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BACK FROM THE DEAD:Former South Vietnamese commandos (left to right) Sang Xuan Nguyen, Bui Quang
Cat, Son Van Ha, and Hoc Van Mai, meet at Mai's San Jose home to discuss the
U.S. Senate action granting the commandos $20 million in reparation payments.
photo by Vu Van Loc
by Bert Eljera
Back in the
summer of 1967, Son Van Ha was an adventurous 19-year-old South Vietnamese Army
commando eager to do battle with the North Vietnamese Communists.
He was a member
of an elite unit, called spy commandos, trained by the CIA to conduct
intelligence and sabotage missions deep into North Vietnam.
On his first
mission, however, Ha and his 10-man team, which included two American officers,
were captured by the North Vietnamese while gathering information on enemy troop
movements near the North Vietnam-Laos border.
For the next 20
years, Ha endured "barbaric" conditions at a North Vietnamese prison. But worst
of all, he was declared dead, virtually forgotten by the U.S. government that
financed his mission.
Ha was finally
released from prison in 1987, 12 years after the Vietnam War ended. Lost,
middle-aged, and his parents both dead, Ha wandered about in Ho Chi Minh City
until arriving in the United States in 1994.
Now living in
Atlanta, Ha, 48, is among 281 former commandos seeking compensation from the
U.S. government, which had refused to acknowledge their existence throughout the
Vietnam War and for years afterward.
But, a lawsuit in
1986 and recent declassified military documents have uncovered the "Lost
Commandos." Last week, in a dramatic move, the U.S. Senate authorized a $20
million reparations program for the commandos.
Using words like
"atrocity," "betrayal," and "indefensible" in describing the men's treatment by
the U.S. government, the senators voted to provide lump-sum payments of up to
$40,000, or $2,000 a year for every year the commando was in prison.
"This conduct [by
U.S. government officials] seems to be totally indefensible," said Sen. Alan
Specter, R-Pa., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which conducted
hearings on the commandos. "I have grave doubts that this money is enough. This
conduct is criminal."
Sen. John Kerry,
D-Mass., a decorated Vietnam veteran, introduced legislation that would provide
the reparation payments. His bill applies specifically to South Vietnamese
commandos who infiltrated North Vietnam to gather intelligence and conduct
sabotage missions.
Kerry's bill is
attached as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill of 1997, which
President Clinton has promised to support. The House of Representatives has yet
to approve the bill.
About half of the
surviving commandos are already in the United States, said Ha, who was in San
Jose last week to meet with former commandos living in the Bay Area. Although
more than 80 are still in Vietnam, all commandos and the heirs of those who have
died will be eligible for the reparation payments, according to Ha.
"It's not the
money that we care about," said Ha, who is general secretary of the Vietnamese
Community of Georgia, which assists Vietnamese refugees. "We were written off as
dead, but we want the U.S. government to recognize us."
Moreover, Ha said
they want the former commandos still in Vietnam and their families to be allowed
to immigrate to the United States.
"It's the
least the U.S. can do," said Ha, who testified before the U.S. Senate last week.
"I'm 48, and I'm probably the youngest. The others are in their 50s and 60s,
some in their 70s. We can't get our lives back, but we can regain our honor."
A former U.S.
Army intelligence officer has been credited for bringing the plight of the
former commandos to public attention in the United States.
Sedgwick
Tourison, who served in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand during the Vietnam War, came
back in 1983 to work at the Pentagon as a civilian intelligence officer dealing
with POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia.
The reports of
POW sightings led nowhere, but Tourison, who is married to a Vietnamese, kept
receiving information about South Vietnamese commandos apparently
abandoned after they were captured by the North Vietnamese.
In 1985, he met
his first commando: Le Van Ngung, who was captured in 1967, had just arrived in
Baltimore. Through Ngung, Tourison met other commandos.
"Neither Ngung
nor I had any idea at the time what really happened," Tourison said in a
telephone interview last week from his home in Crofton, Md., just outside
Annapolis, where he now works as a master jeweler.
"It became a
puzzle," he said. "The puzzle was partially solved in 1992 when a top secret
history of the commando operations was declassified in a joint decision by the
CIA, the defense department, and the department of state."
Tourison
worked with the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in
Action from 1991 to 1993, allowing him the opportunity to review the secret
commando program.
From the
declassified military documents and interviews with the commandos, Tourison
wrote a book, titled Secret Army, Secret War, which was published by the Naval
Institute Press in 1995.
"It was
obvious that these people should have been compensated and this was something
the government has covered up for 30 years,"Tourison said. "I believe there was a reason to go to court."
While working
with the Select Committee on POWs and MIAs, Tourison met John C. Mattes, a Miami
lawyer and staff attorney of the committee.
When their
services with the committee ended, Tourison and Mattes decided to work together
on behalf of the commandos. Mattes filed a suit for reparations with the U.S.
Claims Court in April 1995, and Tourison continued to contact former commandos
in the United States, Vietnam, and other countries.
Tourison said
that nearly 200 former commandos are living overseas: 190 in the U.S.; one in
China; one in Denmark; one in Holland; three in Australia; and one in Thailand.
There are 89 left in Vietnam.
In addition, he
said he has located 93 widows and heirs of dead commandos. The North Vietnamese
government announced in 1995 that they had captured or killed 463 commandos.
Tourison, who
testified before the U.S. Senate last week, said that regardless of where the
commandos or their heirs are living right now, they are all entitled to
compensation.
"It's the
right thing to do," Tourison said. "We lied to them."
Mattes said he
is confident the U.S. Congress will approve the reparations program. If that
happens, the suit with the U.S. Claims Court would be withdrawn.Otherwise, he
will pursue the lawsuit, which he claims now has an excellent chance of being
decided in his favor, following the Senate action and the release of recent
declassified documents.
This month, the
Pentagon has released employment records of the commandos, confirming that they
were paid salaries and other benefits by the U.S. government, he said.
"The secret
was preserved up through 1993," said Mattes, who now practices law in Miami.
"The fundamental question for the court is: Will we acknowledge them and their
place in history? To acknowledge them is to pay them."
The Pentagon, the
U.S. Department of Justice, and the CIA have asked the U.S. Claims Court to
dismiss the suit.
It was a similar
claim for benefits by a former commando that brought the story of the Vietnamese
commandos to public attention in the United States for the first time.
In 1986, Vu Duc
Guong, who escaped from a Communist prison in 1980 and made his way to the
United States, filed a claim for about $500,000 in back wages and interest with
the U.S. Claims Court.
In addition,
Guong sought $21 million in damages because the United States was obligated to
repatriate him from a North Vietnamese prison and had failed to do so, according
to his lawyer, Anthony J. Murray Jr. of Chicago.
But the U.S.
Claims Court dismissed the suit, ruling that Goung had participated in an
undercover operation sponsored by the U.S. government, and no action can be
brought to enforce a secret contract.
The ruling was
based on an 1875 U.S. Supreme Court decision that barred the estate of a spy for
Abraham Lincoln from collecting payment for work performed during the Civil War.
"Both employer
and agent must have understood that the lips of the other were to be forever
sealed," the high court ruled.
But Mattes argues
that the veil of secrecy has since been lifted because some of the Pentagon
documents have been declassified and the fate of the commandos has been
published in books and newspaper articles.
Mattes suggests
that acknowledging the existence of the commandos would alter the widely
accepted view that the U.S. escalated the war as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin
incident on Aug. 2, 1964.
North Vietnamese
patrol boats allegedly attacked the U.S. destroyer USS Maddox without
provocation, leading to the congressional passage of the Tonkin Resolution that
allowed then-President Lyndon Johnson to step up American involvement in
Vietnam.
Declassified
documents now show that South Vietnamese commandos operated in the area under
the direction of the Americans.
"The U.S. always
want to portray the Vietnam War as a war we were just assisting," Mattes said.
"But I'm not here to say what caused what. I only represent the commandos, not
interpret history. "I felt there was an injustice to look for [American] POWs
and forget those who served with us just because they were Asian," he added.
One commando,
Sang Xuan Nguyen, now 61, said he was captured by the North Vietnamese in
December 1963, well before the Tonkin incident.
A 28-year-old
South Vietnamese Army sergeant at the time, Nguyen said he volunteered for the
commando unit because of the extra pay and the prestige of being a member of the
elite force.
The commandos
were paid three times the amount of ordinary South Vietnamese soldiers. They
could wear any military uniform they wished, had no military ranks, and were
granted privileges such as chauffeur-driven cars.
Nguyen said the
training was secret and rigorous. He said he was trained as a communication
expert for nine months before being dropped in North Vietnam as a member of a
seven-man intelligence unit.
The unit was
captured within a week before it could accomplish its mission, Nguyen said. "It
looked like Hanoi knew what was going on," he said. "There was an information
leak from the south."
His unit was
taken to a local jail in Quang Binh Province, Nguyen said. A military court
tried them as traitors, and each was sentenced to 20 years in jail.
Nguyen was
released in 1983, but three members of his team died in prison. "It was
terrible," Nguyen said through an interpreter. "For the first 10 years, we were
never allowed outside for fear that we would escape."
Even after the
war ended in 1975, he said they were placed in single cells and shackled. "It
was terrible," he said. "The food was not fit for humans."
His family was
told he was dead. His four children, including a daughter who was born after his
capture in 1963, were all grown up when he returned 20 years later. His wife had
remarried.
"I lost
everything," said Nguyen, who arrived in the United States just last week and
now lives with friends in San Jose.
Ha, Nguyen, and
others like them were recruited to join a program dubbed "Operation Plan-34
Alpha," which the CIA began in 1961, according to the declassified documents.
Over the next
decade, the CIA spent more than $100 million to train and send about 500
Vietnamese agents to infiltrate North Vietnam, but most ended up in prison
camps.
One declassified
report contains testimony before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which those
responsible for the plan knew the men were prisoners but decided to tell their
families they were killed to reduce program costs.
"We reduced the
number [on the payroll] gradually by declaring so many of them dead each month
until we had written them off and removed them from the monthly payroll," Marine
Col. John J. Windsor testified.
Ha said he
himself was declared dead and his parents were paid, although he did not know
how much.
"I saw the
document with my father's signature on it that said he received my death
benefits," said Ha, who was an only child. His parents are now both dead.
But what the
Pentagon officials did not anticipate was for many former commandos, such as Ha,
to survive the prison camps and make their way to the United States.
"These commandos
are no longer young," Tourison said, adding that one commando now living in
Stockton is 82 years old. "They cannot wait another 30 years. They need help
now."
But some defense
officials argue that providing back-pay to the Vietnamese commandos would set a
bad precedent. This might open the door for other forces supported by the U.S.
government, such as the Contras of Nicaragua and the Cubans in the Bay of Pigs,
to seek compensation.
In his testimony
before the U.S. Senate last week, retired Army Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, who
was a colonel in 1965 headed the defense department unit that wrote off the
commandos, said the Vietnamese commandos are not entitled to compensation.
"They were
recruited by the Vietnamese," Singlaub said. "We were less than a full partner
in this particular operation."
Singlaub said the
program was a failure from the start because a spy had infiltrated it and was
sending information to the North Vietnamese.
But Mattes and
Tourison insist that that was not an excuse to leave the commandos behind and
not work for their release when the U.S. signed the agreement with North Vietnam
ending the war in 1975.
"We knew exactly
what happened to them," Mattes said. "And we lied to their families."
This "betrayal"
is the hardest to accept, according to Hoc Van Mai, 55, who is also now a San
Jose resident..
"We fought a
secret war," said Mai, a logistical officer with the South Vietnamese Army when
he joined the commandos in 1963. "We had no name, no fame, and when it was over,
we were abandoned."
Mai spent 20
years in a Communist labor camp, escaped in 1982, but was arrested again after
trying to organize opposition to the Vietnamese government.
After spending
four more years in prison, he escaped again. In 1985, Mai joined the exodus of
boat people leaving Vietnam. After one year at a refugee camp in the
Philippines, he was admitted into the U.S.
For the past
three years, he has been active in rallying support for the commandos. He joined
in the class-action suit to force the U.S. government to recognize them.
"We have to raise
the issue and tell our story," said Mai, who hosted the meeting last week with
Ha and other commandos at his San Jose home.
But telling the
story is still an emotional and gut-wrenching experience for most commandos.
Many have refused to open up, even to their family members.
Bui Quang Cat,
56, who lives in San Jose with his wife and two children, still finds it
difficult to describe the 17 years he spent in a Communist labor camp.
"He does not want
his family to know the pain he endured in prison," said Phan Nguyen, a family
friend.
With Nguyen
interpreting, Bui said he was only 26 years old, a civilian employee of the
South Vietnamese Information Ministry, when he was sent as a spy into North
Vietnam in 1966. He was captured within a month, after the North Vietnamese were
apparently tipped off about his mission.
"I don't mind
that I was captured; it was war," Bui said. "But, at least our sacrifices should
have been recognized."
For Ha, who now
works as a forklift operator in Atlanta, the gung-ho spirit of his youth is all
gone. The "barbaric Communist prison has seen to that.
He was captured
just a few days after his team was dropped near Laos. His team leader, an
American officer, was beaten to death while they were being transported to
Hanoi.
Some members of
his team were released back in 1973, but he stayed until 1987. Even after the
war ended in 1975, he was shackled and kept in solitary confinement.
Chain Reaction:
Filipino WWII veterans chained themselves in front of the White House
last July to protest the delay in benefits. South Vietnamese and Laotian
vets have joined them in demands for equal veterans benefits.
Veterans benefits become a key civil rights issue for APA groups
BY BERT
ELJERA
Filipino
soldiers fought in some of the fiercest battles in the Pacific during World War
II. And when their American commanders ordered them to surrender to the invading
Japanese forces, they endured the infamous "Bataan Death March." Later, many of
them took to the hills and waged a guerrilla war. After the war, they were
declared ineligible for benefits under the G.I. Bill and other laws. Now more
than 50 years later, they are still seeking formal recognition as U.S. veterans
as well as the accompanying benefits. South Vietnamese commandos were recruited
by the Central Intelligence Agency for sabotage and intelligence missions deep
inside North Vietnam. When they were captured, their U.S. officers declared them
dead and forgot about them until long after the end of the Vietnam War. They
were on the Pentagon payroll and never formally discharged from military
service, yet they are not considered U.S. veterans.
Laotians and
Hmongs are a gentle people, proud of their independence and simple ways.
American officers recruited them to fight the Communists and help rescue downed
U.S. pilots during the Vietnam War. They were lauded for their bravery, loyalty,
and fierce anti-communist spirit. But they too are not considered U.S. veterans
and, in fact, could now lose their primary source of sustenance--food stamps.
All of these soldiers are Asians. All fought under the U.S. flag. Yet none
receives benefits enjoyed by other U.S. veterans. More and more are asking for
an explanation. The answer is as complicated as the era in which the United
States was at war. World War II was fought more than a half-century ago. Most
Americans do not have a recollection of that conflict. The Vietnam War does not
conjure happy memories for the American public; it might as well be forgotten.
Advocates within the Asian American community say that political expediency, the
enormous cost, and public apathy have conspired to push these veteran's issues
off of the nation's radar screens. Some say it's a question of fairness that
national leaders have yet to fully address. And time is running out.
"When we ask
someone to stand with us, fight with us under our flag, we should not turn and
run away from them when they seek our assistance," said John Mattes, a Miami
lawyer who is spearheading the effort to obtain veteran status for former South
Vietnamese soldiers. "That is cowardly."
A little
history helps to clarify the issues. In the case of Filipino veterans, they were
inducted into the U.S. Army under a military order issued by President Roosevelt
on July 26, 1941. At that time, the Philippine Islands were a colony of the
United States. About 120,000 members of the Commonwealth Armed Forces of the
Philippines were merged with the 12,000-strong Philippine Scouts and 10,000 U.S.
Army regulars to form the first line of defense against the advancing Japanese.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the troops made a stand at Bataan
and Corrigidor. The Filipino soldiers, fighting side by side with their U.S.
comrades, held off the Japanese for five months, allowing the U.S. to prepare
for the defense of Australia and the eastern Pacific. When Bataan and Corrigidor
fell in 1942, many of the Filipino soldiers became guerrilla fighters, harassing
the Japanese and providing intelligence information to their American officers.
Their work helped smooth the return of Gen. Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines
to liberate the islands in 1944. In the latter part of 1945, the U.S. Veterans
Administration (VA) tried to determine how much it would cost to provide
veterans benefits to the Filipino soldiers. The VA administrator at the time,
Gen. Omar Bradley, estimated that it would cost the U.S. $3.2 billion to
compensate the veterans and eligible family members.
Because of the
enormous cost, the U.S. Congress decided to pass the Rescission Act of 1946,
stating that military service under the Philippine colonial government was not
considered active service in the U.S. Armed Forces.
The U.S.
Congress allocated $200 million for partial benefits, including service-related
disability, death, and life insurance. The Filipino veterans were classified
under four categories: Regular Philippine Scouts, who enlisted with the U.S.
Armed Forces before Oct. 6, 1945; Special Philippine Scouts, whose service began
on or after Oct. 6, 1945; and members of the Commonwealth Army of the
Philippines. The fourth category recognized guerrillas, who supported U.S.
forces from April 1942 to June 1946. In all, nearly 200,000 Filipinos fought
under the U.S. flag. About 70,000, now mostly in their 70s and 80s, are still
alive, . Only the Regular Philippine Scouts receive the full range of veterans
benefits, while those in the other categories receive 50 cents for every dollar
authorized in monetary compensation.
Patrick Ganio,
who heads the Washington, D.C-based American Coalition for Filipino Veterans
(ACFV), said Filipinos were singled out for denial of full benefits, while
116,000 alien veterans from 66 foreign countries that fought in the same
situation were granted full benefits. "Unless and until the law is rectified to
correct the wrong done to Filipino veterans, the claim for equalized benefits
remain unresolved," Ganio said. "To the Filipino veterans now in the twilight of
their lives, time is running out."
A veterans
equity bill has been filed in the U.S. Congress since 1989, but none has
succeeded in securing benefits for the Filipino veterans. Legislators made an
overture by adopting an amendment to the 1990 Immigration Law that allowed about
26,000 Filipino veterans to become U.S. citizens.
Although now
U.S. citizens, they are still denied benefits available to other U.S. veterans.
Ken McKinnon, a spokesman for the Department of Veteran Affairs, said that
veteran status is not based on citizenship, but on military service.
Since the U.S.
Congress declared back in 1946 that service in the Philippine Commonwealth
Forces and the guerrilla movement was not considered active service in the U.S.
military, Filipinos do not have the status of U.S. veterans, McKinnon said. "We
provide benefits to veterans as provided by law," McKinnon added. "We do not
make the policies; we implement them."
The Filipino
Veterans Equity Bill hopes to do just that. Authored by Sen. Daniel Inouye,
D-Hawaii, in the U.S. Senate and Rep. Bob Filner, D-Calif., in the House of
Representatives, the bill seeks to give Filipino veteran parity with other U.S.
veterans. Again, the bill is given slim chance of passage this year. Eric
Lachica, executive director of the American Coalition for Filipino Veterans,
said 50 senators and 216 representatives must co-sponsor the legislation to
ensure its passage. So far, 11 senators and 176 representatives have signed on,
but there's a long way to go. "What we're asking for is something we should have
gotten back in 1946," Lachica said. "It's about time [the U.S.] comes through
with its promises and obligations."
Last month
brought some good news. The Senate Veterans Affairs Committee voted to provide
burial benefits to naturalized Filipino veterans who reside in the United
States.
Sen. Daniel
Akaka, D-Hawaii, who sits on the committee said it was a small but significant
concession toward granting the Filipino veterans their due. "Providing full
burial benefits to Filipino veterans who fought alongside our men in the
Philippine Islands is a small, but symbolic first step toward equity," Akaka
said in a prepared statement.
Filipino
veterans recently opened a new front in their quest to secure full benefits.
They filed a lawsuit against the federal government, seeking full benefits and
back pay.
"You can only
sit down and wait for so long," said the veterans' lawyer, William Salica from
Los Angeles. "These plaintiffs don't have much time to wait."
The suit in
Los Angeles Superior Court was filed on behalf of 220 former military personnel
all living in the United States.
The South
Vietnamese commandos have also used the courts and the U.S. Congress to demand
compensation and recognition as U.S. veterans. Last year, legislators approved a
$20-million compensation package to be paid out to the commandos, each receiving
an average of $20,000. Claims are now being processed and could be disbursed
before the end of the year, according to Mattes, the commandos' lawyer.
About 200 of
the estimated 350 commandos who have been identified now live in the United
States.
But Mattes
said he is working toward recognition for former soldiers as U.S. veterans
entitled to medical care, housing loans, student loans, job training, and other
benefits.
He said he has
petitioned the Pentagon to classify his clients as U.S. veterans. Failing that,
he said he's willing to go to court or to the U.S. Congress to secure the
benefits.
"These men
were on the payroll as combat employees of the United States," Mattes said.
"They are eligible to gain veteran status."
It was through
Mattes' work and that of a former U.S. intelligence officer that the plight of
the commandos became known. The CIA and, later, the U.S. Army botched the spy
operations in North Vietnam and many of the soldiers were captured after they
parachuted behind enemy lines. Recent declassified documents indicate that U.S.
officers declared them dead, and their families were provided burial
compensation and other benefits.
Mattes said
that documents recently made public show that the commandos were "killed off "
to reduce cost, even though there was evidence the men were being held in
Communist prisons.
Although the
Vietnam War ended in 1975, many of the commandos were still in prison camps
until the mid-1980s. Sang Xuan Nguyen, who now lives in San Jose, said they were
placed in single cells and shackled.
"We were never
allowed outside for fear that we would escape," Nguyen said. "It was terrible.
The food was not fit for humans."
Mattes said
it's critical for the commandos to receive medical care, especially now that
they are advancing in age. "Medicaid--which the commandos receive--does not
address the battle wounds and torture these people suffered," he said. "These
men are wounded and need specialized care."
That could be
achieved by declaring them U.S. veterans, Mattes said. "The evidence is
overwhelming," he said. "We have the physical payrolls and the persons who
engaged in combat. There can't be a clearer case than that."
He said that
if the petition, which was sent to the Pentagon in September, is denied, he will
go to court to compel the military to recognize the commandos as veterans.
"This country
could do the right thing," Mattes said, adding that the same treatment could not
be done to white POWs or to minority groups other than Asians. "Sometimes, we
have to bring out our government kicking and screaming to provide justice." In a
sense, the Hmongs and Laotians are doing just that. They are using the courts,
with help from the Asian Law Caucus, to keep their food-stamp benefits, which
the new welfare reform law has taken away.
Under last
year's welfare reform act, noncitizens, except those who meet limited exceptions
such as veterans, are barred from receiving food stamps. According to Asian Law
Caucus attorney Victor Hwang, there is a sense in Congress that Hmongs and other
Highland Lao veterans who fought on behalf of the U.S. Armed Forces during the
Vietnam conflict should be considered veterans for purposes of continuing
certain welfare benefits.
About 50 Hmong
and Lao veterans whose benefits were terminated earlier this month are testing
the language of the law at a municipal court in Marysville, Calif. "All they're
asking is not to be cut off from welfare," Hwang said. "They should be given
veteran status. They thought the welfare checks and benefits were money they
earned for fighting for the U.S. They said it was OK to send 100 Hmongs to die
to save the life of one American soldier. They literally killed themselves to
save American lives." He said the welfare benefits were practically "bribes" to
them for the past 20 years. "Now, you turn around and say, 'get a job."'
According to the 1990 census, there are about 100,000 Hmongs in the United
States, with nearly half (43,000) living in California. There are about 150,000
Laotians, again mostly in California, particularly Fresno, San Diego, and
Sacramento.
A mountain
people with limited education, about 60 to 70 percent of Hmongs and Laotians are
on welfare, according to Hwang, who is representing many of them in appeals to
keep their food stamps.
"They are some
of the most loyal anti-Communists that you can find," Hwang said. "Some say,
their only useful skill was killing people. Now that it's peacetime, they don't
need that skill--and they have nothing else."
Yee Xiong,
president of the California Statewide Lao/Hmong Coalition, said his people have
suffered long enough. "The Hmong people were targeted for persecution and
execution in Laos because of their service on behalf of the CIA," Xiong said.
"Many have sacrificed the lives of their parents, brothers, sisters, sons, and
daughters on the promise the United States would care for their families. All we
ask is to honor that promise."
"Lost Commando" Bui Quang Cat shows a photo of himself as a young
recruit in American military training in Saigon. He was captured on a
1966 mission in North Vietnam and spent 17 years in a labor camp. He now
lives with his wife and two children in San Jose, Calif.
From 1961 to
1975, the Hmongs and Laotians were recruited and trained to fight the North
Vietnamese Army and rescue pilots shot down in Laos and Vietnam. By some
accounts, as many as 150,000 fled their country at the end of the war when the
Communists took over. They were resettled in Minnesota, Wisconsin, California,
and other places. In September, the veterans were honored at a ceremony in
Wisconsin for their sacrifices during the Vietnam War.
But according
to McKinnon, the Department of Veterans Affairs spokesman, the agency has fought
against granting veteran status for those who have not served actively in the
U.S. military.
"You need to
show a discharge document from the military service," McKinnon said. "If it's an
honorable discharge, then you may be entitled to certain benefits."
The benefits
include disability compensation, pension, burial benefits, home loan guarantees,
small-business loans, hospitalization and health care, and education under the
G.I. Bill. Stephen L. Lemons, the acting undersecretary for benefits at the
Department of Veterans Affairs, said they have opposed the Filipino Veterans
Equity Bill because the current Philippine law for veterans is as comprehensive
as that authorized by U.S. laws.
"There is no
question that Filipino forces, fighting to preserve the independence of their
homeland, contributed to the allied victory in the Pacific," Lemons said in a
testimony before the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in July.
"However,
current law appropriately recognizes our two nations' shared responsibility for
their well-being and should not be changed," Lemons said. In addition, he said
the health-related components of the bill would cost an estimated $1.6 billion
in fiscal 1998 and $7.5 billion over five years. But Filipino veterans advocates
say the estimates are inflated. For one thing, only about 70,000 of the veterans
are still alive, and less than half of them are U.S. citizens.
"What's so
unfair is that they are looked upon as less than equal to other American
servicemen," said Lachica, the ACFV executive director. He added, however, that
the strong opposition from even the Department of Veterans Affairs, which should
be an advocate, will not deter them from seeking parity. The decision to provide
burial benefits for Filipino veterans in the U.S. is an encouraging sign. "It's
a very small concession, but it chips away at the 1946 Rescission Act," Lachica
said. "But we're aiming higher. They deserve to get those benefits."
But Mattes is
less diplomatic. He said racism is the reason why the Asian veterans are not
recognized for what they are--U.S. veterans. "It's so easy to turn our backs on
people who are not white or Anglos," he said. "Let's be honest, if this happened
to white Anglo soldiers, do you think the Pentagon would be as callous?"
The Vietnam
War was a struggle between communist and pro-western forces that lasted from the
end of World War II until 1975. The communist Viet Minh, or League for the
Independence of Vietnam, sought to gain control of the entire nation from its
stronghold in the north. Opposing it were, first, France, and later the United
States and United Nations forces, who supported the non-communist forces in
southern Vietnam. In 1975, in violation of a 1973 peace treaty negotiated to end
United States military involvement in South Vietnam and active war against North
Vietnam, North Vietnamese forces and South Vietnamese communist sympathizers
seized control of South Vietnam
and reunited
the two countries into a single communist country.
American
involvement in Vietnam has long been a subject of controversy. The fighting
depended, to a greater extent than in any conflict before, on the work of
intelligence forces. Most notable among these were various U.S. military
intelligence organizations, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Early
stages.
Led by Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), the Viet Minh aligned themselves with the
Soviets from the 1920s. However, they configured their struggle not in
traditional communist terms as a class struggle, but as a war for national
independence and unity, and against foreign domination. Vietnam at the time was
under French control as part of Indochina, and World War II provided the first
opportunity for a Viet Minh uprising against the French, in 1940. France, by
then aligned with the Axis under the Vichy government, rapidly suppressed the
revolt. Nor did the free French, led by General Charles de Gaulle, welcome the
idea of Vietnamese independence.
After the war
was over, de Gaulle sent troops to resume control, and fighting broke out
between French and Viet Minh forces on December 19, 1946. On May 7, 1954, the
French garrison at Dien Bien Phu fell to the Viet Minh after an eight-week
siege. Two months later, in July 1954, the French signed the Geneva Accords, by
which they formally withdrew from Vietnam.
The Geneva
Accords divided the country along the 17th parallel, but this division was to be
only temporary, pending elections in 1956. However, in 1955 Ngo Dinh Diem
declared the southern portion of the nation the Republic of Vietnam, with a
capital at Saigon. In 1956, Diem, with the backing of the United States, refused
to allow elections, and fighting resumed. The conflict was now between South
Vietnam and the communist republic of North Vietnam, whose capital was Hanoi.
Fighting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were not only the regular
army forces of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), but also Viet Cong, guerrillas
from the South who had received training and arms from the North.
American
involvement.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower had already sent the first U.S. military and
civilian advisers to Vietnam in 1955, and four years later, two military
advisers became the first American casualties in the conflict. The
administration of President John F. Kennedy greatly expanded U.S. commitments to
Vietnam, such that by late 1962 the number of military advisers had grown to
11,000. At the same time, Washington's support for the unpopular
Diem had
faded, and when American intelligence learned of plans for a coup by his
generals, the United States did nothing to stop it. Diem was assassinated on
November 1, 1963.
Under
President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. participation in the Vietnam War reached its
zenith. The beginnings of the full-scale commitment came after August 2, 1964,
when North Vietnamese gunboats in the Gulf of Tonkin attacked the U.S. destroyer
Maddox. Requesting power from Congress to strike back, Johnson received
it in the form of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted the president
virtual carte blanche to prosecute the war in Vietnam.
High point
of the war.
As a result of his strengthened position to wage war, and still enjoying broad
support from the American public, Johnson launched a bombing campaign against
North Vietnam in late 1964, and again in March 1965, after a Viet Cong attack on
a U.S. installation at Pleiku. By June 1965, as the first U.S. ground troops
arrived, U.S. troop strength stood at 50,000. By year's end, it would be near
200,000.
General
William C. Westmoreland, who had assumed command of U.S. forces in Vietnam in
June 1964, maintained that victory required a sufficient commitment of ground
troops. Yet by the mid-1960s, the NVA had begun moving into the South via the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, and as communist forces began to take more villages and hamlets,
they seemed poised for victory. Johnson pledged greater support, but despite
growing number of ground troops and intensive bombing of the North in 1967, U.S.
victory remained elusive.
The turning
point in the U.S. effort came on January 30, 1968, when the NVA and Viet Cong
launched a surprise attack during celebrations of the Vietnamese lunar new year,
or Tet. The Tet Offensive, though its value as a military victory for the North
is questionable, was an enormous psychological victory that convinced Americans
that short of annihilation of North Vietnam—an unacceptable geopolitical
alternative—they could not win a Korea-like standoff or outright victory in
Vietnam. In March 1968, Johnson called for an end to bombing north of the 20th
parallel, and announced that he would not seek reelection. Westmoreland, too,
was relieved of duty.
Withdrawal
(1969–75).
The administration of President Richard Nixon in 1969 began withdrawing, and
instituted a process of "Vietnamization," or turning control of the war over to
the South Vietnamese. In 1970, the most significant military activity took place
in Cambodia and Laos, where U.S. B-52 bombers continually pounded the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in an effort to cut off supply lines.
Despite the
bombing campaign, undertaken in pursuit of Vietnamization and the goal of making
the war winnable for the South, the North continued to advance. On January 27,
1973, the United States and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords, and
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam ended.
During the two
years that followed, the North Vietnamese gradually advanced on the South. On
April 30, 1975, communist forces took control of Saigon as government members
and supporters fled. On July 2, 1976, the country was formally united as the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.
The
intelligence and special operations war.
Behind and alongside the military war was an intelligence and special operations
war that likewise dated back to World War II. At that time, the United States,
through the Organization of Strategic Services (OSS), actually worked closely
with Viet Minh operatives, who OSS agents regarded as reliable allies against
the Japanese. Friendly relations with the Americans continued after the Japanese
surrender, when OSS supported the cause of Vietnamese independence.
This stance
infuriated the French, who sought to reestablish control while avoiding common
cause with the Viet Minh. They attempted to cultivate or create a number of
local groups, among them a Vietnamese mafia-style organization, that would work
on their behalf against the Viet Minh. These efforts, not to mention the
participation of one of the world's most well-trained special warfare
contingents, the Foreign Legion, availed the French little gain.
Special
Forces, military intelligence, and CIA.
In the first major U.S. commitment to Vietnam, Kennedy brought to bear several
powerful weapons that together signified his awareness that Vietnam was not a
war like the others America had fought: the newly created Special Forces group,
known popularly as the "Green Berets," as well as CIA and a host of military
intelligence organizations.
Though Special
Forces are known popularly for their prowess in physical combat, their mission
in Vietnam from the beginning had a strong psychological warfare component. In
May 1961, Kennedy committed 400 of these elite troops to the war in Southeast
Asia, and more would follow.
Alongside
them, in many cases, were military intelligence personnel, whose ranks in
Vietnam numbered 3,000 by 1967. Most of these were in two army units, the Army
Security Agency (ASA) and the Military Intelligence Corps. The work of military
intelligence ranged from the signals intelligence of ASA, one of whose members
became the first regular-army U.S. soldier to die in combat in 1961, to the
electronic intelligence conducted by navy destroyers such as the ill-fated
Maddox. In addition, military aircraft such as the SR-71 Blackbird and U-2
conducted extensive aerial reconnaissance.
As for CIA, by
the time the war reached its height in the mid-to late 1960s, it had some 700
personnel in Vietnam. Many of these operated undercover groups that included the
Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA, led by future CIA chief
William Colby), which occupied a large portion of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
Cooperation
and conflict.
These three major arms of the intelligence and special operations war—Special
Forces and other elite units, military intelligence, and CIA—often worked
together. When Kennedy sent in the first contingent of Special Forces, they went
to work alongside CIA, to whom the president in 1962 gave responsibility for
paramilitary operations in Vietnam.
Unbeknownst to
most Americans, CIA was also in charge of paramilitary operations in two
countries where the United States was not officially engaged: Cambodia and Laos.
Long before Nixon's campaign to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail with strategic
bombers, CIA operatives were training a clandestine army of tribesmen and
mercenaries in Laos. Ordinary U.S. troops were not involved in this sideshow war
in the interior of Southeast Asia: only Special Forces, who—in order to conceal
their identity as American troops—bore neither U.S. markings nor U.S. weaponry.
CIA and army
intelligence personnel worked on another notorious operation, Phoenix, an
attempt to seek out and neutralize communist personnel in South Vietnam during
the period from 1967 to 1971. CIA claimed to have killed, captured, or turned as
many as 60,000 enemy agents and guerrillas in Phoenix, a project noted for the
ruthlessness with which it was carried out. In this undertaking, CIA and the
army had the nominal assistance of South Vietnamese intelligence, but due to an
abiding U.S. mistrust of their putative allies, the Americans gave the Saigon
little actual role in Phoenix.
The
military and CIA debacles.
In other situations, CIA and military groups did not so much intentionally
collaborate as they found themselves thrown together, often at cross-purposes,
or at least in ways that were not mutually beneficial. While U.S. Navy
destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin were monitoring North Vietnamese electronic
transmissions, CIA was busy striking at Viet Minh naval facilities with fast
craft whose South Vietnamese (or otherwise non-American) crews made CIA
involvement deniable. But North Vietnamese intelligence was as capable as its
military, and they fired on the Maddox in direct response to this CIA
operation.
The U.S.
military became involved in another CIA debacle when, in 1968, army intelligence
tried to resume a failed effort by CIA's Studies and Observation Group (SOG),
another cover organization. From the early 1960s, SOG had been attempting to
parachute South Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam, with the intention of
using them as saboteurs and agents provocateur. The effort backfired, with most
of the infiltrators dead, imprisoned, or used by the North Vietnamese as bait.
CIA put a stop to the undertaking, but army intelligence tried to succeed where
CIA had failed—only to lose several hundred more Vietnamese agents.
The U.S. Air
Force had to take over another unsuccessful CIA operation, Black Shield, which
involved a series of reconnaissance flights by A-12 Oxcart spy planes over North
Vietnam in 1967 and 1968. Using the A-12, which could reach speeds of Mach 3.1
(2,300 m.p.h. or 3,700 k.p.h.), Black Shield gathered extensive information on
Soviet-built surface-to-air missile (SAM) installations in the North. To obtain
the best possible photographic intelligence, the Oxcarts had to fly relatively
low and slow, and in the fall of 1967 North Vietnamese SAMs hit—but did not
down—an A-71. In 1968, the U.S. Air Force, operating SR-71 Blackbirds, replaced
CIA.
Assessing
CIA in Vietnam.
Despite the notorious nature of Phoenix or the CIA undertakings in Cambodia and
Laos, as well as the occasions when CIA overplayed its hand or placed the
military in the position of cleaning up one of its failed operations, CIA
involvement in Vietnam was far from an unbroken record of failure. One success
was Air America. The latter, a proprietary airline chartered in 1949, supplied
the secret war in the interior, and also undertook a number of other operations
in Vietnam and other countries in Asia. That Air America was only disbanded in
1981, long after the war ended, illustrates its effectiveness.
The popular
image of CIA operatives in Vietnam as fiends blinded by hatred of communism—an
image bolstered by Hollywood—is as lacking in historical accuracy as it is in
depth of characterization. Like other Americans involved in Vietnam, members of
CIA began with the belief that they could and would save a vulnerable nation
from Soviet-style totalitarianism and provide its people with an opportunity to
develop democratic institutions, establish prosperity, and find peace. Much more
quickly than their counterparts in the military and political communities,
however, members of the intelligence community came to recognize the fallacies
on which their undertaking was based.
Intelligence vs. the military and the politicians.
Whereas many political and military leaders adhered to standard interpretations
about the North Vietnamese, such as the idea that they were puppets of Moscow
whose power depended entirely on force, CIA operatives with closer contact to
actual Vietnamese sources recognized the appeal of the Viet Minh nationalist
message. And because CIA recognized the strength of the enemy, their estimate of
America's ability to win the war—particularly as the troop buildup began in the
mid-1960s—became less and less optimistic.
CIA appraisal
of the situation tended to be far less sanguine than that of General
Westmoreland and other military leaders, and certainly less so than that of
President Johnson and other political leaders far removed from the conflict. In
1965, for instance, CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced a
joint study in which they predicted that the bombing campaign would do little to
soften North Vietnam. This was not a position favored by Washington, however, so
it received little attention.
Whereas
Washington favored an air campaign, General Westmoreland maintained that the war
would be won by ground forces. Both government and military leaders agreed on
one approach: the use of statistics as a benchmark of success or failure. In
terms of the number of bombs dropped, cities hit, or Viet Cong and NVA killed,
American forces seemed to be winning. Yet for every guerrilla killed, the enemy
seemed to produce two or three more in his place, and every village bombed
seemed only to increase enemy resistance.
The lessons
of Vietnam.
In the end, the United States effort in Vietnam was undone by the singularity of
aims possessed by its enemies in the North; the instability and unreliability of
its allies in the South, combined with American refusal to give the South
Vietnamese a greater role in their own war; and a divergence of aims on the part
of American leaders.
For example,
the Tet Offensive, which resulted in so many Viet Cong deaths that the guerrilla
force was essentially eliminated, and NVA regulars took the place of the Viet
Cong, is remembered as a victory for the North. And it was a victory in
psychological, if not military, terms. The surprise, fear, and disappointment
elicited by the Tet Offensive—combined with a rise of political dissent within
the United States—punctured America's will to wage the war, and marked the
beginning of the end of American participation in Vietnam.
For some time,
U.S. college campuses had seen small protests against the war, but in 1968 the
number of these demonstrations grew dramatically, as did the ranks of
participants. Nor were youth the only Americans now opposing the war in large
numbers: increasingly, other sectors of society—including influential figures in
the media, politics, the arts, and even the sciences—began to make their
opposition known. In the final years of Vietnam, there was a secondary war being
fought in the United States—a war concerning America's vision of itself and its
role in the world.
By war's end,
Vietnam itself had largely been forgotten. Despite earlier promises of a liberal
democratic government, the unified socialist republic fell prey to the
exigencies typical of communist dictatorship: mass imprisonments and executions,
forced redistribution of land, and the banning of political opposition.
Forgotten, too, were Laos and even Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge launched a
campaign of genocide that killed an estimated two million people.
The Vietnamese
invasion in 1979 probably saved thousands of Cambodian lives, but in the
aftermath, Vietnam came to be regarded as a colonialist power. The nation once
admired by the third world for standing up to America now became a pariah,
supported only by Moscow—which had gained access to a valuable warm-water port
at Cam Ranh Bay—and its allies in Eastern Europe.
During the
remainder of the 1970s, America was in retreat, its attention turned away from
the fate of countries that fell to communism or, in the case of Iran, to Islamic
fundamentalist dictatorship. Americans focused their anger on those they
regarded as having led them astray during the war years: politicians, the
military, and CIA, which came under intense scrutiny during the 1975–76 Church
committee hearings in the U.S. Senate. Only in the 1980s, under President Ronald
Reagan, did the United States return to an activist stance globally.
Allen, George
W. None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam.
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001.
Conboy,
Kenneth K., and Dale Andradé. Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the
Secret War in North Vietnam. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
Kissinger,
Henry. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999.
Shultz,
Richard G. The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of
Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York:
HarperCollins, 1999.
Sorley, Lewis.
A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last
Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999.
Wirtz, James
J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
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