materials.

 

   Over a 10-year period, the federal spending should be phased out and states should assume decision-making control over how to provide a quality education to children from low-income families.

 

Additional School Choice Options

House Republicans included school choice in their “Commitment to America” agenda.

 

   Though actions by state lawmakers are essential and any federal policies should be strictly designed so they do not conflict with state activities, Congress could consider school choice legislation such


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

as the Educational Choice for Children Act. This bill would create a federal scholarship tax credit that would incentivize donors to contribute to nonprofit scholarship granting organizations (SGOs). Eligible families could then use that funding from the SGOs for their children’s education expenses including private school tuition, tutoring, and instructional materials.

 

ADDITIONAL K–12 REFORMS

Allowing States to Opt Out of Federal Education Programs. States should be able to opt out of federal education programs such as the Academic Partnerships Lead Us to Success (APLUS) Act. Much of the red tape and regulations that hinder local school districts are handed down from Washington. This regulatory burden far exceeds the federal government’s less than 10 percent financing share of K–12 education. In the most recent fiscal year (FY 2022), states and localities financed 93 percent of K–12 education costs, and the federal government just 7 percent. That 7 percent share should not allow the federal government to dictate state and local education policy.

   To restore state and local control of education and reduce the bureaucratic and compliance burden, Congress should allow states to opt out of the dozens of federal K–12 education programs authorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and instead allow states to put their share of federal funding toward any lawful education purpose under state law. This policy has been advanced over the years via a proposal known as the Academic Partnerships Lead Us to Success (APLUS) Act.

 

HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM

 

HEA: Accreditation Reform

Congress established two primary responsibilities for the U.S. Department of Education in the HEA: 1) to ensure the “administrative capacity and financial responsibility” of colleges and universities that accept Title IV funds; and 2) to ensure the quality of those institutions. Congress did not endow the Department of Education with the authority to involve itself in academic quality issues relating to colleges and universities that participate in the Title IV student aid program; the HEA allows the agency only to recognize accreditors, which are then supposed to provide quality assurance measures.

Unfortunately, the Biden Administration has followed closely in the footsteps of the Obama Administration by engaging in a politically motivated and incon- sistent administration of the accrediting agency recognition process. As a result, accreditors have transformed into de facto government agents. Despite claims by


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

the department and accreditation agencies that accreditation is voluntary, the fact that Americans are denied access to an otherwise widely available entitle- ment benefit if the institution “elects” to not be accredited makes accreditation anything but voluntary. Today, accreditation determines whether Americans can access federal student aid benefits, transfer academic credits, enroll in higher-level degree programs, and even qualify for federal employment.

Unnecessarily focused on schools in a specific geographic region, institutional accreditation reviews have also become wildly expensive audits by academic “peers” that stifle innovation and discourage new institutions of higher education. Of par- ticular concern are efforts by many accreditation agencies to leverage their Title IV (student loans and grants) gatekeeper roles to force institutions to adopt policies that have nothing to do with academic quality assurance and student outcomes. One egregious example of this is the extent to which accreditors have forced col- leges and universities, many of them faith-based institutions, to adopt diversity, equity, and inclusion policies that conflict with federal civil rights laws, state laws, and the institutional mission and culture of the schools. Perhaps more distress- ingly, accreditors, while professing support for academic freedom and campus free speech, have presided over a precipitous decline in both over the past decade. Despite maintaining criteria that demand such policies, accreditors have done nothing to dampen the illiberal chill that has swept across American campuses over the past decade.

The current system is not working. A radical overhaul of the HEA’s accreditation requirements is thus in order. The next Administration should work with Congress to amend the HEA and should consider the following reforms:

 

   Prohibit accreditation agencies from leveraging their Title IV gatekeeper role to mandate that educational institutions adopt diversity, equity, and inclusion policies.

 

   Protect the sovereignty of states to decide governance and leadership issues for their state-supported colleges and universities by prohibiting accreditation agencies from intruding upon the governance of state-supported educational institutions.

 

   Protect faith-based institutions by prohibiting accreditation agencies from:

 

1.        Requiring standards and criteria that undermine the religious beliefs of, or require policies or conduct that conflict with, the religious mission or religious beliefs of the institution; and


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

2.        Intruding on the governance of colleges and universities controlled by a religious organization.

 

   Revamp the system for recognizing accreditation agencies for Title IV purposes by removing the department’s monopoly on recognition by (1) authorizing states to recognize accreditation agencies for Title IV gatekeeping purposes and/or (2) authorizing state agencies to act as accreditation agencies for institutions throughout the United States.

 

The next Administration and Congress might also consider amending the HEA to remove accreditors from the program triad entirely to allow accreditation to return to its original role of voluntary quality assurance. This would permit accreditors to put some “teeth” back into their standards without creating high- stakes disasters, such as institutional loss of Title IV access through paperwork submission errors, a state exercising its constitutional authority to administer its public colleges and universities, or an institution freely exercising the religious beliefs of its founders. With this option, neither the department nor the states would oversee or recognize accrediting agencies. The department’s role would be limited to evaluating the institution’s compliance with federal accounting requirements pursuant to evaluations conducted by appropriately credentialed auditors who have no conflicts of interest in performing the review paid for by the federal agency charged with overseeing compliance—not the institutions being reviewed.

 

HEA: Student Loans

   Beyond immediate policy moves and rulemaking to end the current Administration’s abuse of the department’s payment pause and HEA loan forgiveness programs, the department should work with

Congress to overhaul the federal student loan program for the benefit of taxpayers and students.

 

The federal government does not have the proper incentives to make sound lending decisions. The new Administration should consider:

 

   Privatizing all lending programs, including subsidized, unsubsidized, and PLUS loans (both Grad and Parent). This would allow for market prices and signals to influence educational borrowing, introducing consumer-driven accountability into higher education. Pell grants should retain their current voucher-like structure.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

If privatizing student lending is not feasible, then the next Administration should consider the following reforms:

 

   Switch to fair-value accounting from FCRA accounting.

 

   Consolidate all federal loan programs into one new program that

a) utilizes income-driven repayment, b) includes no interest rate subsidies or loan forgiveness, c) includes annual and aggregate limits on borrowing, and d) includes skin in the game to hold colleges accountable.

 

   Eliminate Grad PLUS loans (for graduate students) and Parent PLUS loans (for parents of undergraduates).

 

Graduate students are already eligible for unsubsidized Stafford student loans; Grad PLUS loans are redundant. They also lack some of the safeguards of Stafford loans, such as annual and aggregate borrowing limits. Parent PLUS loans are also redundant because there are many privately provided alternatives available.

 

   The Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, which prioritizes government and public sector work over private sector employment, should be terminated.

 

Whatever Congress chooses to do with future loans, there is still the question of the government’s responsible stewardship of the existing student loan portfolio—a substantial taxpayer asset. The current Administration has recklessly engaged in the policy fetish of forgiving and canceling student loans with abandon.

 

   The next Administration should work with Congress to amend the HEA to ensure that no Administration engages in this kind of abuse in the future.

 

   Specifically, the new Administration should urge the Congress to amend the HEA to abrogate, or substantially reduce, the power of the Secretary to cancel, compromise, discharge, or forgive the principal balances of Title IV student loans, as well as to modify in any material way the repayment amounts or terms of Title IV student loans.

 

   Further, the next Administration should propose that Congress amend the HEA to remove the department’s authority to forgive loans based on borrower defense to repayment; instead, the department


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

should be authorized to discharge loans only in instances where clear and convincing evidence exists to demonstrate that an educational institution engaged in fraud toward a borrower in connection with his or her enrollment in the institution and the student’s educational program or activity at the institution.

 

Cap indirect costs at universities. Currently, the federal government pays a por- tion of the overhead expenses associated with university-based research. Known as “indirect costs,” these reimbursements cross-subsidize leftist agendas and the research of billion-dollar organizations such as Google and the Ford Foundation. Universities also use this influx of cash to pay for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) efforts. To correct course,

 

   Congress should cap the indirect cost rate paid to universities so that it does not exceed the lowest rate a university accepts from a private organization to fund research efforts. This market-

based reform would help reduce federal taxpayer subsidization of leftist agendas.

 

NEW REGULATIONS

 

Attacking the Accreditation Cartel

For a college to participate in federal financial aid programs, it must be accred- ited, but accreditors have been abusing their quasi-regulatory power to impose non-educational requirements and ideological preferences on colleges.

 

   The Secretary of Education should refuse to recognize all accreditors that abuse their power.

 

   New accreditors should also be encouraged to start up.

 

Confronting the Chinese Communist Party’s Influence on Higher Education According to media reports, more than 100 universities in the U.S. received nearly $100 billion in gifts and grants from China-based sources between 2013 and 2020. Much of this money derives from the Chinese Communist Party and

its proxies. The next Administration must

 

   Reverse the Biden Administration’s refusal to enforce Section 117 of the HEA, which directs colleges and universities to report gifts from, and contracts with, sources outside the U.S. worth

$250,000 or more.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

   Investigate postsecondary institutions that fail to honor their Section 117 obligations and make appropriate referrals to DOJ.

 

   Work with Congress to amend the HEA to tie the HEA’s foreign source reporting requirements to an institution's ability to receive federal financial assistance, particularly participation in programs funded under Titles IV and VI of the HEA.

 

Allowing Competency-Based Education to Flourish

Competency-based education is a promising approach that could provide a high-quality and affordable education to many students. Since the credit hour, which measures the time in the classroom, is inappropriate for such programs, the direct assessment method was introduced to allow competen- cy-based programs to participate in the federal financial aid programs. However, overregulation has hampered the usage of direct assessment, with the lead- ing competency-based university choosing to instead convert their courses into credit hours for compliance purposes. One of the leading obstacles is the requirement that courses include “regular and substantive” interaction between faculty and students.

 

   New regulations should clarify the definition and requirements of regular and substantive interaction for competency-based education, as well as for online programs.

 

Reforming “Area Studies” Funding

   Congress should wind down so-called “area studies” programs at universities (Title VI of the HEA), which, although intended to serve American interests, sometimes fund programs that run counter to those interests.

 

   In the meantime, the next Administration should promulgate a new regulation to require the Secretary of Education to

allocate at least 40 percent of funding to international business programs that teach about free markets and economics and require institutions, faculty, and fellowship recipients to certify that they intend to further the stated statutory goals of serving American interests.


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

NEW EXECUTIVE ORDERS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ISSUE

 

Guidance Documents

   The President should immediately reinstate and reissue Executive Order 13891: Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9, 2019), and Executive Order 13892: Promoting the Rule of Law Through

Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication (Oct. 15, 2019).

 

These executive orders required all federal agencies to treat guidance documents as non-binding in law and practice and also forbade federal agencies from imposing new standards of conduct on persons outside the executive branch through guid- ance documents. They required all federal agencies to apply regulations and statutes instead of guidance documents in any enforcement action. President Biden revoked these executive orders on January 20, 2021, demonstrating that these executive orders effectively restrained the abuses of an expansive administrative state.

   Require APA notice and comment. The President should issue an executive order requiring the Office for Civil Rights’ Case Processing Manual to go through APA (Administrative Procedures Act) notice and comment.

   Protect the First Amendment. The President should issue an executive order requiring grant applications (SF-424 series) to contain assurances that the applicant will uphold the First Amendment in funded programs and work.

   Minimize bachelor’s degree requirements. The President should issue an executive order stating that a college degree shall not be required for any federal job unless the requirements of the job specifically demand it.

   Eliminate the “list of shame.” Educational institutions can claim a religious exemption with the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education from the strictures of Title IX. In 2016, the Obama Administration published on the Department of Education’s website a

list of colleges that had applied for the exemption. This “list of shame” of faith-based colleges, as it came to be known, has since been archived on ED’s website, still publicly available. The President should issue an executive order removing the archived list and preventing such a list from being published in the future.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

NEW AGENCY POLICIES THAT DON’T REQUIRE NEW LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS TO ENACT

 

Transparency of FERPA and PPRA Complaints

   The Department of Education should be transparent about complaints filed on behalf of families regarding the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA).

 

   At the same time, the Department of Education should develop a portal and resources for parents on their rights under FERPA

and PPRA. This portal should also contain an explanation of the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) and public school procedures to demonstrate that the law does not deprive parents of their right to access any school health records.

 

The D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program

In 2011, Congress added new requirements to the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program stating that participating private schools must submit to site visits by the program administrator, inform prospective students about the school’s accreditation status, mandate that teachers of core subjects have bachelor’s degrees, and require participating students to take some form of nationally norm-referenced test. Notably, the 2011 reauthorization also required, for the first time, that participating private schools be accredited or be on a path to accreditation. The 2017 reauthorization went further, requiring that each participating school supply a certificate of accreditation to the administering entity upon program entry, demonstrating that the school is fully accredited before being allowed to participate. The list of approved accreditors is entirely too small to serve the mission of the diverse schools in the nation’s capital.

 

   Although the accreditation regulations should be removed entirely by Congress, in the meantime, the next President should issue an executive order expanding the list of allowable accreditors.

 

Transparency Around Program Performance and DEI Influence

The next President should issue a series of executive orders requiring:

 

   An accounting of how federal programs/grants spread DEI/CRT/ gender ideology,

 

   A review of outcomes for GEAR UP and the 21st Century grants programs,


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

   The reissuing of the report on school safety from 2018 with updated information,

 

   The release of a report to Congress on how to consolidate the department and trim nonessential employees,

 

   A report on the negative influence of action civics on students’ understanding of history and civics and their disposition toward the United States,

 

   An update of the Coleman report to show the impact of family structure on student achievement,

 

   A full accounting of CARES Act education expenditures, and

 

   A report on how many dollars make their way to the classroom in every federal education grant and program.

 

Pursue Antitrust Against Accreditors

   The President should issue an executive order pursuing antitrust against college accreditors, especially the American Bar Association (ABA).

 

NEW POLICIES/REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES AND/OR THE WHITE HOUSE

The department must coordinate any rulemaking with the White House, the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOJ, and other agencies that share responsibility with the department in the administration or enforcement of stat- ute, such as Titles VI and IX. Moreover, regarding regulations arising under civil rights laws administered by the department, Executive Order 12550 requires the Attorney General to approve final regulations; the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights must approve notices of proposed rulemaking.

 

Organizational Issues

Historical Budget Information. Congressional appropriations for the U.S. Department of Education have risen from $14 billion in 1980 to $95.5 billion in 2021, an astounding increase, especially in light of the lack of improvements in student outcomes.

Recommend Budget Cuts, Shifts, and Augmentations, If Any. Transferring most of the programs at the U.S. Department of Education to other agencies and eliminating duplicative and ineffective programs would yield significant taxpayer


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

 

CHART 4

U.S. Department of Education, Total Appropriations

IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

$120

 

 

$100

 

 

$80

 

 

$60

 

 

$40

 

 

$20

 


$0

1980


1985


1990


1995


2000


2005


2010


2015


2020


 

NOTE: Totals include mandatory and discretionary appropriations.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, “Budget History Tables,” Education Department Budget History Table, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html (accessed March 17, 2023).

 

A heritage.org


 

savings. The proposal would immediately save more than $17 billion annually in various programs. Savings over a decade would be far more robust, as the revenue responsibility for many formula grant programs would be returned to the states. Some highlights include:

 

   Eliminate competitive grant programs and reduce spending on formula grant programs. Competitive grant programs operated by the Department of Education should be eliminated, and federal spending should be reduced to reflect remaining formula grant programs authorized under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)

and the handful of other programs that do not fall under the competitive/ project grant category. Remaining programs managed by the Department


2025 Presidential Transition Project

 

of Education, such as large formula grant programs for K–12 education, should be reduced by 10 percent. This would cut approximately 29 programs, most of which are discretionary spending. In total, this would generate approximately $8.8 billion in savings.

   Eliminate the PLUS loan program. As mentioned above, the PLUS loan program, which provides graduate student loans and loans to the parents of undergraduate students, should be eliminated. This would generate an estimated $2.3 billion in savings.

   End time-based and occupation-based student loan forgiveness. A low estimate suggests ending current student loan forgiveness schemes would save taxpayers $370 billion.

   Eliminate GEAR-UP. It is not the responsibility of the federal government to provide taxpayer dollars to create a pipeline from high school to college. GEAR UP should be eliminated, and its functions should instead be handled privately or at the state and local levels, where policymakers are better equipped to increase college preparedness within their school districts.

 

Personnel

The Department of Education currently employs approximately 4,400 indi- viduals. As programs are eliminated or transferred to other agencies, those employees whose positions are determined to be essential to the mission would move with their constituent programs. Current salaries and expenses at ED total

$2.2 billion annually.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Jonathan Butcher, Bob Eitel, Jim Blew, Diane Auer Jones, Erin Valdez, Andrew Gillen, and Max Eden deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.


Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise

 

ENDNOTES

1.                Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education (1955), https://la.utexas.edu/users/ hcleaver/330T/350kPEEFriedmanRoleOfGovttable.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023).

2.                Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Public Law 89-10.

3.                Higher Education Act of 1965, Public Law 89-329.

4.                 Elementary and Secondary Schools Emergency Relief Funds.

5.                Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Public Law 93-112.

6.                Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Public Law 94-142.

7.                 Perkins Career and Technical Education Acts, Perkins IV, Public Law 109-270.

8.                S. 510, Department of Education Organization Act, Public Law 96-88.

9.                Ambassador Susan Rice, Gene Sperling, and Clarence Wardell III, Advancing Equity through the American Rescue Plan, pg. 26. May 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ADVANCING- EQUITY-THROUGH-THE-AMERICAN-RESCUE-PLAN.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023).

10.           U.S. Department of Education, Overview and Mission Statement, https://www2.ed.gov/about/landing. jhtml#:~:text=ED's%20mission%20is%20to%20promote,offices%20from%20several%20federal%20agencies   (accessed February 28, 2023).

11.           Jonathan Butcher, “Who Signs Your Paycheck?” Education Next, https://www.educationnext.org/who-signs- your-paycheck-federal-influence-state-education-agencies/#_edn1 (last updated, April 9, 2018).

12.           Education at a Crossroads: What Works and What’s Wasted in Education Today, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 17, 1998, pp. xiii and xiv.

13.           Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2015).

14.           20 U.S.C. §6571. Under subchapter I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged) and Section 20 U.S.C. §1022f; 20 U.S.C. §1098a. Under Title 20, Section 1098a, of the U.S. Code, the Secretary is authorized to waive the requirement for negotiated rulemaking if he or she “determines that applying such a requirement with respect to given regulations is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest (within the meaning of section 553(b)(3)(B) of [the APA]), and publishes the basis for such determination in the Federal Register at the same time as the

proposed regulations in question are first published.” 20 U.S.C. §1098a(b)(2). Congressional Research Service, “Negotiated Rulemaking: In Brief,” April 12, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46756 (accessed March 13, 2023).

15.           H.R. 8767, Empowering Parents Act, 117th Congress.

16.           H.R. 5, Parents Bill of Rights Act.

17.           H.J.Res. 99, Public Law 115-30.

18.           National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.

19.           National Center for Education Statistics, “Fast Facts: Title I,” https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=158 (accessed February 28, 2023).

 

 

Heritage Foundation - Politico - Bureau Labor Statistic - Market Watch - Statistic Highest Rate - American Presidency Project

Thống Kê Việc Làm Và Thất Nghiệp Từ 1980-2023 - https://gop.com/about-our-party/ - Neo Marx - New Left

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fredric_Jameson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterculture_of_the_1960s - Joe Mac Carthy- Ame Enterprise Institute

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/museums/hrnm/Education/EducationWebsiteRebuild/RussianPropagandaAboutGermany/

https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/difference-between-communism-capitalism-and-socialism/

https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/082415/pros-and-cons-capitalist-vs-socialist-economies.asp

https://www.oneplace.com/ministries/changing-worldviews/read/articles/difference-between-socialism-and-communism-9441.html

https://www.crossingbordersnk.org/communism-and-dictatorship-in-north-korea?utm_source=google&utm_medium=ppc&utm_id=google-ad-grant&gad_source]

https://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=13056&gad_source=

https://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/engl_258/lecture%20notes/capitalism%20etc%20defined.htm

https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/difference-between-capitalism-socialism-and-communism

Capitalism-and-Communism-same-goal/

Online.Hillsdale.Edu/Marxism-Socialism-Communism?

 

 

THÁNG 4-2024

 

THÁNG 3-2024

 

 

MINH THỊ

LỊCH SỬ ĐÃ CHỨNG MINH, KHÔNG MỘT ĐÁM NGOẠI NHÂN NÀO YÊU THƯƠNG ĐẤT NƯỚC, DÂN TỘC CỦA CHÚNG TA NẾU CHÍNH CHÚNG TA KHÔNG BIẾT YÊU THƯƠNG LẤY ĐẤT NƯỚC VÀ DÂN TỘC CỦA MÌNH. 

DÂN TỘC VIỆT NAM PHẢI TỰ QUYẾT ĐỊNH LẤY VẬN MỆNH CỦA MÌNH CHỨ KHÔNG THỂ VAN NÀI, CẦU XIN ĐƯỢC TRỞ THÀNH QUÂN CỜ PHỤC VỤ CHO LỢI ÍCH CỦA NGOẠI BANG VÀ NHỮNG THẾ LỰC QUỐC TẾ. 

 

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