The Invisible Government Dan Moot
The Invisible Government David Wise
Báo cáo của Kissinger 1974
Tác động của việc tăng trưởng dân số toàn cầu
National Security Study Memorandum
Implications of Worldwide Population Growth
For U.S. Security and Overseas Interests
(THE KISSINGER REPORT)
December 10, 1974
CLASSIFIED BY Harry C. Blaney, III
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1980.
This document can only be declassified by the White House.
Declassified/Released on 7/3/89
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by F. Graboske, National Security Council
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 4-17
Part One -- Analytical Section
Chapter I World Demographic Trends 19-34
Chapter II Population and World Food Supplies 34-39
Chapter III Minerals and Fuel 40-49
Chapter IV Economic Development and Population Growth 50-55
Chapter V Implications of Population Pressures for
National Security 56-65
Chapter Vl World Population Conference 66-72
Part Two -- Policy Recommendations 73
Section I A U.S. Global Population Strategy 74-84
Section II Action to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline:
Population and a Development Assistance Strategy 85-105
A. General Strategy and Resource for A.I.D. 85-91
B. Functional Assistance Programs to Create 92-102
Conditions for Fertility Decline
C. Food for Peace Program and Population 103-105
Section III International Organizations and other
Multilateral Population Programs 106-107
A. UN Organization and Specialized Agencies
B. Encouraging Private Organizations
Section IV Provision and Development of Family Planning
Services, information and Technology 108-120
A. Research to Improve Fertility Control Technology
B. Development of Low-Cost Delivery Systems
C. Utilization of Mass Media and Satellite
Communications System for Family Planning
Section V Action to Develop Worldwide Political and Popular
Commitment to Population Stability 121-123
World Demographic Trends
1. World population growth since World War 11 is
quantitatively and qualitatively different from any previous epoch
in human history. The rapid reduction in death rates,unmatched by
corresponding birth rate reductions, has brought total growth rates
close to 2 percent a year, compared with about 1 percent before
World War II, under 0.5 percent in
2. The second new feature of population trends is
the sharp differentiation between rich
3. Because of the momentum of population
dynamics, reductions in birth rates affect total numbers only
slowly. High birth rates in the recent past have resulted in a high
proportion the youngest age groups, so that there will continue to
be substantial population increases over many years even if a
two-child family should become the norm in the future. Policies to
4. U.N. estimates use the 3.6 billion population
of 1970 as a base (there are nearly 4
Adequacy of World Food Supplies
5. Growing populations will have a serious impact
on the need for food especially in the
6. The most serious consequence for the short and
middle term is the possibility of
Countries with large population growth cannot
afford constantly growing imports, but for them to raise food output steadily by 2 to 4 percent
over the next generation or two is a formidable
7. In addition, in some overpopulated regions,
rapid population growth presses on a fragile environment in ways that threaten
longer-term food production: through cultivation of
Mineral and Fuel
8. Rapid population growth is not in itself a major factor in pressure on depletable resources (fossil fuels and other minerals), since demand for them depends more on levels of industrial output than on numbers of people. On the other hand, the world is increasingly dependent on mineral supplies from developing countries, and if rapid population frustrates their prospects for economic development and social progress, the resulting instability may undermine the conditions for expanded output and sustained flows of such resources.
9. There will be serious problems for some of the poorest LDCs with rapid population growth. They will increasingly find it difficult to pay for needed raw materials and energy. Fertilizer, vital for their own agricultural production, will be difficult to obtain for the next few years. Imports for fuel and other materials will cause grave problems which could impinge on the U.S., both through the need to supply greater financial support and in LDC efforts to obtain
better terms of trade through higher prices for exports.
Economic Development and Population Growth
10. Rapid population growth creates a severe drag on rates of economic development otherwise attainable, sometimes to the point of preventing any increase in per capita incomes. In addition to the overall impact on per capita incomes, rapid population growth seriously affects a vast range of other aspects of the quality of life important to social and economic progress in the LDCs.
11. Adverse economic factors which generally result from rapid population growth include:
-- reduced family savings and domestic investment;
-- increased need for large amounts of foreign exchange for food imports;
-- intensification of severe unemployment and underemployment;
-- the need for large expenditures for services
such as dependency support,
-- the concentration of developmental resources on increasing food production to ensure survival for a larger population, rather than on improving living
conditions for smaller total numbers.
12. While GNP increased per annum at an average
rate of 5 percent in LDCs over the last
13. If significant progress can be made in slowing population growth, the positive impact on growth of GNP and per capita income will be significant. Moreover, economic and social progress will probably contribute further to the decline in fertility rates.
14. High birth rates appear to stem primarily from:
a. inadequate information about and availability of means of fertility control;
b. inadequate motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with motivation for many children resulting from still high infant and child mortality and need for support in old age; and
c. the slowness of change in family preferences in response to changes in environment.
15. The universal objective of increasing the
world's standard of living dictates that economic growth outpace population growth. In
many high population growth areas of the world,
services are generally one of the most cost effective investments for an LDC country seeking to improve overall welfare and per capita economic growth. We cannot wait for overall modernization and development to produce lower fertility rates naturally since this will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing countries, during which time rapid population growth will tend to slow development and widen even more the gap between rich and poor.
16. The interrelationships between development and population growth are complex and not wholly understood. Certain aspects of economic development and modernization appear to be more directly related to lower birth rates than others. Thus certain development programs may bring a faster demographic transition to lower fertility rates than other aspects of development.
The World Population Plan of Action adopted at the World Population Conference recommends that countries working to affect fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and education strategies which have a decisive effect on fertility. International cooperation should give priority to assisting such national efforts. These programs include: (a) improved health care and nutrition to reduce child mortality, (b) education and improved social status for women; (c) increased female employment; (d) improved old-age security; and (e) assistance for the rural poor, who generally have the highest fertility, with actions to redistribute income and resources including providing privately owned farms. However, one cannot proceed simply from identification of relationships to specific large-scale operational programs. For example, we do not yet know of cost-effective ways to encourage increased female employment, particularly if we are concerned about not adding to male unemployment. We do not yet know what specific
packages of programs will be most cost effective in many situations.
17. There is need for more information on cost effectiveness of different approaches on both the "supply" and the "demand" side of the picture. On the supply side, intense efforts are required to assure full availability by 1980 of birth control information and means to all (fertile individuals, especially in rural areas. Improvement is also needed in methods of birth control most) acceptable and useable by the rural poor. On the demand side, further experimentation and implementation action projects and programs are needed. In particular, more research is needed on the motivation of the poorest who often have the highest fertility rates. Assistance programs must be more precisely targeted to this group than in the past.
18. It may well be that desired family size will not decline to near replacement levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor improves to the extent that the benefits of reducing family size
appear to them to outweigh the costs. For urban people, a rapidly growing element in the LDCs, the liabilities of having too many children are already becoming apparent. Aid recipients and donors must also emphasize development and improvements in the quality of life of the poor, if significant progress is to be made in controlling population growth. Although it was adopted primarily for other reasons, the new emphasis of AID's legislation on problems of the poor (which is echoed in comparable changes in policy emphasis by other donors and by an increasing number of LDC's) is directly relevant to the conditions required for fertility reduction. Political Effects of Population Factors
19. The political consequences of current
population factors in the LDCs - rapid growth,
20. The pace of internal migration from
countryside to over swollen cities is greatly
21. Adverse socio-economic conditions generated by these and related factors may contribute to high and increasing levels of child abandonment, juvenile delinquency, chronic and growing underemployment and unemployment, petty thievery, organized brigandry, food riots, separatist movements, communal massacres, revolutionary actions and counter-revolutionary coupe. Such conditions also detract form the environment needed to attract the foreign capital vital to increasing levels of economic growth in these areas. If these conditions result in expropriation of foreign interests, such action, from an economic viewpoint, is not in the best interests of either the investing country or the host government.
22. In international relations, population
factors are crucial in, and often determinants of,
General Goals and Requirements for Dealing With Rapid Population Growth
23. The central question for world population
policy in the year 1974, is whether mankind is to remain on a track toward an
ultimate population of 12 to 15 billion -- implying a
earliest feasible population stability -- implying ultimate totals of 8 to 9 billions and not more than a three or four-fold increase in any major region.
24. What are the stakes? We do not know whether
technological developments will make
25. But even if survival for these much larger
numbers is possible, it will in all likelihood be bare survival, with all efforts going in the
good years to provide minimum nutrition and utter dependence in the bad years on emergency rescue
efforts from the less populated and richer countries of the world. In the shorter run --
between now and the year 2000 -- the difference
26. There is no single approach which will
"solve" the population problem. The complex social
27. Coordination among the bilateral donors and multilateral organizations is vital to any effort to moderate population growth. Each kind of effort will be needed for worldwide results.
28. World policy and programs in the population field should incorporate two major objectives:
(a) actions to accommodate continued population
growth up to 6 billions by the
developmental hopes; and
(b) actions to keep the ultimate level as close as possible to 8 billions rather than permitting it to reach 10 billions, 13 billions, or more.
29. While specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our aim should be for the world to achieve a replacement level of fertility, (a two- child family on the average), by about the year
2000. This will require the present 2 percent growth rate to decline to 1.7 percent within a decade and to 1.1 percent by 2000 compared to the U.N medium projection, this goal would result in 500 million fewer people in 2000 and about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment of this goal will require greatly intensified population programs. A basis for developing national population growth control targets to achieve this world target is contained in the World Population Plan of
30. The World Population Plan of Action is not self-enforcing and will require vigorous efforts by interested countries, U.N. agencies and other international bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership is essential. The strategy must include the following elements and actions:
(a) Concentration on key countries.
Assistance for population moderation should give primary emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries where there is special U.S. political and strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia and Columbia. Together, they account for 47 percent of the world's current population increase. (It should be recognized that at present AID bilateral assistance to some of these countries may not be acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent that funds are available, will be given to other countries, considering such factors as population growth, need for external assistance, long-term U.S. interests and willingness to engage in self help. Multilateral programs must necessarily have a wider coverage and the bilateral programs of other national donors will be shaped to their particular interests. At the same time, the U.S. will look to the multilateral agencies, especially the U.N. Fund for Population Activities which already has projects in over 80 countries to increase population assistance on a broader basis with increased U.S. contributions. This is desirable in terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political terms in the United Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key 13 and our limited resources should give major emphasis to them. (b) Integration of population factors and population programs into country development planning. As called for the world Population Plan of Action, developing countries and those aiding them should specifically take population factors into account in national planning and include population programs in such plans.
(c) Increased assistance for family planning services, information and technology. This is a vital aspect of any world population program.
1) Family planning information and materials
based on present technology
2) Fundamental and evelopmental research should be expanded, aimed at simple, low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable methods of fertility control. Support by all federal agencies for biomedical research in this field should be increased by $60 million annually.
(d) Creating conditions conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits and consistent with the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action,
priority should be given in the general aid program to selective development policies in sectors offering the greatest promise of increased motivation for
smaller family size. In many cases pilot programs and experimental research will be needed as guidance for later efforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors include:
-- Providing minimal levels of education, especially for women;
-- Reducing infant mortality, including through simple low cost health care networks;
-- Expanding wage employment, especially for women;
-- Developing alternatives to children as a source of old age security;
-- Increasing income of the poorest, especially
in rural areas, including
-- Education of new generations on the desirability of smaller families.
While AID has information on the relative importance of the new major socio- economic factors that lead to lower birth rates, much more research and experimentation need to be done to determine what cost effective programs and policy will lead to lower birth rates.
(e) Food and agricultural assistance is vital for
any population sensitive development
(f) Development of a worldwide political and
popular commitment to
The U.S. should encourage LDC leaders to take the
lead in advancing family
through bilateral contacts with other LDCs. This will require that the President and the Secretary of State treat the subject of population growth control as a
matter of paramount importance and address it specifically in their regular contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly LDCs ental action. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
12 The U.S. should encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in advancing family planning and population stabilization both within multilateral organizations and through bilateral contacts with other LDCs. This will require that the President and the Secretary of State treat the subject of population growth control as a matter of paramount importance and address it specifically in their regular contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly LDCs.
31. The World Population Plan of Action and the resolutions adopted by consensus by 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N. World Population Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent framework for developing a worldwide system of population/ family planning programs. We should use them to generate U.N. agency and national leadership for an all-out effort to lower growth rates. Constructive action by the U.S. will further our objectives. To this end we should:
(a) Strongly support the World Population Plan of Action and the adoption of its appropriate provisions in national and other programs.
(b) Urge the adoption by national programs of specific population goals including replacement levels of fertility for DCs and LDCs by 2000.
(c) After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal to maintain our present national average fertility no higher than replacement level and attain near stability by 2000.
(d) Initiate an international cooperative strategy of national research programs on human reproduction and fertility control covering biomedical and socio-economic factors, as proposed by the U.S. Delegation at Bucharest. (e) Act on our offer at Bucharest to collaborate with other interested donors and U.N. agencies to aid selected countries to develop low cost preventive health and family planning services. (f) Work directly with donor countries and through the U.N.Fund for Population Activities and the OECD/DAC to increase bilateral and multilateral assistance for population programs.
32. As measures to increase understanding of population factors by LDC leaders and to strengthen population planning in national development plans, we should carry out the recommendations in Part II, Section VI, including: (a) Consideration of population factors and population policies in all Country Assistance Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development Assistance Program (DAP) multi-year strategy papers.
13 (b) Prepare projections of population growth individualized for countries with analyses of development of each country and discuss them with national leaders. (c) Provide for greatly increased training programs for senior officials of LDCs in the elements of demographic economics. (d) Arrange for familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and comparably influential leaders from private life. (e) Assure assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population factors in national plans, particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income and social stability. (f) Also assure assistance to LDC leaders in relating population policies and family planning programs to major sectors of development health, nutrition, agriculture, education, social services, organized labour, women's activities, and community development. (g) Undertake initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment regarding improvement in the status of women. (h) Give emphasis in assistance to programs on development of rural areas. Beyond these activities which are essentially directed at national interests, we must assure that a broader educational concept is developed to convey an acute understanding to national leaders of the interrelation of national interests and world population growth. 33. We must take care that our activities should not give the appearance to the LDCs of an industrialized country policy directed against the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this field we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within this country. "Third World" leaders should be in the forefront and obtain the credit for successful programs. In this context it is important to demonstrate to LDC leaders that such family planning programs have worked and can work within a reasonable period of time. 34. To help assure others of our intentions we should indicate our emphasis on the right of individuals and couples to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have information, education and means to do so, and our continued interest in improving the overall general welfare. We should use the authority provided by the World Population Plan of Action to advance the principles that: 1) responsibility in parenthood includes responsibility to the children and the community and 2) that nations in exercising their sovereignty to set population policies should take into account the welfare of their neighbours
14 and the world. To strengthen the worldwide approach, family planning programs should be supported by multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the most efficient means. 35. To support such family planning and related development assistance efforts there is need to increase public and leadership information in this field. We recommend increased emphasis on mass media, newer communications technology and other population education and motivation programs by the UN and USIA. Higher priority should be given to these information programs in this field worldwide. 36. In order to provide the necessary resources and leadership, support by the U.S. public and Congress will be necessary. A significant amount of funds will be required for a number of years. High level personal contact by the Secretary of State and other officials on the subject at an early date with Congressional counterparts is needed. A program for this purpose should be developed by OES with H and AID. 37. There is an alternative view which holds that a growing number of experts believe that the population situation is already more serious and less amenable to solution through voluntary measures than is generally accepted. It holds that, to prevent even more widespread food shortage and other demographic catastrophes than are generally anticipated, even stronger measures are required and some fundamental, very difficult moral issues need to be addressed. These include, for example, our own consumption patterns, mandatory programs, tight control of our food resources. In view of the seriousness of these issues, explicit consideration of them should begin in the Executive Branch, the Congress and the U.N. soon. (See the end of Section I for this viewpoint.) 38. Implementing the actions discussed above (in paragraphs 1-36), will require a significant expansion in AID funds for population/family planning. A number of major actions in the area of creating conditions for fertility decline can be funded from resources available to the sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture). Other actions, including family planning services, research and experimental activities on factors effecting fertility, come under population funds. We recommend increases in AID budget requests to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million requested for FY 1975). This funding would cover both bilateral programs and contributions to multilateral organizations. However, the level of funds needed in the future could change significantly, depending on such factors as major breakthroughs in fertility control technologies and LDC receptivities to population assistance. To help develop, monitor, and evaluate the expanded actions discussed above, AID is likely to need additional direct hire personnel in the population/family planning area. As a corollary to expanded AID funding levels for population, efforts must be made to encourage increased contributions by other donors and recipient countries to help reduce rapid population growth. Policy Follow-up and Coordination 39. This world wide population strategy involves very complex and difficult questions.
15 Its implementation will require very careful coordination and specific application in individual circumstances. Further work is greatly needed in examining the mix of our assistance strategy and its most efficient application. A number of agencies are interested and involved. Given this, there appears to be a need for a better and higher level mechanism to refine and develop policy in this field and to coordinate its implementation beyond this NSSM. The following options are suggested for consideration: (a) That the NSC Under Secretaries Committee be given responsibility for policy and executive review of this subject: Pros: - Because of the major foreign policy implications of the recommended population strategy a high level focus on policy is required for the success of such a major effort. - With the very wide agency interests in this topic there is need for an accepted and normal inter agency process for effective analysis and disinterested policy development and implementation within the N.S.C. system. - Staffing support for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on exists within the USC framework including utilization of the Office of Population of the Department of State as well as others. - USC has provided coordination and follow-up in major foreign policy areas involving a number of agencies as is the case in this study. Cons: - The USC would not be within the normal policy-making framework for development policy as would be in the case with the DCC. - The USC is further removed from the process of budget development and review of the AID Population Assistance program. (b) That when it=s establishment is authorized by the President, - the Development Coordination Committee, headed by the AID Administrator be given overall responsibility: * NOTE: AID expects the DCC will have the following composition: The Administrator of AID as Chairman; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs; the Under Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and labour; an Associate Director of OMB; the Executive Director of CIEP, STR; a representative of the NSC; the President of the EX-IM Bank and OPIC; and any other agency when items of interest to them are under discussion. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
16 Pros: (Provided by AID) - It is precisely for coordination of this type of development issue involving a variety of U.S. policies toward LDCs that the Congress directed the establishment of the DCC. - The DCC is also the body best able to relate population issues to other development issues, with which they are intimately related. - The DCC has the advantage of stressing technical and financial aspects of U.S. population policies, thereby minimizing political complications frequently inherent in population programs. - It is, in AID's view, the coordinating body best located to take an overview of all the population activities now taking place under bilateral and multilateral auspices. Cons: - While the DCC will doubtless have substantial technical competence, the entire range of political and other factors bearing on our global population strategy might be more effectively considered by a group having a broader focus than the DCC. - The DCC is not within the N.S.C. system which provides more direct access to both the President and the principal foreign policy decision-making mechanism. - The DCC might overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of population and under emphasize other important elements. (c) That the NSC/CEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group for this subject to insure follow-up interagency coordination, and further policy development. (No participating Agency supports this option, therefore it is only included to present a full range of possibilities). Option (a) is supported by State, Treasury, Defence (ISA and JCS), Agriculture, HEW, Commerce NSC and CIA o Option (b) is supported by AID. Under any of the above options, there should be an annual review of our population policy to
17 examine progress, insure our programs are in keeping with the latest information in this field, identify possible deficiencies, and recommend additional action at the appropriate level5 1. Department of Commerce supports the option of placing the population policy formulation mechanism under the auspices of the USC but believes that any detailed economic questions resulting from proposed population policies be explored through existing domestic and international economic policy channels. 2. AID believes these reviews undertaken only periodically might look at selected areas or at the entire range of population policy depending on problems and needs which arise. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 18 Table 1. POPULATION GROWTH, BY MAJOR REGION: 1970_2075 (Absolute numbers in billions) ___________________________________________________________________ U.N. Medium Variant U.S. Proposed Goal... for World Projections for: Population Plan of Action Projection for: 1970 2000 2075 2000 2075 Actual Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple Numbers of 1970 Numbers of 1970 Numbers of 1970 Numbers of 1970 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ WORLD TOTAL 3.6 6.4 x 1.8 12.0 x 3.3 5.9 1.6 8.4 x 2.3 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- More Developed Regions 1.1 1.4 x 1.3 1.6 x 1.45 1.4 x 1.2 1.6 x 1.4 Less Developed Regions 2.5 5.0 x 2.0 10.5 x 4.1 4.5 x 1.8 6.7 x 2.65 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Africa 0.4 0.8 x 2.4 2.3 x 6.65 0.6 x 1.8 0.9 x 2.70 East Asia 0.8 1.2* x 1.5 1.6* x 2.0 1.4* x 1.6 1.9 x 2.30 South & South East Asia 1.1 2.4 x 2.1 5.3 x 4.7 2.1 x 1.9 3.2 x 2.85 Latin America 0.2 0.6 x 2.3 1.2 x 5.0 0.5 x 2.0 0.7 x 3.00 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ More Developed Regions: Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Temperate South America. Less Developed Regions: All other regions * The seeming inconsistency in growth trends between the UN medium and the US_Proposed Projection variants for East Asia is due to a lack of reliable information on China's total population, its age structure, and the achievements of the country's birth control program.
CHAPTER I - WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS Introduction The present world population growth is unique. Rates of increase are much higher than in earlier centuries, they are more widespread, and have a greater effect on economic life, social justice, and -- quite likely -- on public order and political stability. The significance of population growth is enhanced because it comes at a time when the absolute size and rate of increase of the global economy, need for agricultural land, demand for and consumption of resources including water, production of wastes and pollution have also escalated to historically unique levels. Factors that only a short time ago were considered separately now have interlocking relationships, inter- dependence in a literal sense. The changes are not only quantitatively greater than in the past but qualitatively different. The growing burden is not only on resources but on administrative and social institutions as well. Population growth is, of course, only one of the important factors in this new, highly integrated tangle of relationships. However, it differs from the others because it is a determinant of the demand sector while others relate to output and supply. (Population growth also contributes to supply through provision of manpower; in most developing countries, however, the problem is not a lack of but a surfeit of hands.) It is, therefore, most pervasive, affecting what needs to be done in regard to other factors. Whether other problems can be solved depends, in varying degrees, on the extent to which rapid population growth and other population variables can be brought under control. Highlights of Current Demographic Trends Since 1950, world population has been undergoing unprecedented growth. This growth has four prominent features: 1. It is unique, far more rapid than ever in history. 2. It is much more rapid in less developed than in developed regions. 3. Concentration in towns and cities is increasing much more rapidly than overall population growth and is far more rapid in LDCs than in developed countries. 4. It has a tremendous built-in momentum that will inexorably double populations of most less developed countries by 2000 and will treble or quadruple their populations before levelling off -- unless far greater efforts at fertility control are made than are being made. Therefore, if a country wants to influence its total numbers through population policy, it
must act in the immediate future in order to make a substantial difference in the long run. For most of man's history, world population grew very slowly. At the rate of growth estimated for the first 18 centuries A.D., it required more than 1,000 years for world population to double in size. With the beginnings of the industrial revolution and of modern medicine and sanitation over two hundred years ago, population growth rates began to accelerate. At the current growth rate (1.9 percent) world population will double in 37 years. --By about 1830, world population reached 1 billion. The second billion was added in about 100 years by 1930. The third billion in 30 years by 1960. The fourth will be reached in 1975. --Between 1750-1800 less than 4 million were being added, on the average, to the earth's population each year. Between 1850-1900, it was close to 8 million. By 1950 it had grown to 40 million. By 1975 it will be about 80 million. In the developed countries of Europe, growth rates in the last century rarely exceeded 1.0-1.2 percent per year, almost never 1.5 percent. Death rates were much higher than in most LDCs today. In North America where growth rates were higher, immigration made a significant contribution. In nearly every country of Europe, growth rates are now below 1 percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The natural growth rate (births minus deaths) in the United States is less than 0.6 percent. Including immigration (the world's highest) it is less than 0.7 percent. In less developed countries growth rates average about 2.4 percent. For the People's Republic of China, with a massive, enforced birth control program, the growth rate is estimated at under 2 percent. India's is variously estimated from 2.2 percent, Brazil at 2.8 percent, Mexico at 3.4 percent, and Latin America at about 2.9 percent. African countries, with high birth as well as high death rates, average 2.6 percent; this growth rate will increase as death rates go down. The world's population is now about 3.9 billion; 1.1 billion in the developed countries (30 percent) and 2.8 billion in the less developed countries (70 percent). In 1950, only 28 percent of the world's population or 692 million, lived in urban localities. Between 1950 and 1970, urban population expanded at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth of total population. In 1970, urban population increased to 36 percent of world total and numbered 1.3 billion. By 2000, according to the UN's medium variant projection, 3.2 billion (about half of the total) of world inhabitants will live in cities and towns. In developed countries, the urban population varies from 45 to 85 percent; in LDCs, it varies from close to zero in some African states to nearly 100 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore. In LDCs, urban population is projected to more than triple the remainder of this century, from 622 million in 1970 to 2,087 in 2000. Its proportion in total LDC population will thus
21 increase from 25 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 2000. This implies that by the end of this century LDCs will reach half the level of urbanization projected for DCs (82 percent) (See Appendix Table 1). The enormous built-in momentum of population growth in the less developed countries (and to a degree in the developed countries) is, if possible, even more important and ominous than current population size and rates of growth. Unlike a conventional explosion, population growth provides a continuing chain reaction. This momentum springs from (1) high fertility levels of LDC populations and (2) the very high percentage of maturing young people in populations. The typical developed country, Sweden for example, may have 25% of the population under 15 years of age. The typical developing country has 41% to 45% of its population under l5. This means that a tremendous number of future parents, compared to existing parents, are already born. Even if they have fewer children per family than their parents, the increase in population will be very great. Three projections (not predictions), based on three different assumptions concerning fertility, will illustrate the generative effect of this building momentum. a. Present fertility continued: If present fertility rates were to remain constant, the 1974 population 3.9 billion would increase to 7.8 billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103 billion by 2075. b. U.N. "Medium Variant": If present birth rates in the developing countries, averaging about 38/1000 were further reduced to 29/1000 by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 6.4 billion, with over 100 million being added each year. At the time stability (non-growth) is reached in about 2100, world population would exceed 12.0 billion. c. Replacement Fertility by 2000: If replacement levels of fertility were reached by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 5.9 billion and at the time of stability, about 2075, would be 8.4 billion. ("Replacement level" of fertility is not zero population growth. It is the level of fertility when couples are limiting their families to an average of about two children. For most countries, where there are high percentages of young people, even the attainment of replacement levels of fertility means that the population will continue to grow for additional 50-60 years to much higher numbers before levelling off.) It is reasonable to assume that projection (a) is unreal since significant efforts are already being made to slow population growth and because even the most extreme pro-natalists do not argue that the earth could or should support 103 billion people. Famine, pestilence, war, or birth control will stop population growth far short of this figure. The UN medium variant (projection (b) has been described in a publication of the UN
22 Population Division as "a synthesis of the results of efforts by demographers of the various countries and the UN Secretariat to formulate realistic assumptions with regard to future trends, in view of information about present conditions and past experiences." Although by no means infallible, these projections provide plausible working numbers and are used by UN agencies (e.g., FAO, ILO) for their specialized analyses. One major shortcoming of most projections, however, is that "information about present conditions" quoted above is not quite up-to-date. Even in the United States, refined fertility and mortality rates become available only after a delay of several years. Thus, it is possible that the rate of world population growth has actually fallen below (or for that matter increased from) that assumed under the UN medium variant. A number of less developed countries with rising living levels (particularly with increasing equality of income) and efficient family planning programs have experienced marked declines in fertility. Where access to family planning services has been restricted, fertility levels can be expected to show little change. It is certain that fertility rates have already fallen significantly in Hong King, Singapore, Taiwan, Fiji, South Korea, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius (See Table 1). Moderate declines have also been registered in West Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. Steady increases in the number of acceptors at family planning facilities indicate a likelihood of some fertility reduction in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Colombia, and other countries which have family planning programs. On the other hand, there is little concrete evidence of significant fertility reduction in the populous countries of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc. 1/ make a serious effort to do something about it. The differences in the size of total population projected under the three variants become substantial in a relatively short time. By 1985, the medium variant projects some 342 million fewer people than the constant fertility variant and the replacement variant is 75 million lower than the medium variant. By the year 2000 the difference between constant and medium fertility variants rises to 1.4 billion and between the medium and replacement variants, close to 500 million. By the year 2000, the span between the high and low series -- some 1.9 billion -- would amount to almost half the present world population. Most importantly, perhaps, by 2075 the constant variant would have swamped the earth and the difference between the medium and replacement variants would amount to 3.7 billion. (Table 2.) 1/ Of 82 countries for which crude birth rates are available for 1960 and 1972 -- or 88 percent -- experienced a decline in birth rates during this period. The 72 countries include 29 developed countries and 24 independent territories, including Hong Kong and Puerto Rico. The 19 sovereign LDCs include Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Singapore, Barbados, Taiwan, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Guyana, West Malaysia, and Algeria. (ISPC, US Bureau of the Census). CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
23 The significance of the alternative variants is that they reflect the difference between a manageable situation and potential chaos with widespread starvation, disease, and disintegration for many countries.
24 Table 1. Declines in Total Fertility Rates: Selected Years Annual average Fertility fertility decline Country Year level (Percent) Hong Kong 1961 5,170 1971 3,423 4.0 Singapore 1960 5,078 1970 3,088 6.4 Taiwan 1960 5,750 1970 4,000 3.6 South Korea 1960 6,184 1970 3,937 4.4 West Malaysia 1960 5,955 1970 5,051 1.6 Sri Lanka 1960 5,496 1970 4,414 2.4 Barbados 1960 4,675 1970 2,705 5.3 Chile 1960 5,146 1970 3,653 3.4 Costa Rica 1960 7,355 1970 4,950 3.9 Trinidad & Tobago 1960 5,550 1970 3,387 4.8 Mauritius 1960 5,897 1970 3,387 5.4 Egypt 1960 6,381 1970 5,095 2.2 Fiji 1960 5603 1970 3,841 5.4 _________________________________________________________________________
Source of basic data: ISPC, U.S. Bureau of the Census Total Fertility Rate: Number of children a woman would have if she were to bear them at the prevailing rate in each five-year age group of woman's reproductive span (ages 15-19,20-24...45-49). Rates in this table refer to number of children per 1,000 women.
Projection (c) is attainable if countries recognized the gravity of their population situation and By CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 26 Table 2. - World Population Growth Under Different Assumptions Concerning Fertility: 1970-2075 Constant Medium Replacement Fertility Variant Fertility Variant Fertility Variant Millions Growth* Millions Growth* Millions Growth* 1970 3,600 - 3,600 - 3,600 - 1985 5,200 2.4% 4,858 2.0% 4,783 1.8% 2000 7,800 2.8% 6,407 1.9% 5,923 1.4% 2075 103,000 3.4% 12,048 0.84% 8,357 0.46% * Annual average growth rate since preceding date. Furthermore, after replacement level fertility is reached, family size need not remain at an average of two children per family. Once this level is attained, it is possible that fertility will continue to decline below replacement level. This would hasten the time when a stationary population is reached and would increase the difference between the projection variants. The great momentum of population growth can be seen even more clearly in the case of a single country -- for example, Mexico. Its 1970 population was 50 million. If its 1965-1970 fertility were to continue, Mexico's population in 2070 would theoretically number 2.2 billion. If its present average of 6.1 children per family could be reduced to an average of about 2 (replacement level fertility) by 1980-85, its population would continue to grow for about sixty years to 110 million. If the two-child average could be reached by 1990-95, the population would stabilize in sixty more years at about 22 percent higher -- 134 million. If the two-child average cannot be reached for 30 years (by 2000-05), the population at stabilization would grow by an additional 24 percent to 167 million. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 27 Similar illustrations for other countries are given below. Table 3. Projected Population Size Under Different Assumptions Concerning Fertility: 1970-2070 Population Ratio of 2070 to Country Fertility assumption in millions 1970 population 1970 2000 2070 Venezuela Constant fertility 11 31 420 38.2 Replacement fertility by: 2000-05 22 34 3.1 1990-95 20 27 2.4 1980-85 18 22 2.0 Indonesia Constant fertility 120 294 4,507 37.6 Replacement fertility by: 2000-05 214 328 2.7 1990-95 193 275 2.3 1980-85 177 236 2.0 Morocco Constant fertility 16 54 1,505 14.1 Replacement fertility by: 2000-05 35 58 3.6 1990-95 30 44 2.8 1980-85 26 35 2.2 Source of basic data: ISPC, U.S. Bureau of the Census As Table 3 indicates, alternative rates of fertility decline would have significant impact on the size of a country's population by 2000. They would make enormous differences in the sizes of the stabilized populations, attained some 60 to 70 years after replacement level fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of the utmost urgency that governments now recognize the facts and implications of population growth determining the ultimate population sizes that make sense for their countries and start vigorous programs at once to achieve their desired goals. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 28 Future Growth in Major Regions and Countries Throughout the projected period 1970 to 2000, less developed regions will grow more rapidly than developed regions. The rate of growth in LDCs will primarily depend upon the rapidity with which family planning practices are adopted.. Differences in the growth rates of DCs and LDCs will further aggravate the striking demographic imbalances between developed and less developed countries. Under the U.N. medium projection variant, by the year 2000 the population of less developed countries would double, rising from 2.5 billion in 1970 to 5.0 billion (Table 4). In contrast, the overall growth of the population of the developed world during the same period would amount to about 26 percent, increasing from 1.08 to 1.37 billion. Thus, by the year 2000 almost 80 percent of world population would reside in regions now considered less developed and over 90 percent of the annual increment to world population would occur there. The paucity of reliable information on all Asian communist countries and the highly optimistic assumptions concerning China's fertility trends implicit in U.N. medium projections1/ argue for desegregating the less developed countries into centrally planned economies and countries with market economies. Such desegregation reflects more accurately the burden of rapidly growing populations in most LDCs. As Table 4 shows, the population of countries with centrally planned economies, comprising about 1/3 of the 1970 LDC total, is projected to grow between 1970 and 2000 at a rate well below the LDC average of 2.3 percent. Over the entire thirty-year period, their growth rate averages 1.4 percent, in comparison with 2.7 percent for other LDCs. Between 1970 and 1985, the annual rate of growth in Asian communist LDCs is expected to average 1.6 percent and subsequently to decline to an average of 1.2 percent between 1985 and 2000. The growth rate of LDCs with market economies, on the other hand, remains practically the same, at 2.7 and 2.6 percent, respectively. Thus, barring both large-scale birth control efforts (greater than implied by the medium variant) or economic or political upheavals, the next twenty-five years offer non-communist LDCs little respite from the burdens of rapidly increasing humanity. Of course, some LDCs will be able to accommodate this increase with less difficulty than others. Moreover, short of Draconian measures there is no possibility that any LDC can stabilize its population at less than double its present size. For many, stabilization will not tee short of three times their present size. 1/ The size of the Chinese population, its age distribution and rate of growth are widely disputed, not only among western observers but apparently within China itself. Recent estimates vary from "over 700 million," a figure used consistently by PR China's representatives to U.N. meetings, to 920 million estimated for mid-1974 by U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
TABLE 4. TOTAL POPULATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND RATES OF GROWTH, by Major Region: 1970-2000 (UN "medium" projection variant) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total Population Growth Major Region and Country 1970 1985 2000 1970-2000 Mil- Per- Mil- Mil- Per- Mil- Annual lions cent lions lions cent lions average WORLD TOTAL 3,621 100.0 4,858 6,407 100.0 2,786 1.9% DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1,084 29.9 1,234 1,368 21.4 284 0.8% Market economies 736 20.3 835 920 14.4 184 0.7% US 205 5.7 236 264 4.1 59 0.9% Japan 104 2.9 122 133 2.1 29 0.8% Centrally planned 348 9.6 399 447 7.0 99 0.8% economies USSR 243 6.7 283 321 5.0 78 0.9% LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 2,537 70.1 3,624 5,039 78.6 2,502 2.3% Centrally planned economies* 794 21.9 l,007 1,201 18.7 407 1.4% China 756 20.9 955 1,127 17.6 369 1.3% Market economies 1,743 48.1 2,616 3,838 59.9 2,095 2.7% East Asia 49 1.4 66 83 1.3 34 1.8% South Asia 1,090 30.1 1,625 2,341 36.5 1,251 2.6% Eastern South Asia 264 7.3 399 574 9.0 310 2.6% Indonesia 120 3.3 177 250 3.9 130 2.5% Middle South Asia 49 20.7 1,105 1,584 24.7 835 2.5% Indian sub- continent** 691 19.1 1,016 1,449 22.6 758 2.5% Western South Asia 77 2.1 121 183 2.9 106 2.9% Africa 352 9.7 536 884 13.1 482 2.9% Nigeria 55 1.5 84 135 2.1 80 3.0% Egypt 33 0.9 47 66 1.0 33 2.3% Latin America 248 6.8 384 572 8.9 324 2.8% Caribbean 26 0.7 36 48 0.8 22 2.2% Central America 67 1.8 109 173 2.7 106 3.2% Mexico 50 1.4 83 132 2.1 82 3.3% Tropical S. America 155 4.3 239 351 5.5 196 2.8% Brazil 95 2.6 145 212 3.3 117 2.7% Columbia 22 0.6 35 51 0.8 29 2.9% Oceania 4 0.1 6 9 0.1 5 2.6% _______________________________________________________________________ * Centrally planned economies include PR-China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia
NATO and Eastern Europe. In the west, only France
and Greece have a policy of
1/ Most provide some or substantial family planning services. All appear headed toward lower growth rates. In two NATO member countries (West Germany and Luxembourg), annual numbers of deaths already exceed births, yielding a negative natural growth rate.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia have active policies to increase their population growth rates despite the reluctance of their people to have larger families. Within the USSR, fertility rates in RSFSR and the republics of Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia are below replacement level. This situation has prevailed at least since 1969-1970 and, if continued, will eventually lead to negative population growth in these republics. In the United States, average
fertility also fell below replacement level in the past two years (1972 and 1973). There is a striking difference, however, in the attitudes toward this demographic development in the two countries. While in the United States the possibility of a stabilized (non-growing) population is generally viewed with favor, in the USSR there is perceptible concern over the low fertility of Slavs and Balts (mostly by Slavs and Balts). The Soviet government, by all indications, is studying the feasibility of increasing their sagging birth rates. The entire matter of fertility-bolstering policies is circumscribed by the relatively high costs of increasing fertility (mainly through increased outlays for consumption goods and services) and the need to avoid the appearance of ethnic discrimination between rapidly and slowly growing nationalities. U.N. medium projections to the year 2000 show no significant changes in the relative demographic position of the western alliance countries as against eastern Europe and the USSR. The population of the Warsaw Pact countries will remain at 65 percent of the populations of NATO member states. If Turkey is excluded, the Warsaw Pact proportion rises somewhat from 70 percent in 1970 to 73 percent by 2000. This change is not of an order of magnitude that in itself will have important implications for east-westpower relations. (Future growth of manpower in NATO and Warsaw Pact nations has not been examined in this Memorandum.) Of greater potential political and strategic significance are prospective changes in the populations of less developed regions both among themselves and in relation to developed countries.
Africa. Assessment of future demographic trends
in Africa is severely impeded by lack of reliable base data on the size, composition,
fertility and mortality, and migration of much of
before they begin to decline. Rapid population expansion may be particularly burdensome to the "least developed" among Africa's LDCs including according to the U.N. classification -- Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Burundi, Guinea, Chad, Rwanda, Somalia, Dahomey, Lesotho, and Botswana. As a group, they numbered 104 million in 1970 and are projected to grow at an average rate of 3.0 percent a year, to some 250 million in 2000. This rate of growth is based on the assumption of significant reductions in mortality. It is questionable, however, whether economic and social conditions in the foreseeable future will permit reductions in mortality required to produce a 3 percent growth rate. Consequently, the population of the "least developed" of Africa's LDCs may fall short of the 250 million figure in 2000. African countries endowed with rich oil and other natural resources may be in a better economic position to cope with population expansion. Nigeria falls into this category. Already the most populous country on the continent, with an estimated 55 million people in 1970 (see footnote to Table 4), Nigeria's population by the end of this century is projected to number 135 million. This suggests a growing political and strategic role for Nigeria, at least in Africa south of the Sahara.
In North Africa, Egypt's population of 33 million in 1970 is projected to double by 2000.
The large and increasing size of Egypt's
population is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration in the formulation of
many foreign and domestic policies not only of
Latin America. Rapid population growth is projected for tropical South American which includes Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Brazil, with a current population of over 100 million, clearly dominates the continent demographically; by the end of this century, its population is projected to reach the 1974 U.S. level of about 212 million people. Rapid economic grows] prospects -- if they are not diminished by demographic overgrowth -- portend a growing power status for Brazil in Latin America and on the world scene over the next 25 years.
The Caribbean which includes a number of countries with promising family planning programs Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba, Barbados and also Puerto Rico) is projected to grow a 2.2 percent a year between 1970 and 2000, a rate below the Latin American average of 2.8 percent.
Perhaps the most significant population trend
from the view point of the United States is
South Asia. Somewhat slower rates are expected for Eastern and Middle South Asia
whose combined population of 1.03 billion in 1970 is projected to more than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. In the face of continued rapid population growth (2.5 percent), the prospects for the populous Indian subregion, which already faces staggering economic problems, are particularly bleak. South and Southeast Asia's population will substantially increase relative to mainland China; it appears doubtful, however, that this will do much to enhance their relative power position and political influence in Asia. On the contrary, preoccupation with the growing internal economic and social problems resulting from huge population increases may progressively reduce the ability of the region, especially India, to play an effective regional and world power role.
Western South Asia, demographically dominated by
Turkey and seven oil-rich states (including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait)
is projected to be one of the fastest growing
Rapid population growth in less developed countries has been mounting in a social milieu of poverty, unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment, widespread malnutrition, and increasing costs of food production. These countries have accumulated a formidable "backlog" of unfinished tasks. They include economic assimilation of some 40 percent of their people who are pressing at, but largely remain outside the periphery of the developing economy; the amelioration of generally low levels of living; and in addition, accommodation of annually larger increments to the population. The accomplishment of these tasks could be intolerably slow if the average annual growth rate in the remainder of this century does not slow down to well below the 2.7 percent projected, under the medium variant, for LDCs with market economics. How rapid population growth impedes social and economic progress is discussed in subsequent chapters.
Appendix Table 1
Projected Growth of Urban Population, Selected Years 1965-2000
(U.N. Medium Variant)
Year World Population DC Population LDC Population
Total Urban Percent Total Urban Percent Total Urban Percent
(millions) urban (millions) urban (millions) urban
1965 3,289 1,158 35.2 1,037 651 62.8 2,252 507 22.5
1970 3,621 1,315 36.3 1,084 693 63.9 2,537 622 24.5
1980 4,401 1,791 40.7 1,183 830 70.2 3,218 961 29.9
1990 5,346 2,419 45.3 1,282 977 76.2 4,064 1,443 35.5
2000 6,407 3,205 50.0 1,368 1,118 81.8 5,039 2,087 41.4
Note: The 'urban' population has....... been estimated in accordance with diverse national definitions of that term.
Rates of Growth of Urban and Rural Populations, 1970-2000
(U.N. Medium Variant)
World Population DC Population LDC Population
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
(percent) 76.9 143.7 38.8 26.2 61.3 -36.1 98.6 235.5 54.2
growth (percent) 1.9 3.0 1.1 0.8 1.6 - 1.5 2.3 4.1 1.5
CHAPTER II - POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES
Rapid population growth and lagging food
production in developing countries, together
As a result of population growth, and to some
extent also of increasing affluence, world
Argentina combined. This annual increase in food demand is made up of a 2 % annual increase in population and a 0.5 % increased demand per capita. Part of the rising per capita demand reflects improvement in diets of some of the peoples of the developing countries. In the less developed countries about 400 pounds of grain is available per person per year and is mostly eaten as cereal. The average North American, however, uses nearly a ton of grain a year, only 200 pounds directly and the rest in the form of meat, milk, and eggs for which several pounds of cereal are required to produce one pound of the animal product (e.g., five pounds of grain to produce one pound of beef).
During the past two decades, LDCs have been able to keep food production ahead of population, notwithstanding the unprecedent- edly high rates of population growth. The basic figures are summarized in the following table: [calculated from data in USDA, The World
Agricultural Situation, March 1974]:
INDICES OF WORLD POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION
(excluding Peoples Republic of China)
WORLD DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LESS DEVELOPED
Food Production Food Production Food production
Population Total Per Capital Population Total Per Capital Population Total
1954 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1973 144 170 119 124 170 138 159 171 107
increase (%) 1.9 2.8 0.9 1.1 2.8 1.7 2.5 0 2.9 0.4
will be noted that the relative gain in LDC total
food production was just as great as for advanced
populous group (including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) in which the rate of increase in production barely exceeded population growth but did not keep up with the increase in domestic demand. [World Food Conference, Preliminary Assessment, 8 May 1974; U.N. Document
E/CONF. 65/PREP/6, p. 33.]
General requirements have been projected for the
years 1985 and 2000, based
A recent projection made by the Department of Agriculture indicates a potential productive capacity more than adequate to meet world cereal requirements (the staple food of the world) of a population of 6.4 billion in the year 2000 (medium fertility variant) at roughly current relative prices.
This overall picture offers little cause for
complacency when broken down by geographic
experience of 1972-73 is very sobering. The coincidence of adverse weather in many regions in 1972 brought per capita production in the LDCs back to the level of the early 1960s. At the same time, world food reserves (mainly American) were almost exhausted, and they were not rebuilt during the high production year of 1973. A repetition under these conditions of 1972 weather patterns would result in large-scale famine of a kind not experienced for several decades -- a kind the world thought had been permanently banished. Even if massive famine can be averted, the most optimistic forecasts of food production potential in the more populous LDCs show little improvement in the presently inadequate levels and quality of nutrition. As long as annual population growth continues at 2 to 3 percent or more,
LDCs must make expanded food production the top
development priority, even though it may
accompanied by food riots and chronic social and political instability. They would improve the possibilities for long-term development and integration into a peaceful world order. Even taking the most optimistic view of the theoretical possibilities of producing enough foods in the developed countries to meet the requirements of the developing countries, the problem of increased costs to the LDCs is already extremely serious and in its future may be insurmountable. At current prices the anticipated import requirements of 102-122 million tons by 2000 would raise the cost of developing countries' imports of cereals to $16-20 1/ billion by that year compared with $2.5 billion in 1970. Large as they may seem even these estimates of import requirements could be on the low side if the developing countries are unable to achieve the Department of Agriculture's assumed increase in the rate of growth of
production. The FAO in its recent "Preliminary Assessment of the World Food Situation Present and Future" has reached a similar conclusion:
What is certain is the enormity of the food
import bill which might face
At least three-quarters of the projected increase
in cereal imports of developing
The problem in Latin America, therefore, appears relatively more manageable. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the poorer countries of Asia and Africa will be
1/ At $160.00 per ton.
able to finance nearly like the level of import
requirements projected by the USDA. Few of them
While foreign assistance probably will continue
to be forthcoming to meet short-term emergency situations like the threat
of mass starvation, it is more questionable whether aid donor countries will be prepared to
provide the sort of massive food aid called for by the import projections on a long-term continuing
basis. Reduced population growth rates clearly could
bring significant relief over the longer term. Some analysts maintain that for
the post-1985 period a rapid decline in fertility will be crucial to adequate diets worldwide. If,
as noted before, fertility in the developing countries could be made to decline to the
replacement level by the year 2000, the world's population in that year would be 5.9 billion or
500 million below the level that would be attained if the UN medium projection were followed. Nearly
all of the decline would be in the LDCs. With such a reduction the projected import gap of
102-122 million tons per year could be eliminated while still permitting a modest
improvement in per capita consumption. While such a rapid reduction in fertility rates in the next 30
years is an optimistic target, it is thought by some
The problem is clear. The solutions, or at least the directions we must travel to reach them are also generally agreed. What will be required is a genuine commitment to a set of policies that will lead the international community, both developed and developing countries, to the achievement of the objectives spelled out above.
CHAPTER III - MINERALS AND FUEL
Population growth per se is not likely to impose
serious constraints on the global physical
The important potential linkage between rapid
population growth and minerals availability is indirect rather than direct. It
flows from the negative effects of excessive population growth in economic development and
social progress, and therefore on internal stability, in overcrowded under-developed
countries. The United States has become increasingly dependent on mineral imports from developing
countries in recent decades, and this trend is likely to continue. The location of known
reserves of higher-grade ores of most minerals favours increasing dependence of all
industrialized regions on imports from less developed countries. The real problems of mineral supplies
lie, not in basic physical sufficiency, but in the politico-economic issues of access, terms for
exploration and exploitation, and division of the
In the extreme cases where population pressures lead to endemic famine, food riot, and breakdown of social order, those conditions are scarcely conducive to systematic exploration for mineral deposits or the long-term investments required for their exploitation. Short of famine, unless some minimum of popular aspirations for material improvement can be satisfied, and unless the terms of access and exploitation persuade governments and peoples that this aspect of the international economic order has "something in it for them," concessions to foreign companies are likely to be expropriated or subjected to arbitrary intervention. Whether through government action, labor conflicts, sabotage, or civil disturbance, the smooth flow of needed Materials will be jeopardized. Although population pressure is obviously not the only factor involved, these types of frustrations are much less likely under conditions of slow or zero population growth.
non-fuel minerals on which the U.S. depends heavily for imports1/ support these conclusions on physical resources (see Annex). Proven reserves of many of these minerals appear to be more than adequate to meet the estimated accumulated world demand at 1972 relative prices at least to the end of the century. While petroleum (including natural gas), copper, zinc, and tin are probable exceptions, the extension of economically exploitable reserves as a result of higher prices, as well as substitution and secondary recovery for metals, should avoid long-term supply restrictions. In many cases, the price increases that have taken place since 1972 should be more than sufficient to bring about the necessary extension of reserves. These conclusions are consistent with a much more extensive study made in 1972 for the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future.
As regards fossil fuels, that study foresees
adequate world reserves for at least the next quarter to half century even without major
technological breakthroughs. U.S. reserves of coal and oil shale are adequate well into the next
century, although their full exploitation may be limited by environmental and water supply factors.
Estimates of the U.S. Geological Survey suggest recoverable oil and gas reserves (assuming
sufficiently high prices) to meet domestic demand for another two or three decades, but there is also
respectable expert opinion supporting much lower estimates; present oil production is below the
peak of 1970 and meets only 70 percent of current demands.3/ Nevertheless, the U.S. is in a
relatively strong position on fossil fuels compared with the rest of the industrialized world, provided
that it takes the time and makes the heavy investments needed to develop domestic
alternatives to foreign sources. In the case of the 197 non-fuel minerals studied
by the Commission it was concluded there were sufficient proven reserves of nine to
meet cumulative world needs at current relative prices through the year 2020.4/ For the ten
others5/ world proven reserves were considered
generally is reluctant to undertake costly
exploration to meet demands which may or may not
1/ Aluminum, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, tin, uranium, zinc, and petroleum (including natural gas).
2/ Population, Resources and the Environment, edited by Ronald Ridker, Vol. III of the Commission Research
3/ For a recent review of varying estimates on oil and gas reserves, see Oil and Gas Resources," Science, , 12 July
74, pp. 127-130 (Vol. 185).
4/ Chromium, iron, nickel, vanadium, magnesium, phosphorous, potassium, cobalt, and nitrogen.
5/ Manganese, molybdenum, tungsten, aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, tin, titanium, and sulphur.
The adequacy of reserves does not of course
assure that supplies will be forthcoming in a
periods of overcapacity and falling prices. Necessary technical adjustments required for the shift to substitutes or increased recycling also may be delayed by the required lead time or by lack of information. An early warning system designed to flag impending surpluses and shortages, could be very helpful in anticipating these problems. Such a mechanism might take the form of groups of experts working with the UN Division of Resources. Alternatively, intergovernmental commodity study groups might be set up for the purpose of monitoring those commodities identified as potential problem areas.
Adequate global availability of fuel and non-fuel
minerals is not of much
intensified. Success in such efforts is
questionable, however; there is no case in which the quantities involved are remotely comparable to
the cases of energy; and the scope for successful price-gouging or cartel tactics is much smaller. Although the U.S. is relatively well off in this
regard, it nonetheless depends heavily on mineral imports from a number of sources which
are not completely safe or stable. It may therefore be necessary, especially in the light
of our recent oil experience, to keep this dependence within bounds, in some cases by
developing additional domestic resources and more generally by acquiring stockpiles for economic as
well as national defence emergencies. There are also possible dangers of unreasonable prices
promoted by producer cartels and broader policy questions of U.S. support for commodity
agreements involving both producers and consumers. Such matters, however, are in the
domain of commodity policy rather than populationpolicy.
At least through the end of this century, changes
in population growth trends will make little difference to total levels of requirements
for fuel and other minerals. Those requirements
abroad, especially from less developed countries.7/ That fact gives the U.S. enhanced interest in the political, economic, and social stability of the supplying countries. Wherever a lessening of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase the prospects for such stability, population policy becomes relevant to resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States.
7/ See National Commission on Materials Policy, Towards a National Materials Policy: Basic Data and Issues, April
OUTLOOK FOR RAW MATERIALS
I. Factors Affecting Raw Material Demand and
Economic theory indicates that the pattern of
consumption of raw materials
1. In industrialized countries, the services
component of GNP expands
2. Technological progress, on the whole, tends to lower the intensity-ofuse through greater efficiency in the use of raw materials-and development
3. Economic growth continues to be characterized by substitution of one material by another and substitution of synthetics for natural materials.
Most developed countries have reached this point
of declining intensity-ofuse.9/ For other countries that have not
reached this stage of economic development, their
8/ Materials Requirements Abroad in the Year 2000, research project prepared for National Commission on Materials Policy by the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; pp. 9-10.
9/ United Nations symposium on Population; Resources, and Environment Stockholm, 9/26-10/5/73,
E/Conf.6/CEP/3, p. 35.
adjustment process, and availability of capital
for needed investment can also be expected to
The following table presents the 1972 net imports
and the ratio of imports
1972 Ratio of Imports
Commodity Net Imports to Total Demand
Aluminum 483.8 .286
Copper 206.4 .160
Iron 424.5 .049
Lead 102.9 .239
Nickel 477.1 .704
Tin 220.2 .943
Titanium 256.5 .469
Zinc 294.8 .517
Petroleum 5,494.5 .246
(including natural gas)
The primary sources of these US imports during the period 1969-1972 were:
Commodity Source & %
Aluminum - Canada 76%
Copper - Canada 31%, Peru 27%, Chile 22%
Iron - Canada 50%, Venezuela 31 %
Lead - Canada 29%, Peru 21%, Australia 21%
Nickel - Canada 82%, Norway 8%
Tin - Malaysia 64%, Thailand 27%
Titanium - Japan 73%, USSR 19%
Zinc (Ore) - Canada 60%, Mexico 24%
Zinc (Metal) - Canada 48%, Australia 10%
Petroleum (crude) - Canada 42%
Petroleum (crude) -Venezuela 17%
* The values are based on U.S. 1972 prices for
materials in primary form, and in some cases do not represent
II. World Reserves
The following table shows estimates of the world
reserve position for these
Price (per pound primary aluminum)
Price A Price B Price C Price D
.23 .29 .33 .36
Reserves (billion short tons, aluminum content )
World 3.58 3.76 4.15 5.21
U.S. .01 .02 .04 .09
Price A Price B Price C Price D
Price (per pound refined copper)
.51 .60 .75
Reserves (million short tons)
World 370 418 507
U.S. 83 93 115
Price ( per troy ounce )
58.60 90 100 15O
Reserves ( million troy ounce )
World 1,000 1,221 1,588 1,850
U.S. 82 120 200 240
Price ( per short ton of primary iron contained in ore )
17.80 20.80 23.80
Reserves ( billion short tons iron content )
World 96.7 129.0 206.0
U.S. 2.0 2.7 18.0
Price A Price B Price C Price D
Price ( per pound primary lead metal )
.15 .18 .20
Reserves ( million short tons, lead content )
World 96.0 129.0 144.0
U.S. 36.0 51.0 56.0
Price ( per pound of primary metal )
1.53 1.75 2.00 2.25
Reserves ( millions short tons )
World 46.2 60.5 78.0 99.5
U.S. .2 .2 .5 .5
Price ( per pound primary tin metal )
1.77 2.0 2.5 3.00
Reserves ( thousands of long tons - tin content )
World 4,180 5,500 7,530 9,290
U.S. 5 9 100 200
Price ( per pound titanium in pigment )
.45 .55 .60
Reserves ( thousands short tons titanium content )
World 158,100 222,000 327,000
U.S. 32,400 45,000 60,000
Price ( per pound, prime western zinc delivered )
.18 .25 .30
Reserves ( million short tons, zinc content )
World 131 193 260
U.S. 30 40 50
Data necessary to quantify reserve-price
relationships are not available. For planning
Price ( wellhead price per thousand cubic feet )
.186 .34 .44 .55
Reserves ( trillion cubic feet )
World 1,156 6,130 10,240 15,599
U.S. 266 580 900 2,349
It should be noted that these statistics
represent a shift in 1972 relative prices and assume
technology limit economically recoverable reserves to bauxite sources. Alternate sources of aluminum exist (e.g., alunite) and if improved technology is developed making these alternate sources commercially viable, supply constraints will not likely be encountered.
The above estimated reserve figures, while
representing approximate orders of magnitude, are adequate to meet projected
accumulated world demand (also very rough orders
CHAPTER IV - Economic Development and Population Growth
Rapid population growth adversely affects every
aspect of economic and social progress
Even in countries with good resource/population
ratios, rapid population growth causes problems for several reasons: First, large
capital investments generally are required to exploit unused resources. Second, some countries already
have high and growing unemployment and lack the means to train new entrants to their
labor force. Third, there are long delays between starting effective family planning programs and
reducing fertility, and even longer delays between reductions in fertility and population
stabilization. Hence there is substantial danger of vastly overshooting population targets if
population growth is not moderated in the near future. During the past decade, the developing countries
have raised their GNP at a rate of 5 percent per annum as against 4.8 percent in
developed countries. But at the same time the LDCs experienced an average annual population growth
rate of 2.5 percent. Thus their per capita income growth rate was only 2.5 percent and in
some of the more highly populated areas the increase in per capita incomes was less than 2
percent. This stands in stark contrast to 3.6 percent in the rich countries. Moreover, the low rate
means that there' very little change in those countries whose per capita incomes $200 or less
per annum. The problem has been further
Moderation of population growth offers benefits
in terms of resources saved for
This raises the question of how much more
efficient expenditures for population control
(2) Child quality versus quantity. Parents make investment decisions, in a sense, about their children. Healthier and better-educated children tend to be economically more productive, both as children and later as adults. In addition to the more-or-less conscious trade- offs parents can make about more education and better health per child, there are certain biologic adverse effects suffered by high birth order children such as higher mortality and limited brain growth due to higher incidence of malnutrition. It must be emphasized, however, that discussion of trade-offs between child quality and child quantity will probably remain academic with regard to countries where child mortality remains high. When parents cannot expect most children to survive to old age, they probably will continue to "over-compensate", using high fertility as a form of hedge to insure that they will have some living offspring able to support the parents in the distant future.
(3) Capital deepening versus widening. From the
family's viewpoint high fertility is likely to reduce welfare per child; for the
economy one may view high fertility as too rapid a growth in labor force relative to capital stock.
Society's capital stock includes facilities such as
growth rate can help increase the amount of capital and education per worker, helping thereby to increase output and income per capita. The problem of migration to cities and the derived demand for urban infrastructure can also be analysed as problems of capital widening, which
draw resources away from growth-generating investments. In a number of the more populous countries a fourth aspect rapid growth in numbers has emerged in recent years which 1: profound long-run consequences. Agricultural output was able keep pace or exceed population growth over the many decades population rise prior to the middle of this century, primer through steady expansion of acreage under cultivation. More recently, only marginal unused land has been available in India, Thailand, Java, Bangladesh, and other areas. As a result (a) la holdings have declined in size, and (b) land shortage has led deforestation and overgrazing, with consequent soil erosion and severe water pollution and increased urban migration. Areas that once earned foreign exchange through the export of food surpluses are now in deficit or face early transition to dependence on food imports. Although the scope for raising agricultural productivity is very great in many of these areas, the available technologies for doing so require much higher capital costs per acre and much larger foreign exchange outlays for "modern" inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, petroleum fuels, etc.) than was the case with the traditional technologies. Thus the population growth problem can seen as an important long-run, or structural, contributor to current LDC balance of payments problems and to deterioration of the basic ecological infrastructure.
Finally, high fertility appears to exacerbate the
maldistribution of income which is a
III. The Effect of Development on Population
Growth The determinants of population growth are not
well understood, especially for low income societies. Historical data show that
declining fertility in Europe and North America has been associated with declining mortality and
increasing urbanization, and generally with
(though not fully known) number of couples would
like to have fewer children than possible
a. Inadequacy of information and means. Actual family size in many societies is higher than desired family size owing to ignorance of acceptable birth control methods or unavailability of birth control devices and services. The importance of this factor is evidenced by many sociological investigations on "desired family size" versus actual size, by the substantial rates of acceptance for contraceptives when systematic family planning services are introduced.
This factor has been a basic assumption in the
family planning programs of official bilateral and multilateral programs in many countries over the
past decade. Whatever the actual weight of this factor, which clearly varies from country to
country and which shifts with changes in economic and social conditions, there remains without
question a significant demand for family planning
b. Inadequacy of motivation for reduced numbers
of children. Especially in the rural
1/ See James E. Kocher, Rural Development, Income Distribution, and Fertility Decline (Population Council, New York, 1973), and William Rich, smaller Families through Social and Economic Progress (Overseas Development
Council, Wash., 1973).
absence of educational and employment
opportunities for young women intensifies these same
c. The "time lag". Family preferences and social
institutions that favour high fertility change slowly. Even though mortality and economic
conditions have improved significantly since World War II in LDCs, family expectations,
social norms, and parental practice are slow to respond to these altered conditions. This factor
leads to the need for large scale programs of information, education, and persuasion directed
at lower fertility. The three elements are undoubtedly intermixed in
varying proportions in all underdeveloped countries with high birth rates.
In most LDCs, many couples would reduce their completed family size if appropriate birth
control methods were more easily available. The extent of this reduction, however, may still leave their
completed family size at higher than mere replacement levels -- i.e., at levels implying
continued but less rapid population growth. Many other couples would not reduce their desired
family size merely if better contraceptives were available, either because they see large families
as economically beneficial, or because of cultural factors, or because they misread their own
economic interests. Therefore, family planning supply (contraceptive
technology and delivery systems) and demand (the motivation for reduced fertility)
would not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives; they are complementary and may be
mutually reinforcing. The selected point of focus mentioned earlier -- old age security
pro-grams, maternal and child health programs, increased female education, increasing the legal
age of marriage, financial incentives to "acceptors", personnel, -- are important, yet
better information is required as to which measures are most cost-effective and feasible in a given
situation and how their cost-effectiveness compares to supply programs. One additional interesting area is receiving
increasing attention: the distribution of the benefits of development. Experience in several
countries suggests that the extent to which the poor, with the highest fertility rates, reduce
their fertility will depend on the extent to which they participate in development. In this view the
average level of economic development and the
IV. Employment and Social Problems
Employment, aside from its role in production of
goods and services, is an important
The most economically significant employment problems in LDCs contributed to by excessive population growth are low worker productivity in production of traditional goods and services produced, the changing aspirations of the work force, the existing distribution of income, wealth and power, and the natural resource endowment of a country. The political and social problems of urban overcrowding are directly related to population growth. In addition to the still-high fertility in urban areas of many LDC's, population pressures on the land, which increases migration to the cities, adds to the pressures on urban job markets and political stability, and strains, the capacity l to provide schools, health facilities, and water supplies.
It should be recognized that lower fertility will
relieve only a portion of these strains and
CHAPTER V - Implications of Population Pressures for National Security
It seems well understood that the impact of population factors on the subjects already considered -- development, food requirements, resources, environment -- adversely affects the welfare and progress of countries in which we have a friendly interest and thus indirectly adversely affects broad U.S. interests as well. The effects of population factors on the political stability of these countries and their implications for internal and international order or disorder, destructive social unrest, violence and disruptive foreign activities are less well understood and need more analysis. Nevertheless, some strategists and experts believe that these effects may ultimately be the most important of those arising from population factors, most harmful to the countries where they occur and seriously affecting U.S. interests. Other experts within the U.S. Government disagree with this conclusion.
A recent study* of forty-five local conflicts
involving Third World countries examined
1. ". . . population factors are indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent conflict in developing areas. Segmental (religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid population growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban differences, population pressure and the special location of population in relation to resources -- in this rough order of importance -- all appear to be important contributions to conflict and violence...
2. Clearly, conflicts which are regarded in primarily political terms often have demographic roots: Recognition of these relationships appears crucial to any
understanding or prevention of such hostilities." It does not appear that the population factors
act alone or, often, directly to cause the disruptive effects. They act through intervening
elements -- variables. They also add to other causative factors turning what might have been
only a difficult situation into one with disruptive
* Choucri, Nazli, Professor of Political Science, M.I.T. - "Population Dynamics and Local Conflict; A
Cross-National Study of Population and War, A Summary," June 1974.
This action is seldom simple. Professor Philip
Hauser of the University of Chicago
These population factors contribute to socio-economic variables including breakdowns in social structures, underemployment and unemployment, poverty, deprived people in city slums, lowered I opportunities for education for the masses, few job opportunities for those who do obtain education, interracial, religious, and regional rivalries, and sharply increased financial, planning, and administrative burdens on governmental systems at all levels.
These adverse conditions appear to contribute frequently to harmful developments of a political nature: Juvenile delinquency, thievery and other crimes, organized brigandry, kidnapping and terrorism, food riots, other outbreaks of violence; guerrilla warfare, communal violence, separatist movements, revolutionary movements and counter-revolutionary coupe. All of these bear upon the weakening or collapse of local, state, or national government functions. Beyond national boundaries, population factors appear to have had operative roles in some past politically disturbing legal or illegal mass migrations, border incidents, and wars. If current increased population pressures continue they may have greater potential for future disruption in foreign relations. Perhaps most important, in the last decade population factors have impacted more severely than before on availabilities of agricultural land and resources, industrialization, pollution and the environment. All this is occurring at a time when international communications have created rising expectations which are being frustrated by slow development and inequalities of distribution. Since population factors work with other factors and act through intervening linkages, research as to their effects of a political nature is difficult and "proof" even more so. This does not mean, however, that the causality does not exist. It means only that U.S. policy decisions must take into account the less precise and programmatic character of our knowledge of these linkages. Although general hypotheses are hard to draw, some seem reasonably sustainable:
1. Population growth and inadequate resources.
Where population size is greater
tendency toward internal disorders and violence
and, sometimes, disruptive international policies or violence. The higher the rate of growth, the
more salient a factor population increase appears
2. Populations with a high proportion of growth.
The young people, who are
3. Population factors with social cleavages. When adverse population factors of growth, movement, density, excess, or pressure coincide with racial, religious, color, linguistic, cultural, or other social cleavages, there will develop the most potentially explosive situations for internal disorder, perhaps with external effects. When such factors exist together with the reality or sense of relative deprivation among different groups within the same country or in relation to other countries or peoples, the probability of violence increases significantly.
4. Population movements and international migrations. Population movements within countries appear to have a large role in disorders. Migrations into neighbouring countries (especially those richer or more sparsely settled), whether legal or illegal, can provoke negative political reactions or force.
There may be increased propensities for violence
arising simply from technological
Some Effects of Current Population Pressures
In the 1960s and 1970s, there have been a series of episodes in which population factors have apparently had a role ── directly or indirectly ── affecting countries in which we have an interest.
El Salvador-Honduras War. An example was the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras. Dubbed the "Soccer War", it was sparked by a riot during a soccer match, its underlying cause was tension resulting from the large scale migration of Salvadorans from their rapidly growing, densely populated country to relatively uninhabited areas of Honduras. The Hondurans resented the presence of migrants and in 1969 began to enforce an already extant land
tenancy law to expel them. El Salvador was
angered by the treatment given its citizens. Flaring
nations and caused political repercussions and pressures in the United States. It was fundamentally a matter of tribal relationships. Irritations among the tribes caused in part by rapidly increasing numbers of people, in a situation of inadequate opportunity for most of them, magnified the tribal issues and may have helped precipitate the war. The migration of the Ibos from Eastern Nigeria, looking for employment, led to competition with local peoples of other tribes and contributed to tribal rioting. This unstable situation was intensified by the fact that in the 1963 population census returns were falsified to inflate the Western region's population and hence its representation in the Federal Government. The Ibos of the Eastern region, with the oil resources of the country, felt their resources would be unjustly drawn on and attempted to establish their independence.
Pakistan-India-Bangladesh l970-71. This religious
and nationalistic conflict contains several points where a population factor at a
crucial time may have had a causal effect in turning events away from peaceful solutions to violence.
The Central Government in West Pakistan resorted to military suppression of the East Wing
after the election in which the Awami League had an overwhelming victory in East Pakistan.
This election had followed two sets of circumstances. The first was a growing discontent
in East Pakistan at the slow rate of economic
outbursts of violence were induced or enlarged by
the population "complosion" factor.The
The political arrangements in the Subcontinent have changed, but all of the underlying population factors which influenced the dramatic acts of violence that took place in 1970-71 still exist, in worsening dimensions, to influence future events.
Additional illustrations. Population factors also
appear to have had indirect causal relations, in varying degrees, on the killings in
Indonesia in 1965-6, the communal slaughter in
Some Potential Effects of Future Population Pressures Between the end of World War II and 1975 the world's population will have increased about one and a half billion -- nearly one billion of that from 1960 to the present. The rate of growth is increasing and between two and a half and three and a half billion will be added by the year 2000, depending partly on the effectiveness of population growth control programs. This increase of the next 25 years will, of course, pyramid on the great number added with such rapidity in the last 25. The population factors which contributed to the political pressures and
instabilities of the last decades will be multiplied. PRC - The demographic factors of the PRC are referred to on page 79 above. The Government of the PRC has made a major effort to feed its growing population. Cultivated farm land, at 107 million hectares, has not increased significantly over the past 25 years, although farm output has substantially kept pace with population growth through improved yields secured by land improvement, irrigation extension, intensified cropping, and rapid expansion in the supply of fertilizers.
In 1973 the PRC adopted new, forceful population control measures. In the urban areas
Peking claimed its birth control measures had secured a two-child family and a one percent annual population growth, and it proposes to extend this development throughout the rural areas by 1980. The political implications of China's future population growth are obviously important but are not dealt with here. Israel and the Arab States. If a peace settlement can be reached, the central issue will be how to make it last. Egypt with about 37 million today is growing at 2.8% per year. It will approximate 48 million by 1985, 75 million by 1995, and more than 85 million by 2000. It is doubtful that Egypt's economic progress can greatly exceed its population growth. With Israel starting at today's population of 3.3 million, the disparity between its population and
those of the Arab States will rapidly increase.
Inside Israel, unless Jewish immigration continues,
rising population in urban areas, food shortages, and growing scarcities in household commodities. The GOI has not been very successful in alleviating unemployment in the cities. The recent disturbances in Gujarat and Bihar seem to be only the beginning of chronic and serious political disorders occurring throughout India."
There will probably be a weakening, possibly a breakdown, of the control of
the central government over some of the states
and local areas. The democratic system will be
Bangladesh. With appalling population density, rapid population growth, and extensive poverty will suffer even more. Its population has increased 40% since the census 13 years ago and is growing at least 3% per year. The present 75 million, or so, unless slowed by famine, disease, or massive birth control, will double in 23 years and exceed 170 million by 2000. Requirements for food and other basic necessities of life are growing at a faster rate than existing resources and administrative systems are providing them. In the rural areas, the size of the average farm is being reduced and there is increasing landlessness. More and more people are migrating to urban areas. The government admits a 30% rate of unemployment and underemployment. Already, Embassy Dacca reports (Dacca 3424, June 19, 1974) there are important economic-population causes for the landlessness that is rapidly increasing and contributing to violent crimes of murder and armed robbery that terrorize the ordinary citizen.
"Some of the vast army of unemployed and landless, and those strapped by the escalating cost of basic commodities, have doubtless turned to crime."
Three paragraphs of Embassy Dacca's report
sharply outline the effect on U.S. political interests we may anticipate from population I
factors in Bangladesh and other countries that, if
politically stable country which will not threaten the stability of its neighbours in the Subcontinent nor invite the intrusion of outside powers. Surrounded on three sides by India and sharing a short border with Burma, Bangladesh, if it descends into chaos, will threaten the stability of these nations as well. Already Bengalees are illegally migrating into the frontier provinces of Assam and Tripura, politically sensitive areas of India, and into adjacent Burma. Should expanded out-migration and socio-political collapse in Bangladesh threaten its own stability, India may be forced to consider intervention, although it is difficult to see in what way the Indians could cope with the situation.
"Bangladesh is a case study of the effects of few
resources and burgeoningpopulation not
Panama. The troublesome problem of jurisdiction
over the Canal Zone is primarily due
On our side, the Bureau of the Census estimates that as more and more Americans move to the Southwestern States the present 40,000,000 population may approximate 61,000,000 by 1995. The domestic use of Colorado River water may again have increased the salinity level in Mexico and reopened that political issue.
Amembassy Mexico City (Mexico 4953, June 14,
1974) summarized the
"An indefinite continuation of Mexico's high
population growth rate would increasingly act as a brake on economic (and social)
improvement. The consequences would be noted in various ways. Mexico could well take more
radical positions in the international scene. Illegal migration to the U.S. would increase. In
a country where unemployment and under-employment is already high, the entry of
increasing numbers into the work force would only intensify the pressure to seek
employment in the U.S. by whatever means. Yet another consequence would be increased demand for
food imports from the U.S., especially if the fate of growth of agricultural
production continues to lag behind the population growth rate. Finally, one cannot
dismiss the spectre of future domestic instability as a long term consequence, should
the economy, now strong, falter." UNCTAD, the Special UNGA, and the UN. The
developing countries, after several years of unorganized maneuvering and erratic
attacks have now formed tight groupings in the Special Committee for Latin American
Coordination, the Organization of African States, and the Seventy-Seven. As illustrated in the Declaration
of Santiago and the recent Special General Assembly, these groupings at times appear to
reflect a common desire to launch economic attacks against the United States and, to a
lesser degree, the European developed countries. A factor which is common to all of them, which
retards their development, burdens their foreign exchange, subjects them to world prices for food,
fertilizer, and necessities of life and pushes them into disadvantageous trade relations is
their excessively rapid population growth. Until they
In industrial nations, population growth
increases demand for industrial output. This over
Countries suffering under such burdens will be more susceptible to radicalization. Their vulnerability also might invite foreign intervention by stronger nations bent on acquiring political and economic advantage. The tensions within the Have-not nations are likely to intensify, and the conflicts between them and the Haves may escalate. Past experience gives little assistance to predicting the course of these developments because the speed of today's population growth, migrations, and urbanization far exceeds anything the world has seen before. Moreover, the consequences of such population factors can no longer be evaded by moving to new hunting or grazing lands, by conquering new territory, by discovering or colonizing new continents, or by emigration in large numbers. The world has ample warning that we all must make more rapid efforts at social and economic development to avoid or mitigate these gloomy prospects. We should be warned also that we all must move as rapidly as possible toward stabilizing national and world population
CHAPTER VI - World Population Conference
From the standpoint of policy and program, the focal point of the World Population Conference (WPC) at Bucharest, Romania, in August 1974, was the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) The U.S. had contributed many substantive points to the draft Plan We had particularly emphasized the incorporation of population factors in national planning of developing countries' population programs for assuring the availability of means of family planning to persons of reproductive age, voluntary but specific goals for the reduction of population growth and time frames for action
As the WPPA reached the WPC it was organized as a
demographic document. It also
1. Repeated references to the importance (or as some said, the pre- condition) of economic and social development for the reduction of high fertility. Led by Algeria and Argentina, many emphasized the "new international economic order" as central to economic and social development.
2. Efforts to reduce the references to population
programs, minimize their
3. Additional references to national sovereignty
in setting population
The Plan of Action
Despite the initial attack and continuing efforts to change the conceptual basis of the world Population Plan of Action, the Conference adopted by acclamation (only the Holy See staking a general reservation) a complete World Population Plan of Action. It is less urgent in tone than the draft submitted by the U.N. Secretariat but in several ways more complete and with greater potential than that draft. The final action followed a vigorous debate with hotly contested positrons and forty-seven votes. Nevertheless, there was general satisfaction among the participants at the success of their efforts.
a. Principles and Aims
The Plan of Action lays down several important
principles, some for the first time in a
1. Among the first-time statements is the
assertion that the sovereign right of each
2. The conceptual relationship between population
and development is stated in Para
13(c): Population and development are interrelated:
population variables influence
3. A basic right of couples and individuals is recognized by Para 13(f),
for the first time in a single declarative
4. Also for the first time, a U.N. document links the responsibility of child-bearers to the community [Para 13(f) continued]:
The responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community.
It is now possible to build on this newly-stated principle as the right of couples first recognized in the Tehran Human Rights Declaration of 1968 has been built on.
5. A flat declaration of the right of women is included in Para 13(h): Women have the right to complete integration in the development process particularly by means of an equal participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and political life. In addition, the necessary measures should be taken to facilitate this
integration with family responsibilities which should be fully shared by both partners.
6. The need for international action is accepted
in Para 13(k):
7. The "primary aim" of the Plan of Action is
asserted to be "to expand and
The Plan of Action includes recommendations for: population goals and policies; population growth; mortality and morbidity; reproduction; family formation and the status of women; population distribution and internal migration; international migration; population structure; socio-economic policies; data collection and analysis; research; development and evolution of population policies; the role of national governments and of international cooperation; and monitoring, review and appraisal.
A score of these recommendations are the most important:
1. Governments should integrate population
measures and programs into omprehensive
2. Countries which consider their population
growth hampers attainment of their
3. Highest priority should be given to reduction in mortality and morbidity and increase of life expectancy and programs for this purpose should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups. (Para 20-25)
4. Countries are urged to encourage appropriate
education concerning responsible
5. Family planning and related services should
aim at prevention of unwanted pregnancies and also at elimination of
involuntary sterility or subfecundity to enable couples to
6. Adequately trained auxiliary personnel, social workers and non-government channels should be used to help provide family planning services. [Pare 29(e)]
7. Governments with family planning programs should consider coordinating the mwith health and other services designed to raise the quality of life.
8. Countries wishing to affect fertility levels
should give priority to development
9. Countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to set quantitative goals and implement policies to achieve them by 1985. [Pare 37]
10. Developed countries are urged to develop
appropriate policies in population,
11. Because the family is the basic unit of
society, governments should assist families
12. Governments should ensure full participation
of women in the educational,
13. A series of recommendations are made to stabilize migration within countries, particularly policies to reduce the undesirable consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. [Para 44-50]
14. Agreements should be concluded to regulate
the international migration of
their families; also other measures to decrease the brain drain from developing countries. [Para
15. To assure needed information concerning
population trends, population censuses
17. Training of management on population dynamics
and administration, on an
18. An important role of governments is to determine and assess the population problems and needs of their countries in the light of their political, social, cultural, religious and economic conditions; such an undertaking should be carried out systematically and periodically o as to provide informed, rational and dynamic decision-making in matters of population and
development. [Para 97]
20. The Plan of Action should be closely
coordinated with the International
population policies, supported, upon request, by
adequate international assistance." Para 37 then
Usefulness of the Plan of Action
The World Population Plan of Action, despite its wordiness and often hesitant tone, contains all the necessary provisions for effective population growth control programs at national and international levels. It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with time frames for their accomplishment. These will have to be added by individual national action and development as rapidly as possible in further U.N. documents. The basis for suitable goals exists
in paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and 106, referred to above. The U.N. low variant projection used in these paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the United States and other ECAFE nations:
- For developed countries -
replacement levels of fertility by 1985;
stationary populations as soon as
- For developing countries -
- For the world -
a 1.7% population growth rate by 1985 with 2% average for the developing countries and 0.7% average for developed countries; replacement level of fertility for all countries by 2000. The dangerous situation evidenced by the current food situation and projections for the future make it essential to press for the realization of these goals. The beliefs, ideologies and misconceptions displayed by many nations at Bucharest indicate more forcefully than ever the need for extensive education of the leaders of many governments, especially in Africa and some in Latin America. Approaches leaders of individual countries must tee designed in the light of their current beliefs and to meet their special concerns. These might include:
1. Projections of population growth
individualized for countries and with
2. Familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and comparably influential leaders from private life.
3. Greatly increased training programs for senior officials in the elements of
4. Assistance in integrating population factors in national plans, particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income and social stability.
5. Assistance in relating population policies and family planning programs to major sectors of development: health, nutrition, agriculture, education, social services, organized labor, women's activities, community development.
6. Initiatives to implement the Percy amendment regarding improvement in the status of women.
7. Emphasis in assistance and development programs on development of ruralareas.
All these activities and others particularly productive are consistent with the Plan of Action and may be based upon it.
Beyond these activities, essentially directed at national interests, a broader educational concept is needed to convey an acute understanding of the interrelation of national interests and world population growth.
P A R T T W O
I. Introduction - A U.S. Global Population Strategy
There is no simple single approach to the
population problem which will provide a
A. Basic Global Strategy
The following basic elements are necessary parts of a comprehensive approach to the population problem which must include both bilateral and multilateral components to achieve success. Thus, USG population assistance programs will need to be coordinated with those of the major multilateral institutions, voluntary organizations, and other bilateral donors. The common strategy for dealing with rapid population growth should encourage constructive actions to lower fertility since population growth over the years will seriously negate reasonable prospects for the sound social and economic development of the peoples involved. While the time horizon in this NSSM is the year 2000 we must recognize that in most countries, especially the LDCs, population stability cannot be achieved until the next century. There are too many powerful socio-economic factors operating on family size decisions and too much momentum built into the dynamics of population growth to permit a quick and dramatic reversal of current trends. There is also even less cause for optimism on the rapidity of socio-economic progress that would generate rapid fertility reduction in the poor LDCs than on the feasibility of extending family planning services to those in their populations who may wish to take advantage of them. Thus, at this point we cannot know with certainty when world population can feasibly be stabilized, nor can we state with assurance the limits of the world's ecological "carrying capability". But we can be certain of the desirable direction of change and can state as a plausible objective the target of achieving replacement fertility rates by the year 2000.
Over the past few years, U.S. government-funded
population programs have played a
However, there is growing appreciation that the problem is more long term and complex than first appeared and that a short term burst of activity or moral fervour will not solve it. The danger in this realization is that the U.S. might abandon its commitment to assisting in the world's population problem, rather than facing up to it for the long-run difficult problem that it is. From year to year we are learning more about what kind of fertility reduction is feasible
in differing LDC situations. Given the laws of compound growth, even comparatively small reductions in fertility over the next decade will make a significant difference in total numbers by the year 2000, and a far more significant one by the year 2050. The proposed strategy calls for a coordinated approach to respond to the important U.S. foreign policy interest in the influence of population growth on the world's political, economic and ecological systems. What is unusual about population is that this foreign policy interest must have a time horizon far beyond that of most other objectives. While there are strong short-run reasons for population programs, because of such factors as food supply, pressures on social service budgets, urban migration and social and political instability, the major impact of the benefits - or avoidance of catastrophe - that could be accomplished by a strengthened U.S. commitment in the population area will be felt less by those of us in the U.S. and other countries today than by our children and grandchildren.
B. Key Country priorities in U.S. and Multilateral Population Assistance
One issue in any global population strategy is
the degree of emphasis in allocation of
In order to assist the development of major countries and to maximize progress toward population stability, primary emphasis would be placed on the largest and fastest growing developing countries where the imbalance between growing numbers and development potential most seriously risks instability, unrest, and international tensions. These countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, The Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Colombia. Out of a total 73.3 million worldwide average increase in population from 1970-75 these countries contributed 34.3 million or 47%. This group of priority countries includes some with virtually no government interest in family planning and others with
active government family planning programs which require and would welcome enlarged technical and financial assistance. These countries should be given the highest priority within AID's population program in terms of resource allocations and/or leadership efforts to encourage action by other donors and organizations.
However, other countries would not be ignored.
AID would provide population
C. Instruments and Modalities for Population Assistance
Bilateral population assistance is the largest and most invisible "instrument" for carrying out U.S. policy in this area. Other instruments include: support for and coordination with population programs of multilateral organizations and voluntary agencies; encouragement of
multilateral country consortia and consultative
groups to emphasize family planning in reviews of overall recipient progress and aid requests;
and formal and informal presentation of views at international gatherings, such as food and
population conferences. Specific country strategies must be worked out for each of the highest
priority countries, and for the lower priority ones. These strategies will take account of such
factors as: national attitudes and sensitivities on family planning; which "instruments" will be most
acceptable, opportunities for effective use of assistance; and need of external capital or
operating assistance. For example, in Mexico our strategy would focus
on working primarily through private agencies and multilateral organizations to
encourage more government attention to the need for control of population growth; in Bangladesh we
might provide large-scale technical and financial assistance, depending on the soundness of
specific program requests; in Indonesia we would
Within the overall array of U.S. foreign assistance programs, preferential treatment in allocation of funds and manpower should be given to cost- effective programs to reduce population growth; including both family planning activities and supportive activities in other sectors.
While some have argued for use of explicit Aleverage@ to Aforce@better population programs on LDC governments, there are several practical constraints on our efforts to achieve program improvements. Attempts to use "leverage" for far less sensitive issues have generally caused political frictions and often backfired. Successful family planning requires strong local dedication and commitment that cannot over the long run be enforced from the outside. [**
There is also the danger that some LDC leaders will see developed country pressures for family planning as a form of economic or racial imperialism; this could well create a serious backlash.**]
Short of Aleverage@, there are many opportunities, bilaterally and multilaterally, for U.S. representations to discuss and urge the need for stronger family planning programs. There is also some established precedent for taking account of family planning performance in appraisal of assistance requirements by AID and consultative groups. Since population growth is a major determinant of increases in food demand, allocation of scarce PL 480 resources should take
account of what steps a country is taking in
population control as well as food production. In these sensitive relationships, however, it is
important in style as well as substance to avoid the
D. Provision and Development of Family Planning Services,
Information and Technology
Past experience suggests that easily available
family planning services are a vital and
Two main advances are required for providing safe
and effective fertility control
1. Expansion and further development of efficient low-cost systems to assure
the full availability of existing family planning services, materials and information to the 85% of
LDC populations not now effectively reached. In developing countries willing to create special
delivery systems for family planning services this may be the most effective method. In others
the most efficient and acceptable method is to combine family planning with health or nutrition
in multi-purpose delivery systems.
2. Improving the effectiveness of present means
of fertility control, and developing
E. Creating Conditions Conducive to Fertility Decline
It is clear that the availability of contraceptive services and information is not a complete answer to the population problem. In view of the importance of socio-economic factors in determining desired family size, overall assistance strategy should increasingly concentrate on selective policies which will contribute to population decline as well as other goals. This strategy reflects the complementarity between population control and other U.S. development objectives, particularly those relating to AID's Congressional mandate to focus on problems of the Apoor majority@ in LDC's.
We know that certain kinds of development policies -- e.g., those which provide the poor with a major share in development benefits -- both promote fertility reductions and accomplish other major development objectives. There are other policies which appear to also promote fertility reduction but which may conflict with non-population objectives (e.g., consider the effect of bringing a large number of women into the labor force in countries and occupations where unemployment is already high and rising).
However, AID knows only approximately the relative priorities among the factors that affect fertility and is even further away from knowing what specific cost-effective steps
governments can take to affect these factors. Nevertheless, with what limited information we have, the urgency of moving forward toward lower fertility rates, even without complete knowledge of the socio-economic forces involved, suggests a three-pronged strategy:
1. High priority to large-scale implementation of programs affecting the determinants of fertility in those cases where there is probable cost- effectiveness, taking account of potential impact on population growth rates; other development benefits to be gained; ethical considerations; feasibility in light of LDC bureaucratic and political concerns and problems; and time-frame for accomplishing objectives.
2. High priority to experimentation and pilot projects in areas where there is evidence of a close relationship to fertility reduction but where there are serious questions about cost-effectiveness relating either to other development impact (e.g., the female employment example cited above) or to program design (e.g., what cost-effective steps can be taken to promote female employment or literacy). 3. High priority to comparative research and evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size of the socio-economic determinants of fertility in general and on what policy scope exists for affecting these determinants. In all three cases emphasis should be given to moving ction as much as possible to LDC institutions and individuals rather than to involving U.S. researchers on a large scale. Activities in all three categories would receive very high priority in allocation of AID funds. The largest amounts required should be in the first category and would generally not come from population funds. However, since such activities (e.g., in rural development and basic
education) coincide with other AID sectoral priorities, sound project requests from LDC's will be placed close to the top in AlD's funding priorities (assuming that they do not conflict with other major development and other foreign policy objectives).
The following areas appear to contain significant promise in effecting fertility declines,
and are discussed in subsequent sections.
-- providing minimal levels of education especially for women;
-- reducing infant and child mortality;
-- expanding opportunities for wage employment especially for women;
-- developing alternatives to "social security" support provided by children to aging parents;
-- pursuing development strategies that skew income growth toward the poor, especially rural development focusing on rural poverty;
-- concentrating on the education and indoctrination of the rising generation of children regarding the desirability of smaller family size.
The World Population Plan of Action includes a
provision (paragraph 31) that countries trying for effective fertility levels should give
priority to development programs and health and
F. Development of World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment
to Population Stabilization and Its Associated Improvement of
Individual Quality of Life.
A fundamental element in any overall strategy to
deal with the population problem is
organizations but also through bilateral contacts with leaders of other LDCs. Reducing population growth in LDCs should not be advocated exclusively by the developed countries. The U.S. should encourage such a role as opportunities appear in its high level contact with LDC leaders.
The most recent forum for such an effort was the
August 1974 U.N. World Population
The U.S. strengthened its credibility as an
advocate of lower population growth rates by
The U.S. further offered to collaborate with other interested donor countries and organizations (e.g., WHO, UNFPA, World Bank, UNICEF) to encourage further action by LDC governments and other institutions to provide low-cost, basic preventive health services, including maternal and child health and family planning services, reaching out into the remote rural areas.
The U.S. delegation also said the U.S. would request from the Congress increased U.S. bilateral assistance to population-family planning programs, and additional amounts for essential functional activities and our contribution to the UNFPA if countries showed an interest in such assistance.
Each of these commitments is important and should
be pursued by the U.S. Government. It is vital that the effort to develop and
strengthen a commitment on the part of the LDC leaders not be seen by them as an industrialized
country policy to keep their strength down or to reserve resources for use by the "rich"
countries. Development of such a perception could create a serious backlash adverse to the cause of
population stability. Thus the U.S. and other "rich" countries should take care that policies they
advocate for the LDC's would be acceptable within their own countries. (This may require public
debate and affirmation of our intended policies.) The "political" leadership role in developing
countries should, of course, be taken whenever possible by their own leaders. The U.S. can help to minimize charges of an
imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting
that such support derives from a concern with: (a) the right of the individual couple to
determine freely and responsibly their number and spacing of children
and to have information, education, and means to do
so; and (b) the fundamental social and economic
development of poor countries in which rapid population growth is
population growth is in the mutual interest of the developed and developing countries alike.
Family planning programs should be supported by
multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the most efficient and
acceptable means. Where U.S. bilateral assistance is necessary or preferred, it should be provided in
collaboration with host country institutions -- as is the case now. Credit should go to local
leaders for the success of projects. The success and acceptability of family planning assistance will
depend in large measure on the degree to which it contributes to the ability of the host government
to serve and obtain the support of its people. In many countries today, decision-makers are wary
of instituting population programs,
We should also appeal to potential leaders among the younger generations in developing countries, focusing on the implications of continued rapid population growth for their countries in the next 10-20 years, when they may assume national leadership roles. Beyond seeking to reach and influence national leaders, improved world-wide support for population-related efforts should be sought through increased emphasis on mass media and other population education and motivation programs by the U.N., USIA, and USAID. We should give higher priorities in our information programs world-wide for this area and consider expansion of collaborative arrangements with multilateral institutions in population education programs.
Another challenge will be in obtaining the further understanding and support of the U.S. public and Congress for the necessary added funds for such an effort, given the competing demands for resources. If an effective program is to be mounted by the U.S., we will need to contribute significant new amounts of funds. Thus there is need to reinforce the positive attitudes of those in Congress who presently support U.S. activity in the population field and to enlist their support in persuading others.
Public debate is needed now.
Personal approaches by the President, the
Secretary of State, other members of the Cabinet, and their principal deputies would be
helpful in this effort. Congress and the public
Conference can help.
An Alternative View
The above basic strategy assumes that the current
forms of assistance programs in both
The conclusion of this view is that mandatory programs may be needed and that we should be considering these possibilities now.
This school of thought believes the following types of questions need to be addressed:
-- Should the U.S. make an all out commitment to
-- Should the U.S. set even higher agricultural
-- On what basis should such food resources then be provided?
Would food be considered an instrument of national power?
Will we be forced to make choices as to whom we can reasonably assist, and if so, should population efforts be a criterion for such assistance?
-- Is the U.S. prepared to accept food rationing
to help people
-- Should the U.S. seek to change its own food
-- Are mandatory population control measures appropriate for the U.S. and/or for others?
-- Should the U.S. initiate a major research effort to address the growing problems of fresh water supply, ecological damage, and adverse climate?
While definitive answers to those questions are not possible in this study given its time
limitations and its implications for domestic
policy, nevertheless they are needed if one accepts
The overall strategy above provides a general
approach through which the difficulties and dangers of population growth and related problems
can be approached in a balanced and comprehensive basis. No single effort will do the
job. Only a concerted and major effort in a number of carefully selected directions can
provide the hope of success in reducing population growth and its unwanted dangers to world economic
will-being and political stability. There are no "quick-fixes" in this field. Below are specific program recommendations which
are designed to implement this strategy. Some will require few new
resources; many call for major efforts and significant
II. - Action to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline: Population and a Development Assistance Strategy
A. General Strategy and Resource Allocations for AID Assistance
1. Past Program Actions
Since inception of the program in 1965, AID has
obligated nearly $625 million for
population programs - from almost nothing ten
years ago, the amounts being spent from all sources in 1974 for programs in the developing
countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia (excluding China) will total between $400 and
$500 million. About half of this will be contributed by the developed countries
bilaterally or through multilateral agencies, and the balance will come from the budgets of the
developing countries themselves. AID's contribution is about one-quarter of the total - AID obligated
$112.4 million for population programs in FY 1974 and plans for FY 1975 program of $137.5
million. While world resources for population activities
will continue to grow, they are unlikely to expand as rapidly as needed. (One rough estimate
is that five times the current amount, or about $2.5 billion in constant dollars, will be
required annually by 1985 to provide the 2.5 billion people in the developing world, excluding China,
with full-scale family planning programs). In
active in the worldwide population effort. Although this study has not yet been completed, a general outline of a U.S. population assistance strategy can be developed from the results of the priorities studied to date. The geographic and functional parameters of the strategy are discussed under 2. and 3. below. The implications for population resource allocations are presented under
2. Geographic Priorities in U.S. Population Assistance
The U.S. strategy should be to encourage and
support, through bilateral, multilateral and
-- The first is the country's contribution to the
-- The second is the extent to which population growth impinges on the country's economic development and its financial capacity to cope with its population problem.
-- The third factor is the extent to which an
These countries should be given the highest
priority within AID's population program in
3. Mode and Content of U.S. Population Assistance
In moving from geographic emphases to strategies
for the mode and functional content of
(3) the country's need for external financial assistance to deal with the problem; and (4) its receptivity to various forms of assistance.
Some of the countries in the high priority group
cited above (e. g. Bangladesh, Pakistan,
In other high and lower priority countries U.S.
assistance is limited either by the nature of
4. Resource Allocations for U.S. Population Assistance
AID funds obligated for population/family planning assistance rose steadily since inception of the program ($10 million in the FY 1965-67 period) to nearly $125 million in FY 1972. In FY 1973, however, funds available for population remained at the $125 million level; in FY 1974 they actually declined slightly, to $112.5 million because of a ceiling on population obligations inserted in the legislation by the House Appropriations Committee. With this plateau
in AID population obligations, worldwide resources have not been adequate to meet all identified, sensible funding needs, and we therefore see opportunities for significant expansion of the program.
Some major actions in the area of creating conditions for fertility decline, as described in Section JIB, can be funded from AID resources available for the sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture). Other actions come under the purview of population ("Title X") funds. In this latter category, increases in projected budget requests to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 -- above the $137.5 million requested by FY 1975 -- appear appropriate at this time. Such increases must be accompanied by expanding contributions to the worldwide population effort from other donors and organizations and from the LDCs
themselves, if significant progress is to be made. The USG should take advantage of appropriate
opportunities to stimulate such contributions from others.
Title X Funding for Population
Year Amount ($ million)
FY 1972 - Actual Obligations 123.3
FY 1973 - Actual Obligations 125.6
FY 1974 - Actual Obligations 112.4
FY 1975 - Request to Congress 137.5
FY 1976 - Projection 170
FY 1977 - Projection 210
FY 1978 - Projection 250
FY 1979 - Projection 300
FY 1980 - Projection 350
These Title X funding projections for FY 1976-80
are general magnitudes based on
Our objective should be to assure that developing countries make family planning information, educational and means available to all their peoples by 1980. Our efforts should include:
-- Increased A.I.D. bilateral and centrally-funded programs, consistent with the geographic priorities cited above.
-- Expanded contributions to multilateral and private organizations that can work effectively in the population area.
-- Further research on the relative impact of various socio-economic factors on desired family size, and experimental efforts to test the feasibility of larger-scale efforts to affect some of these factors.
-- Additional big-medical research to improve the existing means of fertility control and to develop new ones which are safe, effective, inexpensive, and attractive to both men and women.
-- Innovative approaches to providing family planning services, such as the utilization of commercial channels for distribution of contraceptives, and the development of low-cost systems for delivering effective health and family planning services to the 85% of LDC populations not now reached by such services.
-- Expanded efforts to increase the awareness of LDC leaders and publics regarding the consequences of rapid population growth and to stimulate further LDC commitment to actions to reduce fertility.
We believe expansions in the range of 35-50 million annually over the next five years are realistic, in light of potential LDC needs and prospects for increased contributions from other population assistance instrumentalities, as well as constraints on the speed with which AID (and other donors) population funds can be expanded and effectively utilized. These include negative or ambivalent host government attitudes toward population reduction programs; the need for complementary financial and manpower inputs by recipient governments, which must come at the expense of other programs they consider to be high priority; and the need to assure that new projects involve sensible, effective actions that are likely to reduce fertility. We must avoid
inadequately planned or implemented programs that lead to extremely high costs per acceptor. In effect, we are closer to "absorptive capacity" in terms of year- to-year increases in population programs than we are, for example, in annual expansions in food, fertilizer or generalized resource transfers.
It would be premature to make detailed funding
recommendations by countries
significant countries in the highest priority
group, due to the nature of U.S. political and
presentation of funding requests to the Congress. Recognizing that changing opportunities for action could substantially affect AID's resource requirements for population assistance, we anticipate that, if funds are provided by the Congress at the levels projected, we would be able to cover necessary actions related to the highest priority countries and also those related to lower priority countries, moving reasonably far down the list. At this point, however, AID believes it would not be desirable to make priority judgments on which activities would not be funded if Congress did not provide the levels projected. If cuts were made in these levels we would have to make judgments based on such factors as the priority rankings of countries, then-existing LDC needs, and divisions of labour with other actors in the population assistance area.
If AID's population assistance program is to expand at the general magnitudes cited above, additional direct hire staff will likely be needed. While the expansion in program action
would be primarily through grants and contracts
with LDC or U.S. institutions, or through
1. The U.S. strategy should be to encourage and
support, through bilateral,
3. AID's further development of population program priorities, both geographic and functional, should be consistent with the general strategy discussed above, with the other recommendations of this paper and with the World Population Plan of Action. The strategies should be coordinated with the population activities of other donors countries and agencies using the WPPA as leverage to obtain suitable action.
4. AID's budget requests over the next five years should include a major expansion of bilateral population and family planning programs (as appropriate for each country or region), of functional activities as necessary, and of contributions through multilateral channels, consistent with the general funding magnitudes discussed above. The proposed budgets should emphasize the country and functional priorities outlined in the recommendations of this study and as detailed in AID's geographic and functional strategy papers.
II B. Functional Assistance Programs to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline
It is clear that the availability of
contraceptive services and information, important as that
areas than they do in less developed areas. Thus,
investments in development are important in lowering fertility rates. We know that the major
socio-economic determinants of fertility are strongly interrelated. A change in any one of
them is likely to produce a change in the others as well. Clearly development per se is a powerful
determinant of fertility. However, since it is
Thus, to assist in achieving LDC fertility reduction, not only should family planning be high up on the priority list for U.S. foreign assistance, but high priority in allocation of funds should be given to programs in other sectors that contribute in a cost-effective manner in reduction in population growth.
There is a growing, but still quite small, body
of research to determine the socio-economic aspects of development that most
directly and powerfully affect fertility. Although the limited analysis to date cannot be
considered definitive, there is general agreement that the five following factors (in addition to
increases in per capita income) tend to be strongly
development. There are a number of other factors
identified from research, historical analysis,
As a recent research proposal from Harvard's Department of Population Studies puts this problem: "Recent studies have identified more specific factors underlying fertility declines, especially, the spread of educational attainment and the broadening of nontraditional roles for women. In situations of rapid population growth, however, these run counter to powerful market forces. Even when efforts are made to provide educational opportunities for most of the school age population, low levels of development and restricted employment opportunities for academically educated youth lead to high dropout rates and non-attendance..."
Fortunately, the situation is by no means as
ambiguous for all of the likely factors
program and to our confidence in the reliability
of that estimate. There is room for honest
1. AID should implement the strategy set out in the World Population Plan of Action, especially paragraphs 31 and 32 and Section I ("Introduction - a U.S. Global Population Strategy") above, which calls for high priority in funding to three categories of programs in areas affecting fertility (family- size) decisions:
a. Operational programs where there is proven cost- effectiveness, generally where there are also significant benefits for non-population objectives;
b. Experimental programs where research indicates close relationships to fertility reduction but cost-effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated in terms of specific steps to be taken (i.e., program design); and
c. Research and evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size of the socio-economic determinants of fertility, and on what policy scope exists for
affecting these determinants.
2. Research, experimentation and evaluation of ongoing programs should focus on answering the questions (such as those raised above, relating to female education) that determine what steps can and should be taken in other sectors that will in a cost-effective manner speed up the rate of fertility decline. In addition to the five areas discussed in Section II. B 1-5 below, the research should also cover the full range of factors affecting fertility, such as laws and norms respecting age of marriage, and financial incentives. Work of this sort should be undertaken in individual key countries to determine the motivational factors required there to develop a preference for small family size. High priority must be given to testing feasibility and replicability on a wide scale.
3. AID should encourage other donors in LDC
governments to carry out parallel
4. AID should help develop capacity in a few
existing U.S. and LDC institutions to
a forum for discussion, and generally provide the
"critical mass" of effort and visibility which has
undertaken in the five promising areas mentioned above.
1. Providing Minimal Levels of Education, Especially for Women
There is fairly convincing evidence that female
education especially of 4th grade and
1. Integrated basic education (including applied literacy) and family planning programs should be developed whenever they appear to be effective, of high priority, and acceptable to the individual country. AID should continue its emphasis on basic education, for women as well as men.
2. A major effort should be made in LDCs seeking
to reduce birth rates to assure at least
assure that level of fertility in two or three decades. AID should encourage and respond to requests for assistance in extending basic education and in introducing family planning into curricula. Expenditures for such emphasis on increased practical education should come from general AID funds, not population funds.
2. Reducing Infant and Child Mortality
High infant and child mortality rates, evident in
many developing countries, lead parents
Although we do not have all the answers on how to
develop inexpensive, integrated delivery systems, we need to proceed with
operational programs to respond to ODC requests if they are likely to be cost-effective based on
experience to date, and to experiment on a large scale with innovative ways of tackling the outstanding
problems. Evaluation mechanisms for measuring the impact of various courses of action
are an essential part of this effort in order to provide feedback for current and future projects
and to improve the state of the art in this field. Currently, efforts to develop low-cost health and
family planning services for neglected
A. The World Bank could supply low interest
credits to LDCs for the development of
A current reading from the Bank's staff suggests
that unless there is some change in the
The Bank stance is regrettable because the Bank
could play a very useful role in this area
the Bank's frankly admitting that we do not have
all the "answer" or cost- effective models for
Involvement of the Bank in this area would open
up new possibilities for collaboration.
Obviously, in addition to building, we assume the
Bank could fund other local-cost
improved consultation with AID and UNFPA, a much greater dent could be made on the overall problem.
B. The World Health Organization (WHO) and its
counterpart for Latin America, the
the international funding agencies to health actions could expand the opportunities for useful collaborations among donor institutions and countries to develop low-cost integrated health and family planning delivery systems for LDC populations that do not now have access to such services.
The U.S. should encourage heightened
international interest in and commitment of
1. Encouraging the World Bank and other
international funding mechanisms,
2. Indicating U.S. willingness (as the U.S. did
at the World Population Conference) to
A. As offered at Bucharest, the U.S. should join donor countries, WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank to create a consortium to offer assistance to the more needy developing countries to establish their own low-cost preventive and curative public health systems reaching into all areas of their countries and capable of national support within a reasonable period. Such systems would include family planning services as an ordinary part of their overall services.
B. The WHO should be asked to take the leadership in such an arrangement and is ready to do so. Apparently at least half of the potential donor countries and the EEC's technical assistance program are favourably inclined. So is the UNFPA and UNICEF. The U.S., through its representation on the World Bank Board, should encourage a broader World Bank initiative in this field, particularly to assist in the development of inexpensive, basic health service infrastructures in countries wishing to undertake the development of such systems.
3. Expanding Wage Employment Opportunities, Especially for Women
Employment is the key to access to income, which
opens the way to improved
1. AID should communicate with and seek opportunities to assist national economic development programs to increase the role of women in the development process.
2. AID should review its education/training
programs (such as U.S. participant
3. AID should enlarge pre-vocational and vocational training to involve women more directly in learning skills which can enhance their income and status in the community (e.g. paramedical skills related to provision of family planning services).
4. AID should encourage the development and placement of LDC women as decision-makers in development programs, particularly those programs designed to increase the role of women as producers of goods and services, and otherwise to improve women's welfare (e.g. national credit and finance programs, and national health and family planning programs).
5. AID should encourage, where possible, women's
active participation in the labour
6. AID should continue to review its programs and projects for their impact on LDC women, and adjust them as necessary to foster greater participation of women - particularly those in the lowest classes - in the development process.
4. Developing Alternatives to the Social Security Role Provided
By Children to Aging Parents
In most LDCs the almost total absence of government or other institutional forms of social security for old people forces dependence on children for old age survival. The need for such support appears to be one of the important motivations for having numerous children. Several proposals have been made, and a few pilot experiments are being conducted, to test the impact of financial incentives designed to provide old age support (or, more tangentially, to
increase the earning power of fewer children by
financing education costs parents would otherwise bear). Proposals have been made for
son-insurance (provided to the parents if they have no more than three children), and for
deferred payments of retirement benefits (again tied to specified limits on family size), where the
payment of the incentive is delayed. The intent is not only to tie the incentive to actual fertility,
but to impose the financial cost on the government or private sector entity only after the benefits of
the avoided births have accrued to the economy and the financing entity. Schemes of varying
administrative complexity have been developed to take account of management problems in LDCs. The
economic and equity core of these long-term
AID should take a positive stance with respect to
exploration of social security type
5. Pursuing Development Strategies that Skew Income Growth Toward the Poor,
Especially Rural Development Focussing on Rural Poverty
Income distribution and rural development: The higher a family's income, the fewer children it will probably have, except at the very top of the income scale. Similarly, the more evenly distributed the income in a society, the lower the overall fertility rate seems to be since better income distribution means that the poor, who have the highest fertility, have higher income. Thus a development strategy which emphasizes the rural poor, who are the largest and poorest group in most LDCs would be providing income increases to those with the highest fertility levels. No LDC is likely to achieve population stability unless the rural poor participate in income increases and fertility declines. Agriculture and rural development is already, along with population, the US. Government's highest priority in provision of assistance to LDCs. For FY 1975, about 60% of the $1.13 billion AID requested in the five functional areas of the foreign assistance legislation is in agriculture and rural development. The $255 million increase in the FY 1975 level authorized in
the two year FY 1974 authorization bill is
virtually all for agriculture and rural development. AID's primary goal in agriculture and rural
development is concentration in food output and increases in the rural quality of life; the
major strategy element is concentration on increasing the output of small farmers, through assistance
in provision of improved technologies, agricultural inputs, institutional supports, etc. This strategy addresses three U.S. interests:
First, it increases agricultural output in the LDCs, and speeds up the average pace of their
development, which, as has been noted, leads to increased acceptance of family planning. Second,
the emphasis on small farmers and other
can sustain adds an important destabilizing
element to development efforts and goals of many countries. Indeed, urban areas in some LDCs are
already the scene of urban unrest and high crime
AID should continue its efforts to focus not just on agriculture and rural development but specifically on small farmers and on labour-intensive means of stimulating agricultural output and on other aspects of improving the quality of life of the rural poor, so that agriculture and rural development assistance, in addition to its importance for increased food production and other purposes, can have maximum impact on reducing population growth.
6. Concentration on Education and Indoctrination of The Rising Generation of Children Regarding the Desirability of Smaller Family Size
Present efforts at reducing birth rates in LDCs,
including AID and UNFPA assistance, are directed largely at adults now in their
reproductive years. Only nominal attention is given to population education or sex education in schools
and in most countries none is given in the very early grades which are the only attainment of
2/3-3/4 of the children. It should be obvious, however, that efforts at birth control directed
toward adults will with even maximum success result in acceptance of contraception for the
reduction of births only to the level of the desired family size
which knowledge, attitude and practice studies in many countries
indicate is an average of four or more children.The great necessity is to convince the masses of
the population that it is to their individual
1. That U.S. agencies stress the importance of
education of the next generation of parents,
2. That AID stimulate specific efforts to develop
means of educating children of
General Recommendation for UN Agencies
As to each of the above six categories State and AID should make specific efforts to have
the relevant UN agency, WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the UNFPA take its proper role of leadership in the UN family with increased program effort, citing the world Population Plan of Action.
II. C. Food for Peace Program and Population
One of the most fundamental aspects of the impact of population growth on the political and economic well-being of the globe is its relationship to food. Here the problem of the interrelationship of population, national resources, environment, productivity and political and economic stability come together when shortages of this basic human need occur. USDA projections indicate that the quantity of grain imports needed by the LDCs in the 1980s will grow significantly, both in overall and per capita terms. In addition, these countries will face year-to-year fluctuations weather and other factors.
This is not to say that the LDCs need face
starvation in the next two decades, for the same projections indicate an even greater
increase in production of grains in the developed nations. It should be pointed out, however, that
these projections assume that such major problems as the vast increase in the need for
fresh water, the ecological effects of the vast increase in the application of fertilizer,
pesticides, and irrigation, and the apparent adverse trend in the global climate, are solved. At
present, there are no solutions to these problems in
The major challenge will be to increase food
production in the LDCs themselves and to
importer of food.
There are major inter-agency studies now progressing in the food area and this report cannot go deeply into this field. It can only point to serious problems as they relate to population and suggest minimum requirements and goals in the food area. In particular, we believe that population growth may have very serious negative consequences on food production in the LDCs including over-expectations of the capacity of the land to produce, downgrading the ecological economics of marginal areas, and over-harvesting
the seas. All of these conditions may affect the viability of the world's economy and thereby its prospects for peace and security.
Since NSC/CIEP studies are already underway we
refer the reader to them. However the
(2) Development of national food stocks *( including those needed for emergency relief - ) within an internationally agreed framework sufficient to provide an adequate level of world food security;
(3) Expansion of production of the input elements of food production (i.e., fertilizer, availability of water and high yield seed stocks) and increased incentives for expanded agricultural productivity. In this context a reduction n the real cost of energy (especially fuel) either through expansion in availability through new sources or decline in the relative price of oil or both would be of great importance;
(4) Significant expansion of U.S. and other producer country food crops within the context of a liberalized and efficient world trade system that will assure food availability to the LDCs in case of severe shortage. New international trade arrangements for agricultural products, open enough to permit maximum production by efficient producers and flexible enough to dampen wide price fluctuations in years when weather conditions result in either significant shortfalls or surpluses. We believe this objective can be achieved by trade liberalization and an internationally coordinated food reserve program without resorting to price-oriented agreements, which have undesirable effects on both production and distribution;
(5) The maintenance of an adequate food aid
program with a clearer focus on its use as a means to make up real food deficits, pending
the development of their own food resources,
(6) A strengthened research effort, including long term, to develop new seed and
* Department of Agriculture favours U.S. commercial interests holding any national
stocks in an international network of stockpiles
farming technologies, primarily to increase yields but also to permit more extensive cultivation techniques, particularly in LDCs.
III. International Organizations and other Multilateral Population Programs
A. UN Organization and Specialized Agencies
In the mid-sixties the UN member countries slowly
began to agree on a greater
Most of the projects financed by UNFPA are implemented with the assistance of organizations of the United Nations system, including the regional Economic Commission, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO). Collaborative arrangementshave been made with the International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank, and with the World Food Programme.
Increasingly the UNFPA is moving toward
comprehensive country programs negotiated directly with governments. This permits the
governments to select the implementing (executing) agency which may be a member of the UN system or
a non-government organization or company. With the development of the country
program approach it is planned to level off UNFPA funding to the specialized agencies. UNFPA has received $122 million in voluntary
contributions from 65 governments, of
million goal for fund-raising, as follows:
1974 - $54 million
1975 - $64 million
1976 - $76 million
1977 - $86 million
Through 1971 the U.S. had contributed
approximately half of all the funds contributed to
The U.S. should continue its support of
multilateral efforts in the
c) supporting the coordinating role which UNFPA plays among donor and recipient countries, and among UN and other organizations in the population field, including the World Bank.
B. Encouraging Private Organizations
The cooperation of private organizations and groups on a national, regional and world-wide level is essential to the success of a comprehensive population strategy. These groups provide important intellectual contributions and policy support, as well as the delivery of family planning and health services and information. In some countries, the private and voluntary organizations are the only means of providing family planning services and materials. Recommendations:
AID should continue to provide support to those private U.S. and international organizations whose work contributes to reducing rapid population growth, and to develop with them, where appropriate, geographic and functional divisions of labor in population assistance.
IV. Provision and Development of Family Planning
Services, Information and Technology
Legislation and policies affecting what the U.S. Government does relative to abortion in the above areas is discussed at the end of this section.
A. Research to Improve Fertility Control Technology
The effort to reduce population growth requires a
variety of birth control methods which are safe, effective, inexpensive and attractive
to both men and women. The developing countries in particular need methods which do not require
physicians and which are suitable for use in primitive, remote rural areas or urban slums by
people with relatively low motivation.
technology on fertility control.
1. Short-term approaches: These include applied and developmental work which is required to perfect further and evaluate the safety and role of methods demonstrated to be effective in family planning programs in the developing countries.
Other work is directed toward new methods based on well established knowledge about the physiology of reproduction. Although short term pay-offs are possible, successful development of some methods may take 5 years and up to $15 million for a single method.
2. Long-term approaches: The limited state of- fundamental knowledge of many reproductive processes requires that a strong research effort of a more basic nature be maintained to elucidate these processes and provide leads for contraceptive development research. For example, new knowledge of male reproductive processes is needed before research to develop a male "pill" can come to fruition. Costs and duration of the required research are high and difficult to quantify.
With expenditures of about $30 million annually, a broad program of basic and applied
big-medical research on human reproduction and contraceptive development is carried out by the
Center for Population Research of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. The Agency for International Development annually funds about $5 million of principally applied research on new means of fertility control suitable for use in developing countries.
Smaller sums are spent by other agencies of the U.S. Government. Coordination of the federal research effort is facilitated by the activities of the Interagency Committee on Popu ation
Research. This committee prepares an annual
listing and analyses of all government supported
A variety of studies have been undertaken by
non-governmental experts including the
A stepwise increase over the next 3 years to a total of about $100 million annually for fertility and contraceptive research is recommended. This is an increase of $60 million over the current $40 million expended annually by the major Federal Agencies for biomedical research. Of this increase $40 million would be spent on short-term, goal directed research. The current expenditure of $20 million in long-term approaches consisting largely of basic biomedical research would be doubled. This increased effort would require significantly increased staffing of the federal agencies which support this work. Areas recommended for further research are: 1. Short-term approaches: These approaches include improvement and field testing of existing technology and development of new technology. It is expected that some of these approaches would be ready for use within five years. Specific short term approaches worthy of increased effort are as follows:
a. Oral contraceptives have become popular and widely used; yet the optimal steroid hormone combinations and doses for LDC populations need further definition. Field studies in several settings are required. Approx. Increased Cost: $3 million annually.
b. Intra-uterine devices of differing size, shape, and bioactivity should be developed
and tested to determine the optimum levels of effectiveness, safety, and acceptability. Approx. Increased Cost: $3 million annually.
c. Improved methods for ovulation prediction will be important to those couples who wish to practice rhythm with more assurance of effectiveness
than they now have. Approx. Increased Cost: $3
million annually. d. Sterilization of men and women has received
wide-spread acceptance in several areas when a simple, quick, and safe procedure is
readily available. Female
techniques can be developed. For men several current techniques hold promise but require more refinement and evaluation. Approx. Increased Cost $6 million annually.
e. Injectable contraceptives for women which are
effective for three months or more
f. Leuteolytic and anto-progesterone approaches
to fertility control including use of
g. Non-Clinical Methods. Additional research on non-clinical methods including foams, creams, and condoms is needed. These methods can be used without medical supervision. Approx. Increased Cost; $5 million annually. h. Field studies. Clinical trials of new methods in use settings are essential to test their worth in developing countries and to select the best of several possible methods in a given setting. Approx. Increased Cost: $8 million annually.
2. Long-term approaches: Increased research toward better understanding of human reproductive physiology will lead to better methods of fertility control for use in five to fifteen years. A great deal has yet to be learned about basic aspects of male and female fertility and how regulation can be effected. For example, an -effective and safe male contraceptive is needed, in particular an injection which will be effective for specified periods of time. Fundamental research must be done but there are reasons to believe that the development of an injectable male contraceptive is feasible. Another method which should be developed is an injection which will assure a woman of regular periods. The drug would be given by pare-professionals once a month or as needed to regularize the menstrual cycle. Recent scientific advances indicate that this
method can be developed. Approx. Increased Cost: $20 million annually.
B. Development of Low-cost Delivery Systems
Exclusive of China, only 10-15% of LDC
populations are currently effectively reached
1. Government-run clinics or centers which offer family planning services alone;
2. Government-run clinics or centers which offer family planning as part of a broader based health service;
3. Government-run programs that emphasize door to
door contact by family
make referrals to clinics;
4. Clinics or centres run by private organizations (e.g., family planning associations);
5. Commercial channels which in many countries sell condoms, oral contraceptives, and sometimes spermicidal foam over the counter;
6. Private physicians. Two of these means in particular hold promise for allowing significant expansion of services to the neglected poor:
1. Integrated Delivery Systems. This approach
involves the provision of family planning in
In addition, the provision of family planning in
the context of broader health services can
variety of reasons (some ideological, some simply
humanitarian) object to family planning. Family planning in the health context shows a
concern for the well-being of the family as a whole and not just for a couple's reproductive
function. Finally, providing integrated family planning and
health services on a broad basis would help the U.S. contend with the ideological
charge that the U.S. is more interested in curbing the numbers of LDC people than it is in
their future and well-being. While it can be argued, and argued effectively, that limitation
of numbers may well be one of the most critical factors in enhancing development
potential and improving the chances for well-being, we should recognize that those who
argue along ideological lines have made a great deal of the fact that the U.S. contribution
to development programs and health
2. Commercial Channels. In an increasing number of LDCs, contraceptives (such as condoms, foam and the Pill) are being made available without prescription requirements through commercial channels such as drugstores.* The commercial approach offers a practical, low-cost means of providing family planning services, since it utilizes an existing distribution system and does not involve financing the further expansion of public clinical delivery facilities. Both A.I.D. and private organizations like the IPPF are currently testing commercial distribution schemes in various LDCs to obtain further information on the feasibility, costs, and degree of family planning acceptance achieved through this approach. A.I.D. is currently spending about $2 million annually in this area. In order to stimulate LDC provision of adequate family planning services, whether alone or in conjunction with health services, A.I.D. has subsidized contraceptive purchases for a number of years. In FY 1973 requests from A.I.D. bilateral and grantee programs for contraceptive supplies ── in particular for oral contraceptives and condoms ── increased
markedly, and have continued to accelerate in FY 1974. Additional rapid expansion in demand is
* For obvious reasons, the initiative to distribute prescription drugs through commercial channels should be taken by
local government and not by the US Government.
expected over the next several years as the accumulated population/family planning efforts of the
past decade gain momentum.
While it is useful to subsidize provision of
contraceptives in the short term in order to
1. A.I.D. should aim its population assistance
program to help achieve adequate coverage of
b. The services provided must take account of the capacities of the LDC governments or institutions to absorb full responsibility, over reasonable time-frames, for financing and managing the level of services involved.
c. A.I.D. and other donor assistance efforts should utilize to the extent possible indigenous structures and personnel in delivering services, and should aim at the rapid development of local (community) action and sustaining capabilities.
d. A.I.D. should continue to support experimentation with commercial distribution of contraceptives and application of useful findings in order to further explore the feasibility and replicability of this approach. Efforts in this area by other donors and organizations should be encouraged. Approx. U.S. Cost: $5-10 million annually. 3. In conjunction with other donors and organizations, A.I.D. should actively encourage the development of LDC capabilities for production and procurement of needed family planning contraceptives.
Special Footnote: While the agencies
participating in this study have no specific
1. Worldwide Abortion Practices
Certain facts about abortion need to be appreciated:
-- No country has reduced its population growth without resorting to abortion.
-- Thirty million pregnancies are estimated to be
terminated annually by abortion
elective abortion for at least some categories of women, for 36 percent. No information is available for the remaining 8 percent; it would appear, however, that most of these people live in areas with restrictive abortion laws.
-- The abortion statutes of many countries are not strictly enforced and some abortions on medical grounds are probably tolerated in most places. It is well known that in some countries with very restrictive laws, abortions can be obtained from physicians openly and without interference from the authorities. Conversely, legal authorization of elective abortion does not guarantee that abortion on request is actually available to
all women who may want their pregnancies terminated. Lack of medical personnel and facilities or conservative attitudes among physicians and hospital administrators may effectively curtail access to abortion, especially for economically or socially deprived women.
2. U.S. Legislation and Policies Relative to Abortion
Although the Supreme Court of the United States
invalidated the abortion laws of most states
a. A.I.D. Program
The predominant part of A.I.D.'s population
assistance program has concentrated on
Section 114 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 93-189), as amended in 1974, adds for the first time restrictions on the use of A.I.D. funds relative to abortion. The provision states that "None of the funds made available to carry out this part (Part I of the Act) shall be used to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions." In order to comply with Section 114, A.I.D. has determined that foreign assistance funds will not be used to:
(i) procure or distribute equipment provided for the purpose of inducing abortions as a method of family planning.
(ii) directly support abortion activities in
LDCs. However, A.I.D. may provide
wholly attributable to the permissible aspects of such programs.
(iii) information, education, training, or communication programs that promote abortion as a method of family planning. However, A.I.D. will continue to finance training of LDC doctors in the latest techniques used in obstetrics-gynaecology practice, and will not disqualify such training programs if they include pregnancy termination within the overall curriculum. Such training is provided only at the election of the participants.
(iiii) pay women in the LDCs to have abortions as
a method of family planning or to
A.I.D. funds may continue to be used for research relative to abortion since the Congress specifically chose not to include research among the prohibited activities. A major effect of the amendment and policy determination is that A.I.D. will not be involved in further development or promotion of the Menstrual Regulation Kit. However, other donors or organizations may become interested in promoting with their own funds dissemination of this promising fertility control method.
b. DHEW Programs
Section 1008 of the Family Planning Services and
Population Research Act of 1970
1. The persistent and ubiquitous nature of abortion.
2. Widespread lack of safe abortion technique.
3. Restriction of research on abortifacient drugs and devices would:
a. Possibly eliminate further development of the IUD.
b. Prevent development of drugs which might have
other beneficial uses. An
C. Utilization of Mass Media and Satellite Communications Systems for Family Planning
1. Utilization of Mass Media for Dissemination of Family Planning Services and Information.
The potential of education and its various media is primarily a function of (a) target populations where socio-economic conditions would permit reasonable people to change their behavior with the receipt of information about family planning and (b) the adequate development of the substantive motivating context of the message. While dramatic limitations in the availabilty of any family planning related message are most severe in rural areas of developing countries, even more serious gaps exist in the understanding of the implicit incentives in the system for large families and the potential of the informational message to alter those conditions.
Nevertheless, progress in the technology for mass
media communications has led to the suggestion that the priority
need might lie in the utilization of this technology, particularly
Yet A.I.D.'s work suggests that radio, posters, printed material, and various types of personal contacts by health/family planning workers tend to be more cost-effective than television except in those areas (generally urban) where a TV system is already in place which reaches more than just the middle and upper classes. There is great scope for use of mass media, particularly in the initial stages of making people aware of the benefits of family planning and of
services available; in this way mass media can effectively complement necessary interpersonal communications.
In almost every country of the world there are
channels of communication (media)
A.I.D. believes that the best bet in media strategy is to encourage intensive use of media already available, or available at relatively low cost. For example, radio is a medium which in some countries already reaches a sizeable percentage of the rural population; a recent A.I.D.
financed study by Stanford indicates that radio is as effective as television, costs one-fifth as much, and offers more opportunities for programming for local needs and for local feedback.
USAID and USIA should encourage other population donors and organizations to develop comprehensive information and educational programs dealing with population and family planning consistent with the geographic and functional population emphasis discussed in other sections. Such programs should make use of the results of AID's extensive experience in this field and should include consideration of social, cultural and economic factors in population
control as well as strictly technical and
One key factor in the effective use of existing
contraceptive techniques has been the
In mid-1975, ATS-6 will be moved to a point over
the Indian Ocean to begin beaming
receiving stations and are relayed to individual television sets on a local or regional basis. The latter can be used in towns, villages and schools.
The hope is that these new technologies will provide a substantial input in family planning programs, where the primary constraint lies in informational services. The fact, however, is that information and education does not appear to be the primary constraint in the development of effective family planning programs. AID itself has learned from costly intensive inputs that a supply oriented approach to family planning is not and cannot be fully effective until the demand side - incentives and motivations are both understood and accounted for. Leaving this vast problem aside, AID has much relevant experience in the numerous problems encountered in the use of modern communications media for mass rural education. First, there is widespread LDC sensitivity to satellite broadcast, expressed most vigorously in the Outer Space Committee of the UN. Many countries don't want broadcasts of neighbouring countries over their own territory and fear unwanted propaganda and subversion by hostile broadcasters. NASA experience suggests that the U.S. must tread very softly when discussing assistance in program content. International restrictions may be placed on the types of proposed broadcasts and it remains technically difficult to restrict broadcast area coverage to national boundaries. To the extent programs are developed jointly and are appreciated and wanted by receiving countries, some relaxation in their position might occur. Agreement is nearly universal among practitioners of educational technology that the technology is years ahead of software or content development. Thus cost per person reached tend to be very high. In addition, given the current technology, audiences are limited to those who are willing to walk to the village TV set and listen to public service messages and studies show declining audiences over time with large audiences primarily for popular entertainment. In addition, keeping village receivers in repair is a difficult problem. The high cost of program development remains a serious constraint, particularly since there is so little experience in validifying program content for wide general audiences. With these factors it is clear that one needs to proceed slowly in utilization of this technology for the LDCs in the population field.
1. The work of existing networks on population,
education, ITV, and broadcast satellites
Brazil, and India and each clearly documents the very experimental character and high costs of the effort. Thus at this point it is clearly inconsistent with U.S. or LDC population goals to allocate large additional sums for a technology which is experimental.
2. Limited donor and recipient family planning funds available for education/motivation must be allocated on a cost-effectiveness basis. Satellite TV may have opportunities for cost-effectiveness primarily where the decision has already been taken ── on other than family planning grounds ── to undertake very large-scale rural TV systems. Where applicable in such countries satellite technology should be used when cost-effective. Research should give special attention to costs and efficiency relative to alternative media.
3. Where the need for education is established and an effective format has been developed, we recommend more effective exploitation of existing and conventional media: radio, printed material, posters, etc., as discussed under part I above.
V. Action to Develop World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment to Population Stability
A far larger, high-level effort is needed to
develop a greater commitment of leaders of
In the United States, we do not yet have a
domestic population policy despite widespread recognition that we should -- supported by the
recommendations of the remarkable Report of the Commission on Population Growth and the
American Future. Although world population growth is widely
recognized within the Government
control programs and 16 more include family planning in their national health services ── at least in some degree -- the commitment by the leadership in some of these countries is neither high nor wide. These programs will have only modest success until there is much stronger and wider acceptance of their real importance by leadership groups. Such acceptance and support will be essential to assure that the population information, education and service programs have vital moral backing, administrative capacity, technical skills and government financing.
1. Executive Branch
a. The President and the Secretary of State
should make a point of discussing our national concern about world population growth in meetings
with national leaders where it would
b. The Executive Branch should give special attention to briefing the Congress on population matters to stimulate support and leadership which the Congress has exercised in the past.
A program for this purpose should be developed by S/PM with H and AID.
2. World Population Conference
a. In addition to the specific recommendations
for action listed in the preceding sections,
The U.S. should continue to play a leading role
in ECOSOC and General Assembly
3. Department of State
a. The State Department should urge the establishment at U.N. headquarters of a high level seminar for LDC cabinet and high level officials and non-governmental leaders of comparable responsibility for indoctrination in population matters. They should have the opportunity in this seminar to meet the senior officials of U.N. agencies and leading population experts from a variety of countries.
b. The State Department should also encourage organization of a UNFPA policy staff to consult with leaders in population programs of developing countries and other experts in population matters to evaluate programs and consider actions needed to improve them. c. A senior officer, preferably with ambassadorial experience, should be assigned in each regional bureau dealing with LDCs or in State's Population Office to give full-time attention to the development of commitment by LDC leaders to population growth reduction.
d. A senior officer should be assigned to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to follow and press action by the Specialized Agencies of the U.N. in population matters in developing countries.
e. Part of the present temporary staffing of S/PM for the purposes of the World Population Year and the World Population Conference should be continued on a permanent basis to take advantage of momentum gained by the Year and Conference. Alternate View on 3.c.
b. The Department should expand its efforts to
help Ambassadorial and other high-ranking
c. The Department would also give increased attention to developing a commitment to population growth reduction on the part of LDC leaders.
d. Adequate manpower should be provided inS/PM and other parts of the Department as appropriate to implement these expanded efforts.
4. A I D. should expand its programs to increase
the understanding of LDC leaders regarding the consequences of rapid population growth and
their commitment to undertaking remedial actions. This should include necessary actions
for collecting and analyzing adequate and reliable demographic data to be used in promoting
awareness of the problem and in
5. USIA. As a major part of U.S. information policy, the improving but still limited programs of USIA to convey information on population matters should be strengthened to a level commensurate with the importance of the subject.
(END OF NSSM 200)
National Security Council
Memorandum (NSSM) 314
November 26, 1975
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Tặng Kim Âu
Chính khí hạo nhiên! Tổ Quốc tình.
Nghĩa trung can đảm, cái thiên thanh.
Văn phong thảo phạt, quần hùng phục.
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Thảo Đường Cư Sĩ.
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